80.Tourism, the creative industries and the digital tech sector all operate under the umbrella of EU regulation. Which? noted that that travellers benefit from consumer protection measures such as “flight rights and protection for package holidays”, all of which are a consequence of EU regulation. The Design Council identified “unique policy frameworks or cross-border agreements that stem from the European Commission.” UKIE summarised how the regulatory environment provided a commercial foundation for the British digital games sector:
Harmonised rules, for instance on data protection, copyright and VAT, have enabled games businesses based in the UK to seamlessly export digital goods and services throughout the EU.
81.Examining the EU regulatory underpinnings of the digital single market that apply in the UK, BT Group said that, overall, they were satisfied with the current regime:
The existing UK regulatory framework—largely a product of the DSM [digital single market] which was driven by successive UK Governments—works well for the most part and has been highly successful in delivering effective competition in the UK across a wide variety of markets.
82.BT Group’s written evidence explored in some depth how the UK’s regulatory system could be developed to support the commercial development of digital businesses once the UK has left the EU. They said there is an opportunity to “take advantage of Brexit” and the Government should:
espouse data free flow and open effectively regulated reciprocal trade in services (including communications services) in trade agreements with other nations or blocs.
Nevertheless, the first principle that BT wanted the Government to apply to the UK’s negotiations with the EU was aligning where possible:
to tried and tested regulatory principles, or agree to continue to operate within the existing framework as part of any negotiated settlement with the EU.
83.The Radiocentre, which represents commercial radio stations, is campaigning for an alteration in the regulatory environment, particularly as it relates to advertising. They wish to see the requirement to include ‘quick talking’ terms and conditions at the end of radio adverts removed. The requirement exists because it is mandated in the Consumer Credit Directive and although some progress was being made at EU level they said because of Brexit “there will almost certainly be scope for the rules to be reviewed.”
84.Similarly, Visit Britain argued that recent amendments to the travel package directive, which are burdensome for accommodation providers, could be revised once the UK has left the EU. They did not, however, explain how the UK could achieve regulatory freedom in this regard whilst also maintaining regulatory equivalence for visa free travel and continued participation in EU arrangements such as the single aviation market.
85.In some cases, witnesses regarded Brexit as an opportunity for the UK to develop relationships with markets which, as a member of the EU, would have been determined by the EU’s common commercial policy. Ozwald Boateng emphasised the importance of extending our trading relationship with Commonwealth nations to further develop markets for the high–end fashion industry. Mr Boateng told us that while the EU market offers approximately 400 million consumers, the Commonwealth market offers as many as 2.3 billion; developing a coherent, renewed strategy about how the fashion industry can better reach the Commonwealth market and exact its potential could help to mitigate any potential loses as a result of Brexit. Equally, fashion production chains—many of which rely on countries like Italy, Portugal and Turkey—could then be on-shore, but Mr Boateng remarked that this could only become a reality if the Government provided the appropriate strategy, including financial support.
86.Other witnesses argued for policy changes which could be implemented even if the UK had voted to remain in the EU. The Airport Operators Association, which is campaigning for a reduction in Air Passenger duty, said Brexit was the UK’s opportunity to “bring UK aviation taxes in line with Germany.” They called for regulatory simplification, but accept that this would be dependent on the UK’s final agreement with the EU.
87.Common rules, standards and regulation form part and parcel of the UK’s membership of the EU and its Single Market and Customs Union. Some argue that Brexit may provide opportunities to tailor our regulatory systems more closely to the needs of British businesses across tourism, the creative industries and the digital economy. Whether opportunities present themselves, however, will depend on the detail of the UK’s final agreement with the EU. We found little appetite amongst witnesses to surrender the benefits of a uniform and open European marketplace and regulatory system in favour of domestic regulatory changes that may not be consistent with the rest of the EU.
88.Some businesses, in the fashion and textiles sector, for instance, do see opportunities to improve trade links beyond the EU post-Brexit, and to develop strategies to support more UK-based production. The Government should, therefore, set out more clearly how this might be achieved—and what it will do to support this—and what the counter-vailing harmful effects are likely to be of leaving the Single Market and Customs Union.
89.The Government should set out as a matter of urgency those areas where it believes that Brexit offers an opportunity for beneficial regulatory reforms and how it intends to capitalise on any such opportunities.
90.Outside the US technology giants, the UK has the most developed digital technology sector of all the members of European Union. It has had, therefore, the most to gain from the developing digital single market—and has, therefore, potentially the most to lose in the future, should we not negotiate mutually beneficial arrangements following Brexit.
91.In this section, we address two concerns over which our enquiry received considerable evidence: the future of data roaming in the telecommunications sector; and data-sharing and protection, which affects a broader swathe of UK industry. Issues of copyright protection and those affecting broadcasting in the context of the digital single market we address in the Creative Industries section below.
92.In June 2017 mobile roaming surcharges for customers travelling within the EU were abolished in an initiative known as Roam Like at Home (RLAH). The House of Commons Library Briefing notes that the abolition of retail roaming charges for customers depends on a regulation which caps the wholesale prices that mobile operators in EU countries are allowed to charge when their customers roam on each other’s networks.
93.The House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) has examined the implications of Brexit for UK-EU mobile roaming as part of its ongoing scrutiny of European legislative proposals. In correspondence with the Committee, Matt Hancock MP, then Minister of State for Digital and now the Secretary of State for DCMS, said that the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill—then known as the Great Repeal Bill—would allow the Government to retain the current roaming arrangements after it had left the EU:
The Great Repeal Bill will end the authority of EU law. The same rules and laws will apply on the day after Brexit as they did before, including for roaming.
94.However, in April 2017 the ESC concluded that it was not persuaded by his argument that the same rules would apply after Brexit by virtue of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, because the wholesale roaming market was cross-border, and the Government would not be able to require mobile operators in other countries to cap the wholesale charges they applied to UK operators when UK customers used their networks:
The cross-border nature of roaming itself [ … ] means that, post-exit, even if the Government chose to retain the same EU rules in domestic law through the Great Repeal Bill, those rules would not have the same effect as at present (in the absence of a bilateral agreement with the EU27).
The Government would be able to cap the wholesale roaming charges that UK-based operators could impose on EU operators for using their networks, but could not [their emphasis] require EU-based operators to reciprocate when UK consumers used EU networks. EU operators would, in consequence, be free to charge UK operators higher wholesale roaming charges if they wished, which would quickly have the effect of rendering surcharge-free roaming services commercially unviable for UK networks.
95.Analysis undertaken by the House of Commons Library concluded that, although the Repeal Bill could prevent UK-based mobile operators from applying surcharges, that this would not apply to wholesale caps. Moreover, the Library paper observed that “the 2015 Government described the wholesale price caps as “a key enabler for the abolition of roaming charges”—calling into the question of retaining a ban on retail roaming charges in the absence of an agreement with the EU to continue to cap the wholesale charges incurred by operators.
