1The pace of change since the Grenfell Tower fire
6.It has now been over two years since the fire at Grenfell Tower. This chapter reflects the views of many individuals and organisations that the pace of change set by the Government in reforming the system has been too slow. In particular, serious concerns have been expressed around the limited progress that has been made towards the removal and replacement of potentially dangerous cladding on residential buildings.
Pace of change since the Grenfell Tower fire
7.When Grenfell United gave evidence to us in June last year, Edward Daffarn warned very clearly and powerfully that:
Grenfell 2 is in the post unless you act, and quickly.4
The Government initially appeared to accept the need for urgent reform. When it launched the Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety in July 2017, it commissioned Dame Judith Hackitt to “urgently assess” the effectiveness of the building and fire safety regulations.5
8.However, this sense of urgency appears to have been lost. During the Committee’s evidence session with Dame Judith Hackitt in January 2019, she revealed her disappointment that the Government had lost momentum by waiting seven months to formally accept the recommendations of the Independent Review in full:
It is a matter of some regret to me that it took seven months before that was made public, because we did lose some momentum, because it was December before that was formally stated. As I made clear at the time when the report was first published, one of the real challenges throughout my review was people saying, “But will Government implement this?” It was waiting for that strong signal from Government that caused us to lose some momentum between May and December. We now need to get that back.6
It took a further seven months—that is, 14 months since the publication of the Final Report of the Independent Review and 24 months since the fire at Grenfell Tower—for the Government to eventually publish the consultation into its proposals for reform of the building safety regulatory system.7
9.It is clear that disappointment regarding the pace of change extends more widely. Roy Wilsher, Chair of the National Fire Chief’s Council, told us he was not satisfied with the progress the Government had made.8 Adrian Dobson, representing the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), expressed his view that nothing significant—other than the combustible cladding ban—had changed in the building regulations since June 2017:
We have had one helpful change, which is the restriction on combustible materials, but other than that the regulatory regime and the regulations remain absolutely the same. We presumably have not only unsafe buildings out there, but we are potentially still constructing unsafe buildings.9
10.The pace of change set by the Government in reforming the building and fire safety regulatory regime has been far too slow. It has been over two years since the fire at Grenfell Tower, and more than a year since the publication of the Final Report of the Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety, and yet the Government has only just published a consultation into its proposals for reform of the building safety regulatory system. The Government must pick up the pace of reform, before it is too late and we have another tragedy on the scale of Grenfell Tower.
Prescription in the new regulatory regime
11.This Committee has repeatedly expressed its concerns around the outcomes-(or risk-) based approach advocated by Dame Judith Hackitt in the reports of the Independent Review. In the foreword to her Final Report, Dame Judith described calls for the prescription of specific materials as “siloed thinking that is part of the problem we must address.”10 However, in our response last year, we expressed our view that a prescriptive approach was the most effective way to guarantee the safety of residents:
We want to see a system in which a reformed industry can be trusted to put fire safety first, with a robust system of oversight and meaningful sanctions, but underpinned by a strong, prescriptive approach to ensure minimum standards and guarantee the safety of residents.11
12.The risks associated with an outcomes-based approach were articulated by Dr Jonathan Evans, who referred to Dame Judith’s proposals in the context of the fire in Barking, east London, which destroyed 20 flats in June 2019:
If it had happened in the middle of the night, it would have probably killed five or 10 people, perhaps. Relying on this outcomes-based approach is a very dangerous thing to do. [ … ] Her suggestion that the Government could then backtrack to just presenting outcomes-based regulations and let industry sort it out is ridiculous. You will have regulations that basically capitulate down to saying, “Do not let it collapse. Do not burn people. Do not electrocute people. Do not let people freeze. You sort it all out, and we will punish you if you get it wrong”. That model is just not going to work.12
13.We reiterate the view we expressed last year, that Dame Judith Hackitt was right to call for greater accountability, robust oversight and strengthened sanctions in the new regulatory regime, but that this must be underpinned by strong, prescriptive standards, which are essential if residents are to be kept safe.
