



House of Commons
Transport Committee

Vauxhall Zafira fires

Tenth Report of Session 2016–17

*Report, together with formal minutes
relating to the report*

*Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed
24 April 2017*

Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated public bodies.

Current membership

[Mrs Louise Ellman MP](#) (*Labour (Co-op), Liverpool, Riverside*) (Chair)

[Clive Efford MP](#) (*Labour, Eltham*)

[Robert Flello MP](#) (*Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South*)

[Karl McCartney MP](#) (*Conservative, Lincoln*)

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald MP](#) (*Scottish National Party, Glasgow South*)

[Mark Menzies MP](#) (*Conservative, Fylde*)

[Huw Merriman MP](#) (*Conservative, Bexhill and Battle*)

[Will Quince MP](#) (*Conservative, Colchester*)

[Iain Stewart MP](#) (*Conservative, Milton Keynes South*)

[Graham Stringer MP](#) (*Labour, Blackley and Broughton*)

[Martin Vickers MP](#) (*Conservative, Cleethorpes*)

Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication

Committee reports are published on the Committee's website at www.parliament.uk/transcom and in print by Order of the House.

Evidence relating to this report is published on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Gordon Clarke (Committee Clerk), Nehal Bradley-Depani (Second Clerk), James Clarke (Committee Specialist), Andrew Haylen (Committee Specialist), Daniel Moeller (Senior Committee Assistant), Michelle Owens (Committee Assistant) and Estelle Currie (Media Officer).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 3266; the Committee's email address is transcom@parliament.uk.

Contents

Summary	3
Summary time line	5
1 Background	6
Vehicle fires	6
Vehicle recalls	8
The Committee's involvement	9
2 Investigations and recalls	10
The initial investigation	10
Non-code action	11
The initial recall	13
The GBB report	13
Fires in recalled vehicles and further investigation	14
Second recall	15
3 Next steps	17
Encouraging defect reporting and sharing information	17
Improving investigation of vehicle fires	19
Managing recalls	20
Action on dangerous repairs	22
Resources and powers of the DVSA	23
Conclusions and recommendations	26
Formal minutes	31
Witnesses	32
Published written evidence	33
Correspondence	33
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament	34

Summary

Vehicle fires can be terrifying for vehicle occupants and other road users, some of whom are seriously or fatally injured as a result of such fires. In 2015 there was a sudden increase in vehicle fires involving Vauxhall Zafira B models. Vauxhall was too slow to begin a full investigation into the fires affecting Zafira B models and too quick to attribute the problem to improper and unauthorised repair. Vauxhall does not appear to have grasped the seriousness of the issue, placing the blame on third parties and addressing the problem, in the first instance, through a non-coded action rather than a recall. A fire cannot occur in a Zafira's heating and ventilation system solely because the resistor controlling the speed of the blower motor has been improperly repaired; another fault, such as corrosion of the blower motor due to water ingress, would also need to be present.

Vauxhall has been reluctant to accept the part that corrosion in blower motors in the affected models has played in causing the fires. Vauxhall's initial investigation did not identify all the failings that could cause a fire in a Model B Zafira's heating and ventilation system. This led to fires occurring in vehicles that had been returned to their original equipment condition following the initial recall. Vauxhall were slow to notify the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) about these fires.

After the initial recall Vauxhall should have acted more quickly to address the problems once it became clear that all the causes of the fires affecting the heating and ventilation system had not been found. Its initial recall reduced the risk of the fire, but owners were left thinking their cars were safe when the reality was that some were at risk.

Vauxhall's decision to continue to let people drive affected cars once it knew that cars that had already been successfully recalled still caught fire amounts to a reckless disregard for safety. This is particularly damning given its admission that it should have notified customers earlier. The DVSA needs to show how it has assured itself that the remedial action taken by Vauxhall has been effective in eliminating the risk of fires in the heating and ventilation system of Model B Zafiras, given that Vauxhall was over optimistic in thinking it had tackled the root cause with the first recall.

The Government should work with the Society of Motor Manufacturers & Traders, the Retail Motor Industry Federation and its associations, and other relevant trade associations to see how the reporting of potential safety defects can be improved. It should ensure the motor industry and the insurance industry are working together to eliminate any barriers that prevent the full and proper investigation of any potential safety defect in a vehicle. The Government should consider the steps it can take to improve traceability and ensure a greater number of owners comply with recalls; motorists' contact with the Government's motoring agencies offer a number of opportunities to do so.

We welcome the moves that have been made by the DVSA to strengthen the Code of Practice on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls. We believe that the Department for Transport and the DVSA should keep under review the question of whether the Code needs to be strengthened in respect of the obligation placed on manufacturers to inform

their suppliers. Ministers should satisfy themselves that the arrangements for dealing with parts suppliers that are in place are sufficient to ensure vehicle safety in the event that a defect was found in a part used in a number of different makes and models.


Despite Vauxhall blaming the fires on unauthorised repair by third parties, no effort was made to find out where such dangerous practices were carried out. The Department should consider how best the safety implications of improper and dangerous repair can be addressed. The DVSA should do more to use its network of garages to collect and collate information on vehicle safety issues.

The DVSA lacks enforcement powers. The Government should consider bringing forward legislative proposals to give the DVSA the enforcement powers it needs to compel manufacturers to act, should it need to do so. Such powers would sit behind the voluntary Code and enable the DVSA to act where it found a manufacturer was unwilling or too slow to act. The DVSA should have commissioned its own independent testing once fires in successfully recalled vehicles called into question Vauxhall's claim to have found the root cause of the fires. In future, it should be more willing to make greater use of independent testing; vehicle manufacturers should continue to bear the costs of such testing.


Summary time line




2005 – ZafiraB introduced




2008 – First suspected fire relating to heating and ventilation system




2014 – First concerns raised within Vauxhall about fires with a distinctive pattern




Aug 2015 – Vauxhall start to investigate fires




Oct 2015 – Member of the public makes first report to DVSA; Vauxhall notify DVSA of potential safety issue



5 Nov 2015 – Vauxhall notify DVSA of its intention to carry out a non-code action




12 Nov 2015 – Vauxhall obtain registered keeper data from DVLA




Dec 2015 –DVSA request full recall




14 Dec 2015 – Vauxhall commence first recall



Feb 2016 – Vauxhall notified of first fire in a recalled vehicle and notify DVSA



9 May 2016 – Vauxhall and DVSA meet to discuss fires in recalled vehicles; DVSA request second recall



19 May 2016 – Vauxhall announce second recall




2 Aug 2016 – Second recall commences

1 Background

Vehicle fires

1. Vehicle fires can be terrifying for vehicle occupants and other road users and have caused serious injury and death. Thankfully the number of such fires has declined steadily over the last 15 years and in 2015–16 there were just under 21,000 attended vehicle fires in England, of which just over 13,000 were fires in cars.

Figure 1: Attendance at vehicle fires, England, 2009–2016




Source: Fire Monitor Statistics

2. Thomas Berenz, Director of Global Safety and Field Investigations, GM Motors, said that estimates of vehicles fires in the UK varied but that most were the result of “criminal intent”.¹ This was the case six or seven years ago but since around 2011/12 the number of accidental fires has exceeded the number of deliberate fires. The number of accidental fires has remained essentially flat since 2012/13. Since 2009/10 the number of deliberate fires has more than halved, although the number increased significantly in 2015/16 (up 15% on the previous year). Of the 13,183 attended car fires in England in 2015/16, 7,393 were accidental and 5,791 were started deliberately.² 19 people lost their lives in these fires (ten of them in fires that were started deliberately) and 290 were injured (260 of whom were injured in fires that started by accident).³

1 [Q36](#)

2 Home Office, [Fire Statistics Table 0302: Fires, fatalities and non-fatal casualties in road vehicles by motive and vehicle type, England](#)

3 Home Office, [Fire Statistics Table 0302: Fires, fatalities and non-fatal casualties in road vehicles by motive and vehicle type, England](#)

Figure 2: Attended Vehicle fires by cause, England, 2009–2016

Source: Fire Monitor Statistics

3. In 2015 Vauxhall’s Zafira B model became a cause for concern when a distinctive pattern of fires was identified. The Zafira, a multi-purpose vehicle (MPV) popular with families, has been in production since 1999. The first generation (known as Zafira A) was sold until 2005, when it was replaced by the second generation model (known as Zafira B); the third generation is the Zafira Tourer C. The Model B Zafira was no longer on the market by the time Vauxhall became aware of the distinctive pattern of car fires.⁴ Vauxhall sold 234,938 Model B Zafiras with manual or no air conditioning between 2005 and 2014.

