House of Commons
Defence Committee

Missile Misdemeanours: Russia and the INF Treaty

Fifteenth Report of Session 2017–19
House of Commons
Defence Committee

Missile Misdemeanours: Russia and the INF Treaty

Fifteenth Report of Session 2017–19

Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 26 March 2019
The Defence Committee

The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.

Current membership

Rt Hon Dr Julian Lewis MP (Conservative, New Forest East) (Chair)
Leo Docherty MP (Conservative, Aldershot)
Martin Docherty-Hughes MP (Scottish National Party, West Dunbartonshire)
Rt Hon Mr Mark Francois MP (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)
Graham P Jones MP (Labour, Hyndburn)
Johnny Mercer MP (Conservative, Plymouth, Moor View)
Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend)
Gavin Robinson MP (Democratic Unionist Party, Belfast East)
Ruth Smeeth MP (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent North)
Rt Hon John Spellar MP (Labour, Warley)
Phil Wilson MP (Labour, Sedgefield)

Powers

The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications

© Parliamentary Copyright House of Commons 2019. This publication may be reproduced under the terms of the Open Parliament Licence, which is published at www.parliament.uk/copyright/.

Committee reports are published on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.uk/defcom and in print by Order of the House.

Evidence relating to this report is published on the inquiry page of the Committee’s website.

Committee staff

Mark Etherton (Clerk), Dr Adam Evans (Second Clerk), Ian Hart, David Nicholas, Eleanor Scarnell, Ian Thomson and Dr Lauren Twort (Committee Specialists), Chrysoula Kapelonis (Hansard Scholar), Sarah Williams (Senior Committee Assistant) and Arvind Gunnoo (Committee Assistant).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is defcom@parliament.uk. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson on 020 7219 1589.
Contents

Summary 3

1 Introduction 5

2 The INF Treaty 7
   Origins 7
   Treaty provisions 10

3 Violation of the Treaty 12
   Indications of Russian violation 12
   Motivations 17
      Nuclear posture 17
      Conventional posture 18
      Bureaucratic/industrial momentum 19
      Political advantage 19
   Asia and the Middle East 20
   Allegations of US violations 22
      Unmanned aerial vehicles/drones 22
      Missile defence targets 23
      Deployment of Mark 41 launchers 23
   UK response 24

4 Future action 26
   Diplomatic options 26
      Public presentation of intelligence 27
   US, NATO and UK defence policy 29
   Impact on future arms control 32

Conclusions and recommendations 35

Annex 1: US nuclear forces in Europe 40

Annex 2: Alleged Russian non-compliance in arms control agreements 41

Formal minutes 44

Witnesses 45

Published written evidence 45

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 46
Summary

The INF Treaty is a landmark Cold War arms control agreement in response to Soviet deployment of a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear missiles—the SS-20s—from the mid-1970s. Through a co-ordinated policy of diplomatic and military responses, NATO was able to meet this challenge and bring the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. The resulting treaty abolished an entire category of land-based nuclear missiles and prohibited their future development by Russia or the United States. The agreement remains central to nuclear arms control. At some point in the mid to late 2000s, the Russian Government decided to develop and later deploy a missile system—the SSC-8—which clearly violated the Treaty.

Successive US administrations over a number of years have sought to bring Russia back into compliance, but each attempt has been met with flat denial and total intransigence. The US announcement that it is now seeking to withdraw from the Treaty is a justified response to Russia’s continuing violation. For several years, NATO has shown increasing concern at Russia’s activities and has now come to a unanimous view in support of the US analysis and its determination to confront the issue. The British Government is right to support this strong collective position. Whilst at every point a diplomatic solution has been and continues to be sought, an essentially bilateral Treaty that has been rendered inoperative by its violation by one party should not be saved at any cost. International arms control relies on adherence to reciprocal obligations and nations should not be required to subject themselves to unilateral observance of them. Arms control more generally is undermined by violation going unchallenged.

There are no straightforward options for saving the Treaty in its current form and any attempt to replace it must be underpinned by robust and continuing verification requirements. However, a change in Russia’s policy on adherence to such agreements would be a necessary prerequisite.

While the security situation in Asia is a factor in both Russian and American nuclear policy, we reject the claims that the US is content to see the Treaty collapse, or has deliberately engineered this because it wishes to deploy missiles in Asia against a growing threat from China. The US has at every stage shown willingness to continue fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty if Russia returns to compliance. Indeed, even now the US has offered to halt the economic and military steps it has begun taking, if Russia returns to compliance. If the Treaty fails, the sole responsibility for its failure will lie with Russia, and any Russian attempts to manipulate the narrative to suggest otherwise must be strongly resisted. We urge the UK Government to persuade the US to use every opportunity, in international fora such as the United Nations, relentlessly to expose and publicise the evidence of Russia’s systematic violation of the Treaty.

NATO is now considering what further steps to take to maintain security and deterrence, and what military options should be part of this process. It is right that there is a detailed collective and consultative discussion within NATO covering a wide range of options. A response need not entail new ground-launched missile deployments in Europe. Instead, NATO should consider augmenting its existing strengths in sea- and
air-launched systems to neutralise any advantage that Russia might hope to gain from its decision to violate the INF Treaty by developing and deploying the SSC-8 ground-launched system.
1 Introduction

1. The INF Treaty is a landmark Cold War arms control agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987. The Treaty’s central aim was to eliminate an entire class of ground-based intermediate-range missiles and prevent the deployment of these systems in the future by either party.

2. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 the United States sought full continuation of the Treaty with the six former Soviet states that had inspectable INF facilities in their territory—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. What was originally a bilateral treaty thus became a multilateral one amongst relevant Soviet successor states.1

3. In the late 2000s concerns began to grow in the United States that Russia was in the process of developing missile systems that violated the terms of the Treaty. The US Government made these concerns public in 2014, and has since then repeatedly sought to engage both with Russia and with European allies to resolve concerns about Russian non-compliance. Russia has at every stage rejected any suggestion that it has violated the Treaty, despite increasing international consensus that there is reliable evidence of a violation. After a political rally on 20 October 2018 US President Donald Trump announced that the United States intended to withdraw from the Treaty. In December, alongside a statement from NATO Foreign Ministers indicating unanimous agreement with the American assessment of Russian violation, the US further announced that it would allow Russia a period of 60 days to return to compliance, failing which it would initiate the formal mechanism of withdrawal within the Treaty. On 1 February, at the expiry of the 60-day period the US issued formal notice of withdrawal—which would become effective six months later. In response Russia stated the next day that it was also intending to withdraw from the Treaty.

4. Although the INF Treaty was originally a bilateral agreement between the US and the USSR and the United Kingdom is not a party, the failure of the Treaty has potentially far-reaching implications for UK defence and security policy. The Treaty has always had particular significance for European security, having been prompted by the need to address the build-up of Soviet intermediate-range missile systems threatening Western Europe from the mid-1970s, and the substantial military and diplomatic consequences this had at that time for European members of NATO, the United Kingdom among them.2 The UK is within range of intermediate-range missiles deployed in Western Russia. Further development in Russian missile capabilities, which have advanced considerably over the last decade, will have an effect on the strategic balance in Europe, including implications for UK Armed Forces rotationally deployed on the continent, from the High North to the Black Sea. NATO’s strategic posture, both conventional and nuclear, may need re-examination in the face of this new challenge. Alongside military considerations,

1 US State Department, Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), accessed 22 February 2019

2 Our predecessor Committee raised its concerns on Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in its report of July 2016 on the defence and security implications of a resurgent Russia. See Defence Committee, Russia: Implications for UK Defence and Security, First Report of Session 2016–17, HC 107, paras 33–36
the political and diplomatic consequences for NATO of the Treaty's demise may also be significant, as may the impact these events have on global arms control agreements more generally.

5. Having resolved to launch an inquiry into the consequences for UK Defence of the failure of the INF Treaty, we put out a call for evidence on 15 November 2018, requesting written submissions on the following points:

- Has the INF Treaty been violated?
- How best could a return to compliance with the Treaty be achieved?
- What would the consequences be of the US withdrawing from the Treaty?
- Could the Treaty be amended to make it more attractive to both sides?
- Is the INF Treaty still relevant given the technological and geopolitical developments since it was signed?
- What role could the UK play in future discussions of the Treaty?

The Committee held three oral evidence sessions during the inquiry and received a total of 13 submissions in written evidence. We would like to express our gratitude to all who offered their time and expertise to assist us in our work.
2 The INF Treaty

Origins

6. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (commonly known as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty) was signed by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev in Washington DC on 8 December 1987. The Treaty arose as a result of the situation in Europe in the later phases of the Cold War. In the mid-1970s the Soviet Union began deploying a new type of nuclear-capable missile that was designated by NATO as the SS-20 'Saber'. The SS-20 was an intermediate-range ballistic missile which incorporated several features distinguishing it from previous missiles deployed by Soviet forces.

- The SS-20 had a longer range that its predecessors, sufficient to reach targets in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom.
- The missile was also more accurate, allowing it to target specific military infrastructure, and was able to carry multiple independently-targetable warheads rather than single warheads, thus multiplying its destructive capability and giving greater flexibility in targeting.
- The SS-20 had a solid propellant allowing it to be deployed at shorter notice than a liquid-fuelled counterpart.
- The flight time of the missile was short, reducing the warning time that early warning systems would be able to give following the missile being launched.
- The SS-20 could also be deployed on mobile rather than fixed launchers, which would allow the missile to be dispersed across the vastness of Soviet- and Warsaw Pact-controlled territory in the run-up to an attack, making the capability impossible to destroy by pre-emptive first strike. NATO had no equivalent system to the SS-20 deployed in Europe.3

7. The sum of these new Soviet capabilities had the potential to destabilise seriously the military and the political balance in Europe. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies already enjoyed considerable superiority over NATO in conventional military forces on the Continent. The defence of Europe, then as now, could be credibly guaranteed only by the continuing commitment of the United States to protect it. In the 1970s, it was the concern of the European members of NATO about the continuing credibility of this commitment that led NATO to respond to the SS-20 deployments. These concerns were encapsulated in the speech of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London in 1977. Schmidt’s principal concern was the danger that the North American and European groups in NATO could become ‘decoupled’. A system such as the SS-20 could not reach the continental United States, but had the range and the accuracy to threaten of European NATO members in general, and their military infrastructure in particular. NATO had no corresponding capability deployed in Europe to respond to this threat, apart from the prospect of escalation by

3 Q2–7; Q64–65. See also Congressional Research Service, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, updated 8 February 2019
recourse to strategic nuclear weapons. There was a concern amongst European NATO members that the US might not risk the threat of a general strategic nuclear exchange and the devastation to the continental United States that would follow, in order to save Europe from a limited—but militarily decisive—SS-20 attack. As Dr Jeremy Stocker, Associate Fellow at RUSI told us:

It was the latest iteration of the perennial problem, “Would an American President risk Washington for the sake of Paris, London or Bonn?” The new SS-20 capability gave added impetus to that long-standing concern.4

Furthermore, there was also the danger that, even if the US would employ ICBMs to respond to such an attack, the Russians might wrongly discount this possibility—finding out their fatal mistake only when it was too late for all concerned.

8. NATO’s reaction, which became known as the ‘Dual Track’ or ‘Twin Track’ policy, was designed to frustrate the Soviet attempt to divide NATO and provide a modernised capability to counter the new missile threat. From its agreement in NATO in December 1979, the Dual Track approach sought to link a deployment track with an arms control track.

