1.The NSCR is still ongoing and we will examine the process and its substantive outcomes when it has concluded. Even with the Defence element of the NSCR being separated from the rest of the review, as has recently been announced, the conclusions and recommendations in this report have continuing relevance to the process that this sorry episode has demonstrated. The entanglement of Defence with other issues under the control of senior National Security Council/Cabinet Office officials has led to an unacceptable lack of Ministerial accountability. We warmly welcome the new Defence Secretary’s success in regaining control of the Defence Review process, but we remain concerned at the post-Levene disintegration of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as the primary source of direct military advice to the Government. (Paragraph 12)
2.Our predecessors, along with other Committees such as the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, have been critical of the process surrounding previous SDSRs: in contrast to earlier exercises, such as the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, there has been very little consultation and engagement outside Government during the review process. Unfortunately, we see no evidence of this state of affairs changing in the NSCR. Bodies that would expect to be consulted in the course of these reviews have not been ‘brought in’ to the process, and have struggled to receive substantive answers to many questions that have arisen. This is a particularly serious omission where Parliament is concerned. Decisions of this magnitude should be debated in Parliament and information provided to select committees to allow for proper scrutiny. Parliament should also have real influence on the review process. Presenting the outcome of a review of this nature to Parliament without any prior Parliamentary input or scrutiny is totally unacceptable. This is not entirely the fault of the Ministry of Defence, as the NSCR is being co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office. Nonetheless, a lack of engagement will only encourage the emergence of rumours and leaks that distract from the overall review. The Department may dismiss such reports as ‘speculation’, but they are inevitable in a secretive—indeed a closed—process without proper external engagement, given the scale of the force structure reconfigurations that are reportedly being considered. The Department may wish to reflect upon this in future defence and security review exercises. We recommend that the Modernising Defence Programme be used as an opportunity finally to involve those organisations, individuals and institutions—including Parliament—which have previously made valuable contributions to strategic defence reviews. (Paragraph 13)
3.The Secretary of State and other Defence Ministers are accountable to Parliament for all the policies, decisions and actions of their department. This is a long-standing constitutional principle which is articulated in the Ministerial Code. It is not acceptable for Ministers to avoid answering questions on force structure and manpower changes on the basis that these were decisions taken by the Service Chiefs, as if Ministers are devoid of responsibility to account for these decisions. If this is the way that the Levene Reforms have been interpreted by the Department, then this is an interpretation made in error. It is not possible for any Department of State to arrange itself internally so as to insulate Ministers from Parliamentary accountability or allow them to hide behind officials. The Service Chiefs are more distant from strategic decision-making than they have been at any point in modern history. The decisions they are required to make on force structure are often invidious choices, entirely restricted by the political and financial parameters, set by Ministers, on how resources are allocated. The Department should be aware that we will not accept an abdication of accountability by Ministers, and will expect Ministers, led by the new Secretary of State, fully to account for and explain the policy rationale behind force structure changes that emerge from this or any future Defence review process. (Paragraph 14)
4.The more recent doctrine and tasking of amphibious units places great emphasis on unopposed landings, ideally at night, to maximise stealth, surprise and the amount of time available to get reinforcements and equipment ashore before the enemy is in a position to counterattack. Any assessment of current UK amphibious capability based on a ‘D-Day’-style conception of amphibious landings, in the teeth of all-out enemy resistance, completely misses the point. (Paragraph 18)
5.The institutional expertise the United Kingdom possesses in amphibious warfare has been hard won, and continues to be maintained today in UK Armed Forces by a group of specialists, mainly found in the Royal Marines and in the Royal Navy’s amphibious fleet. Dispensing with a unique cadre of military expertise from across the three Services, or reducing it to the level where it cannot be deployed on a strategically meaningful scale, would be an irreparable act of folly. The UK is one of the few nations that have a sovereign capability in this specialism. Reductions of the type and scale that are reportedly being contemplated would wipe this out, and there would be no going back. It would be yet another step away from full-spectrum capability. (Paragraph 24)