4. Owners of Zafiras affected by fires started a Facebook group in October 2015 and the issue was covered by the BBC’s Watchdog programme on 22 October 2015.⁵ At about the same time the Zafira Owners’ Club raised concerns about vehicle fires with the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA). The London Fire Brigade (LFB) raised concerns about the number of fires it was called to attend affecting Vauxhall Zafiras.⁶ In November 2015 it said that since 2013 firefighters had been called to 120 fires involving Zafiras, more than double the number in the preceding four years (2009–2012).⁷

5. The Zafira fires were serious enough to destroy an entire vehicle and cause damage to other property and buildings in the vicinity.⁸ We received an account of one fire from an owner whose Zafira caught fire at his home.⁹ We are not aware of any serious injuries or fatalities as a result of Zafira fires but we are aware of reports that the fires can cause the

4 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, Q23 [Peter Hope]

5 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

6 [“Brigade stats help in recall of 220,000 Zafiras”](#), London Fire Brigade press release, 19 November 2015

7 [“Vauxhall Zafiras recalled again as Brigade attends 120 fires in last four years”](#), London Fire Brigade press release, 19 May 2016

8 See, for example, [“You want fires with that? Family of five escape as Vauxhall Zafira bursts into flames in McDonald’s drive-through lane”](#), *Daily Mail*, 2 July 2016

9 Michael Figge ([VVF001](#))

electricians in the car to fail, locking in drivers and passengers.¹⁰ Charles J Klein, Engineering Executive Director Global CO2 Strategy and Energy Center (formerly Vice President of Vehicle Engineering in Europe), General Motors acknowledged that Vauxhall had been fortunate that no one had been seriously injured.¹¹

6. Vauxhall took action to address the problem, although initially this fell short of action notifiable under the voluntary Code of Practice. The DVSA asked Vauxhall to upgrade its action to a safety recall and Vauxhall later had to issue a second recall when further investigation revealed a second mode of failure. We set out the timeline of events in more detail in the next chapter of our report.

Vehicle recalls

7. The DVSA is the competent authority for automotive safety issues in the UK. Within the DVSA, the Vehicle Safety Branch (VSB) is responsible for all matters relating to vehicle safety defects and recalls. The VSB's annual budget was £272,000 in 2014/15 and £280,000 in 2015/16, which is about 1% of the operating surplus retained by the DVSA in 2015/16. This budget covers the administration of the vehicle safety recall scheme and safety defect investigations. The VSB is administered by a team of seven but sits within the DVSA's enforcement arm, which has around 1,000 staff.¹² The DVSA handled 333 recalls last year involving around 1.7 million cars.¹³ In the last ten years around 1.1 million vehicles had been recalled because of issues that could lead to a vehicle fire.¹⁴

8. Any product that is believed to be dangerous can be recalled under provisions in the General Product Safety Regulations 2005.¹⁵ The Regulations provide for the development of codes of practice and encourage voluntary actions by producers and/or distributors. Motor manufacturers carry out recalls under a Code of Practice agreed by the Department for Transport and trade associations representing the motor manufacturing industry.¹⁶ The DVSA has produced a Manufacturers' Guide to Recalls in the UK Automotive Sector, which aims to describe a best practice process to help manufacturers conducting a safety recall.¹⁷

9. Under the Code manufacturers are responsible for informing the DVSA of any defect requiring remedial action where the defect is liable to cause significant risk or injury to the driver of a vehicle, its occupants or other road users. The Code places the onus for investigating and deciding on the appropriate remedial action on the manufacturer.¹⁸ It emphasises co-operation between the DVSA and the manufacturer; for instance, the DVSA and the manufacturer decide together on the nature of the investigation, with close contact between the two and regular reviews during the investigation. The DVSA can and does offer views and make recommendations on measures proposed by manufacturers.

10 See, for example, "[Family petrified after Vauxhall Zafira goes up in flames](#)", *The Oxford Times*, 30 June 2016; and "[Horror moment father and toddler daughter were LOCKED inside Vauxhall Zafira as it filled with smoke—and carmaker admits it doesn't have enough parts to fix them all](#)", *Daily Mail*, 30 October 2015

11 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q20](#)

12 [Qq140-1](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

13 [Q112](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

14 [Q113](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

15 The 2001/95/EC General Product Safety Directive came into force in January 2004 and was transposed into UK law in the [General Product Safety Regulations 2005](#)

16 DVSA, [Code of Practice on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls, November 2013](#)

17 DVSA, [Manufacturers' Guide to Recalls in the UK Automotive Sector, April 2014](#)

18 DVSA, [Code of Practice on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls, November 2013](#), paragraph 7

It can challenge manufacturer decisions on the handling of a safety defect.¹⁹ The DVSA can also tell manufacturers about issues that are brought to its attention (through, for example, an intelligence and market surveillance programme, other national safety recalls, producer websites and press coverage, or defect reports it receives directly from members of the public).²⁰

The Committee's involvement

10. The Chair of the Committee wrote to Vauxhall and the DVSA on 7 December 2015; we received responses from both later the same month. In May 2016 Vauxhall and the DVSA provided us with updates. We have received a number of updates from Vauxhall and the DVSA, which we have published on our inquiry page. Two people submitted written evidence and we wrote to and received replies from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the Society of Motor Manufacturers & Traders (SMMT). We are grateful to all those who have assisted us with our inquiry.

11. On 19 July 2016 the Committee heard evidence from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall and Charles J Klein, Engineering Executive Director Global CO2 Strategy and Energy Center (formerly Vice President of Vehicle Engineering in Europe), General Motors and Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, Peter Hearn, (Acting) Operations Director, and Andy King, Head of Customer and Business Operations, DVSA. The Committee also met some of the people campaigning to raise awareness of fires affecting Vauxhall Zafiras. On 31 August 2016 Vauxhall provided additional information we had requested during the session in July and in November it provided a further update.²¹ In February 2017 we took further evidence on Vauxhall vehicle fires; we heard from Elvira Toelkes, Vice-President, GM Quality Europe, Thomas Berenz, Director, Global Safety and Field Investigations, and Helen Foord, Head of Government Relations and Public Policy, General Motors; and Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, Peter Hearn, Director of Operations, and Andy King, Head of Enforcement, Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency.

19 DVSA, [Code of Practice on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls, November 2013](#), paragraph 5.1

20 DVSA, [Manufacturers' Guide to Recalls in the UK Automotive Sector, April 2014](#), p 38

21 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall to Louise Ellman MP, 31 August 2016](#) and [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall to Louise Ellman MP, 18 November 2016](#)

2 Investigations and recalls

The initial investigation

12. As with any vehicle, fires in Zafiras can start for a number of different reasons.²² As early as 2014 concern was raised within Vauxhall that a distinctive pattern could be discerned in defect reports, which described vehicle fires originating in the heating and ventilation system of Model B Zafiras.²³ In August 2015, Vauxhall started to investigate the cause of these fires.²⁴ As part of the investigation it re-examined earlier defect reports and found that the earliest recorded case of a fire that fitted the pattern was from February 2009;²⁵ this case could not be investigated and Vauxhall have assumed, based on the recorded description of the fire pattern, that it has the same root cause. The DVSA received its first defect form from a member of the public on 12 October 2015.²⁶ DVSA heard from Vauxhall four or five days after the report from the public.²⁷

13. Air flow in the cabin of a Zafira is determined by the speed of the heating and ventilation system's blower motor. The blower has four speeds, three of which (speeds 1–3) use an electrical circuit with a resistor, which is protected by a thermal fuse; speed 4 uses a different circuit, which is protected by a 40 Amp fuse. When the fan is set to speeds 1, 2 or 3 the current to the blower motor flows via the resistor. If the fan stalls, or is stiff due to corrosion, insufficient airflow over the resistor causes the temperature to rise. At a high enough temperature the thermal fuse in the resistor opens, breaking the circuit and preventing further overheating. The blower motor will then not work until the resistor (with its thermal fuse) is replaced. The part is intended to be replaced not repaired.

14. Vauxhall determined that the problem only affected Zafira B models with manual or no air conditioning; other models were not affected. They identified what it thought to be the root cause of the fires towards the end of 2015. Its initial investigation found fire was a risk when:

- the blower motor stalled or was stiff due to corrosion; and
- the thermal fuse in the resistor did not open.²⁸

During its investigation Vauxhall estimated, based on an examination of parts collected after vehicles were recalled, that around 2.4% of thermal fuses had at some stage been repaired rather than replaced.²⁹ The repairs to the fuses had been carried out in a number of different ways but all with the result that the fuse would only open at a significantly higher temperature than intended or not open at all.³⁰ Vauxhall concluded that:

22 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q7](#) [Peter Hope]

23 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q22](#) [Charles J Klein] and [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

24 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

25 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q2](#) [Peter Hope]

26 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q94](#) [Gareth Llewellyn] and [Q121](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

27 [Q122](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

28 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

29 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 20 May 2016

30 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

- unauthorised and improper repair of the thermal fuses was the root cause of the fault;³¹ and
- there was no risk of fire when operating the vehicle in original equipment condition.