96.Which? said in their written evidence that roaming charges were one of the most significant post–Brexit concerns for consumers. Ofcom’s written evidence reflected concern that Brexit will ultimately result in increased costs to British mobile customers:
Roaming charges are being reduced for mobile phone users across the EU, and this progress must be reflected in agreements between the UK and EU member states. Otherwise our mobile operators may be exposed to unfair costs, and UK consumers and businesses could end up paying more than our European neighbours.
97.Analysis by the legal firm Clifford Chance, however, suggested that market pressures may mean that consumers in the UK may not be adversely affected by no longer falling under the auspices of the EU regulations. Their analysis noted that, if Ofcom took a more interventionist stance in relation to retail markets, then the regulator may be able to drive down any initial hike in data roaming charges:
Ofcom’s Sharon White has argued to retain the current limits on roaming charges. Even in the absence of such agreements, competitive pressures may well force operators in both the UK and EU to limit roaming charges. Depending on its post-Brexit powers, Ofcom might also be in a position to drive down retail roaming charges charged by UK operators if these appear to be unfairly punitive for UK consumers.
98.BT’s written evidence, however, indicated that, because UK-based operators are likely to be exposed to uncapped wholesale costs, it may not be straightforward to limit roaming charges in line with the EU roaming regulation post Brexit:
While it requires EU mobile operators to offer ‘roam like at home’ services from June 2017, UK mobile operators will only be in a position to offer such services to their customers when roaming across the EU if they can also benefit from regulated wholesale access charges from operators based in other EU Member States. For example, customers of Swiss mobile operators face significantly higher roaming costs than customers of EU operators as the Swiss operators do not benefit from regulated wholesale rates. It is therefore important that this issue is covered as part of any new trading agreement between the UK and EU.
99.It should be noted, however, that DCMS analysis found that the cost to mobile operators of implementing the ban on surcharges was assessed to be between £110 and £200 million. The European Scrutiny Committee concluded that “non-participation in the EU initiative to abolish roaming charges will save UK mobile operators a significant amount of money” and highlighted independent analysis of the cost to mobile customers which reported that “retail roaming prices are typically a large mark-up on the equivalent wholesale charge that underpins the service.”
100.The end of mobile roaming surcharges within the EU is a significant benefit to UK consumers and is put at risk by Brexit.
101.We accept the European Scrutiny Committee’s conclusion that, after the UK leaves the EU, it will not be possible for the Government to legislate domestically to ensure that UK mobile operators are protected by the EU cap on wholesale roaming charges, due to the reciprocal, cross-border nature of the measure. It is therefore a matter for negotiation.
102.If the UK ceases to be protected by the wholesale roaming cap, EU-based mobile operators will be free to apply higher charges to UK operators when their customers use EU networks. Some mobile operators have already indicated that, if the wholesale roaming cap ceased to apply to them, they would be unable to continue to provide surcharge-free mobile roaming services to their customers, meaning the return of roaming surcharges.
103.After the UK leaves the EU, the Government may, in principle, be able to retain the ban on UK mobile operators surcharging their customers when they use roaming services within the EU. However, in the absence of an effective cap on wholesale prices, the commercial sustainability of this approach for operators appears highly suspect. The 2015 Government acknowledged that the wholesale roaming rules were a “key enabler” of the abolition of roaming surcharges.
104.To protect consumers from the reintroduction of roaming charges, we urge the Government to ensure that provisions which continue to cap wholesale roaming charges are included in any future UK-EU trade agreement. The Government must prioritise this as a first step in protecting consumers from a post-Brexit price hike. Following the UK’s departure from the EU, the Government and regulators should also act to prevent UK mobile operators from reintroducing and increasing retail roaming charges for UK customers.
105.The 1995 Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) formed the basis of EU data protection law. The 1998 Data Protection Act incorporated the directive into UK law, but in 2012 the European Commission proposed new legislation to address fundamental technological change and divergence in the way in which member states had enforced data protection law. The new General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679, the ‘GDPR’) came into force in May 2016 and member states had two years to transpose it into domestic law.
106.Giving evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union in February 2017, Matt Hancock MP, then Minister for Digital and Culture, said the GDPR was a “good piece of legislation”. The Queen’s Speech of 21 June 2017 included a Data Protection Bill to transpose the directive.
107.The importance of keeping the UK in step with EU data protection law after Brexit was highlighted by several witnesses. The Advertising Association said the UK must ensure that the UK maintains equivalence with the EU because the “transfer and use of user data across borders is a vital element in running successful digital advertising campaigns; online content knows no borders.” BT Group said:
The UK should remain aligned with EU data protection legislation, including the new General Data Protection Regulation, and in particular ensure that it retains an adequate level of protection for personal data so that data can continue to be exported from the EU to the UK.
108.Dell EMC made similar remarks in their written evidence but also said “it is important to have a wider review of the new regime, to see if there are any aspects that the UK would want to amend without compromising standards.” UKIE also addressed this point, but emphasised that in any consideration of reform of UK data protection legislation the balance must be struck in favour of maintaining continuity with the EU legislative framework:
Other non-EU countries, such as Switzerland and Norway, have managed to obtain the necessary free movement of data in a variety of ways, and the UK should seek to achieve the same outcome in the Brexit negotiations.
Matt Hancock said in March 2017 that he was “keen to secure the unhindered flow of data between the UK and the EU post-Brexit”.
109.Once the UK leaves the EU, the UK will be classified by the EU’s data protection framework as a “third country”. Maintaining the free flow of data and personal information across borders will only be possible if the UK can demonstrate to the EU that data will be protected in a manner that they deem to be adequate. The Institute for Government provided some context to adequacy agreements:
Currently, the Commission has recognised 12 countries or territories, including Argentina, Israel and New Zealand as providing fully adequate data protection.
The USA and Canada have been deemed to provide only partially adequate protection.
In Canada, only private organisations that use the data for commercial activities have free access to EU data.
110.In its description of the proposed Data Protection Bill, DCMS said that the UK’s regulation will differ from the GDPR in some respects:
The Bill is a complete data protection system, so as well as governing general data covered by GDPR, it covers all other general data, law enforcement data and national security data. Furthermore, the Bill exercises a number of agreed modifications to the GDPR to make it work for the benefit of the UK in areas such as academic research, financial services and child protection.
111.Reporting in July 2017, the House of Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee on Brexit “said it was ‘struck by the lack of detail’ on how the Government plans to deliver the unhindered flow of data after Brexit.” The Lords Committee concluded that adequacy decisions from the European Commission would be the “least burdensome” way for Government to achieve this goal.
112.The Committee emphasised the importance of transitional arrangements to protect data flows in relation to policing, security and commercial interests if an adequacy arrangement cannot be established prior to the UK’s exit from the EU:
Adequacy decisions can only be taken in respect of third countries, and there are therefore legal impediments to having such decisions in place at the moment of exit. In the absence of a transitional arrangement, this could put at risk the Government’s objective of securing uninterrupted flows of data, creating a cliff-edge. We urge the Government to ensure that any transitional arrangements agreed during the withdrawal negotiations provide for continuity of data-sharing, pending the adoption of adequacy decisions in respect of the UK.