9. The deployment track centred on the modernisation of NATO’s short and medium range missile systems, with the deployment of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) between 1983 and 1986. The weapons would be owned and controlled by the United States, but would be deployed in the territory of five NATO allies: Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany and the United Kingdom. The UK’s share of this contribution was to be 160 GLCMs, based at RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth. At the same time the arms control track would proceed and negotiations were opened with the USSR to impose limits on intermediate-range missiles.5 On 18 November, 1981, President Reagan put forward his ‘zero option’ offer, according to which US GLCMs and Pershing II missiles would not be deployed, in return for the elimination of the SS-20s and their SS-4 and SS-5 predecessors. This was flatly rejected by the Soviet leadership, which resulted in NATO deploying its INF on schedule from 1983 onwards, despite unprecedented levels of protest by anti-nuclear organisations in the NATO countries concerned. After several years of negotiations, which only began to make genuine progress once Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, the zero option became the basis of the final agreement. The Treaty was signed in December 1987 and entered into force on 1 June 1988.6

10. A number of witnesses underlined the significance of the Dual Track approach and that its success lay in the linkage between the deployment and arms control aspects. Dr Heather Williams, Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London emphasised in oral evidence the effectiveness of the ‘carrot and stick’ approach which the Dual Track represented and the potential applicability of the same principles today.7 On the question of whether there would have been a prospect of reaching an agreement without US missile deployments, Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace at IISS thought that:

4 Q2
5 Q2; Q64
7 Q7; Q27
… it is a bit crystal ball gazing. There may have been other options that could have been pursued that were not … There are lots of ways to try to incentivise somebody’s behaviour. You do not necessarily have to do it with missiles all the time.8

11. By contrast, both Dr Stocker9 and Frank Miller, a retired senior US government official who was involved in a number of aspects of policy relating to the original Treaty, thought that the pressure brought by the deployment track was decisive in a final agreement being reached. When asked whether there would have been an INF Treaty without these deployments Mr Miller responded “Absolutely not”. He described how the KGB had overestimated the level of public opposition to the deployments within NATO and the Soviet military underestimated the danger that the Pershing II missiles could pose to Moscow and its surrounding infrastructure in the event of a war. Once the military threat posed by the US deployments became clear, the USSR returned to serious negotiations. According to Mr Miller:

> Without the counter-deployments of ground-launched cruise missiles, especially Pershing II, there would have been no INF treaty.10

12. Witnesses noted that there were elements of the Soviet leadership who realised, or came to realise, that the deployment of the SS-20 in this escalatory manner had been a mistake, and one that reduced rather than increased their own national security. Mr Barrie gave the example of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Soviet Chief of the General Staff between 1977 and 1984, who believed that it would be unrealistic to attempt to control a nuclear exchange so that it could be confined to Europe.11 If this could not be done then the North American and European parts of NATO could not realistically be decoupled, as once nuclear weapons were used in Europe an intercontinental strategic exchange with the US was likely to become inevitable. Writing in 1995, former President Gorbachev denounced the original SS-20 deployment as a “dangerous venture” and declared that the Soviet leadership at the time had miscalculated the robust response from NATO:

> It was Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov who had suggested to Brezhnev replacing the missiles based in the European part of the Soviet Union. But it was not merely a question of replacing ‘obsolete’ equipment. Technological progress allowed the creation of SS-20 missiles far superior to their predecessors in terms of range, precision, guidance and all other properties. Essentially they had the characteristics of strategic weapons. Whatever the arguments advanced at the time to justify the deployment of such missiles, the Soviet leadership failed to take into account the probable reaction of the Western countries. I would even go so far as to characterise it as an unforgivable adventure, embarked on by the previous Soviet leadership under pressure from the military-industrial complex. They might have assumed that, while we deployed our missiles, Western counter-measures would be impeded by the peace movement. If so, such a calculation was more than naive.12

---

8 Q3–4  
9 Q3  
10 Q66  
11 Q6  
Again, it was only when it became clear in the minds of the Soviet political and military leadership that the risks they were running outweighed any advantage that an agreement based on the zero option was taken seriously.

13. The Soviet decision to introduce a new generation of intermediate-range missiles into Europe in the mid-1970s disrupted the continental balance of power. The central aim was to create military advantage for the Warsaw Pact and to sow political division within NATO. The resulting Dual Track policy adopted by NATO was highly effective, cementing the unity of the Alliance and presenting a robust response to the Soviet challenge. The dual nature of the response was crucial: diplomatic attempts alone would not have brought resolution. Only by a demonstration of hard power alongside continual diplomatic overtures was NATO able to make it clear to the Soviet leadership that the USSR’s own vital interests were being put at risk by NATO’s response and that a level of competition had been introduced which the Soviet Union could not sustain. Today, although the situation in Europe is very different, the example of the past is instructive. NATO needs to formulate a united response to the challenge posed by the leadership of the Russian Federation.

Treaty provisions

14. The INF Treaty prohibited all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of between 500 km and 5,500 km (c. 300 and 3,400 miles), and required the elimination of US and Soviet missile systems and their launchers meeting these criteria within three years of the Treaty entering into force. The means of calculating missile range in the Treaty differs between ballistic and cruise missiles. The range of a ballistic missile is determined to be “the maximum range to which it has been tested”, whereas the range of a cruise missile is described as “the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth’s sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact”. The Treaty also places tight restrictions on the future testing and development of missiles and their launchers. Under these terms the USSR destroyed 1,846 missiles (mostly SS-4, SS-5, SS-20 and SS-23s missiles) and the USA destroyed 846 (mostly Pershing IIs and Gryphon GLCMs).

15. The Treaty only applies to ground-launched missile systems that fall within the range categories. No restrictions are imposed on missiles that are air-launched (launched from aircraft) or sea-launched (launched from surface ships or submarines). No distinction is made between nuclear-capable and conventional missiles, it applies to any ground-launched missile fulfilling the range criteria which are ‘weapon delivery vehicles’. There are no geographical restrictions on the Treaty: its provisions apply worldwide.

16. The obligations in the Treaty were supported by a rigorous system of monitoring and verification to supervise the elimination of prohibited missiles and ensure ongoing compliance by both parties. This included the creation of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres to co-ordinate on-site inspections at declared missile testing, manufacture and storage

---

14 U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty, Insight IN10985, Congressional Research Service, 1 February 2019
15 Dr Wyn Rees and Azriel Bermant (INF0006)
centres. Comprehensive data exchange and continuous monitoring of missile assembly facilities were also part of this regime. The Treaty however limited these provisions to ten years following the end of the elimination period, and they concluded in 2001. A Special Verification Commission (SVC) was also created by the Treaty as a forum for the parties to resolve any questions relating to compliance and ongoing obligations. The SVC meets at the request of either party.16 We heard some compelling evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about the importance of ongoing verification in arms control treaties. Ben Fender, Head of the Security Policy Department in the Defence and International Security Directorate at the FCO said:

the collapse of the INF, if that is where we end up, surely underlines the crucial importance of verification of treaties. In terms of what the UK has been working on in an NPT [the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] context, we have been one of the leaders, as you will know, in trying to work out what verification would look like in a nuclear disarmament context; I am sure that we will be briefing on that at the next [NPT] review conference. I know it is a slightly indirect connection, but I think it shows the value of that, because if there were ever progress in that direction, verification would be a critical element of it. That is very much a lesson of the INF scenario.17

17. The terms of the INF Treaty were far-reaching in that global prohibitions were placed on the parties in respect of an entire class of weapons. Thousands of missiles were destroyed and tight restrictions were placed on future development and deployment. A thorough system of monitoring and verification was also created. One flaw in these verification provisions was their time-limited nature, allowing for the opportunity of non-compliance once on-site inspections ceased in 2001. The value of ongoing verification provisions in arms control agreements has been demonstrated by the fate of the INF Treaty.
3 Violation of the Treaty

Indications of Russian violation

18. Concerns on the part of the United States that the Russian Federation had begun violating the Treaty first arose in the late 2000s. At the centre of these concerns is a ground-launched cruise missile known in Russia as the 9M729, to which NATO has given the reporting name SSC-8 ‘Screwdriver’. The US Director of National Intelligence concluded in a briefing published in November 2018:

We assess that Russia began the covert development of an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile designated 9M729 probably by the mid-2000s. The 9M729 has a conventional and nuclear warhead capability... Russia began testing the missile in the late 2000’s and by 2015 had completed a comprehensive flight test program consisting of multiple tests of the 9M729 missile from both fixed and mobile launchers. Russia conducted the flight test program in a way that appeared purposefully designed to disguise the true nature of their testing activity as well as the capability of the 9M729 missile.  

Frank Miller told us that:

the Russian Government made a cynical decision sometime in 2008 or so that they needed to break out of the treaty

19. These initial concerns were complemented by a number of indications that Russia was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with its obligations under the Treaty. Commentators have suggested that the Russian President Vladimir Putin and his advisors had been contemplating withdrawal from the Treaty as early as 2000. Frank Miller told us that that Russia had approached the US Government on multiple occasions during the George W. Bush administration to discuss the continuation of the Treaty and any suggestion that the Treaty be terminated had been rebuffed. He had been present at a meeting between the then Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov, and then US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and recalled that Mr Ivanov had not on that occasion elaborated on the reasons behind Russia’s dissatisfaction with the Treaty.

20. Mr Rumsfeld’s successor Robert Gates mentioned similar discussions with Mr Ivanov in 2007, Russia’s stated concern being that the US and Russia were constrained by the Treaty from developing missile systems where other nations were not. This theme was also present in President Putin’s 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference:

I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-
range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character. Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems. It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.\textsuperscript{24}

This was followed by a Russian proposal to the United Nations in 2007 to open the INF Treaty to all other states possessing short and intermediate range missile systems. This proposal failed to attract support.\textsuperscript{25} In 2013 President Putin questioned the wisdom of the USSR signing the Treaty in the first place, calling the decision “debatable to say the least”.\textsuperscript{26} We look at potential Russian motivations for abandoning their obligations in more detail in the next section.

21. In May 2013 officials at the US State Department again raised with their Russian counterparts concerns over compliance. These concerns were met with denials from Russia that there had been any violation. Diplomatic engagement on these issues continued through 2013. The US also began engaging with NATO allies on these concerns in January 2014.\textsuperscript{27} The first public US accusation of Russian violation came in the July 2014 US State Department’s Annual Compliance Report on adherence to arms control agreements:

\begin{quote}
The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

President Obama wrote to President Putin to convey these findings and underlined that the US was willing to enter into dialogue to sustain the Treaty in the hope that Russia would come back to compliance.\textsuperscript{29} The Russian response was to call the US allegations “unsupported” and state that no evidence had been presented to substantiate the allegations.\textsuperscript{30} The NATO 2014 Wales Summit Declaration called on Russia to “preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance”, the first collective reference by NATO to the issue.\textsuperscript{31}

22. Dialogue between American and Russian representatives continued. The accusation of Russian violation through testing of a GLCM system was repeated in the 2015, 2016 and 2017 Compliance Reports. For the first time since 2003 the US requested a meeting of the Special Verification Commission (SVC) in late 2016, but this meeting did not assuage

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{24} Website of the President of the Russian Federation, \textit{Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy}, 10 February 2007
\bibitem{26} “US says it may restart intermediate nuclear missile development”, Financial Times, 10 December 2017
\bibitem{27} US State Department, \textit{INF Diplomatic Timeline}, updated 1 February 2019
\bibitem{28} US State Department, \textit{2014 Report on Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Disarmament Agreements And Commitments, July 2014}, p 8
\bibitem{29} “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty”, \textit{New York Times}, 28 July 2014
\bibitem{30} Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the American accusations that Russia violates the INF Treaty, 30 July 2014
\bibitem{31} NATO, \textit{Wales Summit Declaration}, 5 September 2014, para 53
\end{thebibliography}
American concerns. In March 2017 General Paul Selva, the Vice-Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House of Representatives Armed Service Committee that the Russian GLCM had moved past development and had now been deployed.

23. After a year of further engagement with Russia and consultation with NATO allies, in November 2017 the US publicly identified the SSC-8 with its Russian designator 9M729 as the system concerned in the Treaty violation. The subsequent presentation by the US Director of National Intelligence quoted in paragraph 18 went into detail on how Russia had sought to disguise the violation by conducting parallel tests from fixed and mobile launchers. Russia, which up to this point had denied the existence of the offending missile system, did acknowledge its existence after the US publication of the 9M729 designator, but denied that the missile had exceeded the Treaty limits and continued to claim that the US had provided no evidence to prove the allegations.