15. Charles Klein, Engineering Executive Director Global CO2 Strategy and Energy Center, General Motors, told us: “When repaired, the fuse would not function as intentionally designed and therefore presented a fire risk.”³² He explained that Vauxhall had tested the blower motor and associated wiring to see whether it was possible to create the conditions needed to achieve temperatures high enough to start a fire. He said they had been unable to get temperatures upwards of 100°C, except when manipulated fuses were used.³³

Non-code action

16. In October 2015 Vauxhall informed the DVSA of the potential safety defect, setting out its intention to start a non-coded action (action that falls short of a full recall under the Code of Practice) on 5 November 2015. The purpose of the non-coded action was to return vehicles to their original equipment condition.³⁴

17. On 12 November 2015 Vauxhall wrote to owners of Model B Zafiras having obtained registered keeper data from the DVLA for 226,000 owners.³⁵ Vauxhall shared its findings and discussed the non-coded action with the DVSA at a meeting on 4 December 2015.³⁶ As part of its investigation Vauxhall had:

- inspected 1000 resistors collected during the rework programme;³⁷
- logged 161 incidents of fire and examined 45 vehicles (approximately 28%) that had been the subject of a fire;³⁸
- conducted testing on the blower motor concluding that only where there was a stalled blower motor and a manipulated resistor was there a risk of fire;³⁹ and
- inspected 50,000 Zafira B vehicles as of 18 December 2015.⁴⁰

Vauxhall had also commissioned TÜV Hessen, a testing and certification organisation, to examine the heating and ventilation system in its original manufactured condition. The

31 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q32](#) [Peter Hope] and [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman](#), 18 December 2015

32 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q40](#) [Charles J Klein]

33 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q40](#) [Charles J Klein]

34 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

35 The difference between the figures is accounted for by vehicles that have been scrapped, exported or where the address for the registered keeper is unmailable

36 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

37 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

38 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

39 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q40](#) [Charles J Klein]

40 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 18 December 2015

TÜV Hessen report, completed on 10 December 2015, had confirmed the system was safe and validated Vauxhall's field findings with respect to manipulated fuses.⁴¹ At this early stage, the DVSA concluded, on the basis of the physical, statistical and testing evidence presented by Vauxhall, that Vauxhall's explanation of the fault was reasonable.⁴² It did, however, recommend that the company's non-coded action be reclassified as a recall.⁴³ Vauxhall agreed to upgrade its action to a full safety recall under the Code⁴⁴ and on 14 December issued a press notice saying it had commenced a recall.⁴⁵

18. Most recalls happen in the first three years of a vehicle's life.⁴⁶ Recalls in older cars could point to a problem with the ageing of a component. Corrosion is not uncommon in blower motors but Vauxhall does not seem to us to have given it sufficient consideration as one of the factors contributing to the fires. The company seems to have been too readily attracted by an explanation that placed the blame on rogue repair rather than fully understanding the root cause of the problem. Vauxhall must have been aware that water ingress was a problem. In February 2017 they told us left-hand drive vehicles were not affected as water ingress was different on such vehicles.⁴⁷

19. Vauxhall's initial focus was on the manipulation of the thermal fuse.⁴⁸ The fact that the fuse has been repaired is an indication that the system must have already overheated to the point that the thermal fuse operated. A likely explanation for this would be corrosion in the blower motor. Even where a fuse had been manipulated, the blower motor would have to be corroded to the point that it is stiff or stalls in order for there to be a risk of fire. It should have been more curious about the reasons for corrosion in the blower motor.

20. Vauxhall was too slow to begin a full investigation into the fires affecting Model B Zafiras. It was then too quick to conclude that it had identified the root cause of the fires in Model B Zafiras and to attribute the problem to improper and unauthorised repair of the thermal fuse in the blower resistor. Its initial investigation only briefly considered why the blower motor might be corroded. Its public statements referred to improper repair of the thermal fuse but Vauxhall was clearly aware that a faulty blower motor was one of the necessary conditions for a fire. Vauxhall's sluggish approach to investigation, its willingness to place the blame on third parties, and its attempt to address the problem through non-code action rather than a recall should cause senior management in the company and the wider General Motors Group to reflect on the kind of culture that permits a safety issue of this kind to be handled so poorly. This is something that PSA, the new owners of the Vauxhall brand will need to address. Vauxhall's approach to the fires should cause the DVSA to question whether it should have been more incredulous when Vauxhall gave it explanations and assurances about the cause of the fires, and challenged these.

41 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 18 December 2015](#)

42 [Letter from Paul Satoor, Interim Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 21 December 2015](#)

43 [Letter from Paul Satoor, Interim Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 21 December 2015](#)

44 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 18 December 2015](#) and [Letter from Paul Satoor, Interim Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 21 December 2015](#)

45 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 18 December 2015](#)

46 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q97](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

47 [Q39](#) [Thomas Berenz]

48 ["Vauxhall Zafira B preventative action announced"](#), Vauxhall press release, 2 August 2016

21. *The DVSA should seek assurance from Vauxhall that it has taken steps to learn lessons from its poor handling of this issue and must ensure that Vauxhall has put in place robust processes and systems to ensure that potential defects are properly investigated and the root cause properly identified.*

The initial recall

22. Vauxhall estimated that around 2.4% of Zafira Model Bs in the UK (potentially some 5,500 cars) could have a manipulated resistor.⁴⁹ The purpose of the December 2015 safety recall was the same as that of the non-coded action it followed: to return vehicles to their original equipment condition. Owners were advised that they could use their vehicles but should only use the blower motor on fan speed setting 0 or 4 until their vehicle had been recalled. This advice was reiterated by Elvira Toelkes, Vice-President, GM Quality Europe, when she appeared before us in February 2017.⁵⁰ This initial recall was later amended to include a visual inspection of the blower motor.⁵¹

23. **We believe that the checks that were part of the initial recall and the amendment of the instruction to include a visual check on the blower motor clearly show that Vauxhall was concerned about corrosion in blower motors. We recommend that the DVSA ask Vauxhall to explain why:**

- *it amended its instructions to service engineers to include a visual check on the blower motor;*
- *its statements on the recall focused on manipulated resistors when it was clearly aware that corrosion of the blower motor was a necessary condition for vehicle fires; and*
- *it did not act sooner to take steps to deal with corrosion and replace blower motors (as it did in the second recall) if it knew corrosion was a necessary condition for a vehicle fire.*

The GBB report

24. GBB, forensic investigators and engineers, were commissioned by NewsCorp UK Ltd to investigate the cause of fires in Zafiras. In April 2016 GBB concluded the fires were caused by corroded blower motors and that the design of the vehicles made the blower motor particularly susceptible to corrosion.

25. Vauxhall advised the DVSA that some of GBB's findings were accurate but others were not.⁵² Charles Klein told us some findings were inconsistent with Vauxhall's own testing.⁵³ Vauxhall maintained that extensive investigation had not shown the wiring or the blower motor to be a cause of the fire.⁵⁴ However, Rory Harvey pointed out to us that the condition of the blower motor had always been part of the recall (first through

49 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

50 [Q64](#)

51 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

52 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 19 May 2016.](#)

53 [Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, Q90](#)

54 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

functional testing and later with a visual inspection) and that several thousand blower motors had been replaced as part of the recall.⁵⁵ Andy King, Head of Enforcement, DVSA, told us:

We welcomed the GBB report, in so far as it gave us another third-party view of the issue. The evidence that GBB considered included fires in vehicles that had been rectified under the first activity—the first safety recall—so clearly that was different from our decision making in December.⁵⁶

The DVSA has asked Vauxhall for its response to the GBB report.⁵⁷

Fires in recalled vehicles and further investigation

26. Fires are known to have occurred in vehicles that had been successfully recalled and that should, therefore, have been safe. Vauxhall first became aware of such fires on 2 February 2016.⁵⁸ But it was not until the third week of February that Vauxhall informed the DVSA.⁵⁹ By 19 May 2016 14 vehicles that had previously been recalled had caught fire.⁶⁰ Vauxhall told us that it had examined “each of these vehicles where permission has been granted”.⁶¹ Concerned about these fires in recalled vehicles, Vauxhall carried out further investigations and commissioned laboratory testing by the Fraunhofer Institute. Vauxhall and DVSA did not meet to discuss the fires in the recalled vehicles until 9 May 2016. In February 2017 Vauxhall informed us that it was aware of 59 fires occurring in vehicles after they had been successfully recalled in the first recall. Of these 59 fires only 36 related to the heating and ventilation system.⁶²

27. At the meeting on 9 May Vauxhall presented the findings of its further investigations and independent testing to the DVSA.⁶³ Vauxhall concluded that under certain conditions a thermal fuse in its original condition could fail to operate as expected, with a risk of fire. It described this as a second root cause. Solder in the fuse is meant to melt at a certain temperature opening the electrical circuit and protecting it from overheating. Vauxhall told the DVSA that under certain conditions a filament of solder could be left across the fuse allowing current to continue to flow, leading to further overheating. The Fraunhofer Institute concluded that the blower motor itself did not present a fire risk. We were unable to find any explanation why manufacturing quality assurance and control processes had not identified this issue.