6.We are concerned by the reduction in the strength of the Royal Marines inflicted since 2010, and the further reductions that will follow from the restructuring of 42 Commando. 3 Commando Brigade is required to generate high readiness forces, often entailing units being at short notice to move for extended periods. With the operational tempo remaining high, sustaining Lead Commando Group at high readiness on a reduced strength will put further strain on personnel and equipment. We believe that reductions on the scale contemplated would bring 3 Commando Brigade below the critical mass needed for it to maintain readiness and conduct its standing tasks, let alone be deployed at a tactically significant strength on operations. This is without the further dramatic cuts in personnel that are reportedly being considered. The Department should tell us how the readiness of 3 Commando Brigade and Lead Commando Group is to be sustained following the restructuring announced in April 2017. (Paragraph 32)
7.3 Brigade’s position as a formation that is dependent on elements from all three Services to be deployable makes it particularly vulnerable at a time when all Services are facing considerable manpower pressures. It is the unique nature of the Brigade that gives it its strength, and reductions in supporting elements from other Services and branches would also compromise its capacity as a deployable fighting force. (Paragraph 33)
8.The Royal Marines and attached commando units famously have one of the most rigorous and demanding military training regimes in the world, enabling them to be ready to survive, manoeuvre and fight in a variety of roles and in extreme environmental conditions. Amphibious operations place a premium on specialist training in all parts of the chain of command to plan and execute these complex military tasks. Exercises are vital for putting this training into practice, for maintaining readiness, and for maintaining a credible, high visibility deterrent. Cuts to training and exercises because of lack of resources are another sign of the neglect of this capability. We require the Department to set out in detail, for each training serial or exercise due to involve elements of 3 Commando Brigade that has been run at reduced capacity or cancelled in FY 2017–18: a) the individual units that did or were due to participate in that serial or exercise; b) the extent of reduction in capacity; c) the cost of running the serial or exercise at full capacity; d) the reason for reduction in capacity or cancellation, and e) whether the serial or exercise will be reinstated at full capacity in FY 2018–19 and, if not, why not? (Paragraph 37)
9.It is a matter of particular embarrassment that resource constraints have affected training and exercising with our allies. These opportunities for joint training are invaluable for defence co-operation and for sustaining interoperability. These relationships, which have been forged by the Royal Marines with their American and Dutch counterparts, are models of defence co-operation. Running down the ability of 3 Commando Brigade to participate in a meaningful way in these exercises has the potential to do serious damage to this country’s defence relationships with our closest allies. It also puts at risk our standing commitments to NATO, at a time when the organisation that is the cornerstone of our defence policy needs our full support. (Paragraph 38)
10.The contribution made to UK Special Forces by the Royal Marines is disproportionate to the size of the Corps and is indicative of the quality of the people who pass through its ranks. The growth in the use and tasking of Special Forces in recent years makes a continuing ‘pipeline’ of trained and resilient personnel vital. Reducing the strength of the Royal Marines will substantially reduce the recruitment pool available, and reduce Special Forces’ amphibious warfare expertise. (Paragraph 41)
11.We welcome the decision to consolidate HQs of a number of units in 3 Commando Brigade to a new location in the Plymouth/Torpoint area. This is in keeping with the Department’s overall objectives to make better use of the Defence Estate and reduce its cost, and will have the benefits of consolidating units within the Brigade. But the Department should communicate clearly and often with the personnel affected and their families as the reforms to the Defence Estate proceed, and we would urge that the work in relation to Plymouth/Torpoint site is completed and its outcome communicated as soon as is possible. (Paragraph 43)
12.Given the number of challenges the Corps is facing, it is unsurprising that the combination of these factors is beginning to have a serious effect on morale and Service satisfaction. The Royal Marines have historically exhibited a higher than average level of morale, Service and unit satisfaction than across the other parts of the Armed Forces. AFCAS 2017 shows that the Royal Marines have seen large decreases in these categories. While falling morale and satisfaction across all Services deserve urgent attention from the Department, these notably dramatic reductions, within units that are known for their distinctive ethos and level of ‘espirit de corps’ are a matter of particular concern. The reports that have emerged about the NSCR will have done nothing to improve morale amongst the Royal Marines and attached units, and may well do further damage. The Department has indicated in its written evidence that work has been initiated to gather data on outflow and morale to inform future action plans. We wish to receive detailed information on the work that is being done, the nature of the data being gathered, the level of resource and staffing being dedicated to this exercise, and other steps that are being taken to arrest these alarming reductions in morale. (Paragraph 45)
13.We strongly oppose the withdrawal of the Albion class LPDs from service ahead of their out-of-service dates in 2033 and 2034. They are purpose-built amphibious assault platforms which provide the primary means of deploying a landing force over a beach. There are no other ships in the Royal Navy which could conceivably sustain this capability in the future. The wider utility and the versatility of the LPDs beyond their primary roles in amphibious assault are substantial, and will be sacrificed if their disposal goes ahead. (Paragraph 57)