113.Whether the Government will seek an adequacy agreement is not yet certain. The Minister said in October 2017 that the Government would seek “something akin” to an adequacy deal that would secure the free flow of personal data. Explaining why he used this specific terminology Mr Hancock said:
We want to make sure that the flow of data is unhindered, so we effectively seek an adequacy deal, but that is currently scheduled to be negotiated as part of the future relationship. Whether it is enacted through the formal EU mechanism of an adequacy deal or as part of the negotiation is, in a sense, immaterial. What matters is the unhindered free flow of data between the two regimes.
114.In oral evidence, the then Secretary of State confirmed that the Government’s broad intention is to “achieve adequacy with the European Union as part of our negotiations leaving the EU.” When challenged that an adequacy agreement could only be put in place once the UK is no longer a member of the EU, she said that the implementation phase of any deal post 2019 would enable this to happen:
We cannot enter into any free trade arrangements, or anything else with the EU, until we have actually left the EU, which is why we need to have an implementation period. [ … ]. We would expect to be able to continue with compliance with EU law, and maintain adequacy through the implementation period until we can sign any formal arrangements to have adequacy for the UK.
115.Matt Hancock said that “the UK has been a world leader in data protection for a long time” and that:
the Government is determined to ensure that, after our exit from the EU, the UK remains a global leader, promoting both the flow of data internationally and high standards of data protection.
116.However, House of Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee on Brexit concluded that, to maintain adequacy in the long term, the UK may be compelled to “continue to align domestic data protection rules with EU rules that it no longer participates in setting.”
117.The success of the UK’s digital economy is underpinned by ongoing data transfer across the globe and particularly within the EU. In order to preserve the UK’s policing and security arrangements, and to maintain commercial confidence, the Government must aim to deliver certainty from March 2019 onwards.
118.It is important to recognise that Brexit creates a potential risk that the UK’s ability to transfer data across borders will be limited. The Government said that the risk will be mitigated during the post March 2019 implementation phase of the final UK–EU deal as this will allow for an adequacy agreement to be developed. We believe it is essential that the transition period is constructed to maintain existing levels of data transfer, and that an adequacy agreement is reached at the earliest opportunity within the transition phase.
119.The conclusions of the House of Lords Committee expose two key concerns. Firstly, leaving the EU may not give the UK the flexibility to develop data protection law in the manner called for by witnesses such as Dell EMC. Secondly, once we leave the EU, our influence over the development of the legal framework that will guide UK law will be reduced, undermining our ability to agree structures and exemptions for the UK, and diminishing our role as a world leader in data protection law.
120.Brexit puts at risk the UK’s position as a world leader in developing and implementing the regulatory system for data protection. To address this concern, the Government should lay before Parliament an action plan which describes how, post-Brexit, the UK will be able to develop policy on data protection to support businesses and protect consumers, in order to keep pace with the demands of fast moving and developing technologies.
121.The UK has the third largest aviation network in the world and it is Europe’s biggest, serving 250 million passengers a year and contributing at least £22 billion to the economy in 2015. The industry also underpins the UK’s involvement in international trade, as well as the country’s tourism industry. Of overseas visitors to the UK, according to the Government’s latest statistics, 73% come by air and, of these, 61% were from other EU countries.
122.In this section, therefore, we focus on the two areas—apart from workforce issues considered earlier—where concerns were greatest in evidence submitted to us: maintaining the Single Aviation Market and tourist access to the UK, through its visa regime
123.The single market allows any UK airline to fly from any EU airport to any other EU airport, including domestic flights, and any EU airline to do the same within the UK. UK airlines also have access to the EU–US open skies agreement and all other EU multilateral aviation agreements.
124.Nations outside the EU have some access to the rights of full EU member states. Norway, for example, has single aviation market access but does not have access to the EU–US Open Skies agreement. Switzerland has similar access but does not enjoy cabotage rights (the right to fly domestically within an EU country).
125.In oral evidence Tim Alderslade, Chief Executive of Airlines UK, explained why EU aviation agreements are regarded as crucial:
We are by far and away the largest aviation market in Europe. Since we joined the single aviation market in 1992, we have seen prices come down, huge numbers of new entrants into the market, an increase in destinations. [ … ] But also the EU has negotiated air services agreements with seven countries outside the EU, including the United States, which is an incredibly important market for us.
126.Sally Balcombe of Visit Britain said that access to the single aviation market was essential to retaining visitor numbers to the UK. Conversely, the Airport Operators Association noted that the EU represents “the UK’s single biggest destination, accounting for 49% of passengers and 54% of scheduled commercial flights”. Their written evidence described how EU aviation agreements underpin the travel of most people entering and leaving the UK by air:
The top ten inbound markets by volume are all, except Australia, countries with which the UK has an EU-level air services agreement with, and this applies to seven of the top ten inbound markets by value (exceptions are Australia, China and Saudi Arabia). In relation to outbound tourism, 76% of all UK holidays are in EU countries and the top five destinations are all countries with which the UK has an EU-level air services agreement
127.Stephen D’Alfonso, Group Head of Public Affairs for Thomas Cook, said their “number one” priority” is to “have the correct agreements in place to make sure that we can continue to fly to key destination markets.” Developing an agreement at an early stage was emphasised by Alan Wardle of ABTA who noted in oral evidence that tour operators will soon be marketing packages for post March 2019 holidays. Giving evidence in November 2017 to the House of Commons Transport Committee’s inquiry into Aviation and Brexit, Sophie Dekkers, UK Director for EasyJet, confirmed that charter airline flights are now available to book for the summer of 2019.
128.The Airport Operators Association outlined the possible consequences of failing to reach agreement with the EU. Their written evidence argued that aviation agreements should not be included in a wider trade deal:
The failure to agree a new air services agreement would seriously disrupt important tourism links for the UK, the EU27 and countries like the US. This is why aviation is treated separately from trade agreements: comprehensive air services agreements are the pre-condition for the success of trade agreements.
129.Achieving agreement with the EU was thought to be vital, as falling back on WTO agreements was not seen as a viable option. The Airport Operators Association described the legal position:
While the UK has had bilateral air services agreements with most (but not all) EU27 countries, these date from a different era and are no longer fit for purpose. There is also a question over whether they are still legally valid since the creation of the Single Aviation Market superseded them. The same applies with the UK’s bilateral agreements with non-EU countries where there is now an EU-level air services agreement, like the US.
130.Examining the possible outcomes of the negotiations, Tim Alderslade said the options, as he viewed them, were threefold:
The options that we have are that we remain a member of the single aviation market—which is probably unlikely given that we would then have to accept free movement of people, which the Prime Minister has said is not an option—or we can have a bilateral agreement with the European Union, along the lines of what the Swiss have, or we have a transitional arrangement in place until such time as we can work out what sort of deal we want moving forward.