24. The US Government further announced that it would initiate an Integrated Strategy in response to Russian violations. This would encompass a range of diplomatic, economic and military measures. Attempts to find a diplomatic solution through the SVC and other viable channels would continue. New economic sanctions would be placed on companies involved in the development and manufacture of the SSC-8. Research and development of new missile systems would be considered. These coercive economic and military measures would cease if Russia returned to compliance with the Treaty. Further details on the military response were given by the US Department of Defense in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The Pentagon confirmed that “the United States is commencing INF Treaty-compliant research and development by reviewing military concepts and options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems.” The NPR continued:

the United States will pursue a nuclear-armed SLCM [sea-launched cruise missile], leveraging existing technologies to help ensure its cost effectiveness. SLCM will provide a needed non-strategic regional presence, an assured response capability, and an INF-Treaty compliant response to Russia’s continuing Treaty violation. If Russia returns to compliance with its arms control obligations, reduces its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, and corrects its other destabilizing behaviors, the United States may reconsider the pursuit of a SLCM. Indeed, US pursuit of a SLCM may provide the necessary incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction of its non-strategic nuclear weapons, just as the prior Western deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe led to the 1987 INF Treaty.

References:
32 US State Department, INF Diplomatic Timeline, updated 1 February 2019
33 US Department of Defense, Transcript of Hearing on Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements, 8 March 2017
34 Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats on Russia’s Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Violation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 30 November 2018
35 Q78; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s comment on anti-Russia attacks by the US over the INF Treaty, 9 December 2017
36 US State Department, Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy, 8 December 2017; ‘U.S. presses Russia to comply with nuclear missile treaty’, Reuters, 8 December 2017; US State Department, INF Diplomatic Timeline, updated 1 February 2019;
37 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, pp 10; 55. See also Qq 48–52.
25. A further meeting of the SVC took place in December 2017 at US request, and again ended without progress being made. On 15 December 2017, NATO’s North Atlantic Council released a statement supporting the American efforts to engage with Russia and confirming NATO’s position that a Russian missile system had been identified which raised serious concerns about compliance. There was also a strong reference to the INF Treaty in the declaration following NATO’s Brussels Summit in July 2018:

A pattern of behaviour and information over many years has led to widespread doubts about Russian compliance. Allies believe that, in the absence of any credible answer from Russia on this new missile, the most plausible assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty. NATO urges Russia to address these concerns in a substantial and transparent way, and actively engage in a technical dialogue with the United States. Allies will continue their efforts to engage Russia on this issue in bilateral and multilateral formats.

26. On 20 October 2018 US President Donald Trump said after a political rally that the US would seek to withdraw from the INF Treaty due to Russian non-compliance. US National Security Adviser John Bolton, who was on his way to Moscow at the time, relayed this message to the Russian Government, also stating that the US was “a long way” from taking any decisions on new missile deployments in Europe. In spite of this, Russia responded by promising symmetrical counter-action, with President Putin stating that any European nations participating in new missile deployments “put their own territory at risk of a retaliatory strike”. The initial reaction from Europe was one of surprise and concern at the potential failure of the Treaty. Although it is clear that there had been close engagement between the US and NATO allies on the INF issue over a number of years, the UK Government was not aware of the substance of President Trump’s announcement before it was made, even if the announcement was in hindsight consistent with the American “direction of travel”.

27. If the suddenness of the announcement caused some initial uncertainty, the US was very successful in moving swiftly to reaffirm consensus among NATO Allies in the face of continuing Russian denials. A robust and unequivocal collective position was the result. On 4 December 2018, a joint statement from the scheduled meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers was issued which concurred with the US view that Russia’s development and fielding of the 9M729 system was in violation of the Treaty and Russia was declared to be in material breach of its obligations. Alongside this, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the start of a 60-day period to give Russia an opportunity to return to compliance before the US began the process of formal withdrawal. Despite further

38 US State Department, 2018 Report on Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Disarmament Agreements And Commitments, 17 April 2018
40 NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, 11 July 2018, para 46
41 ‘Remarks by President Trump Before Air Force One Departure’, WhiteHouse.gov, 20 October 2018
42 ‘Bolton says we’re a long way from deploying U.S. missiles in Europe’, Reuters, 23 October 2018
43 ‘EU, Russia urge US not to withdraw from INF Treaty’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 October 2018
44 ‘EU warns Trump of nuclear arms race risk after INF withdrawal move’, Guardian, 22 October 2018; “Don’t throw baby out with bath water”, Germany tells U.S. on INF treaty’, Reuters, 22 October 2018
45 Qq123–126; Foreign and Commonwealth Office (INF0014)
47 US State Department, Press Availability at NATO Headquarters, 4 December 2018
talks in Geneva and at the NATO-Russia Council in January, Russia continued to deny any violation. A Russian effort to showcase the 9M729 publicly in January, to prove that the missile range fell short of the 500 kilometres necessary to bring it within the ambit of the INF Treaty was dismissed by NATO. According to a subsequent news report, the US intelligence community’s assessment is that the real 9M729 missile was not part of this display and that the equipment and schematics on display were not compatible with the dimensions of the 9M729 that had previously been observed.

28. Secretary Pompeo announced on 1 February 2019 that the US was suspending its obligations under the Treaty and giving formal notice of withdrawal under Article 15, which would become effective six months later. This was accompanied by a further statement of support issued by the North Atlantic Council, reiterating the collective position that Russia is in material breach of the Treaty through its development and fielding of the 9M729. The statement noted that the US and NATO Allies had remained open to dialogue with Russia, but that no credible response or demonstrable steps to returning to compliance had been provided and that Allies fully supported the action the US had taken to initiate formal withdrawal from the Treaty. The statement also confirmed that NATO was closely reviewing the implications of new Russian intermediate-range missile deployments and taking the necessary steps to review its overall deterrence and defence posture. On 14 February, the European Parliament called for:

The Russian Federation to return to full and verifiable compliance, in order to address the concerns raised by the US and by NATO, in response to Russia’s continuing breach of the terms of the Treaty, and urges Russia’s commitment to the long-term future of the agreement.

President Putin’s response to the American notification was to announce a symmetrical suspension of obligations and the initiation of what Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu called “retaliatory measures”. These measures included the engineering of a ground-based variant of the sea-launched Kalibr missile, as well as the development of land-based launchers for hypersonic intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. In an address to the Russian Federal Assembly on 20 February, President Putin said:

Russia does not intend to deploy [intermediate-range] missiles in Europe first. If they really are built and delivered to the European continent, and the United States has plans for this, at least we have not heard otherwise, it will dramatically exacerbate the international security situation, and create a serious threat to Russia, because some of these missiles can reach Moscow in just 10–12 minutes. This is a very serious threat to us. In this case, we will be forced, I would like to emphasise this, we will be forced to respond with mirror or asymmetric actions.

---

48 ‘NATO, Russia fail to agree over missile breach, U.S. to quit treaty’, Reuters, 25 January 2019
49 ‘NATO rejects Russian claims that 9M729 GLCM is INF Treaty-compliant’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 January 2019
50 ‘U.S. Intelligence: Russia Tried to Con the World With Bogus Missile’, Daily Beast, 18 February 2019
51 US State Department, Remarks to the Press, 1 February 2019
52 NATO, Statement on Russia’s failure to comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 1 February 2019
54 ‘Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu’, Website of the President of the Russian Federation, 2 February 2019
55 ‘Presidential Address to Federal Assembly’, Website of the President of the Russian Federation, 20 February 2019
29. It is clear that over the past 20 years Russia has been growing increasingly dissatisfied with its obligations under the INF Treaty. The current Russian leadership's view appears to be that it was a mistake for the Soviet Union to enter into the obligations that the Russian Federation has inherited. Russian officials have repeatedly sought ways to dilute or terminate Russia's obligations under the Treaty. The covert development and deployment of the 9M729 missile has proceeded from this, and Russian obfuscation and denial have followed once the system was discovered.

30. Although the US has engaged with allies throughout the development of its concerns on Russian violation, the sudden announcement that the US was intending to withdraw was unexpected and the choreography of the announcement should have been more carefully managed. Consultation and co-ordination with European allies is vital on a matter so central to European security and this should be continually emphasised to the United States by the UK Government. Nonetheless, the US was able subsequently to create consensus within NATO on a robust position in support of its analysis and its actions.

31. The latest Russian responses continue to try to obfuscate and confuse. President Putin has stated that Russia will not be first to deploy intermediate-range missile systems “into Europe”; but the problem of the 9M729 missiles is their ability to threaten targets in Europe once deployed—as may well already be the case—in Western Russia. Russia's announcement of a ‘symmetrical’ initiation of research and development into a new ground-based system is in reality an adaptation of an existing system which has been operational for some time.

Motivations

32. We asked expert witnesses for an assessment of the motivations for Russia’s violation of the Treaty. They told us that the growing antipathy of the Russia's leadership to its international obligations noted above, stemming from a belief that it was a mistake to enter into the INF Treaty can be complemented by a range of other likely concerns regarding national security and foreign policy.56

Nuclear posture

33. Frank Miller suggested that the impetus had come from Russian military planners concluding that the number of targets in both the United States and China which needed to be assigned to strategic nuclear weapons had grown, leading to a requirement for additional missiles to cover targets in Europe. New short- and intermediate-range nuclear missile systems assigned to European targets would release and make available the long-range strategic systems to cover more distant intercontinental targets.57 He also noted that the known deployments of the new Russian missiles have been in Western Russia (against Europe) rather than in locations covering China.58 The fact that the desired requirement was for a ground-launched system rather than an air- or sea-launched system was noted elsewhere in evidence.59 Mobile ground-launchers are more affordable to produce than the aircraft, ships and submarines that would be necessary for other delivery modes,

56 Q11; Q74; Qq82–3; Qq120–2
57 Qq82–84
58 Qq67–69
59 Human Security Centre (INF0003)
allowing a large striking force to be built up at an acceptable cost. Furthermore, Russia’s geographical landmass allows mobile launchers to be widely dispersed to make them less vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike and to avoid detection during deployment and launch.60

34. Mr Miller also noted that the deployment of these weapons systems would be consistent with assessments of current Russian strategy and doctrine. This interpretation, referred to in the US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review as ‘escalate to de-escalate’ or ‘escalate to win’, imagines a scenario where Russia would contemplate limited first use of nuclear weapons to terminate a conventional conflict against NATO quickly and on favourable terms.61 He argued that this approach was evidenced in the doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces and is practiced in Russian exercises.62 Dr Heather Williams also noted the significant escalatory element of modern Russian missile systems being dual-capable (able to carry a conventional or a nuclear warhead), giving a wider range of escalatory options and increasing the uncertainty amongst Russia’s potential opponents as to whether they face a conventional or a nuclear threat.63 Dual-capable systems may enhance deterrence, but can also dramatically increase the possibility of miscalculation.64

Conventional posture

35. President Putin claims that the ground-based missiles eliminated by the Treaty comprised a large proportion of Russia’s intermediate-range inventory. By contrast, the United States’ extensive air- and sea-launched missile inventory was untouched by the Treaty. According to President Putin this amounted to “unilateral disarmament”,65 despite the removal of all of NATO’s ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles.

36. New ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles would provide a further addition to Russia’s already extensive inventory of conventional long-range precision strike capabilities which have seen considerable expansion over the past decade as the modernisation of the Russian Armed Forces has progressed. An emphasis on these strike capabilities has been part of Russian doctrine for many years and Russia has made high-profile use of such weapons throughout its military intervention in Syria. Analysts have speculated that the 9M729 is a land-based variant of the Kalibr 3M-14, a sea-launched cruise missile currently in Russian service.66 As mentioned in paragraph 28 above, the Kalibr is the very system which the Russian Defence Minister said on 2 February would now be adapted to ground-launch mode as a retaliatory measure for the US notification of withdrawal, alongside a new range of hypersonic weapons.67 Novator, the defence company which developed the Kalibr, is one of the Russian firms which has had sanctions applied against it under the

---

62 Qq86–87
63 Q7; Dr Brad Roberts (INF0012)
65 Human Security Centre (INF0003)
66 Human Security Centre (INF0003)
67 ‘Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu’, Website of the President of the Russian Federation, 2 February 2019; Russian Defence Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu holds teleconference with leadership of Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 5 February 2019
US Government’s Integrated Strategy in response to INF violations. It was reported in January that a new sea-launched Kalibr variant, with a maximum range of over 4,500 kilometres, was already in development.

