Sunset for the Royal Marines? The Royal Marines and UK amphibious capability Contents

2The National Security Capability Review

3.The National Security Capability Review (NSCR) was announced on 20 July 2017, with the Government saying it would include “examination of the policy and plans which support implementation of the national security strategy, and help to ensure that the UK’s investment in national security capabilities is as joined-up, effective and efficient as possible, to address current national security challenges”.3 Defence would be one of twelve strands taken forward by a number of cross-departmental teams, under the co-ordination of the National Security Adviser, Sir Mark Sedwill, who is based in the Cabinet Office. This announcement had been preceded by indications that a ‘refresh’ of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR),4 was being considered outside the usual five-year SDSR cycle established in 2010.5

4.In oral evidence to us on 25 October 2017, the then Secretary of State, Sir Michael Fallon MP, stated that the rationale for the NSCR was that the threats identified in 2015 had “intensified” and that the review would concentrate on strengthening cyber, space, CBRN, hybrid and information warfare, and ballistic missile defence. It would also seek to address the difficulties that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is facing in meeting the “challenge of inflation, cost growth in some of our more complex programmes and ambitious efficiency targets … so it is right that we continue to modernise the way we work, look to remove duplication and prioritise our capabilities to deliver smarter and stronger defence.”6 On 18 December, giving evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS), Sir Mark said that the review had been commissioned by the National Security Council as a “fiscally neutral” exercise and that “the purpose in doing it is to see if the money that is already allocated is allocated in the right way”.7

5.Following the announcement of the NSCR in July, reports began to emerge that significant reductions in the UK’s amphibious capability were being considered as part of the review. In September, The Times reported that a reduction of 1,000 Royal Marines (15% of their current strength) was under consideration.8 This was soon followed by reports that the Royal Navy’s two Albion class landing platform dock (LPD) ships were also at risk.9 It was later reported that the Royal Navy’s Commander UK Maritime Forces, Rear Admiral Alex Burton, had resigned over the threat to the LPDs.10

6.The reaction to the reported reductions has been almost wholly negative. Parliamentarians have used every opportunity to criticise these plans and call for their reversal. At a Westminster Hall debate on UK amphibious capability on 21 November, secured by Ruth Smeeth MP, there was cross-party support for maintaining the capability from every backbench Member who spoke.11 In a lengthy debate on defence in the Chamber on 11 January 2018, initiated by former Shadow Defence Secretary Vernon Coaker MP, amphibious capability was cited repeatedly as an example of a capability that should be retained and enhanced.12 The issue has also predominated in departmental questions,13 and the level of concern in the House of Lords has matched that in the Commons.14

7.Before our 5 December oral evidence session on amphibious capability, we had taken other relevant evidence from retired senior officers in a preliminary session on the NSCR. The former First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir George Zambellas, was forthright on the subject:

Nobody in the world of complex warfare, especially for an island nation that delivers force from the sea, thinks that a reduction in the sophisticated end of amphibiosity is a good idea … [any capability review] really needs to consider very carefully why you would want to reduce amphibiosity at the expense of something else when the proper answer is that you should increase and solidify the quality of amphibiosity using investment in new equipment and new capability, and you should preserve the outstanding capability of the Royal Marine in the inventory of fighting forces across defence.15

General Sir Richard Barrons, a former Commander, Joint Forces Command, was equally direct, saying that it was “madness” both to consider removing the capability to put a force ashore over a beach, and to think that the right approach to the Royal Navy’s manpower shortages is to “cull some of the finest infantry in the world … It is just folly”.16

8.A measure of the international reaction to the reported proposals was given by Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, who retired as the commander of US Army Europe in late 2017. When asked in an interview about the UK’s amphibious capability he said “I’d hate to lose that particular capability or take an option off the table that makes the problem a little bit simpler for any potential adversary”. He further warned that such reductions would make it more difficult to ensure a more equitable level of burden-sharing across NATO. On the quality of British personnel, General Hodges noted that some of the best British officers he had met came from the Royal Marines and said “I’d hate to see the institution that produces men like that degraded”.17

9.We welcome the view expressed by the Ministry of Defence in its written evidence that it considers the UK’s amphibious capability to be a “vital component of our nation’s power projection capabilities”, and the Department’s discussion of the place of that capability within UK Defence.18 These sentiments have been echoed by Ministers and officials elsewhere.19 However, the MoD used its written evidence to dismiss reports of reductions in amphibious capability as “speculation”. This is typical of the Department’s refusal to engage on specifics relating to force structure and configuration across the NSCR process.