However, Mr Alderslade also said in evidence that the Government understands that the future of aviation is a “top priority” and he was “absolutely confident” that a deal would be put in place. Mr Alderslade made the case that, post-March 2019, it is likely that the European aviation market will continue to function as it does today:
It is absolutely inconceivable that we are not going to secure market access both within the EU and with third-party countries. This is a technical issue. It is an important one but it is essentially a technical problem and we need to resolve it the best way we can. We have two years to put a deal in place and if we don’t do that then I am absolutely confident that we would be able to get some transitional arrangements.
131.In answer to a written parliamentary question, John Hayes MP, then Minister of State, Department for Transport said:
it will be in the interests of all parties to maintain closely integrated aviation markets. The opening up of access to air services helps to deliver connectivity, choice and value for money that benefits consumers and businesses both here and abroad.
In oral evidence, the Secretary of State noted that it is not DCMS that is leading on the negotiations in this area, but she said that there would not be a cliff edge in March 2019.
132.It is very encouraging that the tourism and aviation sectors believe that existing aviation arrangements will be replicated once the UK has left the EU. Unfortunately, the then Secretary of State could provide very little detail as to the nature of the discussions, potential stumbling blocks and, crucially, the timing associated with reaching an agreement. The Government should recognise that it needs to provide certainty to an industry that is already marketing holidays for summer 2019, and for the consumers who will purchase them.
133.We believe reaching an early agreement in relation to aviation is a key priority for the Government. Nevertheless, the Government must provide an assurance that contingency plans are being made in the event of no deal being agreed and provide more information as to what any contingency arrangements would mean for businesses and travellers.
134.Developing a new system for entry to the UK would have separate but highly significant implications for the tourist industry. When travelling to and from the UK, EEA nationals (and Swiss nationals) are subject to a relatively light-touch system which is no different to that experienced by British passport holders entering the UK and is consistent with the principle of free movement. Consequently:
In 2015, 67% of visits to the UK and 44% of spend in the UK was from other EU member states; 8 of our top 10 and 13 of our top 20 inbound markets are EU member states.
135.Both Cornwall Council and the London Borough of Camden told us that free movement of travellers was vital to their local tourist industries. UKinbound agreed:
We are extremely concerned that Brexit should not mean delays at the Border, or a reduction in our “Welcome” for this important market. More worryingly still, would be any thought of introducing Visas for visitors from the EU, just at the time when we had won some important concessions for existing Visa-markets such as China. Not only would this reinforce a message that the UK was becoming less welcoming to inbound visitors, but it would also put a further barrier in the way of tourism, add cost and bureaucracy to a destination that is, for many, already perceived as expensive.
136.ABTA said in their written evidence that if a more stringent system was applied to EEA nationals it would “place significant strain on immigration services, and would likely lead to the necessary revision of current targets for processing people at UK borders.” ABTA warned that at entry points such as the Port of Dover major delays would be inevitable. In their written evidence, the Airport Operators Association added:
If free movement of people no longer applies, there would likely have to be a hard border check to determine the purpose of a traveller’s visit. [ … ] Should this change go ahead, without a corresponding increase in Border Force resources, this could result in significant increases in queues at passport control. These would much more regularly than today breach the Service Level Agreement target of a maximum 45-minute waiting time for non-EEA international visitors and see a significant deterioration in the passenger experience.
137.Several witnesses said in their evidence that, in response to Brexit, the Government should ease access to the UK for tourists from non–EU countries such as China and India. VisitBritain said that existing visa arrangements can act as a “barrier to visitors” and the Airport Operators Association called for the trial of a liberalised visa scheme for Chinese visitors to be extended to people travelling from India. Hilton’s evidence noted that the “UK China Visa Alliance suggests that the UK still underperforms in the number of Chinese visitors it attracts compared with other major European countries” and noted that the “Britain’s market share of India’s outbound tourists has halved since 2006, despite the market growing at 10% each year.” The City of London Corporation attributed the UK’s relatively poor performance in attracting Chinese and Indian tourists to the fact that our EU competitors are within the Schengen free travel area, where “one visa is sufficient for 26 countries.”
138.The development of a new system of entry to the UK for EEA visitors will be a key aspect of the UK’s relationship with the EU after Brexit. In its consideration of the implications of altering the principle of free movement, the Government must be aware of the detrimental impact this could have for the UK as a tourist destination. Businesses and organisations within the tourist industry are understandably concerned and we believe that the Government should be cautious about taking any steps which could harm the ‘welcome’ the UK provides to tourists.
139.Given the potential benefits to the British tourist industry, while the Government is grappling with the challenges posed by Brexit, it would be wise to design a new system also to encourage more tourism from non-EU markets. We recommend that the Government publishes an analysis of how the visa system could be developed to boost inbound tourism by visitors from beyond the EU.
140.The Creative Industries are a distinctive, important and growing sector, employing around 3 million people in all (9.3% of the UK total) and contributing £87.4bn to the UK’s economy in 2015. They account for 9.4% of all services exported from the UK, worth £21.2bn, with 45% going to the EU; and for 5.2% of all goods’ exports, another £14.7 billion in 2015.
141.Covering nine sub-sectors in all—advertising and marketing; architecture; crafts; design (products, graphic and fashion); film, TV, video, radio and photography; IT, software and computer services, including video games; museums, galleries and libraries; music; performing and visual arts; and publishing—they touch on all aspects of British cultural and business life and, naturally, our inquiry received evidence from all aspects of the creative industries.
142.This evidence highlighted several important concerns relating to the UK’s exit from the EU. In particular, the creative industries are concerned about the future of existing Intellectual Property (IP) provisions, including specific EU initiatives like the Country of Origin principle, the Unregistered Community Design Right, and Artists’ Resale Rights, as well as the much broader obligations of copyright law. Various aspects of UK IP law derive from EU Directives, posing a difficult challenge should existing EU legislation not be fully transposed into domestic law before the UK’s departure. Equally as important, crucial areas of IP enforcement rely on cooperation with EU countries.
143.Organisations across the creative industries sector have called on the Government to protect the current IP and copyright regime. This would include a commitment to preserving relevant EU Directives currently transposed into UK law, and ensuring that IP issues form a central part of any future trade relationship with the EU. Organisations that provided evidence to us also called for a guarantee that any new copyright legislation will be reinforced by a strong enforcement framework. Those from the creative sector who provided us with evidence state that these steps, combined with others mentioned in the following sections, will help to create a legitimate marketplace where the creative industries can continue to thrive.
144.The Alliance for Intellectual Property, which represents 23 trade associations from across the creative, branded and design sectors, described IP to us as “the bedrock of creative industries”. Current IP protections drive investment, productivity, employment and prosperity in the creative sector, in the process safeguarding the UK’s soft cultural power throughout Europe and the wider world.