37. In view of the particular suitability of ground-launched systems for Russian forces noted in paragraph 33 above, Dr Michael Fitzsimmons of the US Army War College has recently argued that a new ground-launched system would be an enhancement to the Russian military arsenal rather than a duplication of existing capabilities. Whether the addition of a ground-launched capability significantly changes the military balance in Russia’s favour, given NATO’s overall conventional superiority in force size and technology, remains disputed. Frank Miller has, for example, written elsewhere that the argument that NATO has overall conventional superiority ignores Russia’s regional superiority on NATO’s Eastern flank. The view of Dr Brad Roberts, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, is that:

> These new ground-launched cruise missiles add range, mobility, and diversity to Russia’s regional strike posture, as well as assured penetration of missile defenses.

**Bureaucratic/industrial momentum**

38. Dr Williams suggested that the 9M729 might not have been developed following a clear instruction from the Russian leadership, but could have come about as a result of independent bureaucratic or industrial initiative. She told us that the Russian military-industrial complex has a certain momentum of its own and might have begun developing and testing new capabilities without appreciating the political consequences. Jeremy Stocker agreed that it was certainly the case in the past that the Soviet defence industry was capable of generating military equipment without a stated requirement, and that the opaque governance structures of modern Russia based on personal relationships represented a degree of continuity. Dr Fitzsimmons also cited this as a possibility. On the other hand, Mr Barrie considered that accidental development and deployment of such a missile “seems unlikely, to be polite”. In any case, as Dr Williams noted, it still amounts to a violation which the Russian leadership has not sought to bring to an end.

**Political advantage**

39. Witnesses have suggested that Russia is likely to be pursuing a range of political objectives. Although the circumstances today are different, the objective of dividing NATO in a similar way to the decoupling scenario of the 1970s would be a desirable aim.
for Russian foreign policy. In oral evidence Mr Miller drew parallels between President Putin’s comments on symmetrical missile deployments and those made by the Soviet leadership in the 1980s. He also argued that threats of retaliatory nuclear strikes against European states were designed to sow public division in the same way. The difficulties of persuading European allies to take overt military steps to counter new Russian capabilities are likely to be as acute as they were in the 1980s, and European pressure for a strong response which was led by leaders like Helmut Schmidt is not present in the same way today. Russia has sought to manipulate the narrative of events by seeking to place the blame on the US for the potential failure of the Treaty. As Mr Barrie argued, this is done for internal purposes in Russia as much as for external ones, allowing the Russian leadership to portray the INF issue as the latest in a succession of US and NATO aggressions against the Russian people. As Dr Roberts argues, the Russian action can in this way be seen as a part of the broader confrontation between Russia and the West, including the rejection of the rules-based international order and a test of the willingness of the United States and NATO to come to terms with the emergent threat.

40. The British Government’s view was summed up by Ben Fender, Head of the Security Policy Department in the Defence and International Security Directorate at the FCO:

   Some commentators have said that perhaps part of their intent in developing this system was not a military one but a political one, in order to make NATO more anxious, to reawaken memories of the past and to divide allies from one another. That may be true to an extent, but the very fact that they have sought to conceal it suggests that their primary objectives in pursuing this system have been military ones.

**Asia and the Middle East**

41. A substantial issue which probably applies to both Russian and American motivations surrounding the INF is the proliferation of intermediate-range missile systems in Asia and the Middle East. Russian concerns over China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were highlighted in the approaches made by Russia to the US on the status of the Treaty in the mid-2000s and were explicitly set out in President Putin’s 2007 Munich speech. China is the most significant actor in this regard given the size of its missile inventory and its status as an expanding military power. Jeremy Stocker said this was a “principal concern” for Russia, citing the large proportion of Chinese missiles that would fall into the prohibited categories of the Treaty, if China were a party to it, and the proliferation of such systems among other Middle Eastern and Asian nations near Russia’s southern borders. Brad Roberts also argued that Russian and American frustration about the situation in Asia had been a shared concern which prompted limited US support for Russian attempts to multilateralise the Treaty in 2007.

---

78 Q7 [Dr Heather Williams]; Q122 [Ben Fender]
79 Q73
80 Q55; Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (INF0009)
81 Q137
82 Q28
83 Dr Brad Roberts (INF0012)
84 Q122
85 See paragraph 19 above.
86 Q11
87 Dr Brad Roberts (INF0012). See para 20 above.
42. There was a wider discussion in our evidence on China’s influence upon American motivations surrounding the INF Treaty. Dr Katarzyna Kubiak, Policy Fellow on Nuclear and Arms Control at the European Leadership Network, argued that this is not a new issue. China has possessed short and intermediate-range missiles since 1970 and, when the INF Treaty was signed in 1987, 75% of Chinese nuclear weapons would have fallen into prohibited categories if China had been a party to the Treaty. The renewed relevance of China according to Dr Kubiak is that it is now explicitly viewed by the US as a strategic competitor.

43. This has been cited as a factor in American consideration of policy on the INF Treaty, as has been made clear by President Trump, Secretary Pompeo and National Security Adviser Bolton. It is also clear that there is a debate at senior levels within the US Armed Services on whether the INF Treaty undermines US defence capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. The debate is still continuing and options for new US missile capabilities are still being considered. While there may be operational advantages in future American deployments of ground-based intermediate range-missiles in Asia, there is some doubt whether they are sufficiently clear to justify ending involvement in the INF Treaty. Issues such as where any new missiles would be based in the region and the political difficulties of seeking agreements from host governments would need to be resolved. The destabilising effect of such deployments in the region would also have to be considered. A number of witnesses have suggested that an effective way of securing the future of the Treaty would be by bringing China into its ambit. We will address this below at paragraph 60.

44. We broadly concur with the British Government’s view on the significance of the Asian security dimension in Russian and American motivations, which was well summed up by Mr Fender:

> About a decade ago the Russians first started to float the idea that the treaty should perhaps be multilateralised. Their idea at the time was, “Well, China has ground-launched intermediate range missiles. Wouldn’t it be better to have a treaty that includes China as well?” I suspect that their motives in doing that were less to preserve the INF treaty and more to manufacture for themselves an excuse for wriggling out of it, because they wished to have INF-violating missiles for other reasons. I think that should not necessarily be taken at face value. Likewise, when you look through public comments made by senior US officials you will occasionally see speculation about whether or not it would be militarily advantageous for the United States to have these missiles in theatres other than Europe. However, I think it has been very clearly the position of the US Administration that they would wish to preserve this treaty if Russia comes back into compliance. So again it would not be true to say that the US is somehow less than enthusiastic about the treaty for non-Euro-Atlantic reasons. On the contrary, they have been putting a huge amount of effort into diplomacy to try to preserve the

---

88 Medact (INF0005); Dr Wyn Rees and Azriel Bermant (INF0006)
89 Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011)
90 See for example Admiral Harry Harris USN, Commander, US Pacific Command, _Oral testimony to the United States Senate Armed Services Committee_, 27 April 2017; Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (INF0009)
91 Dr Wyn Rees and Azriel Bermant (INF0006); Helm, J L, _Missiles for Asia? The Need for Operational Analysis of U.S. Theater Ballistic Missiles in the Pacific_, RAND Corporation, 2016
92 BASIC (INF0004); Dr Wyn Rees and Azriel Bermant (INF0006)
treaty. I think the China issue, or the east Asia issue, is out there as a talking point, but I suspect it is a bit of a distraction. We are in this situation for Euro-Atlantic reasons, I think.93

45. Russian motivations in pursuing the violation are diverse and overlapping. Its behaviour is consistent with the aggressive and revisionist policies that it has been actively pursuing in recent years—the use of multiple military, diplomatic, economic and political tools to challenge the rules-based international system and to seek a range of complementary effects which strengthen Russia’s own position. As we have seen elsewhere, these moves are accompanied by attempts to orchestrate the narrative of events in Russia’s favour and manipulate gullible and complicit elements in the West. When the violation was discovered in the case of the INF Treaty, outright denial was accompanied by an attempt to place the blame on the United States for undermining the continuation of the Treaty. This manipulation of the narrative must not be allowed to succeed. Russia will be solely responsible for failure of the INF Treaty because of Russian development of missile systems in clear violation of its provisions. The US should not be expected to subject itself to unilateral restraint to sustain a Treaty that has been rendered inoperative by another party.

46. Although it is recognised that the changing strategic situation in Asia is a factor in Russia’s violation of the Treaty and the US response to it, we reject the argument that the US is content to see the Treaty collapse, or has deliberately engineered its collapse, because it wishes to deploy ground-based cruise missiles in Asia against a growing threat from China. The US has at every stage shown willingness to continue its obligations under the Treaty if Russia returns to compliance and has said that it will halt the military and economic steps of its Integrated Strategy if this happens. This has been accompanied by a sustained US diplomatic effort to save the Treaty. Responsibility for the failure of the Treaty will lie with Russia alone.

Allegations of US violations

47. The Russian denials of any violation of the Treaty are commonly accompanied by counter-accusations that the US has been in violation, shown most recently in the account of President Putin’s meeting with his Defence and Foreign Ministers on 2 February where Russia announced that it was suspending its participation.94 These allegations fall into three broad categories:

Unmanned aerial vehicles/drones

48. Russia argues that the many types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that the US operates fall into the category of a ground-launched cruise missile under the Treaty’s definition. The US rejects this definition, pointing to the numerous differences between cruise missiles and UAVs, for example that the latter are two-way, re-usable systems, which cruise missiles are not.95 The US notes that these concerns were addressed in the

93 Q140
94 ‘Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu’, Website of the President of the Russian Federation, 2 February 2019
Missile Misdemeanours: Russia and the INF Treaty

SVC meeting of 2003 and were not raised again by Russia until after the US challenged Russia on its violations in the 2015 compliance reporting period. This suggests that the Russian challenge is opportunist rather than substantive.

**Missile defence targets**

49. Russia has argued that certain variants of US target missiles used for the testing of missile defence interceptors are powered by rocket motors or use guidance systems which were salvaged and recycled from old missiles prohibited and eliminated under the INF regime. The US has replied that the use of old booster stages is specifically permitted under the Treaty as long as the missiles in which they are used are not tested or adapted for weapons delivery. Missile defence targets do not carry warheads, so would not fall into this category. The Treaty also specifically permits the removal of guidance systems and their re-use in Treaty-compliant missiles. Like the UAV issue, the US claims these concerns were addressed in the SVC meeting of 2003 and were not raised again until after the US challenged Russia on its violations in the 2015 compliance reporting period.

**Deployment of Mark 41 launchers**

50. As part of its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the United States has begun deploying a missile defence interceptor system, known as Aegis Ashore in Romania, and has planned deployments in Poland. An initiative of the Obama Administration, EPAA is not directed against Russia and is not capable of diluting the effectiveness of the Russian strategic deterrent by intercepting ICBMs. EPAA sites use the Mark 41 vertical launch system (VLS) which is the same type of launcher used on US Navy vessels to launch Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Russia argues that the use of the Mk 41 VLS is a breach of the Treaty because these launchers have the capacity to launch GLCMs, even though they have only ever been used to launch SLCMs. The US argues that as the Mark 41 has never been used to test or launch a GLCM, then it does not fall within the Treaty definition. The prohibition in the Treaty is against launchers that launch GLCMs, not any cruise missile. Moreover the US also argues that the Mk 41 launchers used in the Aegis Ashore system are not the same as the shipboard versions that fire SLCMs. The electronics and software are different and the launchers are capable of firing only defensive interceptor missiles, not cruise missiles such as Tomahawk.

