6The future of amphibious warfare
Global strategic trends
85.The latest edition of the publication on global strategic trends out to 2045 produced by the Ministry of Defence’s own Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) predicts that by 2045, 70% of the world’s population will live in cities, and that this population movement from rural to urban areas will result in the existence of around 280 megacities (defined by DCDC as cities with a population of 20 million or more). It further suggests that a number of these cities will be in littoral areas, with growing susceptibility to the effects of climate change, rising sea levels and other extreme weather events.131 A second DCDC publication looking at the future operating environment out to 2035, characterises what it calls the ‘urban and littoral challenge’:
For our Armed Forces, the urban environment will be one of the most challenging areas to operate in. The city, and its surrounds, will become an increasingly complex and ambiguous tapestry of multiple actors with shifting allegiances, in which we may be required to operate in a variety of ways, from major conflict at range to peace support and humanitarian operations. Where cities are located on the littoral—a complex operating environment in its own right—the complexities of the urban environment will be amplified and even more dynamic. This will exacerbate further the operating challenges.132
86.Even in the absence of conflict, there is a greater likelihood of a need for humanitarian intervention and disaster relief by sea, which amphibious platforms are best placed to deliver. Growing urbanisation also increases the probability of military operations taking place near or in these urban environments. There is an increasing recognition and discussion of this trend and its military consequences within doctrine and commentary in the United States.133 The littoral and amphibious aspects of these future challenges should not be ignored.134
Direction of UK international foreign and defence policy
87.There is a clear emphasis in UK foreign and defence policy on re-establishing a presence outside the Euro-Atlantic area. In December 2016 the Foreign Secretary announced that Britain should once again be seeking to engage ‘East of Suez’.135 This followed undertakings in the SDSR 2015 to deepen defence ties with nations including Japan and South Korea.136 Naval assets including HMS Sutherland and HMS Argyll will be deployed to the Asia-Pacific region in 2018.137 Regional hubs for defence engagement have been set up in West Africa, the Gulf and Singapore.138 As has been demonstrated in the past, amphibious platforms are particularly suited to operations in the Gulf, in the Indian Ocean and in Asia-Pacific, given the importance of maritime power in these regions and the ability of the vessels to operate thousands of miles from their home base. With continuing instability in the Middle East, in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula, there is a clear need for a hard-power edge to this presence.
International amphibious capability
88.The global trend amongst both allies and adversaries indicates an increase in amphibious capability. In oral evidence Dr Roberts noted that the largest amphibious operation in living history was executed by Russia during the 2008 war with Georgia:
Russian naval infantry landed 11,500 people and annexed an entire country or a state of a country—a significant portion of land—with ground-based air support but without sea-based air support. They did it within about 96 hours. It was a flawless amphibious operation from those who we have often written down in our own intelligence estimates.139
Dr Roberts also noted developments elsewhere:
You can look at the amphibious capabilities of the Chinese navy, the PLAN, which are very significant and growing enormously at a pace that will make them larger than the US Marine Corps by 2025, with two divisions capable at the moment and designed to annex countries, not simply areas of land. They are exercising against opposed beachheads. They are expecting losses that the Russians have experienced in Ukraine. We are talking about between 2,000 and 3,000 people dying in 15 minutes from serving troops. That is the level at which our adversaries are preparing to take risk in amphibious operations.
Iran and North Korea were also mentioned as nations investing in amphibious capability.140
United States
89.The United States Navy has recently taken delivery of the LPD USS Portland, with the next in class expected to be delivered in 2021. The 355 ship force-level goal that the US Navy has established saw an increase in the requirement from 34 to 38 amphibious ships, 13 of which will be LPDs. The Portland will also serve as the test platform for the US Navy’s prototype directed energy weapon.141 The next class of amphibious ship to replace the existing LSD class is in development.142
Russia
90.Russia sought to buy two Mistral class LHDs from France, but the contract was cancelled following the aggression in Ukraine and Crimea in 2014.143 The Russian Navy has sought to continue replacing its older LST models with a newer class of landing ship.144 A new class of LHD is also being developed.145
China
91.The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) launched its fifth LPD in June 2017, with a further two under construction. Earlier in March 2017 it was reported that construction had begun on China’s largest ever LHD amphibious vessel. This was accompanied by reports that China is planning a significant expansion of the PLAN Marine Corps up to a total of 100,000.146
Other nations
92.France currently operates three Mistral class LHDs. Australia purchased a Bay class LSD(A) from the UK in 2011 and had two LHDs delivered in 2014 and 2015.147 In 2015, Italy ordered a new LHD which is due for delivery in 2022,148 and Turkey awarded a contract for a new LPD for delivery in 2021.149 Egypt completed the purchase of the two Mistral class LHDs from France that were originally intended for Russia in 2016.150 In 2017 India announced the approval of the construction of a class of four new LPDs151 and Japan commissioned a second LPH into its Navy.152 South Korea is due to commission a second LHD into its Navy in 2018 to operate alongside its existing flotilla of smaller landing ships.153
93.There was a discussion in oral evidence about the value that international partners place more widely on the UK’s amphibious capability. Dr Roberts’s view was that:
If you offered a US military commander either a British carrier or a British amphibious group, they would take the amphibious group any day … From the discussions I have had in DC this year, it strikes me that amphibious capability is actually a lot more critical to the special relationship than carrier power.154
General Thompson said that his experience was the same. Nick Childs differed slightly, pointing out that the US Navy is struggling to meet their deployed carrier commitments, and that “both are critical capabilities as far as the US is concerned”.155 Dr Roberts was more direct when he was asked what our allies would think of us reducing our amphibious capability:
To use very lazy language, they think we are mad. No one invests such an amount of national capital—intellectual, physical and monetary—in a huge capability and a huge number of ships—sailors, airmen, concepts, relationships—just to simply delete it on the basis of a review that might be a defence review, but without any of the coverage, discussion, or debate around it. It would do us tremendous danger in terms of our reputation as a thinking nation, as a rational actor in a military space, to make such a decision. It does not bear any relationship to the way we are talking about foreign policy or the threats that we have.156
94.Global trends point to an increasing proportion of the world’s population living in coastal and littoral zones. There is growing awareness that future conflicts are likely to take place in or near ‘megacities’, and a large proportion of these cities will be on or near a coastline. An amphibious capability opens a range of military options in such an environment.