Sprinklers
14.One of several examples of this relates to calls for the retro-fitting of sprinklers to existing high-rise residential buildings. Last July, this Committee called on the Government to require that, where structurally feasible, sprinklers should be installed in existing buildings, in order to provide an additional layer of safety for residents.13 It was concerning, therefore, to hear reports that 95 per cent of social housing buildings—where more than 400,000 people live—still did not have a sprinkler system installed in their properties.14 Both RIBA and the National Fire Chiefs Council told us that sprinklers should become a mandatory requirement, with Adrian Dobson explaining:
You can think of fire prevention as being about various layers of safety. Usually, when you have a big loss of life, it is because multiple layers have failed. There is quite a lot of evidence around that sprinklers can be quite a key element of fire suppression early in that process [ … ] With existing buildings, some things, such as changing the means of escape, would be very difficult, but fitting sprinklers is a relatively straightforward way of improving fire safety.15
15.The Government has already shown its acceptance of the need for some prescription, having implemented a ban on combustible cladding and insulation. It should now go further and require the installation of sprinkler systems in new and existing high-rise and high-risk buildings, including residential buildings, student accommodation and hospitals, where structurally feasible.
Remediation of buildings with combustible cladding
16.The removal of dangerous materials from the cladding and insultation of high-rise residential buildings, potentially affecting tens of thousands of people, should be the highest priority for the Government. As Edward Daffarn told us, “The idea for any of us that you could go to bed and sleep in a building with the cladding on that did that to us at Grenfell is absolutely horrific.”16
17.However, we heard that progress in removing potentially dangerous cladding had been far too slow. The most recent monthly data release from the Government’s Building Safety Programme (June 2019) reinforces this view.17 It showed that there were 328 high-rise residential and publicly owned buildings with Aluminium Composite Material (ACM) cladding systems—the material used on Grenfell Tower—unlikely to meet Building Regulations which are yet to be remediated in England, including 102 social sector residential buildings and 163 private sector residential buildings.
18.It is taking far too long to remove and replace potentially dangerous cladding from high-rise and high-risk buildings. The Government should set a realistic, but short, deadline by which time all buildings with any form of dangerous cladding should be fully remediated and indicate when this will be. Government policies and funding mechanisms should work to meet this deadline, while sanctions should follow for building owners who fail to make their buildings safe within a reasonable timeframe.
19.The figures published by the Government’s Building Safety Programme do not, of course, include buildings with other forms of potentially dangerous cladding, which is likely to also require remediation. For example, Dr Jonathan Evans told us that some forms of cladding incorporating High Pressure Laminate (HPL) had already been shown to be more dangerous than ACM cladding:
There are only two grades of high-pressure laminates on the market: there is a fire-retardant grade and a standard grade. We now know that the fire-retardant grade failed this test with combustible insulation in 2014 [ … ] In the case of the fire-retardant version, the fire-retardant version of high-pressure laminate failed more quickly than the fire-retardant version of ACM. If you extrapolate that, it is also possible for the standard-grade high-pressure laminate, which contains 70% more combustible material.18
20.The Government has been slow to test non-ACM cladding, something we have raised in correspondence with the Minister of State for Housing and Planning, Kit Malthouse MP.19 The lack of progress in this area has also been noted more widely. Edward Daffarn referred to the Government’s failure to test non-ACM cladding until just two months ago as “a casualness… a lack of focus”.20
21.It is encouraging that the Government has committed to completing its testing programme of non-ACM cladding by the summer.21 However, we heard calls for transparency regarding the results of this testing programme. Some witnesses suggested that the Government already knew of materials that had failed fire safety tests, but that these had not been made public.22
22.It is clear that concerns extend beyond the ACM cladding used on Grenfell Tower, but buildings with other forms of potentially dangerous cladding have not been given the focus they need. The slow rate of progress in testing potentially dangerous non-ACM cladding systems has been unacceptable and, as noted by Grenfell United, suggests to many a casualness and lack of focus from the Government.
23.The Government must publish the results of its testing process and release full details of all past test results of non-ACM cladding. Residents have the right to know whether the buildings they live in are safe or require urgent remediation.
