Sunset for the Royal Marines? The Royal Marines and UK amphibious capability Contents

3Amphibious warfare

The British experience in amphibious operations

15.British expertise in amphibious warfare is extensive and has been shaped by long experience.24 This arose as a matter of geographical and geopolitical reality—an island nation and leading naval power whose foreign policy was tied for many centuries to defending its colonial possessions and maintaining the European balance of power by deploying land forces to the continent.

16.The history of British amphibious warfare demonstrates its dangers and complexities. For every success, there have been serious reverses illustrating the unique risks associated with amphibious operations. The injuries that Horatio Nelson suffered to his right eye and right arm occurred not in battle at sea, but in the course of amphibious operations in the French Revolutionary Wars, the latter injury occurring during the attempted assault on Santa Cruz de Tenerife in 1797, a costly failure.25 The Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War provides a study in failure, demonstrating the rapidity with which a combination of poor planning, inexperienced commanders, a lack of specialist amphibious equipment, poor intelligence, and a lack of proper command and control can result in disaster.26

17.By contrast, the most notable successes, especially the more recent examples, have been characterised by comprehensive planning and direction of amphibious operations by specialists within the Armed Forces. They have been able to rely on personnel who have been rigorously trained in amphibious warfare, operating from purpose-built amphibious assault ships with dedicated command, control and communications facilities. The large-scale amphibious operations of the Second World War give an indication of the level of resource that was applied to developing specialist doctrine, training and equipment. This understanding has evolved, allowing this experience, expertise and meticulous attention to detail to be applied on operations up to the present day.

18.Although this historical record demonstrates the leadership that the UK has shown in developing specialist amphibious techniques, our witnesses emphasised how the nature of amphibious operations has evolved and changed since the era of the Normandy landings. In oral evidence, Major General Julian Thompson referred to the “Saving Private Ryan” scenario—the perception that amphibious operations involve undertaking large-scale assaults with division-sized formations against heavily defended beaches in daylight. This was abandoned in the mid-1950s27 and is not part of the UK’s modern concept of amphibious operations. The more recent doctrine and tasking of amphibious units places great emphasis on unopposed landings, ideally at night, to maximise stealth, surprise and the amount of time available to get reinforcements and equipment ashore before the enemy is in a position to counterattack. Any assessment of current UK amphibious capability based on a ‘D-Day’-style conception of amphibious landings, in the teeth of all-out enemy resistance, completely misses the point28 For example, in the evidence session of 25 October, the then Defence Secretary said:

We have to spend money on dealing with the threats from cyber as well as finding resources to storm beaches.29

This suggests an incomplete understanding of the role of amphibious forces today, despite a welcome emphasis on the need to invest both in conventional and innovative capabilities.

Amphibious capability in modern warfare

19.The 2015 SDSR identified the provision of “world-class amphibious forces” as one of the Royal Navy’s main tasks alongside delivering the nuclear deterrent and projecting maritime power. It further stated that Joint Force 2025 would include:

Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade who are trained and equipped to provide specialist amphibious and Arctic warfare capabilities. We will enhance a Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carrier to support this amphibious capability.30

The most recent Joint Doctrine Publication on Maritime Power, issued in October 2017, also set out the range of capability and flexibility offered by the UK’s amphibious forces, including a landing force of Royal Marines and specialist shipping consisting of the Albion class LPDs.31

20.The evidence we have received has amply illustrated the enduring value of amphibious operations to UK Defence and to modern warfare. General Thompson told us that amphibious capability was “a strategic asset”, recalling the application of the capability in the past, and how easily the specialism is lost if not properly sustained.32 The written evidence provided valuable insights into the role of amphibious capability in modern operations. One submission summed up the range of strategic options that the capability offers:

Amphibious operations project power, support or relief, inland from sea, river or lake without the need for a port, airfield or overflight rights. They can be militarily offensive or defensive. They are an effective method of deploying balanced forces to prevent a hostile landing, to remove an aggressive force or provide support to vulnerable neighbours. The very threat of an amphibious landing can be sufficient to deter hostile action, without the necessity of actually doing anything unless required or asked. An amphibious force can be deployed from its base to be in readiness elsewhere without commitment, it can land at a time of its choosing and retire without taking or losing ground. An amphibious response is a graduated response, and a response that can be delivered with complete surprise, at a location and with a combination of amphibious equipment of the force’s choosing. Unlike other forms of warfare, or disaster relief, amphibious operations can take place at large distances from the home base.33

Witnesses also highlighted the tactical application of amphibious capability, projecting maritime power by manoeuvring, deploying and sustaining balanced forces from the sea, including heavy- and medium-weight equipment, which can then continue a campaign against an enemy on land.34

21.A number of recent operations by UK Armed Forces have been either effected or supported by amphibious power. The campaign in the South Atlantic in 1982 required a landing force, led by 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, to be put ashore to re-take the Falkland Islands.35 In 2000, an Amphibious Ready Group was at the centre of Operation PALLISER, incorporating a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) and a subsequent military intervention to stabilise a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Sierra Leone. Written evidence from personnel involved in the operation demonstrates the decisive role played by the Royal Marines. It also demonstrates the value of operating from the safety of an offshore base, and of the riverine and raiding capabilities of amphibious units using air-cushioned vehicles and offshore raiding craft.36 The United Nations Association in written evidence made the suggestion of how riverine capability could be utilised to support the UN’s humanitarian and peacekeeping work and this would “a way for the Royal Marines to maintain a state of combat readiness and to receive active duty experience”.37 During the Iraq War in 2003 at the outset of Operation TELIC, an amphibious assault was launched against the Al-Faw Peninsula from the Gulf. Although principally an airborne amphibious operation, evidence from commanders involved points to the risks that had to be taken because of a lack of means to put heavy weapons and light armour directly onshore. It was fortunate that access to the peninsula by heavy equipment was available through an alternative overland route, which may not always be available.38 This lack of sealift was the result of the campaign taking place during an LPD capability gap, created by the predecessor Fearless class being retired before the Albion class had entered service.