145.The current IP framework in the United Kingdom is underpinned by various international agreements, but is fundamentally determined by a combination of EU Directives (transposed as UK law) and UK case law. The Government has yet to fully outline the future application of the provisions of UK IP law that constitute the implementation of European Directives, and has been unclear about whether secondary legislation implementing EU Directives would continue to apply following any repeal of the European Communities Act 1972.
146.The Incorporated Society of Musicians, which represents an industry particularly vulnerable to the consequences of IP theft (in the second quarter of 2016 alone, 78 million music tracks were accessed illegally online), told us that the Government must outline its stance on transposed EU IP regulations. The Alliance for Intellectual Property stated that the Government must ensure that historic decisions concerning pertinent EU law will continue to be binding in the UK following Brexit.
147.With the UK likely to be removed from the process of determining EU law following its planned departure from the EU, the Creative Industries Federation told us that the Government could “further develop its network of IP attachés in priority countries” to ensure that future EU IP laws are not detrimental to the UK creative sector. Such a solution may help to address another acute concern of the sector: that once outside of the EU, the UK will lose its ability to shape the IP laws that govern one of our biggest external markets.
148.Paired with their concern about the future of IP law, a considerable number of organisations from across the creative sector expressed specific fears about the copyright regulatory framework. Copyright, a subset of IP law, ensures that the work of the UK creative industries is protected in both the domestic and global marketplace. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, copyright enables creators to derive financial return for their work while simultaneously providing an incentive for businesses to invest in creative content.
149.At the moment, the UK currently provides a high level of protection for copyright works, the provisions of which are enshrined in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. However, while the basic concepts of copyright have been agreed at a global level through the Berne Convention, TRIPS27 and the WIPO28 Internet Treaties, many provisions of UK copyright law derive from European Union Directives. With the Government yet to outline how transposed EU law will operate within the UK after Brexit, the fate of the current copyright regulatory environment remains unclear.
150.The creative industries are seriously concerned by this lack of clarity, and offered several possible solutions for protecting the UK’s strong copyright regime. Articulating a common position, the British Copyright Council told us that the UK’s copyright framework must continue to protect the interests of copyright holders and owners of related rights by transposing existing EU Directives fully into UK law. This approach would provide an element of stability both before and after the UK’s departure from the EU, allowing organisations in the creative industries, many of whom rely on copyright licensing to service global markets, to continue to work without detrimental disruption.
151.‘The Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS), which represents 90,000 authors, told us that, following the so-called ‘Hargreaves Review’, UK copyright law had already introduced aspects which go beyond harmonised EU provisions, in a process that was heavily influenced by the technology sector. It highlighted several safeguards for authors in the Draft EU Directive on the digital single market, including the right to proper information over exploitation of their works and the right to extra, fairer remuneration over future use of such works. It is also, therefore, concerned over the UK’s possible loss of influence as the Draft develops, as well as UK authors being excluded from any beneficial final provisions. ‘Any Brexit strategy must develop fair safeguards for authors and performers in the UK in line with those previously developed in the EU and announced in the EU Draft Directive on the digital single market,’ the organisation told us.
152.Creative organisations were equally as supportive for inclusion of copyright protections into new trade deals following Brexit, with the Creative Industries Federation stating:
Strong protection for copyright should be incorporated as a key principle into any new trade agreements to provide certainty for UK creators, publishers, performers and rights holders and ensure that we can maximise the opportunities to build our presence in new markets over the coming years.
By enshrining copyright provisions in any future trade agreements with the EU and elsewhere, the UK can continue to ensure that its creative output does not fall out of step with its current economic and cultural contributions.
153.The Incorporated Society of Musicians offered a further means of ensuring a strong, robust copyright environment for the UK creative sector after Brexit: membership of the digital single market. In evidence submitted to our inquiry, the group told us:
We support the UK joining the digital single market as a way of protecting copyright from platform interests and international companies which seek to undermine the value of intellectual property through the promotion of “fair use” and other damaging doctrines.
154.Membership of the digital single market would allow the UK to continue to exert a degree of influence over the future of the EU copyright framework, while simultaneously guaranteeing a single standard of copyright protection in both the UK and the EU.
155.Protecting the legislative framework of the UK’s future copyright environment is crucial for the creative industries, but evidence we received also stressed the need for accompanying enforcement mechanisms. UK Music told us:
To support the copyright framework we expect strong enforcement of the law from the UK Government. Creating a legitimate marketplace increases our capacity for growth and supports overall economic wellbeing [ … ] We would like to see the UK Government continue to work within the EU in relation to commercial-scale infringements (the “follow the money” approach) and specific action regarding cross-border enforcement.
The Creative Industries Federation echoed the need for effective enforcement mechanisms, calling on the Government to provide a clear regulatory framework for the “strong enforcement of Intellectual Property rights, including copyright and trademarks.”
156.While the Government’s failure to lay out such a strategy has caused concern about the future of copyright enforcement after Brexit, the likely break from EU-directed legislation provides a window of opportunity for improving the current enforcement system. The Publishers Association outlined several enforcement areas that could be improved. These include requiring search engine companies to clamp down on websites that illegally pirate copyright material; a study by the Motion Picture Association found that 74% of people accessing pirate sites for the first time did so via a search engine. Search engines could also be reprimanded for directing users to illegal content, which could occur by the ranking of search engine results. This focus on intermediaries of copyright crime could be coupled, the Publishers Association states, with continued funding for the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit.
157.However, the Government must also acknowledge that Brexit poses significant challenges for enforcement. The current EU copyright enforcement framework relies heavily on Europol to conduct investigations and reprimand offenders, but the UK’s membership of Europol following Brexit is currently unclear. Were the UK to opt out of Europol, its ability to enforce penalties for copyright regulations in EU territories could significantly diminish. In turn, the Publishers Association called on the Government to sign a cooperation agreement with Europol, allowing the UK to operate closely with its European partners on tackling Intellectual Property infringement.
158.Preserving a strong, robust Intellectual Property framework is crucial for the continued success of the creative industries after Brexit. As such, the Government should clarify its position on whether EU Intellectual Property transposed into UK law (via secondary legislation or otherwise) will continue to apply after Brexit, and if not, what contingency plans the Government has in place to ensure that the current level of Intellectual Property protection remains following the UK’s departure from the EU. At the very least, the Government should commit to ensuring that the current level of Intellectual Property protections offered by EU and UK law, including those that are vital to the success of the Creative industries, will remain unchanged.
159.Equally, the Government should clarify how it intends Intellectual Property enforcement to operate after the UK has left the EU. The Government should lay out its plan for cooperation with EU states after Brexit on Intellectual Enforcement Property matters, and outline what improvements, if any, it intends to make to the current enforcement framework.
