Annex: Visit to Glasgow, 19 January 2017
Two members of the Committee met resilience and health officials from the Scottish Government and Health Protection Scotland at the Scottish Government’s offices in Atlantic Quay, Glasgow: Stephen Metcalfe MP and Carol Monaghan MP.
The visit included discussion of matters that had arisen during the Committee’s inquiry. Key points arising included:
a)Definitions: The distinction between ‘CBRN’ and ‘Hazmat’ incidents based on intent (as highlighted by witnesses to the inquiry) was also embedded into planning and response processes in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK. From a public health perspective, the distinction between CBRN and Hazmat is not significant as the response would be very similar; however CBRN incidents would involve bodies such as the police in a lead role. The nature of CBRN meant that identifying substances or the nature of the exposure might be more difficult, whereas in a Hazmat incident the substance is likely to be documented and accompanied by safety procedures and emergency plans.
b)Structures for science advice: The equivalent to COBR for the Scottish Government is SGoRR (Scottish Government Resilience Room). A SAGE would advise COBR and for Civil Nuclear emergencies the Chair of the SAGE would dial in to SGoRR meetings to provide advice. For CBRN incidents this is a working principle but has yet to be formalised. Regional Resilience Partnerships (Category 1 and 2 responders) lead on planning civil response, and are the analogue of Local Resilience Forums in England and Wales. As in the rest of the UK, local Science and Technical Advice Cells (STACs, usually health board led) provide the route for scientists and other experts to feed into the response to an incident. STACs focus on operational issues; SAGE focuses on strategic issues and provides peer review to STAC advice.
c)Cross-border working in CBRN or Hazmat incidents: Health policy is devolved to Scotland, and Health Protection Scotland (HPS) holds the responsibility for providing advice to those front line agencies responsible for directly advising the public in an incident response situation. Nevertheless, Public Health England (PHE) has some UK-wide functions, and also provides radiation expertise to Scotland. PHE can provide advice and support to Scotland STACs even when HPS are the main health agency involved. The Fukushima response was UK-led, and took input from HPS and PHE together. Coordination with PHE is working well.
d)ECOSA: ECOSA exists to coordinate scientific advice during the earliest stages of a CBRN incident; duplicating this mechanism in Scotland would risk discoordination, and thus ECOSA is expected to be used for such incidents in Scotland (although ECOSA has yet to be formally triggered). Public Health England, as part of ECOSA, would engage with Health Protection Scotland for an event in Scotland. ECOSA hands over to a STAC once the STAC has been established. A STAC would include local health bodies involved, and normally Health Protection Scotland, who would provide a link as required with other sources of expertise, including PHE. ECOSA gives advice direct to first responders, including what protective equipment needs to be worn—without this there could be competing advice on what precautions were necessary, creating confusion and delay. Testing of responses is undertaken through participation in exercises, both ‘live’ and table-top. It is important to maximise learning from exercises.
e)Public communication and education: Communicating with the public is part of a STAC’s objectives (Risk Analysis: “Risk assessment, risk management, risk communication”). Regional Resilience Partnerships include a public communications subgroup. Hazmat sites have communication plans, and some nuclear power stations issue emergency potassium iodide supplies to the nearby community as part of education and preparedness. Communication with the public in an emergency could potentially be enhanced through effective use of social media, and work was ongoing on how this could be managed. Messaging quickly through social media was made more complex by the need to ensure that (for CBRN or other malicious incidents) messages do not prejudice any future criminal proceeding, and that that messaging does not cause panic. An example of proactive communication for a particular terrorist threat was the “Run, Hide, Tell” guidance,143 which helped communicate the risks that the public could face from this threat and how to respond.
f)HMNB Clyde and Hunterston power station: The Office of the Nuclear Regulator (ONR) tests the off-site emergency arrangements at civil nuclear sites and MOD-licensed defence sites in accordance with the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001. The Scottish Government will lead on the consequence management for ‘off-site’ response to MOD-site nuclear incidents.144 It has an MoU with MOD for this liaison, setting out where the boundaries of responsibilities lie and how both MOD and the Scottish Government will interact with each other. There is an ‘Off-site Emergency Plan’ for radiation emergencies at HM Naval Base Clyde and the Faslane, Coulport and Lochgoil Berths.
g)Research and development: The Home Office and other Government departments funds/commissions research to inform the response to CBRN incidents. The National Risk Assessment process also feeds into that. R&D to inform terrorism-related CBRN incidents require more development than Hazmat planning, not least because the motivations and attack possibilities are always being expanded. This is an area where new science is continually needed.
143 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, Run Hide Tell (18 December 2015)
144 Scottish Ministers have policy responsibility for emergency planning at civil nuclear sites in Scotland as it is not reserved. The Scottish Government is the Lead Government Department responsible for coordinating the national response in the event of a civil nuclear emergency in Scotland.
27 March 2017