28. Following the meeting on 9 May, the DVSA told Vauxhall that a second recall was needed to address a second root cause of fires.⁶⁴ In his May 2016 letter to the Chair, DVSA Chief Executive Gareth Llewellyn said he stood by the DVSA’s decision to accept Vauxhall’s initial explanation of the defect, given what they were told by the manufacturer

55 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

56 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q107](#)

57 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 19 May 2016](#)

58 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q81](#), [Q83](#) [Charles J Klein]

59 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q83](#) [Charles J Klein]

60 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 19 May 2016](#)

61 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

62 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall to Louise Ellman MP, 22 February 2017](#)

63 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 19 May 2016](#)

64 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 19 May 2016](#)

at the time.⁶⁵ In February 2017 he told us he was concerned that the problems had not been traced back to their root cause, which was water ingress, saying:

The failure of a resistor is an initial cause. If you track back and understand why that resistor failed, you have to ask why somebody had to manipulate it in the first place. They had to manipulate it because the resistor was failing. It was failing because the blower motor was not blowing enough air across it. The blower motor was failing because it was being corroded, and the root cause is water ingress. It is having enough information about the systemic failures to work out what you should actually be solving in the first place.⁶⁶

29. Vauxhall's initial investigation did not identify all the modes of failure that could cause a fire in a Model B Zafira's heating and ventilation system. This meant that fires occurred in vehicles that had been returned to their original equipment condition following the initial recall. There appears to have been a two week period between Vauxhall knowing about the fires in recalled vehicles and it telling the DVSA about them. We can see no reasonable explanation for a delay of more than a couple of days in Vauxhall sharing this information with the DVSA. The first, and certainly the second, fire in a vehicle that had successfully been recalled should have started alarm bells ringing in Vauxhall and the DVSA. Vauxhall's response to these fires appears pedestrian. It should have informed the DVSA sooner and both Vauxhall and the DVSA should have taken action more quickly. We examine the case for giving the DVSA more powers later in this report.

Second recall

30. On 19 May Vauxhall issued a second recall for vehicles⁶⁷ and in its press release announcing the recall, it said:

While the current action achieves the objective of returning vehicles to their original condition, after extensive investigations we have decided to go further and improve the overall robustness of the system.⁶⁸

Mr Harvey told us that Vauxhall would write to all customers to inform them of the second recall action and how to operate the vehicle until the second recall had been conducted.⁶⁹

31. The second recall:

- replaces the current soldered fuse resistor with a wax fuse resistor (eliminating the risk of a solder filament from forming across the fuse and reducing opportunities for unauthorised repair of the part);
- addresses water ingress, which can cause blower motor corrosion, by installing a new moulding at the base of the windscreen; and
- replaces the blower motor.⁷⁰

65 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 19 May 2016](#)

66 [Q94](#)

67 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 19 May 2016.](#)

68 ["Vauxhall Zafira B preventative action announced", Vauxhall press release, 2 August 2016](#)

69 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

70 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

Action to complete the second recall is ongoing.

32. The second recall did not start until 2 August 2016.⁷¹ This was three months after Vauxhall had told the DVSA that a second recall was necessary and six months after they became aware of fires in successfully recalled vehicles. In his letter to the Chair, Rory Harvey said that Vauxhall was working intensely with its parts suppliers to have parts available in August.⁷² Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive of the DVSA, said “I have spent most of my life in the private sector, and it is amazing what you can do with your supply chain when there is enough impetus. I am a little surprised that that time lag is in there.”⁷³ Elvira Toelkes denied that there had been any delay due to parts at the start of the recall.⁷⁴ In November 2016 Vauxhall told us that over 50% of affected vehicles (115,855 vehicles) had been successfully recalled.⁷⁵ As of January 2017 70% of affected vehicles had been recalled.⁷⁶ Vauxhall said it had not received any reports of fires in any vehicles successfully reworked under the second recall.⁷⁷

33. There continued to be reports of Zafiras catching fire.⁷⁸ The initial recall reduced the risk of the fire, but owners were left thinking their cars were safe when in fact some were still at risk. Faster action on the second recall would have reduced the risk more quickly. Vauxhall admitted it should have notified customers earlier.⁷⁹ Vauxhall’s apparent lack of concern for its customers is shocking given it knew there was a risk of fire in Zafiras that had been successfully recalled and the potential danger families in these cars were being placed in every day.⁸⁰

34. We are disappointed at the pace of Vauxhall’s response to the fires in successfully recalled vehicles. Vauxhall’s decision to continue to let people drive affected cars amounts to a reckless disregard for safety. This is particularly damning given its admission that it should have notified customers earlier. As soon as it became clear that all the causes of the fires affecting the heating and ventilation system had not been found Vauxhall should have acted; first to alert customers to the risk and offer them advice and second to get the vehicles fixed faster. In the absence of any explanation for its tardy response from the witnesses that appeared before us we can only conclude that commercial considerations and the need to avoid reputational damage were put ahead of safety; this is unacceptable and morally reprehensible. As well as ensuring vehicles are safe to drive the Department has a role to play in ensuring the public can have confidence in any recall announced by a manufacturer. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Department for Transport set out the steps the DVSA has taken to ensure that the remedial action taken by Vauxhall has been effective in eliminating the risk of fires in the heating and ventilation system of Model B Zafiras.

71 [“Vauxhall Zafira B preventative action announced”](#), Vauxhall press release, 2 August 2016

72 [Letter from Rory Harvey, Chairman and Managing Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 20 May 2016](#)

73 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q112](#)

74 [Q42](#)

75 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall to Louise Ellman MP, 18 November 2016](#)

76 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 2 March 2017](#)

77 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall to Louise Ellman MP, 22 February 2017](#)

78 See, for example, [“ZAFIRETRAP Vauxhall suddenly bursts into flames on the same day the owner received a letter recalling it”](#), *The Sun*, 9 June 2016 and [“Family petrified after Vauxhall Zafira goes up in flames”](#), *The Oxford Times*, 30 June 2016

79 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Qq31–2](#) [Peter Hope]

80 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Qq23–9](#) [Peter Hope and Charles J Klein]

3 Next steps

Encouraging defect reporting and sharing information

35. Any system for monitoring the safety of products once they have been sold relies on reports from users but too few vehicle safety defects are ever reported to either the manufacturer or the DVSA. Only a small proportion of Zafira fires were reported to either the DVSA or Vauxhall. 80% of all safety defects reported to the DVSA come from manufacturers with the remaining 20% coming from other sources (such as media and social media reports).⁸¹ Acknowledging that Vauxhall’s systems only captured a fraction of vehicle defects, Charles Klein explained that it was now using different sources of data to understand vehicle safety defects.⁸² Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall, told us Vauxhall was only aware of 10% of the cases that could have been reported to it.⁸³ Reports jumped from 19 at the start of October 2015 to 110 following a Facebook campaign and use of other media sources. The DVSA is taking steps to encourage members of the public to report safety defects.⁸⁴

36. It was clear from the evidence we heard that more could be done to share information about safety defects likely to cause fires in vehicles. Peter Hope told us that “As an industry we do not really have a lot of data on fire reporting that we can look at to see how our models compare”.⁸⁵ There is no formal mechanism by which insurers could share information about vehicle fires with a motor manufacturer.⁸⁶ Thomas Berenz, Director of Global Safety and Field Investigations, GM Motors, said that motor manufacturers needed better access to information about vehicle fires.⁸⁷ Elvira Toelkes, Vice-President, GM Quality Europe, called for better sharing of data between motor manufacturers, insurers and fire brigades.⁸⁸ Thomas Berenz said he thought better sharing of information could help motor manufacturers identify the root cause of vehicle fires.⁸⁹ There is no reason for thinking that Vauxhall is unique in this regard and we suspect that defect reports from the public will under report the incidence of a problem across all makes and models. We are aware, for example, from media reports and correspondence from constituents, of serious concerns about Nissan’s Navara model—including that it may “snap in half”—and concerns that Nissan has not recalled the entire model fleet.⁹⁰ More needs to be done by motor manufacturers, the SMMT, the Retail Motor Industry Federation and its associations, other relevant trade associations, insurers and others, like fire brigades, to encourage defect reporting.

81 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q93](#) [Gareth Llewellyn] and [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP](#), 2 March 2017

82 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q5](#)

83 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q9](#)

84 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP](#), 2 March 2017

85 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q8](#)

86 [Q37](#) [Elvira Toelkes] and [Letter from Helen Foord, Head of Government Relations and Public Policy, General Motors UK to Louise Ellman MP](#), 8 December 2016

87 [Q27](#)

88 [Q34](#)

89 [Q36](#)

90 [Q103](#); “Furious customers urge Nissan to recall 4x4 Navaras after it emerges that major fault could see trucks snap in HALF”, *The Sun*, 5 February 2017

37. Data held by insurance companies could help to spot more quickly the patterns in vehicle fire reports that suggest there is a common root cause. We are pleased that after our session in July 2016, Vauxhall contacted the SMMT and the ABI to discuss access to such data.⁹¹ Helen Foord, Head of Government Relations and Public Policy, General Motors, told us Vauxhall were working, through the SMMT, to understand the opportunities for better data sharing with insurers.⁹² But Mike Hawes of the SMMT explained inspection of vehicles by insurers did not generate data that could meaningfully inform the investigation of safety defects.⁹³ James Dalton, the ABI's Director of General Insurance Policy, said there were ongoing discussions within the insurance industry over Thatcham Research using data in the Motor Insurance Anti-Fraud Theft Register to identify trends with individual models.⁹⁴ Insurers may not be the best or only source of better data on safety defects. Other sources could help to give an early indication of a problem or highlight patterns that require further investigation, just as the information from the London Fire Brigade did with the Zafira B fires.