51. Dr Williams told us “I really do not see any validity, technically, to the Russian allegations.” Mr Barrie pointed out that it would make no sense for the US to put an offensive missile system on to a fixed launcher in a location that was well known, as a Russian strike could easily disable the system. Dr Stocker agreed and added that the Americans did not need to do this, as a sea-launched Tomahawk would be able to reach...

96 US State Department, 2015 Report on Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Disarmament Agreements And Commitments, 5 June 2015

97 Congressional Research Service, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, updated 8 February 2019, p 27

98 US State Department, 2015 Report on Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Disarmament Agreements And Commitments, 5 June 2015


100 Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011); Congressional Research Service, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, updated 8 February 2019, pp 28–29

101 Q25
any number of Russian targets that the US might want to strike. He made the further point (which was echoed by Mr Miller) that it would be impossible to deploy cruise missiles in Romania (or Poland subsequently) without the knowledge of the governments and the wider public in those countries.102 Dr Kubiak observed that the US was bound by its agreement with Romania that the site is to be used exclusively for self-defence purposes and that the Romanian Government has to be notified of any changes to the interceptors or the launch facility.103

52. The weight of the evidence that the Committee has received suggests that these Russian allegations totally lack in credibility. They were described by Ben Fender of the FCO as “complete nonsense”.104 The statement of NATO Foreign Ministers of 4 December 2018 confirmed that: “The United States has remained in full compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty since it entered into force.”105

53. The Russian counter-allegations that the United States has violated the Treaty are spurious. If Russia had genuine concerns over US compliance, it also had ample opportunity to seek reassurance from the US through the mechanisms which exist within the Treaty. In raising questions over US compliance at this late stage, Russia is seeking to draw attention away from its own violations and to make it appear as if the US is to blame for the failure of the Treaty. We endorse the collective view of NATO, as established in the joint statement of 4 December 2018, that the US has remained in full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty since it entered into force.

UK response

54. The British Government’s response has largely followed that of other European allies, based on a desire to sustain the Treaty if possible, but with a growing realisation that Russia is unlikely to return to compliance, followed by strong support of the action the US is taking. An early UK response, after President Trump’s announcement in October 2018, came from the Defence Secretary Rt Hon Gavin Williamson MP on 21 October. He said that the UK stood “absolutely resolute” with the United States following President Trump’s announcement of the intention to withdraw:

    We of course want to see this treaty continue to stand but it does require two parties to be committed to it and at the moment you have one party that is ignoring it. It is Russia that is in breach and it is Russia that needs to get its house in order.106

In the days following the announcement Ministers underlined the importance of the Treaty for European security and the UK’s wish to see it preserved. It was emphasised that the US had at that point not announced an intention formally to withdraw from the Treaty, that diplomatic engagement was continuing giving Russia an opportunity to come back to compliance, and that close consultation was taking place within NATO.107

---

102 Q26; Q85
103 Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011)
104 Q122
106 ‘UK backs Trump withdrawal from Russia nuclear treaty’, The Guardian, 21 October 2018
107 HL Deb, 24 October 2018, c 863; HC Deb, 25 October 2018, c 439
55. During our January 2019 oral evidence session, we asked Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP, Minister of State for Europe and the Americas at the FCO, whether he thought that the Russians would have moved back into compliance by the end of the 60-day period set on 4 December. He replied “We hope they will, but we are realistic. I don’t think many people think they will, particularly as they have not even admitted that they are not in compliance”. The Minister and Mr Fender highlighted the diplomatic efforts that were continuing in Geneva and at the NATO-Russia, but on the basis of the Russian refusal to acknowledge the violation they stated: “We don’t think they have so far engaged in any serious and meaningful discussions to address the problem”.108 Following the US announcement of suspension in February, the FCO Minister of State Rt Hon Mark Field MP confirmed to the House of Commons that despite these further opportunities to engage on compliance:

I have to inform the House that Russia has not taken that opportunity. It has offered no credible response, only obfuscation and contradictions designed to mislead. This of course fits a wider pattern of behaviour from Russia aimed at undermining our collective security. We and all NATO allies therefore support the US decision to suspend its participation in the treaty and to trigger the formal withdrawal process. NATO is unified on this process. It is Russia’s fault alone that we have arrived at this point. President Putin’s statements in the last few days announcing that Russia, too, will suspend its obligations was unsurprising given the fact that it has violated the treaty over the years. Nevertheless, even at this late stage, we urge Russia to change course. The treaty’s six-month withdrawal process offers Russia a final opportunity to return to compliance through the full and verifiable destruction of all its 9M729 systems. That is the best—indeed, the only—way to preserve the treaty.109

56. The British Government acknowledges the contribution that the INF Treaty has made to European security and that a determined effort should be made to preserve the Treaty if Russia can be brought back into compliance. It is right for the Government to recognise that there is still time for diplomacy and that efforts to find a diplomatic solution should continue.

57. It is also right, however, to recognise both that the Treaty should not be allowed to continue at any cost and that diplomatic solutions alone cannot be indefinitely pursued. Permitting a dysfunctional INF Treaty to continue in spite of Russia’s violation would be a weak response which would do nothing to improve European security. On the contrary, it would reward Russian bad faith, alienate the United States from European allies and undermine arms control more generally. Accordingly, the Government is to be commended for lending its strong support to the United States, individually and within NATO, and to the approach the US has taken since evidence of the Russian violation first arose.

108 Q131
109 HC Deb, 4 February 2019, cc 45–46
4 Future action

Diplomatic options

58. Witnesses proposed a range of options which could provide a basis for a diplomatic settlement. They emphasised the importance of developing new transparency and confidence-building measures to increase trust and establish reciprocal obligations through the Special Verification Commission and existing inspection frameworks. Dr Williams suggested reciprocal inspection arrangements which would allow the US to inspect the 9M729 to determine its range and in return the Russia could inspect the Mark 41 VLS systems, allowing both parties to satisfy their concerns on these respective systems. Other contributors raised this possibility, including Dr Kubiak whose written evidence noted that the proposal has substantial (although not universal) support amongst other commentators. The discussion in evidence on the Mark 41 VLS, including the need for states where they are based to permit access the launchers to be inspected, is laid out from paragraph 50 above.

59. A second option could be to amend the Treaty to render its restrictions less onerous on the parties. This could include restricting the geographical extent of the Treaty so that the ban on ground-launched missiles applied only in Europe and not elsewhere in the world. Frank Miller recalled that the Soviet Union promoted this during the original Treaty negotiations, but the US rejected the proposal because of the concerns of its Asian allies. Missiles on mobile launchers could, in any case, be quickly redeployed to the European theatre in times of crisis. Mr Barrie suggested that an alternative would be to amend the types of weapons covered by the Treaty. Thus removing cruise missiles from the Treaty would help to preserve the Treaty, allow Russia not to have to admit its breaches publicly, and might provide at least a partial answer to concerns within the US military about the situation in Asia. This amendment should be limited to subsonic cruise missiles, as otherwise there was a risk of triggering a destabilising proliferation of high-speed and hypersonic weapons.

60. As discussed above in paragraph 41, several states outside the Treaty deploy intermediate-range missiles. Some witnesses argued that an attempt to include further countries in the Treaty might address the concerns of Russia and the US about being constrained by the Treaty in their responses to proliferation. But attempts at multilateralisation on these grounds have previously been explored without success. The FCO point out that the other states concerned have yet to be persuaded of the merits of eliminating their intermediate-range missile inventories. It is difficult to see what incentive states which have invested heavily in ground-launched, intermediate-range systems and depend on them for their security would have to sign up to a Treaty which would require their elimination. These considerations are particularly relevant to

---

110 Q27
111 Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011). See also BASIC (INF0004); Medact (INF0005); Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament/Christian CND (INF0007); Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (INF0009)
112 BASIC (INF0004); Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011)
113 Q64
114 Q27
115 BASIC (INF0004); Dr Wyn Rees and Azriel Bermant (INF0006); Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (INF0009); Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011)
116 See para 20 above.
117 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (INF0010)
China. Estimates suggest that up to 90% of China’s missile force would fall into short or intermediate-range categories, and most Chinese nuclear weapons are deployed on ground-launched systems. China’s lack of interest in joining the INF Treaty was clearly stated at the February 2019 Munich Security Conference. In response to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s calls for China to play a part in disarmament negotiations which might solve the INF issue, Chinese representative Yang Jiechi said:

China develops its capabilities strictly according to its defensive needs and doesn’t pose a threat to anybody else. So we are opposed to the multilateralization of the INF.

Retired Chinese General Yao Yunzhu was quoted as telling conference delegates that a new arms control agreement could work only if air- and sea-launched systems were part of the negotiations, given China’s reliance on ground-launched systems.

Some witnesses argued that rather than seeking to amend the INF Treaty, it should be replaced by a much more comprehensive arms control agreement. However, such an ambitious undertaking would depend upon a transformation in East-West relations from their current deep-frozen and distrustful state.

Public presentation of intelligence

The sharing of US intelligence on a private basis with NATO allies has been decisive in bringing the Alliance to a collective position on the INF issue. As was done to great effect during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the US could publish and present the evidence proving Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty at a session of the United Nations. The photographic exposure, to the Security Council, of Soviet missiles and bases in Cuba decisively undermined the Soviet Union’s denials that their build-up was taking place. Soviet claims that the evidence was fake were largely ineffective. Accounts of the crisis suggest that the British Government played a useful part in convincing the US Government to release the incriminating material.

In the case of the INF Treaty, it is clear that the Russians have already changed their position as a result of the US providing some evidence of the intelligence it holds on Russian missile programmes. Before US publication of the 9M729 designator in November 2017, the Russians denied the missile existed. Once the designator was made public, Russia was forced to acknowledge that it did exist as a distinct missile system. This demonstrated both the reflexive dishonesty of Russia in these matters, and the benefits of bringing such information into the open when circumstances permit. The decision to reveal the designator publicly was undoubtedly taken only after considerable deliberation and debate amongst the US Government and intelligence agencies; but it has been shown

---

118 Q11; Admiral Harry Harris USN, Commander, US Pacific Command, Oral testimony to the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 27 April 2017
120 Office of the Federal Chancellor, Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel on 16 February 2019 at the 55th Munich Security Conference, 16 February 2019
121 ‘China rebuffs Germany’s call for U.S. missile deal with Russia’, Reuters, 16 February 2019
122 Q128; Foreign and Commonwealth Office (INF0014)
to be effective. In November 2018, the US Director of National Intelligence also publicly discussed details of how Russia has sought to camouflage and conceal the missile's development by conducting parallel tests.124

64. Since it first approached the Russian Government about its concerns on compliance, the US has sought and actively pursued a diplomatic solution to the impasse over the INF Treaty. Russia’s refusal to acknowledge its violations is the central obstacle to any diplomatic progress. In spite of this, the US Government has continued to engage with Russia and has shown willingness to put relations onto a better footing if Russia changes its stance, even at this late stage.

65. Proposals for reciprocal inspections of the 9M729 and the Mark 41 VLS systems carry some risk of giving credence to Russian allegations of US violation which have been described to us as spurious. Reciprocal inspections may also require the permission of those third states hosting the Mark 41 launchers, which may not be forthcoming. Nevertheless, the willingness of the parties to engage in confidence-building measures based on reciprocal inspections should be explored as a basis for further diplomatic efforts.

66. A number of options have been suggested which involve amending the Treaty. Changing the geographical ambit of the Treaty or reducing restrictions on certain categories of weaponry will weaken arms control and might create new security risks. For example, restricting the Treaty to Europe might well have a destabilising influence in Asia. Similarly, removing certain categories of previously prohibited weapons from its scope might well result in further proliferation. Making such changes would also reward Russian bad faith. Russia should not be able to gain a more advantageous settlement through violating the Treaty.