22.The written evidence we received emphasised the deterrent, as well as the offensive power of the capability, citing the operations in Kuwait (1961),39 Tanganyika and Aden40 as examples of the mere presence of amphibious forces nearby preventing a more serious threat emerging. The Gulf War in 1991 is another more recent example of the utility of an amphibious force as a ‘force in being’ that can tie down enemy forces which otherwise might be employed elsewhere.41

23.Further written evidence examined whether sea-based amphibious operations are becoming obsolete and involve too high a level of risk given the technological developments taking place in the modern battlespace. The weight of the evidence, combined with the incidence of recent operational examples mentioned above, suggests that this is not the case. At a time when the UK’s strategic competitors are increasingly relying on technologies which extend ‘access denial’, the capability to deploy personnel and equipment from the sea where access to ports and other points of entry is denied should be sustained.42 We also strongly endorse the argument put by Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fry, a former Commandant General Royal Marines, that if we dispense with the capability we will not be part of its intellectual or technological development in the future:

unless we remain in the game, we cannot expect to get to the next generation of capability. If we lose it now, we will be out of it forever.43

This was echoed by Nick Childs, Senior Fellow for Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies:

dressing it up as a reimagining of capability when actually you are talking about reducing capability is not a way to get to a place in the future where you are using the critical assets, including landing capabilities, in a different way.44

24.The institutional expertise the United Kingdom possesses in amphibious warfare has been hard won, and continues to be maintained today in UK Armed Forces by a group of specialists, mainly found in the Royal Marines and in the Royal Navy’s amphibious fleet. Dispensing with a unique cadre of military expertise from across the three Services, or reducing it to the level where it cannot be deployed on a strategically meaningful scale, would be an irreparable act of folly. The UK is one of the few nations that have a sovereign capability in this specialism. Reductions of the type and scale that are reportedly being contemplated would wipe this out, and there would be no going back. It would be yet another step away from full-spectrum capability.


24 Q4 – Q5; Paul Lloyd (RMA0025); Peter Calliafas (RMA0034); Murdo Mackenzie (RMA0083); Commodore (Rtd) Michael Clapp and Rear Admiral (Rtd) Jeremy Larken (RMA0085)

25 Knight, R, The Pursuit of Victory: The Life and Achievement of Horatio Nelson, Allen Lane, London 2005, pp 172, 249–250

26 See Creswell, J, Generals and Admirals – The Story of Amphibious Command, Longmans, London 1952, pp 118–146; Thompson, J, The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers to a Special Force, Sidgwick & Jackson, London 2000, p 91–106

27 Spellar, I, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy 1945–56, Palgrave, London 2001, pp 94–100

28 Q7–8; George Elton (RMA0020); Gabriele Molinelli (RMA0030); Lt Col (Rtd) Ewen Southby-Tailyour (RMA0051); Lt Col (Rtd) Charles Wilson (RMA0056); William Taylor (RMA0074); Professor Gwythian Prins (RMA0102)

31 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0–10: UK Maritime Power (5th Edition), October 2017, paras 4.15 – 4.18. See also DefenceSynergia (RMA0065)

32 Q2-Q5

33 Lt Col (Rtd) Ewen Southby-Tailyour (RMA0051)

34 Q5 [Dr Roberts]; Q6 [Lt Gen Fry]

35 Q9; Lt Col (Rtd) Ewen Southby-Tailyour (RMA0051); Commodore (Rtd) Michael Clapp and Rear Admiral (Rtd) Jeremy Larken (RMA0085)

36 Lt Col (Rtd) Charles Wilson (RMA0056); Adrian Raisbeck (RMA0062). See also Dorman, A, ‘The British Experience of Low-Intensity Conflict in Sierra Leone’, Defence & Security Analysis, June 2007, Volume 23:2, pp 185–200. The value of riverine and raiding operations is also mentioned by Dr Roberts at Q37 and Q46.

37 United Nations Association (RMA0104)

38 Gabriele Molinelli (RMA0030); Rear Admiral (Rtd) David Snelson and Lt Gen (Rtd) Sir James Dutton (RMA0066)

39 Commander (Rtd) N D MacCartan-Ward (RMA0055)

40 Q5 [Gen Thompson]; Brigadier (Rtd) Tom Lang (RMA0069)

41 Lt Col (Rtd) Charles Wilson (RMA0056); Rear Admiral (Rtd) David Snelson and Lt Gen (Rtd) Sir James Dutton (RMA0066)

42 See for example Gabriele Molinelli (RMA0030). The challenges and opportunities presented by increasing urbanisation of the littoral are discussed in chapter 6.

43 Q31

44 Q31




1 February 2018