Conclusions and recommendations
European Train Control System and European Rail Traffic Management System
1.The European Rail Traffic Management System is becoming a global standard. While the UK will presumably no longer be bound by EU Directives when it leaves the European Union, it would be counterproductive and costly not to continue using the same standards as used in the rest of Europe and the wider world. (Paragraph 14)
The Digital Railway Programme
2.We conclude that improvements to signalling and traffic management technology are needed to deliver a world-class rail network in the UK. In principle we support the idea that the deployment of the European Train Control System (ETCS), Traffic Management software and Driver Advisory systems should be accelerated but this should be subject to careful consideration of the Digital Railway business case, clarity about funding, and a clear understanding of how this programme would affect existing plans for work on enhancements and renewals. In particular, Network Rail’s Digital Railway business case should include a full cost/benefit analysis of all potential systems for a particular route, and consult upon it, before finalising its Digital Railway strategy. (Paragraph 29)
Network Rail
3.Network Rail’s recent history of planning major enhancements work is poor. In producing a plan for the deployment of rail technology, it must be mindful of the consequences and impact of further failures. (Paragraph 34)
ETCS cab fitment fund
4.Cuts to the cab fitment fund may delay the procurement of first-in-class fitment for all rolling stock. Given these cuts, the business plan for Digital Rail should make clear how first-in-class design and cab fitment will be funded. The Department should track how quickly cab fitment is progressing, how changes in funding affect the rate of cab fitment and what implications the rate of progress has for realising the promised increase in capacity. (Paragraph 38)
5.We recommend that the Department for Transport take steps to ensure that work on cab fitment and trackside infrastructure remain broadly aligned; it would be disappointing if trackside infrastructure was ready but could not be used because cab fitment had not progressed quickly enough or vice versa. (Paragraph 39)
Supplier confidence
6.The Digital Railway business plan is an opportunity to regain eroded industry confidence. Network Rail must be mindful of the damage that will be done to supplier confidence if another technology procurement is started only to be halted or abandoned. When planning the Digital Railway programme the Department and Network Rail should consider carefully the risks arising from any further erosion of supplier confidence. (Paragraph 43)
7.The Digital Railway programme cannot be delivered without a cross-industry approach. Technology suppliers are clearly fundamental to a modern rail network. We recommend that Network Rail address the concerns expressed in the evidence we have taken that suppliers and the rail technology industry have not been sufficiently involved. Network Rail and the Department for Transport should take steps to ensure that the views of suppliers and the rail technology industry are heard in consultations on the potential, scope, and cost of projects. It is important that work on the Digital Railway is co-ordinated and is underpinned by a whole sector approach. (Paragraph 45)
Claims of increased capacity
8.Over ambitious claims for improvements in capacity must be met with scepticism, and Network Rail should be very cautious about how it uses the 40% claim. The Department should be very clear about the level of capacity improvement likely to be achieved when assessing the business case for the Digital Railway. It should consider alternative ways of achieving the same level of growth in capacity so that it can make an informed decision on the likely cost/benefit ratios and funding for the Digital Railway. Rather than claims of up to 40% we expect to see a more sophisticated assessment of the likely capacity gains that look at different investment scenarios and their associated costs, benefits and risks. It is important that the Department for Transport and Network Rail make a realistic assessment of how much extra capacity each system within the Digital Railway programme can deliver to meet growing demand. Where the Digital Railway offers the best solution it is important that other work, such as that needed to improve station capacity, is done simultaneously to enable the investment in the Digital Railway to deliver its full potential. (Paragraph 49)
9.Projections based on ETCS Level 3 should only be considered valid when the Level 3 specification is ready for deployment, and Network Rail should avoid using such projections, or the promise of a “moving block” signalling system, in its publicity until such technology is ready to be deployed. (Paragraph 51)
Delays to ETCS and Traffic Management roll out
10.It is important that projects are flexible, and re-signalling works should not be held to an artificial timetable when a delay is required for legitimate reasons. Nonetheless, we have some concern that the recent announcements of delays in both the Romford ROC and the Norwich–Yarmouth–Lowestoft line may be early indications that the timetable that Network Rail has set for Digital Railway is over-ambitious and will not be met. We look to Network Rail to be realistic and measured in the time frame that it sets in the business case for Digital Railway, even if this means rowing back from the 2029 target. (Paragraph 56)
11.The appointment of David Waboso to head Digital Railway is an encouraging sign that signalling expertise will be used to inform the Digital Railway programme. (Paragraph 60)
Making choices
12.Network Rail is right not to present the Digital Railway proposal as a plan to fit ETCS Level 2 across the network; it might not be the appropriate intervention for every line. We recommend that Network Rail keep an open mind in its strategy, pick the most effective intervention for each route, and look to press ahead with Connect Driver Advisory systems and Traffic Management solutions where these are cost-effective. (Paragraph 68)
13.While there is no reason to keep all re-signalling work on hold while waiting for ETCS Level 3, we support the continued development of that system and request that Network Rail undertake a full cost/benefit system of introducing that system directly as opposed to evolving to it from a Level 2 system. As part of that analysis, we recommend that any assessment of a Level 2 system should require input from potential suppliers on the feasibility and costs of upgrading to Level 3. (Paragraph 71)
Passenger and freight rail
14.The rail freight industry must not be forgotten in the deployment of signalling and traffic management technology, either by the failure to be accounted for in Network Rail’s plans, or by a lack of will on the part of the industry to invest in new technology. The Department and Network Rail should continue to have discussions with the Rail Freight Group to discover ways in which ETCS cab fitment in freight can be accelerated in line with passenger rail. We welcome the Government’s commitment to do this in the recently published Rail Freight Strategy. (Paragraph 74)
Rail staff and the Digital Railway
15.Even at this early stage, it is vital that advances in rail technology take into account the impact that changes will have on the workforce. A possible hostile reaction from the workforce or the trade unions should be countered from the outset by a strategy for staff training and development that is as intrinsic to the programme as engineering works. (Paragraph 79)
Rail operating centres
16.Accelerating the speed with which signalling responsibilities are transferred to Rail Operating Centres (ROCs) presents a challenge to Network Rail. Solving any existing issues with ROCs must come before meeting the timetable of Digital Railway, even if this means other ROC transfers become delayed. (Paragraph 82)
Timetable planning
17.Advances in traffic management technology can and should be used as an opportunity to overhaul the timetable planning process on the rail network, making it more responsive to the needs of rail operators, to enable them to provide a better service. Overhauling the timetable planning system should therefore be a long-term goal of any traffic management deployment strategy. (Paragraph 86)
Control periods
18.Technology suppliers and the Rail Delivery Group have cited concerns that the Control Period funding structure has led to a stop-start approach to digital enhancements, stymieing the progress made. The Department should consider carefully whether, in line with the recommendations for large projects in the Bowe review, the Digital Railway (or elements of it) should be placed outside the control period process. (Paragraph 91)
Private funding
19.It is possible that performance-based compensation for traffic management technology providers could improve outcomes by sharing performance risk with technology suppliers. We recommend that this possibility be considered in drawing up contracts for rail traffic management. (Paragraph 95)
21 October 2016