67. The current state of relations between Russia and the West makes prospects for negotiating new nuclear treaties extremely challenging. Should such prospects improve, one vital lesson to apply from the fate of the INF Treaty is clearly that permanent verification procedures must be built into any future agreement.

68. Bringing into the INF Treaty further countries, which currently have no restrictions on intermediate-range missile development, is a theoretical possibility. But there is little appetite for this option amongst the states concerned and little to incentivise them to participate.

69. The intelligence proving Russian violation of the INF Treaty is owned by the United States and only the US can decide how much material can be placed in the public domain. The precedents of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the publication of the 9M729 designator in 2017 show that making intelligence public is effective in strengthening a case internationally. If it is possible to do so without compromising intelligence sources and methods, exposure of Russia’s flouting of the INF Treaty in an international forum like the United Nations could significantly influence world opinion and lay the guilt where it rightly belongs, so long as it is accompanied by a full-spectrum communications strategy. The British Government should give the US Government full encouragement and support in exposing and demonstrating how Russia has broken the Treaty provisions.

---

124 See para 23 above
70. The UK should continue to emphasise to the US the central role the INF Treaty plays in European security, as long as both Russia and the US comply with its provisions, and therefore the importance of consultation with allies and maintaining NATO unity.

**US, NATO and UK defence policy**

71. The US announced as part of the Integrated Strategy, and confirmed in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), that it was commencing INF Treaty-compliant research and development by reviewing military concepts and options for ground-launched intermediate-range missile systems—steps that are directly linked to the Russian violation which the US would discontinue if Russia returns to compliance. The US Congress has also mandated programmes of research and evaluation into new ground-launched missile systems in successive National Defense Authorisation Acts. The US has, however, not made any decision to manufacture or deploy new ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The NATO Secretary General has said that the Alliance has no intention of deploying ground-based nuclear missiles in Europe.

72. The NPR confirmed that the US will be enhancing its air- and sea-launched nuclear capabilities, which will help offset any new ground-launched Russian systems. For example, the US’s proposed Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) weapon is an air-launched missile currently in development. Particular attention has been paid to enhancing non-strategic nuclear capabilities to dispel any Russian misconception that the US could not respond to a limited, low-yield first use of nuclear weapons. This includes modifying a number of US Trident warheads to give a low-yield option and in the longer term pursuing a new nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile system. Witnesses argued that tailoring existing air- and sea-launched systems would be preferable to mirroring Russian ground-launched systems on a like-for-like basis. The role that the UK has played in the past to support these US capabilities in Europe was discussed and how this might be relevant in the future. New ground-launched nuclear missiles may therefore not be necessary to provide a credible and proportionate response, as NATO would be able to offset new Russian deployments with its superiority in air- and sea-launched systems. Dr Roberts argued that conventional ground-launched systems could be one part of a wider Alliance response alongside greater emphasis on nuclear sharing and missile defence to maintain the credibility of NATO’s deterrent and send a strong message to Russia. Mr Barrie also told us that a nuclear response is not necessarily inevitable as there are other conventional options available.

73. The NPR also confirmed that the US would continue its modernisation of the B61 tactical nuclear weapons system which forms the basis of NATO’s nuclear sharing.
arrangements as set out in Appendix 1. As both Dr Stocker\(^{133}\) and Mr Miller\(^{134}\) told us, the B61 had its origins in the 1960s and is long overdue for modernisation, a process which began over a decade ago and is independent of the INF issue. Tactical nuclear strike capability is also being integrated into the F-35 as a potential replacement for the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) requirement of Allied air forces to continue the nuclear sharing mission, although as Dr Stocker pointed out, this requires the European governments participating in nuclear sharing to make the necessary investment in an aircraft capable of performing the DCA role.\(^{135}\)

74. As Mr Fender told us, NATO has been in a process of adaptation in response to Russian aggression and military modernisation over a number of years.\(^{136}\) The defence investment pledge, expansion of the NATO Response Force, the institution of Enhanced Forward Presence, command structure reform and the recent announcements on readiness are all part of this, as is the continuing US commitment to the defence of Europe through the European Deterrence Initiative.\(^{137}\) The joint statements which have emerged from NATO and the statements of Government Ministers from late 2018 have confirmed that the Alliance is in the process of reviewing its own deterrence and defence posture in response to the Russian INF violation.\(^{138}\) On 13 February, Mr Stoltenberg confirmed that although NATO’s priority was for the Treaty to continue, the Alliance was also “preparing for a world without the INF Treaty”. Any steps taken will be “will be defensive, measured and coordinated” and the Secretary General again confirmed that there was no intention to deploy new nuclear ground-launched missiles.\(^{139}\)

75. As well as looking at capabilities themselves, a review of next steps might also mandate a re-examination of underlying policy. Witnesses have observed that NATO’s Strategic Concept, the official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature, and its fundamental security tasks, was last updated in 2010.\(^{140}\) The last NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), an analysis of the range of strategic threats facing NATO and review of Alliance posture to meet these threats (including nuclear posture), was undertaken in 2012.\(^{141}\) Dr Roberts said in written evidence:

[NATO] has a strategic concept from a world gone by (2010) and a *tous azimuts* deterrence and defense posture that has adapted only incrementally to new challenges since 2014. NATO describes itself as an alliance without enemies; Russia has developed an entire theory of war with NATO and tailor-made the doctrine and forces to win.\(^{142}\)

Dr Williams also told us in oral evidence:

\(^{133}\) Q56
\(^{134}\) Q88
\(^{136}\) Q142
\(^{137}\) Congressional Research Service, *The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview*, 8 August 2018
\(^{138}\) See para 28 above
\(^{139}\) NATO, *Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers*, 13 February 2019
\(^{141}\) NATO, *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review*, 2012
\(^{142}\) Dr Brad Roberts (INF0012)
in the event of US withdrawal from INF, it would seem timely and necessary for NATO to write a new DDPR; to revisit NATO’s nuclear planning among the three nuclear powers within NATO; and to consider whether NATO needs to have a new nuclear doctrine or posture.\textsuperscript{143}

76. The Ministry of Defence told us in written evidence that the deployment of new Russian intermediate-range missiles “not only represents a Russian capability enhancement, but is also further demonstration of their strategic intent” and confirmed that “The UK is engaged with NATO to assess the military implications for NATO in the event that Russia does not return to verifiable compliance”. The MoD’s evidence also stated that they did not consider that new Russian missile deployments significantly increased the risk to UK forces currently deployed in Europe. The close level of engagement between the US and NATO over the preceding two years was emphasised, and this would continue as deliberations on defence and deterrence posture proceed.\textsuperscript{144}

77. Frank Miller said that NATO governments need to do a better job in putting out a positive message about NATO, to show why the organisation was still relevant and essential to European security. He argued that as the Cold War becomes more distant in public memory, it will become more difficult to make the case:

The whole of Government, which is an interesting term, effort in the United States, the United Kingdom and every other NATO country, needs to be engaged in putting out a positive message. I think I may have said the last time I was in front of this Committee, the demographics suggested four years ago that between about 28% and 30% of the populations of NATO countries were born after the fall of the Berlin wall. In Turkey at that time four years ago it was 40-odd per cent. If, as people who have been through the Cold War, we don’t explain to our populations why NATO continues to exist and what the threat is from the east—that Vladimir Putin is not a good neighbour—then shame on us. We know how to do this, but we are not doing it effectively. Shame on us.\textsuperscript{145}

78. NATO is currently reviewing the security implications of new Russian missile deployments in Europe and the steps which may be necessary to maintain the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture. This detailed evaluation must proceed through NATO on a collective and consultative basis and we do not seek to pre-empt the process by prescribing steps that should be taken. The result must, however, be robust and clearly a response to Russian actions. Russia must not be able to gain military advantage through its Treaty violation.

79. The United States is already taking certain military steps in direct response to the Treaty violation, with the proviso that they will be discontinued if Russia returns to compliance. Others, many of which were initiated under previous US administrations, are part of a broader strategy of nuclear modernisation to sustain a credible posture of deterrence. Just as the deployment track was a vital part of NATO’s Dual Track policy in the past, a strong response is needed today and this may entail further military options. This does not mean that the same solutions based, as in the 1980s, on like-
for-like ground-launched missile deployments are the right ones for NATO today. The Alliance should seek to enhance its existing strengths in military posture. This can be done while continuing to hold the possibility of diplomatic options open. We expect the UK Government to play a full role in NATO’s evaluation of the military implications arising from the Russian violation of the INF Treaty and to update the Committee with the outcome of this process once it is complete.

80. An evaluation of capability should be accompanied by a re-examination of underlying policy. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review may need updating to reflect a worsening strategic environment. The UK should play a full part in any review of key NATO doctrine.

81. NATO governments must do better at explaining to their populations why the Alliance is essential to European security. Russia’s behaviour in respect of the INF Treaty gives the clearest indication of the continuing relevance of NATO and governments will need public support to take robust steps in response to Russia’s violation. We ask the Government to provide further details of the steps it is taking alongside NATO allies, to make the positive case for NATO and its response to Russian violation of the INF Treaty.

**Impact on future arms control**

82. Dr Williams argued that the Russian violation, if allowed to go unchallenged or permitted on the basis that the Treaty must be saved at any cost, undermined arms control more generally:

> Your question is essentially: is INF worth saving? It really depends on whether the Russians are interested in coming back into compliance. If they are not interested in that and will continue to violate the treaty, then no, there are limits to the length that we will go to in order to save INF. If you have a treaty that one side blatantly violates for years on end, and they do not come back into compliance, that also undermines a lot of the benefits of arms control that you were outlining. It undermines the credibility of arms control agreements; it undermines dialogue and transparency.146

As Brad Roberts put it in written evidence:

> We cannot both ignore treaty violations and call for a stronger commitment to a rules-based international order. 147

83. Witnesses raised the implications of the potential failure of the Treaty for other international arms control agreements. Sir Alan Duncan told us:

> NATO Foreign Ministers have reiterated that Russia’s behaviour erodes the foundations of arms control more widely because all effective arms control agreements rely on the parties having confidence that those agreements will be respected. What we have seen from the Russians is that, while they do implement certain treaties—New START is a fair example—they take an

---

146 Q32
147 Dr Brad Roberts (INF0012)
approach to others, such as the INF or the chemical weapons convention, that not only undermines those agreements but is deeply corrosive to the rules-based system more generally.148

84. There was widespread concern in evidence about the future of the New START, a bilateral treaty between the US and Russia that sets limits on deployments of strategic nuclear weapons. New START is due to expire in 2021, and this—alongside the failure of the INF Treaty—would mean that for the first time in decades there would be no major nuclear arms control treaties in force. There is provision within the New START for extension for a further five years, but the lack of trust and bad feeling around the INF issue may prove a barrier to progress.149

85. There are also implications for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and the next quinquennial NPT Review Conference due to take place in 2020. As Dr Williams observed, Review Conferences have become increasingly difficult as impatience among non-nuclear weapons states has grown at what they see as slow progress of nuclear weapons states in implementing the NPT's disarmament obligations. The failure of the INF Treaty and the prospect of new deployments of nuclear or dual-capable weapons is likely to aggravate this.150 Mr Fender acknowledged this risk:

the loss of the INF treaty, if that is where we end up, is another element of a worsening security environment generally and one that perhaps makes it harder to go as far as countries like the UK would like in terms of disarmament. I think what that says for the NPT is that ahead of the next review conference we all need to redouble our efforts on all pillars of the NPT—whether that is proliferation, and the challenges brought by Iran and North Korea, or disarmament.151

86. Russia's poor record in adhering to arms control agreements has been cited as a further obstacle to future agreements. Annex 2 lists arms control and security agreements about which the US Government has raised concerns over Russian compliance. Mr Miller cited the majority of these in oral evidence, adding:

The only treaty that the Russians still subscribe to is the New START treaty. The Russian track record is that of a serial violator of arms control treaties. The Russians are perfectly happy to have those treaties exist and bind the West while they continue to violate them. Unless things change radically, the future for arms control with Russia is in peril due to the actions of the Russian Government.