38. Gareth Llewellyn said there was more the DVSA could do to corral and coordinate data from various sources to generate a better picture of the root cause of fires and to provide information to the public.⁹⁵ He told us the DVSA has applied to the ABI for access to the Motor Industry Anti-Fraud and Theft Register. James Dalton explained that this data was already accessible to the DVLA so that consumers could check whether a vehicle had previously been "written off" by an insurer.⁹⁶ Better use could also be made of the knowledge held by mechanics and garages across the country about potential safety defects.

39. The DVSA's understanding of vehicle safety defects is determined by information that comes predominantly from manufacturers. It is vital for public confidence that the DVSA is not perceived as being too close to or reliant on motor manufacturers. Other sources of data could help to corroborate and verify what manufacturers tell the DVSA and could act as an early warning allowing safety defects to be identified more quickly. The Department for Transport should do more to encourage the reporting of potential safety defects from drivers and from those with specialist knowledge, such as garages, recovery services, insurers and the emergency services. Defect reporting systems are used in other sectors and the DVSA should identify what lessons it can learn from systems like those used for reporting defects with medical devices. *The Department should convene a round table with interested parties with the aim of identifying what practical steps can be taken to share existing sources of information more effectively, raise awareness of under-reporting and to encourage more reporting of potential safety defects. The Department should submit a report on the steps it plans to take following the proposed round table to the Transport Committee by March 2018. The Government should ensure the Vehicle Safety Branch has the staff and resources it would need to cope with a higher number of defect reports.*

91 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 31 August 2016](#)

92 [Letter from Helen Foord, Head of Government Relations and Public Policy, General Motors UK to Louise Ellman MP, 8 December 2016](#)

93 [Letter from Mike Hawes, Chief Executive, SMMT to Louise Ellman MP, 27 January 2017](#)

94 [Letter from James Dalton, Director of General Insurance Policy, ABI to Louise Ellman MP, 27 January 2017](#)

95 [Q89, Q94](#)

96 [Letter from James Dalton, Director of General Insurance Policy, ABI to Louise Ellman MP, 27 January 2017](#)

Improving investigation of vehicle fires

40. Investigating vehicle fires will always be problematic; vehicles can be destroyed⁹⁷ or gaining access to them for forensic examination can be tricky.⁹⁸ We were surprised that in some cases insurers and owners denied manufacturers' forensic investigators access to fire damaged vehicles.

41. Vauxhall have made efforts to get access to all vehicles affected by fire; Peter Hope said that:

In the case of the Zafira B fires, we have conducted 89 physical inspections. Pretty much every car that we have had access to and had permission to inspect since the issue blew up in October 2015, we have inspected.⁹⁹

In February 2017 Vauxhall confirmed that 287 Zafira B fires had been reported to it and 99 of the affected vehicles had been inspected. When we took evidence in February 2017 Vauxhall confirmed that they had received reports of fires in 287 vehicles of which 99 (approximately 35%) had been inspected.¹⁰⁰ Vauxhall had managed to inspect vehicles in 43 of 57 reported Zafira B fires between July 2016 and February 2017.¹⁰¹

42. Some vehicles will be inspected by insurance companies or their representatives. Insurers may not want or need to carry out a forensic investigation; their concern is generally to ensure any claim is valid and to assess the scale of any loss. The engineers carrying out these assessments would not typically be expected to determine the underlying cause of a fire.¹⁰² It is clear that insurers and customers have prevented Vauxhall from getting access to all the vehicles they would like to have tested.¹⁰³ James Dalton said the only circumstance where an insurer might turn down a request from a manufacturer would be where it would delay or disrupt settlement of a claim. He said it may be the case that a request to inspect a vehicle was made after a claim had been settled and the vehicle had been passed on to a salvage agent or dismantler. Only where an insurer suspected that the cause of some damage was a manufacturing fault, for which they could recover any losses, would a more detailed inspection be carried out.¹⁰⁴

43. Helen Foord said General Motors would like to see a system where manufacturers got access to vehicles that had caught fire. She acknowledged that this system should not delay pay outs to customers. She did not say who should pay for the costs associated with such inspections.¹⁰⁵

44. There will always be reasons why some vehicles cannot be examined after a fire. We believe that the guiding principle should be that the interest of the general public in ensuring vehicle safety comes before any narrow commercial interest in settling a specific claim. Vehicle manufacturers should work with insurers and owners of vehicles to ensure that as few vehicles with potential vehicle defects go un-investigated

97 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q4](#) [Peter Hope] and Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q19](#) [Charles J Klein]

98 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q14](#) [Peter Hope]

99 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q16](#)

100 [Qq5–18](#)

101 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall to Louise Ellman MP](#), 22 February 2017

102 [Letter from James Dalton, Director of General Insurance Policy, ABI to Louise Ellman MP](#), 27 January 2017

103 [Qq14–18](#) [Elvira Toelkes and Thomas Berenz]

104 [Letter from James Dalton, Director of General Insurance Policy, ABI to Louise Ellman MP](#), 27 January 2017

105 [Q58](#)

as possible, especially where the manufacturer is trying to establish the root cause of a potentially serious fault. We believe that where a manufacturer makes sufficient effort they can get access to a greater number of vehicles; Vauxhall has inspected 75% of the vehicles involved in Zafira fires since July 2016. *In seeking to increase the number of vehicles that are properly inspected after a fire, the Department for Transport should first ensure that manufacturers are making enough of an effort to get access to the vehicles. If problems remain the next step should be that the Department ensures the motor industry and the insurance industry work together to eliminate any barriers that prevent the full and proper investigation of any potential safety defect in a vehicle. If a way cannot be found to ensure that manufacturers have access to vehicles as part of an investigation, the Department should consider whether the DVSA should have greater powers to seize vehicles in order to carry out a proper forensic investigation where a manufacturer, insurer or owner was uncooperative. Such a scheme could be costly but this should not remove the manufacturer's current responsibility for carrying out such investigations; the Department could consider how the costs of such investigations might be recovered from uncooperative motor manufacturers and insurers.*

Managing recalls

45. Most of the 300 or so safety recalls handled by the DVSA each year are managed well by the motor manufacturer or producer but a significant few are not.¹⁰⁶ We were surprised to find that the DVSA was dealing with five recalls relating to fire in Vauxhall vehicles (Zafiras, Corsas, Mokka, Antaras and Movanos).¹⁰⁷ We are aware that when we last took evidence from the DVSA it was pressing Vauxhall for more details on reports it had received about problems with Zafiras with electronic climate control, which have so far not been part of the recall effort.¹⁰⁸ Helen Foord told us that a recall of Corsas due to the potential for a short circuit to occur in the vacuum pump relay box due to water ingress was unrelated to the problems with the heating and ventilation system seen in Zafiras.¹⁰⁹ Thomas Berenz explained about 4,000 Corsas with 1.4 litre turbo engines (of around 700,000 on the road) were recalled in April 2016. He said they were aware of only three cases of vehicle fires in affected models.¹¹⁰ The recall for the Corsas was revised in August 2016.¹¹¹ Gareth Llewellyn said the DVSA did not dispute Vauxhall's analysis of the root cause of the problem with the Corsas but was concerned about the remedial actions.¹¹² He pointed out that Vauxhall had needed three recalls to solve the problem; after attempts to waterproof the wiring terminals (recall one) and replace the parts (recall two) the third and final recall fitted a water deflector to deal with water ingress.

46. We are concerned that a small number of manufacturers have problems identifying the root cause of problems or require multiple recalls to resolve an issue. Clearly some defects are more complex than others to trace and solve but it is surprising to us that Vauxhall has five ongoing recalls relating to fire and that two issues have required

106 [Q127](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

107 [Qq114-5](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

108 [Q131](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

109 [Letter from Helen Foord, Head of Government Relations and Public Policy, General Motors UK to Louise Ellman MP, 8 December 2016](#)

110 [Q74](#)

111 [Letter from Helen Foord, Head of Government Relations and Public Policy, General Motors UK to Louise Ellman MP, 8 December 2016](#)

112 [Letter from Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 2 March 2017](#)

more than one recall to resolve. *The DVSA should work with the small number of manufacturers who seem to have difficulty managing recalls to see if it can offer any advice.*

47. Traceability is a key part of any product recall. The SMMT told us about an online tool it had developed in 2015 to allow users to check the safety recall status of a car or van based on its vehicle identification number. The free service gives advice on outstanding recalls and provides the manufacturer's contact details and links to local dealers.¹¹³ Vauxhall told us it had led the establishment of this system.¹¹⁴

48. While manufacturers and the DVSA use vehicle identification numbers for recalls, vehicle registration provides the basis for tracing the owners of an affected model. It can be difficult to trace all affected vehicles, not least because they continue to be sold on the second-hand market and registered keeper data obtained from the DVLA could become out of date. Elvira Toelkes told us that GM had written 1.2 million letters to customers; some had received up to seven letters inviting them to seek assistance or repair for their vehicle.¹¹⁵ A surprisingly high number of affected Zafiras had been scrapped, exported or were registered to owners with unmailable addresses (just under 9,000 vehicles or 4% of those placed on the market).