Government funding for remediation
24.In our July 2018 report, we highlighted concerns around the pace of remediation in the private rented sector. We noted the legal challenges around freeholder liability for remedial works and, rather than see any further delays, called on the Government to urgently provide direct funding, to ensure that remedial works were carried out as quickly as possible and that costs need not be passed on to leaseholders.23
25.The Government did not agree with our recommendation and instead continued to argue that building owners and developers should be responsible for paying for the remediation of private sector buildings, telling us on several occasions that the Government would “rule out no options” if this failed to happen.24
26.Unfortunately, it did fail to happen. By April 2019, just 11 out of 173 private sector residential buildings with ACM cladding had been fully remediated, and only a further 16 had started a remediation process.25 At the time, we wrote to the Minister of State for Housing and Planning, and called again for Government funding for private sector buildings:
The Committee is concerned that progress in remediating these buildings has been far too slow [ … ] Almost two-years on from the fire at Grenfell Tower, this does not suggest that building owners are addressing this issue with the urgency that is required [ … ] Will the Government reconsider our recommendation to introduce funding for private sector building owners, to ensure that remedial work is carried out as quickly as possible?26
On 9 May 2019, the Government relented and announced a £200 million fund to remove and replace unsafe ACM cladding from privately owned high-rise residential buildings.27
27.We have heard concerns, however, that the £200 million put aside for the funding would not be sufficient. For example, Dr Nigel Glen, representing the Association of Residential Managing Agents (ARMA), told us:
[ … ] the £200 million is not enough, I am afraid. We have about 6,800 units or homes under cladding in ARMA. On average, they cost £1.6 million. We can do 124 buildings with that money, and that is not enough.28
28.It is welcome that the Government has finally provided funding to meet the costs of replacing unsafe ACM cladding from privately owned high-rise residential buildings, as we called for in July 2018. We fear, however, that £200 million will not be sufficient to fully remediate all affected buildings, and the Government is highly likely to need to provide additional funding.
29.We have noted that the fund was not considered value for money according to the rules set out by the Treasury in Managing Public Money. The MHCLG Permanent Secretary was therefore required to write to the Secretary of State, informing him that:
[ … ] it is not possible to reconcile a grant scheme with the principles of Managing Public Money [ … ] it is important to ensure that sufficient steps are taken to ensure that the scheme does not create a precedent whereby leaseholders–or freeholders–expect the Government to stand behind failures in the construction or maintenance of residential buildings in future.29
30.Despite Treasury rules, Ministers were absolutely right to insist that public money should be used to make people’s homes safe. The moral case for intervention has now been firmly established. This should be borne in mind in the context of calls for the extension of the funding to other forms of dangerous cladding.
31.It is questionable whether the use of combustible cladding resulted from failures in the construction or the ambiguity of regulations in Approved Document B, particularly whether the ‘filler’ in ACM was required to be of limited combustibility. As other types of cladding, including High Pressure Laminate (HPL), do not incorporate filler, the Government is duty bound to fund replacement should they also prove to be combustible, whether or not they are considered by the Treasury to be ‘value for money’.
32.We are also aware that this funding is to be provided from existing programme budgets within the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. This represents 3 per cent of the entire Department’s capital and resource programme budgets in 2019/20.
33.We are concerned that funding for remedial works is to be found from existing programme budgets. Notwithstanding the detriment to those budgets, this approach is likely to be unsustainable if the fund is found to be insufficient or is extended to other forms of cladding. The costs of replacing all unsafe cladding should be established and the Treasury should provide this funding to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to fully cover the costs of remediating buildings with unsafe cladding.
Operation of the fund
34.The Government has committed to providing full application guidance to building owners on the operation of the fund in July 2019.30 While there has been broad support for the fund as outlined so far, we heard that there were some issues that required further clarification, particularly around where costs might not be covered and could continue to fall on leaseholders. Richard Silva, representing Long Harbour, reported that the fund was unlikely to cover some of the essential ancillary costs associated with remedial works.31 Dr Nigel Glen, from ARMA, told us he was concerned about what might happen if, during remedial works, further issues were uncovered:
Our big concern is, once we start taking the cladding down, what we will find behind it, particularly compartmentalisation. Will funding be required for that? Again, will that fall on the leaseholders? If so, we could find ourselves in a situation where a building has its cladding removed and is exposed to the elements, and we spend two years fighting in the courts about who should pay again.32
35.While we await the publication of the full application guidance, it will need to provide greater clarity on the scope of the funding. In particular, the fund must be flexible enough to cover all ancillary costs associated with remedial works—such as building surveys—and the reasonable costs of any additional essential works that become apparent after remediation has begun. The benefits of the fund would be diminished if high costs were anyway passed on to leaseholders, or if building owners and managing agents refused to participate in the scheme because of perceived financial risks to themselves.