Dr Roberts argues that an integrated solution is needed “to replace the failed arms control regime in Europe with something better”.152

87. Conversely, witnesses also observed that the outlook for arms control is not universally bleak. Dr Williams noted that the success of international arms control in bilateral and multilateral formats depends to an extent on the nature of the weapons being

148 Q130
149 Q36; BASIC (INF0004); Dr Wyn Rees and Azriel Bermant (INF0006); Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament/Christian CND (INF0007); Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011)
150 Q61; BASIC (INF0004); Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (INF0009); Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011)
151 Q145
152 Dr Brad Roberts (INF0012)
controlled. While nuclear arms control is clearly in a period of uncertainty, discussions on controls for certain types of emerging disruptive technologies, such as cyber and artificial intelligence are making some progress on a multilateral basis at the UN.\textsuperscript{153} Dr Stocker also noted that the “dire predictions” for the future of arms control and strategic stability following the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 turned out to be largely unfounded.\textsuperscript{154} Mr Miller made the same point and noted this did not impede further US-Russia arms control agreements being concluded within months.\textsuperscript{155}

88. Nuclear arms control is in a precarious place. The failure of the INF Treaty would be a serious setback and the prospects for other arms control agreements such as New START remain uncertain. Arms control can survive only through the good faith of nations and the belief that other parties will hold to their obligations. The Russian Federation’s poor record of compliance, over decades, across a range of treaties and agreements is indicative of its cavalier and cynical attitude to arms control and other agreements which it considers no longer to serve its interests. Unless this attitude changes, it is difficult to see how other nations can have trust and confidence in Russian undertakings. This does not mean that the UK and its allies should give up in despair: efforts to promote arms control should continue. However, if the past is any guide, Russian compliance should never be relied upon without stringent verification systems permanently in place.
Conclusions and recommendations

The INF Treaty

1. The Soviet decision to introduce a new generation of intermediate-range missiles into Europe in the mid-1970s disrupted the continental balance of power. The central aim was to create military advantage for the Warsaw Pact and to sow political division within NATO. The resulting Dual Track policy adopted by NATO was highly effective, cementing the unity of the Alliance and presenting a robust response to the Soviet challenge. The dual nature of the response was crucial: diplomatic attempts alone would not have brought resolution. Only by a demonstration of hard power alongside continual diplomatic overtures was NATO able to make it clear to the Soviet leadership that the USSR’s own vital interests were being put at risk by NATO’s response and that a level of competition had been introduced which the Soviet Union could not sustain. Today, although the situation in Europe is very different, the example of the past is instructive. NATO needs to formulate a united response to the challenge posed by the leadership of the Russian Federation. (Paragraph 13)

2. The terms of the INF Treaty were far-reaching in that global prohibitions were placed on the parties in respect of an entire class of weapons. Thousands of missiles were destroyed and tight restrictions were placed on future development and deployment. A thorough system of monitoring and verification was also created. One flaw in these verification provisions was their time-limited nature, allowing for the opportunity of non-compliance once on-site inspections ceased in 2001. The value of ongoing verification provisions in arms control agreements has been demonstrated by the fate of the INF Treaty. (Paragraph 17)

Violation of the Treaty

3. It is clear that over the past 20 years Russia has been growing increasingly dissatisfied with its obligations under the INF Treaty. The current Russian leadership’s view appears to be that it was a mistake for the Soviet Union to enter into the obligations that the Russian Federation has inherited. Russian officials have repeatedly sought ways to dilute or terminate Russia’s obligations under the Treaty. The covert development and deployment of the 9M729 missile has proceeded from this, and Russian obfuscation and denial have followed once the system was discovered. (Paragraph 29)

4. Although the US has engaged with allies throughout the development of its concerns on Russian violation, the sudden announcement that the US was intending to withdraw was unexpected and the choreography of the announcement should have been more carefully managed. Consultation and co-ordination with European allies is vital on a matter so central to European security and this should be continually emphasised to the United States by the UK Government. Nonetheless, the US was able subsequently to create consensus within NATO on a robust position in support of its analysis and its actions. Consultation and co-ordination with European allies is vital on a matter so central to European security and this should be continually
emphasised to the United States by the UK Government. Nonetheless, the US was able subsequently to create consensus within NATO on a robust position in support of its analysis and its actions. (Paragraph 30)

5. The latest Russian responses continue to try to obfuscate and confuse. President Putin has stated that Russia will not be first to deploy intermediate-range missile systems “into Europe”; but the problem of the 9M729 missiles is their ability to threaten targets in Europe once deployed—as may well already be the case—in Western Russia. Russia’s announcement of a ‘symmetrical’ initiation of research and development into a new ground-based system is in reality an adaptation of an existing system which has been operational for some time. (Paragraph 31)

6. Russian motivations in pursuing the violation are diverse and overlapping. Its behaviour is consistent with the aggressive and revisionist policies that it has been actively pursuing in recent years—the use of multiple military, diplomatic, economic and political tools to challenge the rules-based international system and to seek a range of complementary effects which strengthen Russia’s own position. As we have seen elsewhere, these moves are accompanied by attempts to orchestrate the narrative of events in Russia’s favour and manipulate gullible and complicit elements in the West. When the violation was discovered in the case of the INF Treaty, outright denial was accompanied by an attempt to place the blame on the United States for undermining the continuation of the Treaty. This manipulation of the narrative must not be allowed to succeed. Russia will be solely responsible for failure of the INF Treaty because of Russian development of missile systems in clear violation of its provisions. The US should not be expected to subject itself to unilateral restraint to sustain a Treaty that has been rendered inoperative by another party. (Paragraph 45)

7. Although it is recognised that the changing strategic situation in Asia is a factor in Russia’s violation of the Treaty and the US response to it, we reject the argument that the US is content to see the Treaty collapse, or has deliberately engineered its collapse, because it wishes to deploy ground-based cruise missiles in Asia against a growing threat from China. The US has at every stage shown willingness to continue its obligations under the Treaty if Russia returns to compliance and has said that it will halt the military and economic steps of its Integrated Strategy if this happens. This has been accompanied by a sustained US diplomatic effort to save the Treaty. Responsibility for the failure of the Treaty will lie with Russia alone. (Paragraph 46)

8. The Russian counter-allegations that the United States has violated the Treaty are spurious. If Russia had genuine concerns over US compliance, it also had ample opportunity to seek reassurance from the US through the mechanisms which exist within the Treaty. In raising questions over US compliance at this late stage, Russia is seeking to draw attention away from its own violations and to make it appear as if the US is to blame for the failure of the Treaty. We endorse the collective view of NATO, as established in the joint statement of 4 December 2018, that the US has remained in full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty since it entered into force. (Paragraph 53)

9. The British Government acknowledges the contribution that the INF Treaty has made to European security and that a determined effort should be made to
preserve the Treaty if Russia can be brought back into compliance. It is right for the Government to recognise that there is still time for diplomacy and that efforts to find a diplomatic solution should continue. (Paragraph 56)

10. It is also right, however, to recognise both that the Treaty should not be allowed to continue at any cost and that diplomatic solutions alone cannot be indefinitely pursued. Permitting a dysfunctional INF Treaty to continue in spite of Russia’s violation would be a weak response which would do nothing to improve European security. On the contrary, it would reward Russian bad faith, alienate the United States from European allies and undermine arms control more generally. Accordingly, the Government is to be commended for lending its strong support to the United States, individually and within NATO, and to the approach the US has taken since evidence of the Russian violation first arose. (Paragraph 57)

Future action

11. Since it first approached the Russian Government about its concerns on compliance, the US has sought and actively pursued a diplomatic solution to the impasse over the INF Treaty. Russia’s refusal to acknowledge its violations is the central obstacle to any diplomatic progress. In spite of this, the US Government has continued to engage with Russia and has shown willingness to put relations onto a better footing if Russia changes its stance, even at this late stage. (Paragraph 64)

12. Proposals for reciprocal inspections of the 9M729 and the Mark 41 VLS systems carry some risk of giving credence to Russian allegations of US violation which have been described to us as spurious. Reciprocal inspections may also require the permission of those third states hosting the Mark 41 launchers, which may not be forthcoming. Nevertheless, the willingness of the parties to engage in confidence-building measures based on reciprocal inspections should be explored as a basis for further diplomatic efforts. (Paragraph 65)

13. A number of options have been suggested which involve amending the Treaty. Changing the geographical ambit of the Treaty or reducing restrictions on certain categories of weaponry will weaken arms control and might create new security risks. For example, restricting the Treaty to Europe might well have a destabilising influence in Asia. Similarly, removing certain categories of previously prohibited weapons from its scope might well result in further proliferation. Making such changes would also reward Russian bad faith. Russia should not be able to gain a more advantageous settlement through violating the Treaty. (Paragraph 66)

14. The current state of relations between Russia and the West makes prospects for negotiating new nuclear treaties extremely challenging. Should such prospects improve, one vital lesson to apply from the fate of the INF Treaty is clearly that permanent verification procedures must be built into any future agreement. (Paragraph 67)

15. Bringing into the INF Treaty further countries, which currently have no restrictions on intermediate-range missile development, is a theoretical possibility. But there is little appetite for this option amongst the states concerned and little to incentivise them to participate. (Paragraph 68)
16. The intelligence proving Russian violation of the INF Treaty is owned by the United States and only the US can decide how much material can be placed in the public domain. The precedents of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the publication of the 9M729 designator in 2017 show that making intelligence public is effective in strengthening a case internationally. If it is possible to do so without compromising intelligence sources and methods, exposure of Russia's flouting of the INF Treaty in an international forum like the United Nations could significantly influence world opinion and lay the guilt where it rightly belongs, so long as it is accompanied by a full-spectrum communications strategy. The British Government should give the US Government full encouragement and support in exposing and demonstrating how Russia has broken the Treaty provisions. (Paragraph 69)

17. The UK should continue to emphasise to the US the central role the INF Treaty plays in European security, as long as both Russia and the US comply with its provisions, and therefore the importance of consultation with allies and maintaining NATO unity. (Paragraph 70)

18. NATO is a currently reviewing the security implications of new Russian missile deployments in Europe and the steps which may be necessary to maintain the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture. This detailed evaluation must proceed through NATO on a collective and consultative basis and we do not seek to pre-empt the process by prescribing steps that should be taken. The result must, however, be robust and clearly a response to Russian actions. Russia must not be able to gain military advantage through its Treaty violation. (Paragraph 78)

19. The United States is already taking certain military steps in direct response to the Treaty violation, with the proviso that they will be discontinued if Russia returns to compliance. Others, many of which were initiated under previous US administrations, are part of a broader strategy of nuclear modernisation to sustain a credible posture of deterrence. Just as the deployment track was a vital part of NATO's Dual Track policy in the past, a strong response is needed today and this may entail further military options. This does not mean that the same solutions based, as in the 1980s, on like-for-like ground-launched missile deployments are the right ones for NATO today. The Alliance should seek to enhance its existing strengths in military posture. This can be done while continuing to hold the possibility of diplomatic options open. We expect the UK Government to play a full role in NATO's evaluation of the military implications arising from the Russian violation of the INF Treaty and to update the Committee with the outcome of this process once it is complete. (Paragraph 79)

20. An evaluation of capability should be accompanied by a re-examination of underlying policy. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept and 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review may need updating to reflect a worsening strategic environment. The UK should play a full part in any review of key NATO doctrine. (Paragraph 80)

21. NATO governments must do better at explaining to their populations why the Alliance is essential to European security. Russia's behaviour in respect of the INF Treaty gives the clearest indication of the continuing relevance of NATO and governments will need public support to take robust steps in response to Russia's
violation. We ask the Government to provide further details of the steps it is taking alongside NATO allies, to make the positive case for NATO and its response to Russian violation of the INF Treaty. (Paragraph 81)