49. Thomas Berenz, Director of Global Safety and Field Investigations, GM Motors, said the data obtained from the DVLA contained data for around 16,000 vehicles that were no longer on the road.¹¹⁶ Helen Foord, Head of Government Relations and Public Policy, General Motors, said there were around 13,000 Zafiras with no registered keeper; these are vehicles which could have been sold to trade.¹¹⁷

50. Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive of the DVSA, suggested that Vauxhall's mail merge had resulted in letters going to the wrong people.¹¹⁸ He explained that the DVSA had sought to help Vauxhall identify those Zafiras still on the road by matching 75,000 vehicle identification numbers with their MOT register. They concluded that around 12,500 did not have a valid MOT and around 5,500 had no MOT history, probably because they had been exported.¹¹⁹

51. Drivers and owners have contact with the Government's motoring agencies when paying vehicle excise duty or obtaining an MOT. Systems are already in place to check that a vehicle has insurance and a valid MOT before it is taxed. Gareth Llewellyn said the DVSA planned to launch an MOT reminder service and that these reminders would encourage owners to ask about outstanding recalls. He explained this could be extended in a second phase so that an MOT could be withheld if a safety critical recall had not been completed.¹²⁰ Peter Hearn, Director of Operations, DVSA, acknowledged that there might be opportunities to link this with payment of vehicle excise duty so that vehicles with outstanding recalls could be prevented from obtaining an MOT or being taxed.¹²¹ It is

113 [Letter from Mike Hawes, Chief Executive, SMMT to Louise Ellman MP, 27 January 2017](#)

114 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP, 31 August 2016](#)

115 [Q41](#)

116 [Q42](#)

117 [Q68](#)

118 [Q88](#)

119 [Q88](#)

120 [Q95](#)

121 [Q101](#)

important that the costs of introducing additional steps to ensure full traceability, such as use of VED renewals and MOT testing, are proportionate to the residual risk to motorists and the general public.

52. Tracing whole vehicles may also not be sufficient. Parts from scrapped vehicles can find their way into vehicles on the road as such parts are often sold as a cheaper alternative to sourcing new parts (and for some older models may be the only way of sourcing some parts).

53. We asked what action Vauxhall had taken to inform other manufacturers of the issue with the resistor. Vauxhall confirmed that as soon as it was aware of the problem it informed its supplier. It said “Having alerted our HVAC system supplier of the problem, we rely on them to reach out to their other customers if they consider another vehicle may be impacted”.¹²² It is unreasonable to expect a parts supplier to know every application vehicle manufacturers have found for a particular part. However, if one manufacturer identifies a potential defect with the part or their application of the part it is vital that the part supplier is informed so that other manufacturers can be informed. These issues are covered only briefly in the manufacturers’ guide to recalls and it is not clear what role the DVSA has beyond ensuring that the relevant information is entered on the RAPEX database, the European Commission’s system for the rapid exchange of information between national authorities in EU member states on dangerous products found on the market.¹²³

54. *We welcome the launch of the MOT reminder service. The DVSA should pursue opportunities to extend this service, ensuring that vehicles with outstanding safety recalls are prevented from obtaining an MOT or being taxed. We recommend that the Department investigate how a motorist’s contact with its motoring agencies, through for example paying vehicle excise duty or obtaining an MOT, could be used to improve the overall rate of compliance with a safety recall.*

55. *We recommend that the Department and the DVSA review the Code of Practice on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls to see if it needs to be strengthened in respect of the obligation placed on manufacturers to inform their suppliers. Ministers should satisfy themselves that the arrangements for dealing with parts suppliers that are in place would be capable of tracing a part with a safety related defect, which has been used in a number of different makes and models. It must be clear who is responsible for ensuring that other manufacturers are aware of the safety concerns associated with a particular component.*

Action on dangerous repairs

56. Vauxhall attributed the problem to improper repair of the thermal fuse in the blower resistor and indicated that unauthorised and improper repair was being carried out in independent garages. We were very surprised to find that no attempt was made by either Vauxhall or the DVSA to identify the garages where such manipulation took place. We were pleased that after our session in July 2016 Vauxhall contacted the Director of the Retail Motor Industry Federation requesting a meeting to discuss the most effective and efficient

122 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 31 August 2016

123 [DVSA, Manufacturers’ Guide to Recalls in the UK Automotive Sector](#), April 2014

way of engaging with independent repair garages.¹²⁴ Elvira Toelkes, Vice-President, GM Quality Europe, said that GM was not responsible for the unauthorised repairs but had taken responsibility for fixing the problem. She noted that it was very difficult to identify those responsible for unauthorised repairs.¹²⁵ Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall, said the nature of the repairs meant it was highly unlikely they were associated with professional mechanics.¹²⁶ He also pointed out that second and third owners of a vehicle might have no knowledge of previous repairs or who carried them out. The DVSA told us that it saw a case for registering garages.¹²⁷

57. Vauxhall was willing to attribute blame on incorrect repair by third parties but made no effort to find out where such dangerous practices were being carried out. We accept that it is not the company's role to police the actions of independent garages but given that Vauxhall alleged the actions of these garages were putting drivers and other road users at risk, they should have done more. Vauxhall's inaction calls into question the credibility of their claim. The DVSA cannot escape censure in this regard either; it was informed that improper repair of parts was a cause of the fires but as far as we can tell it made no efforts to trace those responsible for unsafe repair of the fuses.

58. The Department for Transport, working with Vauxhall, should examine each case of a Zafira fire where manipulation of the thermal fuse is known to have occurred in order to identify where such allegedly dangerous repair took place. It should review information in the DVSA's database of vehicle safety defects to identify what further information is already known about dangerous and improper repair of vehicles. The Department should discuss the scale of the dangerous repair of vehicles and its impact on vehicle safety with the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, the Retail Motor Industry Federation and its associations, other relevant trade associations, and insurers. A key objective for the Department in such discussions should be to identify any systemic failings in the sector and the need for further proportionate action by industry and the Department to tackle the problem. The findings should be reported to the Transport Committee within 18 months.

Resources and powers of the DVSA

59. Manufacturers are under a legal obligation to inform the DVSA of any safety defects.¹²⁸ But the DVSA has no powers to force a manufacturer into a safety recall.¹²⁹ Gareth Llewellyn told us it was unusual for the DVSA to be dealing with multiple recalls on the same model.¹³⁰ Peter Hearn, Director of Operations, DVSA, noted that both the Zafira and the Corsa had been recalled twice for corrective action.¹³¹

60. Actions falling short of a safety recall (non-coded action) are not disseminated on the RAPEX system.¹³² This means it would be possible for a manufacturer to avoid the adverse publicity of a recall by taking non-coded action.

124 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall Motors to Louise Ellman MP](#), 31 August 2016

125 [Q46](#)

126 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall to Louise Ellman MP](#), 22 February 2017

127 [Qq109-11](#)

128 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q121](#) [Andy King and Gareth Llewellyn]

129 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q122](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

130 [Q116](#)

131 [Q117](#)

132 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q122](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

61. Once a recall is underway the DVSA has no way to compel a manufacturer to act more quickly.¹³³ Gareth Llewellyn pointed out that the DVSA was reliant on good cooperation with the industry. He was well aware of the dangers of pushing a manufacturer to rush an investigation but he did suggest that there was no way, if such cooperation was not forthcoming, for the DVSA to get a manufacturer to speed up their investigation or recall.¹³⁴ He acknowledged that goodwill and cooperation could not be relied on as a matter of course and that the DVSA lacked a power to prosecute.¹³⁵ The DVSA's frustration with Vauxhall was palpable.¹³⁶ Mr Llewellyn noted that the DVSA relied on the Department for Transport to fund enforcement activity. He told us the budget for this area would decrease over the next few years and identified enforcement as an area that needed to be strengthened.¹³⁷

62. Gareth Llewellyn said that the current Code of Practice lacked teeth. He wanted to see a level of regulation that encouraged manufacturers to do a better job.¹³⁸ Peter Hearn noted that in Germany road safety could be ensured through powers to stop defective vehicles being licenced and registered.¹³⁹ Gareth Llewellyn explained that in Germany, if a car has not been brought in for remedial work after its owner has been sent three letters about a safety recall, the regulator could remove the registration number from the car so that it could not be driven. In the Netherlands a motor manufacturer guilty of administrative failures in a safety recall could be fined of €800,000, banned from trading for a year or its directors could face two years' imprisonment.¹⁴⁰ Peter Hearn said:

We always welcome a voluntary approach with manufacturers, but clearly, as we have said, we are lacking some teeth and we may want to look at compulsion in the future when we do not get a response or when we are not satisfied. We would like to be able to take further action and expedite some of the road safety risk.¹⁴¹

In February 2017, Gareth Llewellyn told us:

[...] the revision of the code of practice, with SMMT's involvement, is a good step forward. We have already proposed that, so we will be kicking it off fairly shortly. The second level is around what regulatory powers we have in the context of the code of practice. At the moment, we do not have any, and that needs to be improved to be able to chivvy along some of the manufacturers that are not getting to where we need to be. Ultimately our goal is making sure that there are no unsafe vehicles on the road. The final bit is that, while we are an enforcement authority in many areas, we are not an enforcement agency as far as the General Product Safety Regulations are concerned. The final ability to take an organisation to court is not there at the moment.¹⁴²

133 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q110](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

134 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q110](#)

135 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Q109](#)

136 [Q131](#) [Gareth Llewellyn]

137 Oral evidence taken on 19 July 2016, HC318, [Qq114-5](#)

138 [Q102](#)

139 [Q106](#)

140 [Q102](#)

141 [Q103](#)

142 [Q104](#)

He stressed the importance of having the powers to speed up a recall where necessary.¹⁴³

63. **Under a voluntary recall process the DVSA lacks the powers to compel a quicker response. The poor behaviour of Vauxhall clearly shows that the Department for Transport cannot rely on all manufacturers doing the right thing voluntarily. Other manufacturers may have lessons to learn and should take heed of the recommendations in this Report. The DVSA should have the tools it needs to take proportionate and effective enforcement action to ensure vehicle safety. The current Code based approach should be backed up by a credible threat of prosecution for a failure to comply with an instruction from the DVSA. The powers and sanctions must be proportionate to the risk. *We recommend that the Department consider bringing forward legislative proposals to give the DVSA the enforcement powers it needs to compel manufacturers to act should it need to do so. Its proposals should be informed by a comparative analysis of the regulatory powers available to similar bodies in EU member states and to other regulatory bodies in the UK and be based on a period of consultation with stakeholders.***

64. The DVSA did not undertake any independent testing as part of the initial investigation or after it became aware that successfully recalled cars had subsequently caught fire. In his December 2015 letter to the Chair, Mr Satoor, the DVSA's Interim Chief Executive, explained that the DVSA did not conduct any independent testing into the cause of the vehicle fires on the affected Zafira models because it was the responsibility of the vehicle manufacturer to conduct the investigation into the cause of any alleged safety issues on its products and present its findings to the DVSA.¹⁴⁴

65. **We believe that the DVSA should have commissioned its own independent expert advice once fires in successfully recalled vehicles called into question Vauxhall's claim to have found the root cause of the fires. *We recommend that the DVSA review its policy on the use of independent testing and consider making greater use of such testing than it has done previously.***

143 [Q105](#)

144 [Letter from Paul Satoor, Interim Chief Executive, DVSA to Louise Ellman MP, 21 December 2015](#)

Conclusions and recommendations

Investigations and recalls

1. Vauxhall was too slow to begin a full investigation into the fires affecting Model B Zafiras. It was then too quick to conclude that it had identified the root cause of the fires in Model B Zafiras and to attribute the problem to improper and unauthorised repair of the thermal fuse in the blower resistor. Its initial investigation only briefly considered why the blower motor might be corroded. Its public statements referred to improper repair of the thermal fuse but Vauxhall was clearly aware that a faulty blower motor was one of the necessary conditions for a fire. Vauxhall's sluggish approach to investigation, its willingness to place the blame on third parties, and its attempt to address the problem through non-code action rather than a recall should cause senior management in the company and the wider General Motors Group to reflect on the kind of culture that permits a safety issue of this kind to be handled so poorly. This is something that PSA, the new owners of the Vauxhall brand will need to address. Vauxhall's approach to the fires should cause the DVSA to question whether it should have been more incredulous when Vauxhall gave it explanations and assurances about the cause of the fires, and challenged these. (Paragraph 20)
2. *The DVSA should seek assurance from Vauxhall that it has taken steps to learn lessons from its poor handling of this issue and must ensure that Vauxhall has put in place robust processes and systems to ensure that potential defects are properly investigated and the root cause properly identified.* (Paragraph 21)

The initial recall

3. We believe that the checks that were part of the initial recall and the amendment of the instruction to include a visual check on the blower motor clearly show that Vauxhall was concerned about corrosion in blower motors. *We recommend that the DVSA ask Vauxhall to explain why:*
 - *it amended its instructions to service engineers to include a visual check on the blower motor;*
 - *its statements on the recall focused on manipulated resistors when it was clearly aware that corrosion of the blower motor was a necessary condition for vehicle fires; and*
 - *it did not act sooner to take steps to deal with corrosion and replace blower motors (as it did in the second recall) if it knew corrosion was a necessary condition for a vehicle fire.* (Paragraph 23)

Fires in recalled vehicles and further investigation

4. Vauxhall's initial investigation did not identify all the modes of failure that could cause a fire in a Model B Zafira's heating and ventilation system. This meant that fires occurred in vehicles that had been returned to their original equipment condition following the initial recall. There appears to have been a two week period between

Vauxhall knowing about the fires in recalled vehicles and it telling the DVSA about them. We can see no reasonable explanation for a delay of more than a couple of days in Vauxhall sharing this information with the DVSA. The first, and certainly the second, fire in a vehicle that had successfully been recalled should have started alarm bells ringing in Vauxhall and the DVSA. Vauxhall's response to these fires appears pedestrian. It should have informed the DVSA sooner and both Vauxhall and the DVSA should have taken action more quickly. (Paragraph 29)

Second recall

5. We are disappointed at the pace of Vauxhall's response to the fires in successfully recalled vehicles. Vauxhall's decision to continue to let people drive affected cars amounts to a reckless disregard for safety. This is particularly damning given its admission that it should have notified customers earlier. As soon as it became clear that all the causes of the fires affecting the heating and ventilation system had not been found Vauxhall should have acted; first to alert customers to the risk and offer them advice and second to get the vehicles fixed faster. In the absence of any explanation for its tardy response from the witnesses that appeared before us we can only conclude that commercial considerations and the need to avoid reputational damage were put ahead of safety; this is unacceptable and morally reprehensible. *As well as ensuring vehicles are safe to drive the Department has a role to play in ensuring the public can have confidence in any recall announced by a manufacturer. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Department for Transport set out the steps the DVSA has taken to ensure that the remedial action taken by Vauxhall has been effective in eliminating the risk of fires in the heating and ventilation system of Model B Zafiras.* (Paragraph 34)

Encouraging defect reporting and sharing information

6. The DVSA's understanding of vehicle safety defects is determined by information that comes predominantly from manufacturers. It is vital for public confidence that the DVSA is not perceived as being too close to or reliant on motor manufacturers. Other sources of data could help to corroborate and verify what manufacturers tell the DVSA and could act as an early warning allowing safety defects to be identified more quickly. The Department for Transport should do more to encourage the reporting of potential safety defects from drivers and from those with specialist knowledge, such as garages, recovery services, insurers and the emergency services. Defect reporting systems are used in other sectors and the DVSA should identify what lessons it can learn from systems like those used for reporting defects with medical devices. *The Department should convene a round table with interested parties with the aim of identifying what practical steps can be taken to share existing sources of information more effectively, raise awareness of under-reporting and to encourage more reporting of potential safety defects. The Department should submit a report on the steps it plans to take following the proposed round table to the Transport Committee by March 2018. The Government should ensure the Vehicle Safety Branch has the staff and resources it would need to cope with a higher number of defect reports.* (Paragraph 39)

Improving investigation of vehicle fires

7. There will always be reasons why some vehicles cannot be examined after a fire. We believe that the guiding principle should be that the interest of the general public in ensuring vehicle safety comes before any narrow commercial interest in settling a specific claim. Vehicle manufacturers should work with insurers and owners of vehicles to ensure that as few vehicles with potential vehicle defects go un-investigated as possible, especially where the manufacturer is trying to establish the root cause of a potentially serious fault. We believe that where a manufacturer makes sufficient effort they can get access to a greater number of vehicles; Vauxhall has inspected 75% of the vehicles involved in Zafira fires since July 2016. *In seeking to increase the number of vehicles that are properly inspected after a fire, the Department for Transport should first ensure that manufacturers are making enough of an effort to get access to the vehicles. If problems remain the next step should be that the Department ensures the motor industry and the insurance industry work together to eliminate any barriers that prevent the full and proper investigation of any potential safety defect in a vehicle. If a way cannot be found to ensure that manufacturers have access to vehicles as part of an investigation, the Department should consider whether the DVSA should have greater powers to seize vehicles in order to carry out a proper forensic investigation where a manufacturer, insurer or owner was uncooperative. Such a scheme could be costly but this should not remove the manufacturer's current responsibility for carrying out such investigations; the Department could consider how the costs of such investigations might be recovered from uncooperative motor manufacturers and insurers.* (Paragraph 44)