14.The Ocean has repeatedly shown her worth, being at the centre of the UK’s engagements in Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Her disposal without replacement is a serious loss to the amphibious fleet and is rightly criticised throughout the evidence we have received (Paragraph 58)
15.The decision taken in 2015 to dispose of HMS Ocean without replacement is to be greatly regretted. Her unique capabilities and versatility as a platform have been demonstrated time and again on operations. Her disposal represents a serious loss to the amphibious fleet, and was the first indication that the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability is being run down to release necessary manpower for fixed-wing aircraft carriers. (Paragraph 66)
16.We ask the Department to provide us with details on every aspect of the enhancement of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers to support amphibious capability set out in the 2015 SDSR, and the timescale for completion of the enhancement. We request information on whether it is planned for one or both Queen Elizabeth class carriers to operate as an LPH, and the modifications that this would require. If this is the case, we would also request details on whether it is intended for the carrier to operate fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft simultaneously—for example, the number of helicopter spots that can be operated while simultaneously maintaining fixed-wing launch and recovery capability. We request details on the intended command, control and communications systems that are part of this modification and how the capacity of these systems compares with those of an Albion class LPD. We understand that the number of F-35s that the carriers will operate has not yet been confirmed, but ask how many personnel would make up the Carrier Air Wing and how these personnel can be accommodated at the same time as an embarked amphibious force. (Paragraph 67)
17.Several issues arise which would create problems for a carrier acting as an amphibious platform in any configuration. The most significant of these is that carriers can provide only an airborne amphibious capability and cannot transfer any equipment, vehicles or supplies that are too heavy to airlift. Unlike HMS Ocean, the Queen Elizabeth class has no capacity to operate landing craft. The proximity to the shore with which these high-value assets might have to operate is also, in an age of increasingly sophisticated anti-ship missile capabilities, very hazardous. (Paragraph 68)
18.In combination with purpose-built amphibious ships such as the LPDs, the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers could provide support to an amphibious operation. However, they are not primarily designed as amphibious ships and cannot operate as such in a stand-alone role. This makes them a poor substitute for an amphibious assault ship in this specialist role. (Paragraph 69)
19.The Bay class LSD(A)s are valuable vessels for supporting amphibious operations alongside amphibious warships and have recently shown their suitability for conducting a range of tasks including disaster relief operations. For the reasons we have set out, they are, nevertheless, no substitute for dedicated amphibious assault warships. (Paragraph 75)
20.With the understanding that the tender process for the Type 31e Frigate is still ongoing, the Royal Navy’s specification information for the vessel suggests that it would be able to embark only a force of tactically negligible size, let alone the equipment and supplies necessary to sustain a landing force ashore. While some capacity for aviation is also included in the Type 31e specification, it is not at all clear how an embarked force would be moved to its objective. We ask the MoD to give us further details on the amphibious role that is contemplated for the Type 31e, particularly in relation to the size of a landing force that could be embarked, the space for its equipment and how such a force might be delivered to its objective. (Paragraph 78)
21.Previous operations have relied on civilian commercial vessels being chartered or requisitioned (‘taken up from trade’) to provide sealift for personnel, equipment and supplies. This relies on being able to obtain suitable civilian vessels at short notice. Noting both the decline in the numbers of registered militarily useful commercial vessels and a reduction of the number of Point class ships that are chartered by the department to support operations, we seek reassurance that the need for strategic sealift is being adequately prioritised. We ask the MoD to explain the process which it and the Department for Transport use to identify and register militarily useful vessels. Given the decline in these numbers since the last review of strategic sealift requirement in 2011, we also request the Department to revisit this issue, with a view to taking steps to halt the decline. We further request an update on the current status of the agreements in place with Foreland Shipping relating to the Point class vessels, and an explanation of why two of them were released from the contract arrangements in 2012. (Paragraph 82)
22.Disposal of the LPDs and the reduction in strength of the Royal Marines would have a profound effect on Plymouth, a city which shares a long association with the amphibious fleet and which has been designated as a future Amphibious Centre of Specialisation. As well as the impact it would have locally, it would represent a substantial waste of hundreds of millions of pounds of investment that has been put into these units and this capability. We ask the Department to provide us with details of the work that it has done in the course of the National Security Capability Review on examining the impact on local communities, and how it will be incorporated into the work of the Modernising Defence Programme. (Paragraph 84)