36.An area of particular concern relates to the Government’s definition of who should be responsible for the administration of funding for the remediation of buildings with dangerous cladding.33 Since the announcement of funding for replacement cladding of high rise buildings, the Government changed its definition of those responsible for carrying out that work from “building owner” to the “responsible entity”. The Government now defines “responsible entity” as the entity that has the legal obligation to carry out the works and the legal right to recover funds from the leaseholders. Government advice explains that this will normally be the building owner but could also be the developers, managing agents and enfranchised leaseholders that have a share of the freehold and it could also include a body acting on behalf of the “responsible entity”.
37.Consequently, the Committee is aware that, in at least one case, a freeholder has interpreted this definitional change as having effectively been released from its obligations, and is now insisting that the First Tier Tribunal-appointed property manager–a small family business–should be fully, and financially, responsible for the remediation of the affected building. This has become problematic because there is a lack of confidence that the Government’s fund will cover the full costs of remedial work - that there may be a shortfall which could not then be charged on to leaseholders - opening the property manager up to significant contractual and financial risks. In the specific case the Committee has been made aware of, the property manager feels they have no choice but to seek authority from the First Tier Tribunal to relinquish responsibility for the building. Dr Nigel Glen told us this was a big concern for managing agents:
It is a huge concern [ … ] That is what section 24 is all about. If you are trying to get rid of a bad landlord, you put the managing agent, under the First tier Tribunal, in their place. This would be very worrying for a managing agent. Contrary to popular belief, most managing agents are small family affairs and they could not afford the responsibility of doing this, if it was put on them [ … ] They would have to withdraw, if they could, from that [ … ] If I had that firm, I would shut it down. The liability is just too much.34
38.There is considerable concern from managing agents that the Government’s definition of who should be responsible for the administration of funding for the remediation of buildings with dangerous cladding could see many managing agents walking away from their buildings due to the significant contractual and financial risks. The Government should clarify that it is the building owner, the freeholder, who should retain full responsibility for remedial works that are to be paid under the Government’s scheme.
39.There is also a lack of clarity as to whether the funding will cover the replacement of potentially combustible insulation, as well as external cladding. Adel Chaoui, from Grenfell United, told the Committee this was an area of concern:
I have concerns about it, yes. I believe the remediation fund is looking at combustible materials beyond cladding, but I have not had a straight answer to it either. It would be great if this Committee could extract that.35
40.The Government should confirm that the costs of replacing combustible insulation will also be covered by this fund. It would not be fair to charge leaseholders for the removal of dangerous insulation, while it would be perverse to incentivise building owners to leave it in place due to a lack of funding.
Extension of the fund
41.The Secretary of State told us that funding for the removal of unsafe ACM cladding was “wholly exceptional”, noting the “unparalleled fire risk” that ACM posed.36 He said that the Government continued to be of the view that building owners should be responsible for the remediation of non-ACM cladding.
42.However, as outlined earlier in this chapter, other forms of cladding have been shown to be unsafe and potentially as dangerous, if not more so, than the ACM cladding on Grenfell Tower.37 Lord Porter, representing the Local Government Association, expressed his view that it would not be morally acceptable for the Government to provide funding for the remediation of one form of dangerous cladding, but not another:
The Government will have to adopt the same principle. Once we have the test results back on all the external cladding materials and all the insulation, the Government will end up having to stand that bill. You would not be able to morally justify why somebody living in a building with cladding made from one type of material could get compensation to fix it and somebody living in another equally unsafe building could not get compensation to fix it. The Treasury will have to be prepared.38
43.In January, we asked the Housing Minister about the removal of non-ACM materials found to be dangerous. He told us:
By definition, it is then combustible cladding which is now banned. We would obviously have to see remediation as we are doing with ACM.39
We note that, even fire retardant versions of High Pressure Laminate (HPL) cladding have a ‘B’ Euroclass rating, which is a combustible classification.