95.The Government has put a renewed emphasis on the UK having an increased role outside the Euro-Atlantic area and there have been continued discussions of returning to a presence East of Suez. Amphibious platforms, with their inherent flexibility and capacity to operate at considerable distance from the home base, are ideally suited for this role. The uncertain situation in Asia-Pacific, with continuing tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula, would make having a flexible, sea-based platform, with the ability to deliver amphibious infantry trained to operate in extreme environmental conditions, highly desirable.
96.At a time when all of the world’s major defence powers are investing in amphibious units, the United Kingdom is reportedly considering divesting itself of these vital assets. Our allies place a great deal of value on amphibious capability. Both allies and potential adversaries see the value in their amphibious platforms and are seeking to increase their strength and capacity. Once this capability is disposed of, it cannot be regenerated quickly or easily. Its deletion or reduction by the Modernising Defence Programme would reinforce the view that the exercise is wholly divorced from strategic reality. Such a step would signal that we are moving further away from co-operating with our allies and matching our competitors.
97.The international investment in amphibious capability demonstrates the continuing relevance of amphibious operations to modern warfare. Doctrine and platforms will continue to adapt as both the nature of these operations and the technology behind them change. Nonetheless, the ability to strike an enemy from a secure sea base, the ability to insert a force at a point where an enemy is vulnerable and not expecting to be attacked, and the ability to concentrate, reinforce and resupply faster than an enemy is able to do the same, are basic points of advantage in warfare. In restricting these, the UK would be decreasing the range of tactical options available to commanders, and assuming a greater level of risk in operations.
131 Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045 (5th Edition), Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, June 2014, p 17
132 Ministry of Defence, Future Operating Environment 2035 (1st Edition), Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, August 2015, p 32. See also Paul Lloyd (RMA0025); Gabriele Molinelli (RMA0030); Lt Col (Rtd) Charles Wilson (RMA0056); DefenceSynergia (RMA0065); Brigadier (Rtd) Tom Lang (RMA0069); Ronald Lockley (RMA0080); Murdo Mackenzie (RMA0083); Ernest Blaber (RMA0084); DefenceSynergia (RMA0065)Simon Orr (RMA0090); Carl Stephen Patrick Hunter (RMA0091); Col (Rtd) Ian Moore (RMA0094)
133 See for example United States Marine Corps, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, December 2017; Williams, P and Selle, W, Military Contingencies in Cities and Sub-Megacities, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 2016; Gentile, G et al, Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the US Army, RAND Corporation, 2017
134 Gabriele Molinelli (RMA0030) presents a thoughtful argument on urbanisation of the littoral being an opportunity that can be exploited by an amphibious force.
135 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Secretary speech: “Britain is back East of Suez”’, 9 December 2016
136 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, Cm 9161, November 2015, para 5.71–5.82
137 Ministry of Defence, ‘HMS Sutherland to deploy to Asia Pacific, Defence Secretary announces on-board’, 24 November 2017
138 Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon hails importance of UK’s defence network’, 10 January 2017
139 Q32; ‘Georgia: Russian troops seize a strategic prize in swift advance’, Daily Telegraph, 11 August 2008
140 Q32
141 ‘Surface Navy 2018: Officials believe they will field 38 amphibious ships’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 January 2018
142 Congressional Research Service, Navy LX(R) Amphibious Ship Program: Background and Issues for Congress, 8 December 2017
143 ‘France halts first Russian Mistral delivery in response to Ukraine crisis’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 September 2014
144 ‘Russia orders second Ivan Gren-class landing ship’, Jane’s Navy International, 17 October 2014
145 ‘Russia develops Priboy LHD for export customers’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 June 2016; ‘Russia to build first helicopter carrier by 2022’, TASS, 25 May 2017
146 ‘China expanding its amphibious force’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 April 2017; ‘China building navy’s biggest amphibious assault vessel, sources say’, South China Morning Post, 30 March 2017
147 ‘Evolving Expeditionary Capabilities’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 May 2017
148 ‘Italian Navy orders new amphibious assault ship’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 July 2015
149 ‘More details emerge on Turkish LPD’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 February 2016
150 ‘Egypt receives second Mistral LHD’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 September 2016,
151 ‘Government gives green signal to build worth over Rs 20,000 crore’, Economic Times, 21 May 2017
152 ‘Japanese navy commissions second Izumo-class helicopter carrier’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 March 2017
153 ‘Evolving Expeditionary Capabilities’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 May 2017
154 Q34
155 Q34
156 Q45
1 February 2018