160.Within the UK there are five different Intellectual Property protections which can be used to protect designs. The trade association, Anti–Copying in Design, told the Committee that EU regulations are generally harmonised with domestic law but in the case of unregistered designs this is not the case. Therefore, the potential loss of the EU Unregistered Community Design Right was identified by a large number of witnesses as having the potential to leave a gap in protection for the UK’s design and fashion businesses. The Alliance for Intellectual Property described how it provides benefits that go beyond those available in UK law:
The EU unregistered design regime (although only lasting three years) is more favourable to designers as it allows protection to be claimed for all aspects of a design under one right such as surface decoration and colour combinations which the UK design laws do not. UK unregistered design right only offers protection for the shape and configuration of a 3D design.
161.Olswang LLP, a legal firm that works for clients within the British fashion industry, said in its evidence that they:
routinely send cease and desist letters on behalf of our clients in the fashion industry to assert and enforce such rights. The vast majority of the legal cases that have been brought before the UK Courts relating to fashion designs over the last few years have invoked Community rather than UK rights.
The purpose of cease and desist letters is to stop production before an infringement is taken to court. Anti–Copying in Design’s evidence highlighted the significance of protection for unregistered designs, noting that “most of the 1,000’s of settlements on behalf of ACID members have been based on recorded evidence of unregistered EU or UK design rights.”
162.Caroline Rush CBE, Chief Executive Officer of the British Fashion Council, outlined the commercial implications of losing the protection afforded by the Unregistered Community Design Right:
At the moment, that allows for you to disclose your design within the EU, which is quite often done at trade fairs or at London Fashion Week itself. The EU registration covers not only specifics of design but surface pattern as well, which is very important particularly in the designer sector. This has to be disclosed first within the EU and our deep concern is that post exiting the EU those rights will not be recognised and if you were to disclose your collection at London Fashion Week, for instance, those rights will not be protected. All of the copyright issues that tend to arise, particularly through the high-end designer sector, will not necessarily be protected. That means it is a real challenge for London Fashion Week because everyone is going to want to be able to protect their designs as best they possibly can.
163.The British Fashion Council’s written evidence described how London Fashion Week is central to the commercial success of the British Fashion Industry:
London Fashion Week is an important platform for our country as it positions us as a global leader in fashion alongside New York (USA), Milan (Italy), Paris (France). This has immediate benefit to the British economy in terms of spend, it further attracts inward investment in terms of international retailers, but the most important is arguably the reputation which enables a £28billion industry to be competitive.
They concluded that, if the UK were to sit outside of the EU’s unregistered design regime, businesses and designers would want to retain the protection of the UCD within the rest of EU, “effectively closing down London Fashion Week as a platform to promote British businesses.”
164.Looking to the UK’s post–Brexit future, witnesses from across the fashion industry called for, at the very least, a revision of the UK’s existing protections for unregistered design. Olswang LLP said that within UK law there should be an “automatic protection for all new designs including those for surface decoration which would, at a minimum, mirror the scope and 3-year term of protection.”
165.Anti-Copying in Design echoed the call for an extension of UK law to cover all aspects of design and explained why UK law, which provides a minimum of ten years’ protection, is preferable to the three-year limit within the EU system:
The current 3 year EU term gives nothing more than a first to market advantage and as an intellectual property right is not in keeping with the purpose of such rights which allow a return on the investment made by a designer in creating new products.
166.Witnesses, however, did not believe that simply updating the UK unregistered design right would be sufficient to protect British designers and the commercial interests of the industry. Olswang LLP explained why a continuation of reciprocal rights with the EU will be necessary:
Currently, the Community design is such a powerful right because the owner can use it to ask a Court to grant an injunction which stops a copycat product from being sold anywhere within the EU. Post Brexit, UK fashion brands will no longer be able to obtain the same pan-European relief, which significantly increases their legal costs as they would be forced to commence litigation in each of the EU member states where the copycat product was being sold. We therefore believe that these rights can only adequately be protected if the UK government negotiates a mutual recognition treaty with the EU so that UK Courts will recognise and enforce Community designs when they are proven to have been copied in the UK and EU Courts will recognise and enforce British designs within the EU, ideally on a pan-European basis.
167.Caroline Rush described the approach that the British Fashion Council hoped the Government would take to maintaining the EU regime within the UK:
What we are going to be seeking with Government is to understand how legally you can show as part of London Fashion Week but be seen to disclose those designs maybe digitally within the EU so that those rights are protected and they are recognised on both sides.
Similarly, the Design Council argued in its written evidence that losing the EU protection would create a “’gap’ in coverage for UK designers” and they noted the significance of the Intellectual Property Office in shaping the UK’s Brexit negotiations so that “UK designers are not unfairly disadvantaged, and that appropriate transitional arrangements are in place.”
168.Witnesses were unequivocal in stating that losing the protection of the Unregistered Community Design Right would be hugely damaging to the design and fashion industries within the UK. Operating outside the EU regime could mean that the UK loses first marketing protections, weakening the UK’s competitive position and undermining major events such as London Fashion Week. The UK system does not provide sufficient protection on its own and it is evident that protecting the commercial interests of designers and maintaining the pre–eminent position of events such as London Fashion Week can only be achieved via a reciprocal system with comprehensive powers of enforcement.
169.We note that organisations such as the British Fashion Council are exploring ways that technology could be harnessed to access EU protections, but we believe it is imperative to negotiate a continuation of EU-wide protection for British businesses.
170.Artists’ Resale Rights (ARR), introduced in the UK on a phased basis between 2006 and 2012, give creators of original works of art the right to receive a royalty each time one of their artworks is sold on the secondary market by an art market professional for more than €1,000. ARR is an EU initiative, and it aims to give artists an on-going royalty stream for their work. Professional Advisors to the International Market (PAIAM) state that ARR is levied at 4% on sale prices (net of tax) between €1,000 and €50,000, with a sliding scale that reduces to 0.25% on prices of more than €500,000, and subject to a cap so that the total amount of the royalty due on the sale of an artwork cannot exceed €12,500.
171.Analysis of ARR has revealed that the initiative has had both positive and negative impacts on UK artists. Early analyses of ARR argued that the initiative was likely to be damaging for the UK art sector. When the prospect of ARR first emerged in the mid-1990s, a 1996 Government study found that its implementation would lead to nearly a £70 million loss of earnings, incur administrational costs, diminish art dealers’ margins and provide a maximum of £10 million to eligible artists. The Intellectual Property Office’s 2008 study of ARR found that the return paid to artists had been relatively modest, and that it had not benefited as many artists as planned. Equally, according to PAIAM, a critical disadvantage of ARR is that, of the three main art market centres in the world (London, New York and Hong Kong), London is the only one in which ARR is levied, thereby putting the UK art market at a disadvantage.