44.Further, in our July 2018 report, this Committee called on the Government to amend its proposals for a combustible cladding ban such that it would not only apply to high-rise buildings, but also to high-risk buildings where there was likely to be a significant risk to life.40 A similar argument could be made for the funding for the remediation of buildings with dangerous cladding.
45.The Government is right to argue that leaseholders should not be forced to pay for the remediation of their buildings, but is wrong to only provide support to residents with a specific type of cladding. The Government cannot morally justify funding the replacement of one form of dangerous cladding, but not others.
46.There is an unfortunate feeling of deja vu around the Government’s approach to non-ACM cladding and a sense that they will inevitably end up paying for it after a short period of prevaricating. In the meantime, tens of thousands of affected residents continue to live in potentially dangerous buildings, or have been sent large and distressing bills for remedial works.
47.The Government should fully fund the removal and replacement of any combustible cladding—as defined by the Government’s combustible cladding ban—from any high-rise or high-risk building. The Government should, therefore, immediately extend its fund to cover the removal and replacement of any form of combustible cladding from a high-rise or high-risk building.
48.There will be a considerable cost associated with such a commitment, as well as a sense of unfairness that most freeholders have again failed to do the right thing. However, the safety of residents must be the Government’s primary concern.
Support for Grenfell Tower survivors
49.Grenfell United, which represents the survivors and families of the victims of the Grenfell Tower fire, told us about the ongoing difficulties they face to get their voice heard and access the support and services they need. They said that the pace of change at Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) since the fire has been “far too slow”41 and survivors continue to experience problems with their housing.
Quality of housing
50.Bellal El Guenuni told us that the main issue with regards to housing now is with the state of the properties survivors have been moved into and the repairs needed.42 He told us that people had been locked in their homes by faulty front door locks,43 while Adel Chaoui said there had also been structural issues with homes:
We have had the ceilings of balconies falling down into the balcony cavity in brand new buildings effectively, so construction methods have just failed them again. Given where they lived and what they went through, the last thing you would expect is a brand new building to be constructed in such a way that parts of the building are falling down on to the balcony where you could be sitting.44
Toxic contamination
51.Grenfell United told us that residents had been raising concerns about the potential for toxic contamination of the surrounding area since the fire in June 2017. They said that the Government and the local council only took action after the preliminary results of the independent study led by Professor Anna Stec into ‘Environmental Contamination following the Grenfell Tower Fire’, were reported in the press in October 2018.45 Professor Stec said she had found “huge concentrations” of carcinogens in the dust and soil close to the tower.46 The report said analysis of the surrounding area, as well as independent soil testing is necessary.47 In October 2018, Government announced additional environmental checks to provide reassurance to survivors and local residents.48 In a written statement to the House on 29 November 2018, Secretary of State James Brokenshire MP said:
An expert multi-agency group which includes the Environment Agency, Public Health England, RBKC and NHS England has been set up to make sure soil surveying around Grenfell Tower is comprehensive and that analysis will be provided to the public49
52.However, with regard to the Government’s action on environmental checks only after the preliminary findings were reported, Bellel El Guienuni said:
[ … ] it is a classic example of authorities not listening to the residents of north Kensington or the Grenfell residents. They asked and asked and put pressure on to have checks in place for soil contamination and toxicology reports very early on. They were ignored.50
53.The Report by Professor Stec also said the toxicants in the fire effluent could “have potential long-term adverse health effects on emergency responders, clean-up workers and local residents.”51 The study recommended that monitoring for health effects should be undertaken.52 Professor Stec said that health authorities should consider testing the blood and saliva of those affected by the fire to monitor damage to their DNA.53
Health services
54.On 9 October 2018, NHS England announced up to £10 million a year for up to five years to provide a new fast-track community health service that would give support and treatment to people affected by the fire with physical and mental health issues.54 But Bellal El Guenuni told us that adequate screening is still not in place:
[ … ] we are worried that there is screening in place but the screening is minimal. You go to your GP and he will say, “Blow in this tube and see how your lungs are functioning”. Absolutely, that needs to be done, but there have to be deeper checks in terms of long-term effects of cyanide poisoning, all these toxins that people have inhaled, and they are not in place yet.55
In an update to the community on 28 March 2019 MHCLG said “screening can only be implemented where there is a risk of a specific condition and a specific treatment or advice is available”56 but that does not rule out more extensive health checks for those affected by the fire.
