Forensic Science Strategy Contents

1Background

1.In March 2016, the Home Office published its Forensic Science Strategy1 for England and Wales.2 This was more than two years after the publication date originally promised following a 2011 inquiry by our predecessor Committee, and came without the ‘Biometric Strategy’ component that was originally planned.3

Previous Committee reports

2.Our predecessor Science and Technology Committees had produced a number of reports on forensic science which, apart from the need for a Strategy, had examined a number of forensic science issues.

3.Their Forensic science on trial report in March 2005 recommended that a ‘Forensic Science Advisory Council’ be established to act as a regulator of the forensic services market and to provide independent advice to the Government.4 The Government was at that time consulting on the regulation of forensic science quality-assurance,5 and subsequently set up the Forensic Science Regulator in 2008.6 The Committee also examined the use of forensic evidence in court and called for better training of judges and lawyers in forensic evidence, and for improvement in the presentation of scientific and statistical evidence to juries.7

4.In that report, two months before the end of the 2001–2005 Parliament, the Committee also looked at the implications of the then Government’s plan to develop the Forensic Science Service (FSS)—a trading fund since 1999—as a Government-owned company.8 In July 2011, however, another of our predecessor Committees examined the then planned closure of the FSS9 (the closure was subsequently completed in March 2012). The Committee criticised the Government for making its decision without giving enough consideration to the capacity of private sector providers to absorb the FSS’s 60% market share, the possible impact on forensic science research and the wider implications for the criminal justice system. The Committee concluded that “the FSS’s dire financial position appears to have arisen from a complex combination of factors, principally the shrinking forensics market, driven by increasing police in-sourcing of forensic science services, and a forensic procurement framework that has driven down prices and does not adequately recognise the value of complex forensic services”.10 It recommended an extension to the closure process during which “the Government [should] consult on and determine a wider strategy for forensic science”.11

5.The Committee’s 2011 report noted the disappointment of Forensic Science Service employees that a previously planned transformation programme for the organisation had not been allowed to finish before the Government decided on its closure but also the Committee’s view that “the transformation could not have been successful because of the shrinking forensics market”.12 The Committee examined the Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser’s review of the post-FSS requirements for forensic research and criticised his exclusion from the decision-making process. It judged “his failure to challenge the decision” as “unacceptable”.13 Subsequently, Professor Silverman published his report in June 201114 (paragraph 30).

6.In 2013, our predecessor Committee then reported on the impact of the FSS’s closure, a year after the event.15 Its Forensic science report concluded that “the FSS transition was well managed with regards to the maintenance of quality standards. We are satisfied that forensic work was not transferred from the FSS to unaccredited [forensic service providers]”.16

7.The Committee also reiterated its earlier call for a long-term strategy, and in response the Government committed to producing a ‘Biometric and Forensic Strategy’ by the end of 2013.17 When the Committee’s March 2015 Legacy report for the 2010–2015 Parliament criticised the Government’s lack of progress in producing the promised strategy, the Home Office committed to publish it by the end of 2015.18 However, when the Government responded in September 2015 to a separate report by our predecessor Committee on Biometric data and technology,19 it stated that two strategies—a ‘Forensic Strategy’ and a ‘Biometric Strategy’—would be produced by the end-of-2015, in line with its earlier commitment on publication:

The Government recognises the need to develop a strategic approach to the use and retention of biometrics. This approach should recognise that biometrics is fast-changing and provides opportunities for better secure identity verification, better public services, improved public protection and the ability to identify and stop criminals. This should be balanced against safeguarding the rights of the individual from unnecessary intrusion. The Government’s Biometric Strategy and associated policy framework will support an aligned approach on the use and retention of biometrics and how its implementation is governed. Whilst forensics and biometrics both involve the use of science and technology, they are different. The Government is developing two separate but aligned Forensic and Biometric strategies and remains committed to publishing both strategies by the end of 2015.20

The Forensic Science Strategy and our own inquiry

8.The Forensic Science Strategy was eventually published in March 2016,21 while the now separate Biometric Strategy has yet to be published. The Forensic Science Strategy included:

9.We have undertaken our current inquiry in order to follow up not just the delayed Forensic Science Strategy but a number of persistent concerns of our predecessor Committees during the course of their reports:

10.In Chapter 2 we examine the implications for the procurement of forensic services. In Chapter 3 we look at the situation for research. Chapter 4 examines the standards and accreditation, and the provision of statutory powers for the Forensic Service Regulator. In Chapter 5 we consider the extent to which the Strategy deals with the need for a clear plan for the way ahead and the links between the Forensic Strategy and the still-awaited Biometrics Strategy.

11.We received over 30 written submissions and took oral evidence from the Chartered Society of Forensic Sciences, the Forensic Science Regulator, the Association of Forensic Science Providers, the National Police Chiefs Council lead for Forensics, the Metropolitan Police Service, LGC Forensics, Home Office officials, the Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser and the Royal Society. We also took evidence from Mike Penning MP, the then Minister for Policing, Fire and Criminal Justice and Victims (Brandon Lewis MP became the minister on 16 July, after we had concluded taking oral evidence). Members of the Committee also visited the Metropolitan Police Forensic Services Laboratory and LGC Forensics (see Annex). We are grateful to them all.


2 Justice, policing and forensic services are devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

3 Science and Technology Committee, The Forensic Science Service, Seventh Report, Session 2010–12, HC 855

4 Science and Technology Committee, Forensic science on trial, Seventh Report, Session 2004–05, HC 96

5 Science and Technology Committee, Government response: Forensic science on trial, First Special Report, Session 2005–06, HC 427

6 Science and Technology Committee, Forensic science on trial, Seventh Report, Session 2004–05, HC 96

7 Science and Technology Committee, Forensic science on trial, Seventh Report, Session 2004–05, HC 96

8 Ibid.

9 The Forensic Science Service, Seventh Report, Session 2010–12, HC 855

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

15 Science and Technology Committee, Forensic science, Second Report, Session 2013–14, HC 610

16 Ibid.

18 Science and Technology Committee, Legacy: Parliament 2010–15, Ninth Report, Session 2014–15, HC 758

19 Science and Technology Committee, Current and future uses of biometric data and technologies, Sixth Report, Session 2014–15, HC 734

20 Science and Technology Committee, Government response: Current and future uses of biometric data and technologies, Second Special Report, Session 2015–16, HC 455

22 Forensic Science Strategy, Cm 9217, paras 6, 30, 32, 84

23 ibid, p7

24 ibid, p7, para 35

25 ibid, para 63

26 ibid, para 57

27 ibid, para 75




© Parliamentary copyright 2015

16 September 2016