23.Global trends point to an increasing proportion of the world’s population living in coastal and littoral zones. There is growing awareness that future conflicts are likely to take place in or near ‘megacities’, and a large proportion of these cities will be on or near a coastline. An amphibious capability opens a range of military options in such an environment. (Paragraph 94)
24.The Government has put a renewed emphasis on the UK having an increased role outside the Euro-Atlantic area and there have been continued discussions of returning to a presence East of Suez. Amphibious platforms, with their inherent flexibility and capacity to operate at considerable distance from the home base, are ideally suited for this role. The uncertain situation in Asia-Pacific, with continuing tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula, would make having a flexible, sea-based platform, with the ability to deliver amphibious infantry trained to operate in extreme environmental conditions, highly desirable. (Paragraph 95)
25.At a time when all of the world’s major defence powers are investing in amphibious units, the United Kingdom is reportedly considering divesting itself of these vital assets. Our allies place a great deal of value on amphibious capability. Both allies and potential adversaries see the value in their amphibious platforms and are seeking to increase their strength and capacity. Once this capability is disposed of, it cannot be regenerated quickly or easily. Its deletion or reduction by the Modernising Defence Programme would reinforce the view that the exercise is wholly divorced from strategic reality. Such a step would signal that we are moving further away from co-operating with our allies and matching our competitors. (Paragraph 96)
26.The international investment in amphibious capability demonstrates the continuing relevance of amphibious operations to modern warfare. Doctrine and platforms will continue to adapt as both the nature of these operations and the technology behind them change. Nonetheless, the ability to strike an enemy from a secure sea base, the ability to insert a force at a point where an enemy is vulnerable and not expecting to be attacked, and the ability to concentrate, reinforce and resupply faster than an enemy is able to do the same, are basic points of advantage in warfare. In restricting these, the UK would be decreasing the range of tactical options available to commanders, and assuming a greater level of risk in operations. (Paragraph 97)
27.The United Kingdom’s unique experience and expertise in amphibious operations are assets which should be sustained. Their relevance to modern warfare is clear and the evidence submitted to our Inquiry overwhelmingly confirms that they will continue to be relevant in the future. We reject the argument that the capability to project force from the sea over a beach is obsolete. With a diversifying and uncertain picture of future threats, the UK should be enhancing, not diminishing its options. Disposing of our amphibious capability would not only put the interests of this country at serious risk, but would also be a drastic waste of tailor-made vessels, expensively refitted for another 15 years’ use, and of a military specialism that has been fostered across all three Services. (Paragraph 98)
28.The Royal Marines have always shown resilience and flexibility in absorbing the changes that have arisen as the nature of warfare evolved. In recent years, however, the Corps has had to face a succession of challenges which are putting 3 Commando Brigade’s status as a highly trained, high readiness commando force, that is able to deploy independently at scale, under threat. These challenges have also been having an appreciable effect on the formerly high morale and sense of unit pride—traditionally the hallmarks—of the Royal Marines. This was evident even before the reports of the cuts being considered as part of the NSCR, which are likely dramatically to reduce capacity and morale much further. After more than three-and-a-half centuries of service to the nation, Her Majesty’s Corps of Royal Marines is in danger of being sacrificed to short-term Treasury bookkeeping. (Paragraph 99)
29.Along with the Royal Marines, the Albion class ships lie at the heart of UK amphibious capability. There is no substitute for these dedicated and sophisticated platforms. Attempts to create stop-gap solutions, with vessels that are not designed for the purpose, will result in the assumption of wholly unacceptable levels of operational risk. We understand that the Royal Navy and Royal Marines will need to adapt, as they move towards what the First Sea Lord has called a ‘carrier-centric future’. However recent defence reviews have made this adaptation a reductive rather than a constructive process, informed largely by resource constraints and consequential manpower shortages, rather than by any coherent strategic concept or any identifiable operational requirements. (Paragraph 100)
30.The fundamental flaw in the NSCR process was its assumption that as the threats facing the UK are intensifying, reductions in military capabilities, prescribed by the SDSR only two years earlier, must be inflicted. The answer to new and intensified threats must be augmented capabilities—not massively reduced ones such as the deletion of amphibious forces and specialised ships. The Modernising Defence Programme must not proceed on the same contradictory basis as the NSCR. It should result in a level of finance and resource being made available to the Naval Service which allows both the carriers and amphibious capability to be supported. The price of one cannot be the destruction of the other. (Paragraph 101)
1 February 2018