55.The response by the Government and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea to provide the support and services people affected by the fire need continues to be too slow. Two years on, survivors are still experiencing significant problems with their permanent accommodation.
56.Further, we note that the Government has announced a new fast-track community health service for Grenfell survivors. However, it is apparent that the community are not receiving the standard of health checks that they had expected. The Government should urgently implement a programme to provide comprehensive public health services to survivors of the Grenfell Tower fire and the local community.
57.In the context of concerns around contaminated land in the vicinity of the tower, we welcome the introduction of a programme of comprehensive environmental checks but the Government should have listened to local residents’ concerns and implemented these checks sooner.
5 Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: terms of reference, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 30 August 2017
7 Building a safer future: proposals for reform of the building safety regulatory system, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 6 June 2019
10 Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: final report, 17 May 2018, page 6
11 Independent review of building regulations and fire safety: next steps, Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, 18 July 2018, para 22
12 Q612 (Dr Jonathan Evans) and Barking fire: Blaze destroys 20 flats in east London, BBC News, 9 June 2019
13 Independent review of building regulations and fire safety: next steps, Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, 18 July 2018, paras 68–9
14 Thousands STILL at risk after Grenfell because of failure to fit sprinklers, Mirror, 2 July 2019
17 Building Safety Programme: Monthly Data Release, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 10 June 2019
19 Letter to Kit Malthouse MP, Minister of State for Housing and Planning, 24 April 2019
21 Letter from Kit Malthouse MP, Minister of State for Housing and Planning, 23 May 2019
23 Independent review of building regulations and fire safety: next steps, Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, 18 July 2018, paras 86
24 For example, Letter from Rt Hon. James Brokenshire MP, Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, 16 January 2019
25 Building Safety Programme: Monthly Data Release, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 24 May 2019
26 Letter to Kit Malthouse MP, Minister of State for Housing and Planning, 24 April 2019
27 Government to fund and speed up vital cladding replacement, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 9 May 2019
29 Letter from Melanie Dawes, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, to Rt Hon. James Brokenshire MP, Secretary of State, 8 May 2019
30 Letter from Rt Hon. James Brokenshire MP, Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, 10 June 2019
33 As outlined in a letter to Kit Malthouse MP, Minister of State for Housing and Planning, 25 June 2019
36 Letter from Rt Hon. James Brokenshire MP, Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, 10 June 2019
40 Independent review of building regulations and fire safety: next steps, Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, 18 July 2018, para 37
45 Grenfell: toxic contamination found in nearby homes and soil, The Guardian, 28 March 2019
46 Huge concentrations’ of toxins found in Grenfell soil, study finds, The Guardian, 12 October 2018
47 Community update on publication of Professor Stec’s research, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 28 March 2019
48 Further environmental checks for Grenfell site, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government press release, 26 October 2018
51 Anna A. Stec, Kathryn Dickens, Jessica L.J. Barnes, Clare Bedford, Environmental Contamination Following the Grenfell Tower, Chemosphere, vol 226 (2019) 576–586
52 Anna A. Stec, Kathryn Dickens, Jessica L.J. Barnes, Clare Bedford, Environmental Contamination Following the Grenfell Tower, Chemosphere, vol 226 (2019) 576–586
53 Huge concentrations’ of toxins found in Grenfell soil, study finds, The Guardian, 12 October 2018
54 NHS to provide long term screening service for Grenfell community, NHS England, 9 October 2018
56 Community update on publication of Professor Stec’s research, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 28 March 2019
Published: 18 July 2019