Managing recalls

8. We are concerned that a small number of manufacturers have problems identifying the root cause of problems or require multiple recalls to resolve an issue. Clearly some defects are more complex than others to trace and solve but it is surprising to us that Vauxhall has five ongoing recalls relating to fire and that two issues have required more than one recall to resolve. *The DVSA should work with the small number of manufacturers who seem to have difficulty managing recalls to see if it can offer any advice.* (Paragraph 46)
9. *We welcome the launch of the MOT reminder service. The DVSA should pursue opportunities to extend this service, ensuring that vehicles with outstanding safety recalls are prevented from obtaining an MOT or being taxed. We recommend that the Department investigate how a motorist's contact with its motoring agencies, through for example paying vehicle excise duty or obtaining an MOT, could be used to improve the overall rate of compliance with a safety recall.* (Paragraph 54)
10. *We recommend that the Department and the DVSA review the Code of Practice on Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls to see if it needs to be strengthened in respect of the obligation placed on manufacturers to inform their suppliers. Ministers should satisfy themselves that the arrangements for dealing with parts suppliers that are in place would be capable of tracing a part with a safety related defect, which has been used*

in a number of different makes and models. It must be clear who is responsible for ensuring that other manufacturers are aware of the safety concerns associated with a particular component. (Paragraph 55)

Action on dangerous repairs

11. Vauxhall was willing to attribute blame on incorrect repair by third parties but made no effort to find out where such dangerous practices were being carried out. We accept that it is not the company's role to police the actions of independent garages but given that Vauxhall alleged the actions of these garages were putting drivers and other road users at risk, they should have done more. Vauxhall's inaction calls into question the credibility of their claim. The DVSA cannot escape censure in this regard either; it was informed that improper repair of parts was a cause of the fires but as far as we can tell it made no efforts to trace those responsible for unsafe repair of the fuses. (Paragraph 57)
12. *The Department for Transport, working with Vauxhall, should examine each case of a Zafira fire where manipulation of the thermal fuse is known to have occurred in order to identify where such allegedly dangerous repair took place. It should review information in the DVSA's database of vehicle safety defects to identify what further information is already known about dangerous and improper repair of vehicles. The Department should discuss the scale of the dangerous repair of vehicles and its impact on vehicle safety with the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, the Retail Motor Industry Federation and its associations, other relevant trade associations, and insurers. A key objective for the Department in such discussions should be to identify any systemic failings in the sector and the need for further proportionate action by industry and the Department to tackle the problem. The findings should be reported to the Transport Committee within 18 months. (Paragraph 58)*

Resources and powers of the DVSA

13. Under a voluntary recall process the DVSA lacks the powers to compel a quicker response. The poor behaviour of Vauxhall clearly shows that the Department for Transport cannot rely on all manufacturers doing the right thing voluntarily. Other manufacturers may have lessons to learn and should take heed of the recommendations in this Report. The DVSA should have the tools it needs to take proportionate and effective enforcement action to ensure vehicle safety. The current Code based approach should be backed up by a credible threat of prosecution for a failure to comply with an instruction from the DVSA. The powers and sanctions must be proportionate to the risk. *We recommend that the Department consider bringing forward legislative proposals to give the DVSA the enforcement powers it needs to compel manufacturers to act should it need to do so. Its proposals should be informed by a comparative analysis of the regulatory powers available to similar bodies in EU member states and to other regulatory bodies in the UK and be based on a period of consultation with stakeholders. (Paragraph 63)*

14. We believe that the DVSA should have commissioned its own independent expert advice once fires in successfully recalled vehicles called into question Vauxhall's claim to have found the root cause of the fires. *We recommend that the DVSA review its policy on the use of independent testing and consider making greater use of such testing than it has done previously.* (Paragraph 65)

Formal minutes

Monday 24 April 2017

Members present:

Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair

Karl McCartney

Iain Stewart

Huw Merriman

Martin Vickers

Will Quince

Draft Report (*Vauxhall Zafira fires*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 65 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Tenth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[The Committee adjourned.]

Witnesses

Vauxhall vehicle fires

The following witnesses gave evidence for the Vauxhall vehicle fires one-off session. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Monday 6 February 2017

Question number

Elvira Toelkes, Vice President GM Quality Europe, **Thomas Berenz**, Director Global Safety and field investigations, and **Helen Foord**, Head of Government Relations and Public Policy, General Motors

[Q1–86](#)

Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, **Peter Hearn**, Director of Operations, and **Andy King**, Head of Enforcement, Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency

[Q87–144](#)

Vauxhall Zafira B fires

The following witnesses gave evidence for the Vauxhall Zafira B fires one-off session. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Tuesday 19 July 2016

Question number

Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall, and **Charles J Klein**, Engineering Executive Director Global CO2 Strategy and Energy Center (recently Vice President of Vehicle Engineering in Europe), General Motors

[Q1–90](#)

Gareth Llewellyn, Chief Executive, **Peter Hearn**, Acting Operations Director, and **Andy King**, Head of Customer and Business Operations, Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency

[Q91–126](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

INQ numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Dan Hunt ([VVF0002](#))
- 2 Michael Figge ([VVF0001](#))

Correspondence

The following correspondence can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) for the session on 6 February 2017.

- 1 [Written evidence from Gareth Llewellyn regarding Vauxhall vehicle fires, 2 March 2017](#)
- 2 [Letter from Peter Hope regarding Vauxhall vehicle fires, 22 February 2017](#)
- 3 [Letter from James Dalton to Louise Ellman MP regarding vehicle fires, 27 January 2017](#)
- 4 [Letter from Mike Hawes to Louise Ellman MP regarding vehicle fires, 27 January 2017](#)
- 5 [Letter from Louise Ellman MP to James Dalton regarding Vauxhall car fires, 18 January 2017](#)
- 6 [Letter from Louise Ellman MP to Mike Hawes regarding Vauxhall car fires, 18 January 2017](#)
- 7 [Letter from Helen Foord to Louise Ellman MP regarding Vauxhall Corsa D safety recall, 8 December 2016](#)

The following correspondence can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) for the session on 19 July 2016

- 8 [Letter from Peter Hope to Louise Ellman regarding Vauxhall Zafira B fires, 18 November 2016](#)
- 9 [Letter from Peter Hope, Customer Experience Director, Vauxhall, on Vauxhall Zafira B fires, 31 August 2016](#)
- 10 [Letter from Rory Harvey to Louise Ellman regarding Vauxhall Zafira fires, 20 May 2016](#)
- 11 [Correspondence between Louise Ellman and Paul Satoor, Interim Chief Executive, DVSA regarding Vauxhall Zafira B Model fires, 7 and 21 December 2015](#)

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2015–16

First Report	Surface transport to airports	HC 516 (HC 995)
Second Report	Road traffic law enforcement	HC 518 (HC 132)
Third Report	Airport expansion in the South East	HC 784 (HC 564)
First Special Report	Investing in the railway: Network Rail Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2014–15	HC 347
Second Special Report	Motoring of the future: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2014–15	HC 349
Third Special Report	Smaller airports: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2014–15	HC 350
Fourth Special Report	Strategic river crossings: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2014–15	HC 348
Fifth Special Report	Strategic river crossings: Greater London Authority Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2014–15	HC 558
Sixth Special Report	Surface transport to airports: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2015–16	HC 995

Session 2016–17

First Report	Operation Stack	HC 65 (HC 602)
Second Report	All lane running	HC 63 (HC 654)
Third Report	Volkswagen emissions scandal and vehicle type approval	HC 69 (HC 699)
Fourth Report	Skills and workforce planning in the road haulage sector	HC 68 (HC 740)
Fifth Report	All lane running: Government response	HC 654 (HC 858)
Sixth Report	The future of rail: Improving the rail passenger experience	HC 64 (HC 905)

Seventh Report	Rail technology: signalling and traffic management	HC 67 (HC 910)
Eighth Report	Bus Services Bill	HC 611 (HC 918)
Ninth Report	Rail franchising	HC 66 (HC 1145)
First Special Report	Road traffic law enforcement: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2015–16	HC 132 (HC 518)
Second Special Report	Airport expansion in the South East: Government response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2015–16	HC 564
Third Special Report	Operation Stack: Government response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2016–17	HC 602
Fourth Special Report	Volkswagen emissions scandal and vehicle type approval: Government response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2016–17	HC 699
Fifth Special Report	Skills and workforce planning in the road haulage sector: Government response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 740
Sixth Special Report	All lane running: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 858
Seventh Special Report	The future of rail: Improving the rail passenger experience: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 905
Eighth Special Report	Bus Services Bill: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 918
Ninth Special Report	Rail technology: signalling and traffic management: Government response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2016–17	HC 910
Tenth Special Report	Rail franchising: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 1145