10.We also note a disturbing trend relating to Ministerial accountability for decisions resulting in changes to the force structure and manpower of the Services. Since the Levene reforms, we have observed Ministers avoiding explanation or accounting for changes in force structure or manpower on the basis that they are matters for the relevant Service Chief. An example occurred when changes to the role of 42 Commando Royal Marines, and consequent reductions in manpower, were announced in 2017, with Ministers stating within Parliament20 and elsewhere21 that these were matters for the First Sea Lord. The Service Chiefs, as a Committee, are further removed from the process of strategic decision-making today than they have been since their inception, with the Chief of the Defence Staff as the sole uniformed military representative on the National Security Council and none of the Service Chiefs sitting on the Defence Board.22

11.On 25 January 2018, the Defence Secretary announced that the Defence strand was being removed from the NSCR and a new Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) was being initiated. The Secretary of State also confirmed in questions following the statement that this new review process would not be fiscally neutral. The resultant MDP is now due to report in the summer of 2018.23

12.The NSCR is still ongoing and we will examine the process and its substantive outcomes when it has concluded. Even with the Defence element of the NSCR being separated from the rest of the review, as has recently been announced, the conclusions and recommendations in this report have continuing relevance to the process that this sorry episode has demonstrated. The entanglement of Defence with other issues under the control of senior National Security Council/Cabinet Office officials has led to an unacceptable lack of Ministerial accountability. We warmly welcome the new Defence Secretary’s success in regaining control of the Defence Review process, but we remain concerned at the post-Levene disintegration of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as the primary source of direct military advice to the Government.

13.Our predecessors, along with other Committees such as the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, have been critical of the process surrounding previous SDSRs: in contrast to earlier exercises, such as the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, there has been very little consultation and engagement outside Government during the review process. Unfortunately, we see no evidence of this state of affairs changing in the NSCR. Bodies that would expect to be consulted in the course of these reviews have not been ‘brought in’ to the process, and have struggled to receive substantive answers to many questions that have arisen. This is a particularly serious omission where Parliament is concerned. Decisions of this magnitude should be debated in Parliament and information provided to select committees to allow for proper scrutiny. Parliament should also have real influence on the review process. Presenting the outcome of a review of this nature to Parliament without any prior Parliamentary input or scrutiny is totally unacceptable. This is not entirely the fault of the Ministry of Defence, as the NSCR is being co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office. Nonetheless, a lack of engagement will only encourage the emergence of rumours and leaks that distract from the overall review. The Department may dismiss such reports as ‘speculation’, but they are inevitable in a secretive—indeed a closed—process without proper external engagement, given the scale of the force structure reconfigurations that are reportedly being considered. The Department may wish to reflect upon this in future defence and security review exercises. We recommend that the Modernising Defence Programme be used as an opportunity finally to involve those organisations, individuals and institutions—including Parliament—which have previously made valuable contributions to strategic defence reviews.

14.The Secretary of State and other Defence Ministers are accountable to Parliament for all the policies, decisions and actions of their department. This is a long-standing constitutional principle which is articulated in the Ministerial Code. It is not acceptable for Ministers to avoid answering questions on force structure and manpower changes on the basis that these were decisions taken by the Service Chiefs, as if Ministers are devoid of responsibility to account for these decisions. If this is the way that the Levene Reforms have been interpreted by the Department, then this is an interpretation made in error. It is not possible for any Department of State to arrange itself internally so as to insulate Ministers from Parliamentary accountability or allow them to hide behind officials. The Service Chiefs are more distant from strategic decision-making than they have been at any point in modern history. The decisions they are required to make on force structure are often invidious choices, entirely restricted by the political and financial parameters, set by Ministers, on how resources are allocated. The Department should be aware that we will not accept an abdication of accountability by Ministers, and will expect Ministers, led by the new Secretary of State, fully to account for and explain the policy rationale behind force structure changes that emerge from this or any future Defence review process.


3Strategic Defence and Security Review Implementation’, Cabinet Office news release, 20 July 2017

5 See for example the speech of the National Security Adviser, Mark Sedwill, at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference, 29 June 2017

11 HC Deb, 21 November 2017, c 297WH

12 HC Deb, 11 January 2018, c 503

13 HC Deb, 23 October 2017, c 2; HC Deb, 27 November 2017, c 2; HC Deb, 15 January 2018, c 589

14 HL Deb, 23 November 2017, c 293; HL Deb, 28 November 2017, c 644; HL Deb, 29 November 2017, c 674; HL Deb, 5 December 2017, c 958

18 Ministry of Defence (RMA0098)

19 HC Deb, 21 November 2017, c 320WH; Oral evidence, Work of the Department 2017, 2 October 2017, HC 439, Q49 [Lieutenant General Mark Poffley, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability)]

20 HL Deb, 4 April 2017, c 942 [Earl Howe]

22 The predecessor Defence Committee looked at these structural issues in detail in Decision Making in Defence Policy, Eleventh Report of Session 2014–15, HC 682. See also Professor Gwythian Prins (RMA0102).

23 HC Deb, 25 January 2018, c 423. The point regarding fiscal neutrality is at column 426.




1 February 2018