172.More recent studies, however, have demonstrated ARR’s various positive impacts. A 2016 study commissioned by the Design and Artists Copyright Society (DACS) found no evidence to suggest that ARR had negatively impacted the UK art market, or that it had diverted sales to non-ARR markets, such as those in New York and Hong Kong. The study also found that—contrary to earlier studies, which believed that ARR would only benefit well-known artists—a substantial part of ARR royalties have been generated by artists selling pieces in the lower price brackets, with PAIAM adding that “it is fair to assume that a lot of these works are by less-established and emerging artists.”
173.In evidence provided to us, DACS were seriously concerned about the potential negative impact of opting out from ARR. They told us that:
ARR is not only valuable to British artists but also to public arts institutions as it continues to provide resources to artists and estates to contribute to their legacies and the collections of these institutions, preserving the UK’s cultural heritage for future generations.
174.For UK artists, DACS stated, ARR is vital for income, as it helps them to reinvest in their practice and continue to drive up the value of their work that goes into the secondary market. For estates, DACS said that “it supports the artist’s legacy by providing revenues to be used for managing the estate or foundation and for conservation”. Collectively, according to DACS, the benefits of ARR contribute positively to the UK’s cultural heritage. The Government, however, has yet to public articulate their stance towards the UK’s membership of ARR following Brexit.
We call on the Government to explain whether they intend for the UK to retain its involvement with Artists’ Resale Rights after Brexit, and if not, what alternatives the Government has drawn up to provide identical financial support for UK artists and estates.
175.The EU’s ‘country of origin’ rules allow television companies to broadcast throughout the EU by complying with the rules of the EU country in which they are based. When establishing a European headquarters, broadcasters from outside the EU can choose the UK as their centre of operations. The Government’s written evidence noted that the “UK is an attractive prospect for US broadcasters, who utilise the pool of skilled production and broadcast staff to distribute services across the EU.” In oral evidence John Kampfner added:
Ofcom in the UK licenses more than half of the 2,200 channels broadcast across the EU, and of that more than 1,100,650 are being broadcast out of the UK to other countries.
176.The country of origin (COO) principle is enshrined in the Audio-Visual Media Services (AVMS) Directive. The AVMS approach to regulation is widely supported across the broadcasting industry because it ensures that broadcast services need to be regulated only by the member state. Sharon White, Ofcom’s Chief Executive, told us that this is the “biggest issue for our sector” and Ofcom’s written evidence emphasised the importance of retaining these arrangements post Brexit:
We believe the Country of Origin principle should endure in the UK after Brexit, so that media companies based here do not face new hurdles, or feel compelled to move their operations to another European country. We want to encourage, not undermine, the growth of our cultural and creative industries. The Country of Origin rule benefits member states and supports broadcasters, providing a mass audience, and promoting cultural exchange across borders.
177.BT Group said that without a retention of the COO rules for the UK, content rights holders such as BT:
would only be able to offer portability to our customers by clearing rights in each individual EU Member State with potentially different rights-owners in each jurisdiction, which would be highly burdensome and inefficient.
178.AETN UK, a joint venture between Sky Limited and A+E Networks LLC, the US-based studio and broadcaster, said in its written evidence that if the UK could not continue to participate within the COO framework—or a negotiated equivalent—it would reduce investment in the UK, lead to job losses and relocation of businesses. The Advertising Association said “international channels established in the UK would have to re-license their services in an EU market, and move some, or all, of their workforce accordingly.” Asked whether broadcasters were preparing to relocate from the UK, Sharon White said that plans were being prepared:
I think it is clear that there are a number of companies who have contingency plans. [ … ] At the moment, my sense is that the plans are there and the question, I think a bit like financial services, is just watching to see whether the picture becomes clearer and more certain over the next few months.
179.The COO principle within the AVMS directive is not the only European television convention. The Council of Europe’s European Convention on Transfrontier Television (Convention) provides for “a limited form of COO”, but AETN UK did not believe that this would provide a viable alternative to the COO rules because “it is deficient in a number of respects, not least because it only applies to traditional ‘linear’ broadcasts, not on-demand services.”
180.Furthermore, the Advertising Association observed that the Council of Europe’s Convention was last updated in 2002 and “would only provide assurance of access to some but not all parts of the EU.” The House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee agreed with this analysis and concluded that the Convention is severely limited and, perhaps most significantly, it lacks any form of enforcement mechanism.
181.Working on the assumption that there are no sufficient fall–back options, it will be for the Government to negotiate a new arrangement with the EU. Sharon White said it was her view that there is a recognition within the Government of the importance of reaching an agreement that would retain the COO principle. Ofcom’s written evidence outlined the conditions that will exist as part of a new agreement:
Country of Origin cannot endure merely by virtue of existing in UK law. It will only continue to stand if the remaining 27 Member States continue to allow UK-based companies to broadcast to their markets under UK rules; and if the UK allows companies based overseas to broadcast here under EU rules, even though we would no longer have direct influence over these rules.
182.It is likely, however, that negotiations designed to keep the UK within the COO rules would take place outside of those to agree an EU–UK trade deal. The House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee reported in its analysis of the directive that this is because:
Broadcasting is one of the least liberalised sectors in global trade, in terms of both World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). This is because most countries insist that the particular nature and importance of culture means that it should not be treated like other commodities (“l’exception culturelle”).
Maintaining the UK within the scope of the COO rules will, therefore, require a separate agreement, but this is far from assured. The European Scrutiny Committee noted that there “is no precedent for a third country securing Single Market-equivalent access for broadcasters.”
183.Witnesses to this inquiry identified no benefits that could be derived by excluding ourselves from the AVMS arrangements that enshrine the Country of Origin principle. The European Scrutiny Committee reported in the last Parliament that alternative routes to market for UK-based broadcasters are unsatisfactory and we heard evidence that UK-based international broadcasters are already planning contingency arrangements which could see them moving abroad.
184.If Country of Origin rules cease to apply after Brexit then we must expect this will have an impact on the broadcasting industry within the UK. The Government must set out the steps it is taking to avoid that outcome, explaining its negotiating objectives and the timescale for such negotiation. The Government should provide an update to the Committee on progress made in securing a deal by the end of May 2018.
185.The Government should also confirm as soon as possible that it intends for the United Kingdom to remain members of the European Single Market and under the terms of the current Country of Origin rules, for a transitional period after Brexit, until the end of 2020.
186.While much evidence from the creative industries was in favour of many of the provisions of the current Draft Single Digital Market Directive, one aspect of the proposals was of concerns to the audio-visual sector, in particular: the extension of the ‘Country of Origin Principle’ to broadcasters’ ‘ancillary online services’, allowing them to make online ‘simulcast’ and catch-up services available in all EU countries, not just in the country for which the broadcaster has purchased the rights to a particular film, programme or event.
187.The Committee received substantial representations against this proposal—which would affect broadcasters’ existing territorial licensing arrangements—including from the Motion Picture Association, PACT and individual broadcasters such as CBS Studios. Their evidence underlined the importance of the UK continuing to participate strongly in discussions over the Draft Directive, in order not to lose influence over its final provisions.