22. Nuclear arms control is in a precarious place. The failure of the INF Treaty would be a serious setback and the prospects for other arms control agreements such as New START remain uncertain. Arms control can survive only through the good faith of nations and the belief that other parties will hold to their obligations. The Russian Federation’s poor record of compliance, over decades, across a range of treaties and agreements is indicative of its cavalier and cynical attitude to arms control and other agreements which it considers no longer to serve its interests. Unless this attitude changes, it is difficult to see how other nations can have trust and confidence in Russian undertakings. This does not mean that the UK and its allies should give up in despair: efforts to promote arms control should continue. However, if the past is any guide, Russian compliance should never be relied upon without stringent verification systems permanently in place. (Paragraph 88)
Annex 1: US nuclear forces in Europe

Under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements the United States has approximately 150 B61 tactical nuclear gravity bombs deployed in European bases. Warheads are stored and maintained by US Air Force personnel. The B61 can be delivered either by US aircraft or from dual-capable aircraft (DCA) belonging to the hosting state—usually F-15, F-16 or Tornados. Five NATO Allies currently participate in nuclear sharing:

- Belgium: Kleine Brogel Air Base (estimated 20 warheads)
- Germany: Büchel Air Base (estimated 20 warheads)
- Italy: Aviano Air Base (estimated 50 warheads) and Ghedi Air Base (estimated 20 warheads)
- The Netherlands: Vokel Air Base (estimated 20 warheads)
- Turkey: Incirlik Air Base (estimated 50 warheads)

Annex 2: Alleged Russian non-compliance in arms control agreements

Alongside the INF Treaty, the US Government has raised concerns relating to Russian compliance with several major arms control and security agreements. The majority of these allegations are laid out in the US State Department’s annual compliance reports on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements, but these issues were also raised in evidence to this inquiry.156

**Biological Weapons Convention:** The Soviet Union had always strenuously denied the existence of any offensive biological weapons (BW) programme during the Cold War after the signing of the BW Convention in 1972. It was subsequently revealed by a defecting scientist in 1992 that a vast research and development programme for offensive BW weapons, known as ‘Biopreparat’ had existed on a much larger scale than Western intelligence agencies had suspected. The BW Convention requires Russia to destroy such weapons or to divert them to peaceful purposes. Although Russia undertook to do so in 1992, the US considers that Russia’s written submissions on compliance required under the BW Convention have still not satisfactorily documented and demonstrated the complete destruction of this programme, or its diversion into wholly peaceful purposes, as required by Article II of the BW Convention.

**Chemical Weapons Convention:** Russia signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, which places obligations on state parties to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles. In 1997, Moscow declared its possession of the world’s largest stockpile of chemical agents and munitions—40,000 metric tons of agents—under the CWC. The declared inventory consisted of a comprehensive array of traditional chemical warfare agents incorporated into munitions such as artillery shells, bombs, and missile warheads, as well as stored in bulk.157 President Putin said in September 2017 that Russia had destroyed the last of its chemical weapons and that all chemical weapons production and storage facilities had been closed. He claimed this as an “historic moment” and criticised the United States for not following suit.158 The Organisation for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons (OPCW) validated the Russian announcement shortly afterwards.159 Yet, according to the 2018 Compliance Report, Russian use of a military grade nerve agent in the Salisbury attack of March 2018 indicates that the Russian declarations required under the CW Convention are either inaccurate or incomplete. The US does not believe Russia has declared all of its CW stockpile, all of its CW production facilities, and all of its CW development facilities.

**Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty:** The CFE Treaty was signed in 1990. It places comprehensive limits on various categories of conventional military equipment and mandates the disposal of surplus equipment. Russia suspended its implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007, claiming that the establishment of US bases in Romania and Bulgaria was in breach of the Treaty. The US considers the stationing of Russian troops

---

156 Q94; Dr Brad Roberts (INF0012); US State Department, *2018 Report on Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Disarmament Agreements And Commitments*, 17 April 2018
159 *OPCW Marks Completion of Destruction of Russian Chemical Weapons Stockpile*, OPCW, 11 October 2017
in the territory of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine without the permission of the host
governments as a serious violation. Since 2015, Russia has failed to pay its specified share
of the common expenses associated with the operation of the Treaty’s Joint Consultative
Group.

Open Skies Treaty: The Open Skies Treaty allows signatory states an agreed number
of unarmed surveillance flights over each other’s territory. The US considers Russia to
be in violation of its terms by imposing sub-limits to flight plans intended to overfly its
Kaliningrad enclave. No provision of the OST permits the establishment of such sub-
limits. Russia has also rejected flight plans for overflight of its borders adjacent to the
Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions in Georgia—on the basis that these two territories
are independent states and not parties to the OST. The US position, alongside that of all
other parties to the OST, is that the two territories are part of Georgia, which is a signatory
to the Treaty.

Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement: In 2000, the United States and
Russia signed a Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) committing
each country to dispose of no fewer than 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium
removed from their respective defence programs. Although the US believes there is no
indication that Russia violated its obligations under the PMDA, Russia’s October 2016
announcement of a decision to “suspend” the PMDA—a term without clear legal meaning
under the Agreement—raises concerns regarding its future adherence to those obligations.

Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures: As part of
confidence-building measures to increase transparency of the size and deployment of
military forces in Europe, the OSCE Vienna Documents place requirements on signatory
states to exchange information on deployments of military forces within the areas
delimited. The Document also imposes requirements for exercises involving formations
in excess of a certain number of personnel. The US contends that Russia has failed to
declare the presence of particular military units active in the territory of Ukraine and
elsewhere. It also argues that Russia has held exercises, including the major Zapad 2017
exercise, in excess of the threshold required for notification and inspection.

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: A series of Presidential Nuclear Initiatives were
concluded between the US and Russia in 1991, seeking to limit and reduce both countries’
tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles. Under the PNI, the US committed to withdraw to the
US all ground-launched short-range weapons deployed overseas and destroy them along
with existing US-based stockpiles of the same weaponry. Deployment of tactical nuclear
weapons on surface ships, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft would also come
to an end. The PNI were not established on a treaty basis, were non-verifiable, and lacked
transparency. This inability to check implementation of the PNI made any assessment of
their success quite difficult. While the US reportedly completed its proposed reductions
and withdrawals in 1992 and its elimination process in 2003, Russia has released very
little information to substantiate its PNI activities, leading the US State Department to
question and challenge its PNI record.

Helsinki Final Act: A landmark 1975 agreement on European security which guaranteed
the integrity of European states. Russia has arguably violated this in respect of Ukraine,
Georgia and Moldova.
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances: An agreement of 1994 providing assurances on security and territorial integrity to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in return for those states divesting themselves of nuclear weapons and acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A number of states, including the UK and the US, have accused Russia of violating this agreement by its aggressive behaviour since 2014.

Istanbul Accords: An OSCE agreement of 1999, by which Russia undertook to remove its forces from Moldova and Georgia, is clearly being violated by the continuing Russian military presence in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Formal minutes

Tuesday 26 March 2019

Members present:
Rt Hon Julian Lewis, in the Chair
Leo Docherty    Gavin Robinson
Martin Docherty-Hughes  Ruth Smeeth
Graham P Jones    Rt Hon John Spellar
Johnny Mercer

1. Consideration of draft report: Missile Misdemeanours: Russia and the INF Treaty

The Draft Report (Missile Misdemeanours: Russia and the INF Treaty), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 88 read and agreed to.

Annexes agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fifteenth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 2 April at 10.15am]
Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

**Tuesday 20 November 2018**

Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Dr Jeremy Stocker, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute, and Dr Heather Williams, Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College London

**Wednesday 12 December 2018**

Hon. Franklin C. Miller KBE, Principal, The Scowcroft Group

**Wednesday 12 December 2018**

Rt Hon. Sir Alan Duncan KCMG MP, Minister of State for Europe and the Americas, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Ben Fender, Head of Security Policy Department, Defence and International Security Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Published written evidence**

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

INF numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1. BASIC (British American Security Information Council) (INF0004)
2. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (INF0007)
3. Dr Brad Roberts (INF0012)
4. Dr Katarzyna Kubiak (INF0011)
5. Dr Martyn Thomas (INF0001)
6. Dr Rebecca Johnson (INF0009)
7. Dr Wyn Rees and Azriel Bermant (INF0006)
8. Foreign & Commonwealth Office (INF0014)
9. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (INF0010)
10. Human Security Centre (INF0003)
11. Medact (INF0005)
12. Ministry of Defence (INF0013)
13. Ministry of Defence (INF0015)
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website. The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

**Session 2017–19**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>HC/HCW Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Report</td>
<td>Gambling on ‘Efficiency’: Defence Acquisition and Procurement</td>
<td>HC 431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Report</td>
<td>Unclear for take-off? F-35 Procurement</td>
<td>HC 326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Report</td>
<td>Sunset for the Royal Marines? The Royal Marines and UK amphibious capability</td>
<td>HC 622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Report</td>
<td>Rash or Rational? North Korea and the threat it poses</td>
<td>HC 327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Report</td>
<td>Lost in Translation? Afghan Interpreters and Other Locally Employed Civilians</td>
<td>HC 572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Report</td>
<td>The Government’s proposals for a future security partnership with the European Union</td>
<td>HC 594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Report</td>
<td>Beyond 2 per cent: A preliminary report on the Modernising Defence Programme</td>
<td>HC 818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Report</td>
<td>Indispensable allies: US, NATO and UK Defence relations</td>
<td>HC 387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Report</td>
<td>Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2017</td>
<td>HC 707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Report</td>
<td>UK arms exports during 2016</td>
<td>HC 666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh Report</td>
<td>Armed Forces and veterans mental health</td>
<td>HC 813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth Report</td>
<td>On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic</td>
<td>HC 388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteenth Report</td>
<td>Future Anti-Ship Missile Systems: Joint inquiry with the Assemblée nationale’s Standing Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces</td>
<td>HC 1071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourteenth Report</td>
<td>Mental Health and the Armed Forces, Part Two: The Provision of Care</td>
<td>HC 1481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Special Report</td>
<td>SDSR 2015 and the Army</td>
<td>HC 311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Special Report</td>
<td>Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2016</td>
<td>HC 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Special Report</td>
<td>Investigations into fatalities in Northern Ireland involving British military personnel: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2016–17</td>
<td>HC 549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Special Report</td>
<td>Gambling on ‘Efficiency’: Defence Acquisition and Procurement: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report</td>
<td>HC 846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Special Report</td>
<td>Unclear for take-off? F-35 Procurement: Responses to the Committee’s Second Report</td>
<td>HC 845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Special Report</td>
<td>Sunset for the Royal Marines and UK amphibious capability: Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report</td>
<td>HC 1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Special Report</td>
<td>Rash or Rational? North Korea and the threat it poses: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report</td>
<td>HC 1155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Special Report</td>
<td>Lost in Translation? Afghan Interpreters and Other Locally Employed Civilians: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report</td>
<td>HC 1568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Special Report</td>
<td>Indispensable allies: US, NATO and UK Defence relations: Government Response to the Committee’s Eighth Report</td>
<td>HC 1569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Special Report</td>
<td>The Government’s proposals for a future security partnership with the European Union: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report</td>
<td>HC 1570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth Special Report</td>
<td>Mental health and the Armed Forces, Part One: The Scale of mental health issues: Government Response to the Committee’s Eleventh Report</td>
<td>HC 1635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteenth Special Report</td>
<td>On Thin Ice: Defence in the Arctic: Government Response to the Committee’s Twelfth Report</td>
<td>HC 1659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourteenth Special Report</td>
<td>UK arms exports during 2016: Government Response to the Committees’ First Joint Report</td>
<td>HC 1789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteenth Special Report</td>
<td>Beyond 2 per cent: A preliminary report on the Modernising Defence Programme: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report</td>
<td>HC 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixteenth Special Report</td>
<td>Future Anti-Ship Missile Systems: Joint inquiry with the Assemblée nationale’s Standing Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces: Government Response to the Committee’s Thirteenth Report</td>
<td>HC 2033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>