188.The Digital Single Market Working Group, an umbrella group from the audio-visual sector chaired by PACT’s Chief Executive John McVay, told us that:
the continued ability to license content on an exclusive territorial basis is fundamental to the sustainable financing and distribution models that underpin the commercial viability of audio-visual content, whether it be high-end scripted drama, independent films, US films or the broadcast of elite sport. Recent research demonstrates that undermining this long-established and fundamental principle of exclusive territoriality would have significant negative consequences for the industry and viewers.
189.The European Commission, the Working Group said, has stated that broadcasters will not be required to make services available across borders and that rights holders will still be able to license on a territorial basis, but this has not allayed industry concerns for many reasons to do with how licences are negotiated in practice and how loopholes could be exploited.
190.The Motion Picture Association was very forthright about the potential impact of the Draft proposals:
They threaten the competitiveness of the UK’s film and television sector and will ultimately result in a negative impact for consumers. MPA members do not oppose the principle of removing barriers to trade across borders within the single market - but heavy handed, poorly targeted intervention of the kind currently proposed by the Commission, will result in economic harm to the audio-visual sector which, in turn, will negatively impact the industry’s ability to invest in new film and TV content, thereby harming consumers and as well as jobs in the sector.
191.The concerns of audio-visual sector, including broadcasters, producer and rights holders, over terms of the Draft Digital Single Market Directive which would affect territorial licensing are just one example as why it is crucially important that the UK needs to preserve its influence while Brexit proceeds. The Government should clearly spell out its strategy for doing so and how it proposes to embed its future participation in the widening of the digital single market in any Withdrawal Agreement.
88 para 4
89 para 9
90 p 6
91 para 17
92 para 5 b
93 para 5 a
94 p 4 [Note by Radiocentre: We wanted to clarify that Radiocentre is seeking to reform the EU legislation which requires advertisements to include lengthy terms and conditions in order to better protect consumers, not remove requirements entirely. As Radiocentre set out in their written submission to the inquiry, they believe there is an opportunity for the Government to ‘make positive steps to review and implement better regulation with regard to terms and conditions’. While this may seem like a small issue we believe this is an important distinction to make, as our campaign is focussed on reforming terms and conditions, not removing them, in order to make them easier to understand for radio listeners and better protecting UK consumers.]
95 p 7
96 p 5
100 para 25
101 para 26
102 For more information see House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 8034, “The abolition of mobile roaming charges and Brexit” (6 July 2017)
103 House of Commons, Digital Single Market: Wholesale Roaming, report chapters published on 14 September 2016, 18 January 2017, 8 February 2017, 29 March 2017, 25 April 2017
104 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmeuleg/71-xxxv/7109.htm, para 14
106 House of Commons Library, The abolition of mobile roaming charges and Brexit, Number 8034, 6 July 2017, p 20
107 para 9
108 , para 29
110 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Thirty-Seventh Report of Session 2016–17, HC 71-xxxv,
111 HC 71-xxxv, para 6.29
113 para 28
114 para 45 C
115 p 2
116 p 8
117 Select Committee on the European Union, EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, Corrected oral evidence: The EU Data Protection Package, 1 February 2017, Q1
119 Data Protection Bill, Factsheet – Overview
122 Brexit: the EU data protection package
123 Hansard, Leaving the EU: Data Protection, 12 October 2017, Volume 629, Column 499
124 Hansard, Leaving the EU: Data Protection, 12 October 2017, Volume 629, Column 500
127 Hansard, Leaving the EU: Data Protection, 12 October 2017, Volume 629, Column 499
128 Hansard, Leaving the EU: Data Protection, 12 October 2017, Volume 629, Column 499
132 para 5
133 para 5
136 Oral evidence to the Transport Committee, November 2017, HC 531 Q16
137 para 17
138 para 16
142 HC Deb, 20 September 2017, cW
144 The EEA includes EU countries, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, which are part of the Single Market. Switzerland is neither an EU nor EEA member but is part of the Single Market, allowing its nationals the same rights to work in and travel to the UK.
145 p 2
146 p 2
147 para 3.22
148 para 3.22
149 para 22
150 para 24, p 5
151 paras 3.3, 3.4
152 para 16
153 Alliance for Intellectual Property (IOB0067) para 5
154 Incorporated Society of Musicians (IOB0089) para 22
155 Creative Industries Federation, (October, 2016), p 60
156 Alliance for Intellectual Property (IOB0067) para 7
157 World Intellectual Property Organization, (2011) p 20
158 Creative Industries Federation, (October, 2016), p 59
159 British Copyright Council (IOB0028) para 2
160 p 2
161 Creative Industries Federation, (October, 2016), p 61
162 Incorporated Society of Musicians (IOB0089) para 23
163 UK Music (IOB0024) para 19
164 Creative Industries Federation (IOB0106), para 2
165 The Publishers Association (OB0083) para 24
166 The Motion Picture Association, (September 2013) p 8
167 The Publishers Association (OB0083) para 26
168 The Publishers Association (OB0083) para 27
169 p 3
170 p 3
171 p 3
172 p 1
173 p 3
175 para 25
176 para 25
177 p 1
178 p 3
179 p 1–2
181 para 22
182 Original works of art include paintings, engravings, sculpture and ceramics. “Art market professionals” includes, but is not limited to, auction houses, galleries and art dealers. Professional Advisors to the International Market, Memorandum: What impact might Brexit have on Artists’ Resale Rights (August 2017), p 2
183 These figures are from August 2017. Professional Advisors to the International Market, Memorandum: What impact might Brexit have on Artists’ Resale Rights (August 2017), p 2
184 Department for Trade and Industry, Explanatory Memorandum to the EU Directive: Artists Resale Rights (1996), Annex I
185 Katy Graddy, A Study Into the Effect on the UK Art Market of the Introduction of the Artist’s Resale Right (January 2008)
186 Professional Advisors to the International Market, Memorandum: What impact might Brexit have on Artists’ Resale Rights (August 2017), p 4
187 DACS, (2016), p 8
188 Professional Advisors to the International Market, Memorandum: What impact might Brexit have on Artists’ Resale Rights (August 2017), p 4
189 DACS (IOB0051) para 3
190 DACS (IOB0051) para 5
191 DACS (IOB0051) para 5
192 DACS (IOB0051) para 3
193 para 8
194 Q11 This number could not be verified but is what was recorded in the evidence session.
195 The Work of Ofcom, HC 407, Q89
196 , paras 16
197 para 29
198 para 8
199 para 22
200 The Work of Ofcom, HC 407, Q94
201 para 5
202 para 22 Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden are not signatories to the agreement
203 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, HC 71-xxxvii, Fortieth Report of Session 2016–17, 25 April 2017, para 10.5
204 , paras 17
205 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, HC 71-xxxvii, Fortieth Report of Session 2016–17, 25 April 2017, para 10.4
206 HC 71-xxxvii, para 10.27
207 , ,
24 January 2018