31EU Strategy for Afghanistan
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Committee’s assessment |
Politically important |
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Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested; drawn to the attention of the Foreign Affairs and the International Development Committees |
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Document details |
Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy on Afghanistan. |
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Legal base |
— |
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Department |
Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
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Document Number |
(38937), 11482/17, JOIN(2017) 31 |
Summary and Committee’s conclusions
31.1Afghanistan ranks 166th out of 178 countries for GDP per capita, making it one of the most impoverished countries in the world,362 and it has been on the United Nations’ list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) since 1971.363 The country has known conflict continuously for nearly forty years,364 and troops from NATO countries including the US and the UK—who have been present since 2001 to train Afghan security forces and combat a Taliban insurgency—remain in the country as of 2017. Between 2014 and 2020, the EU has committed to spend more than €1.4 billion (£1.25 billion)365 on development aid in Afghanistan.366
31.2In July 2016, EU Foreign Affairs Ministers asked the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to produce a new strategy document for the EU’s approach to Afghanistan to reflect the situation on the ground.367 The resulting Joint Communication, entitled “Elements for an EU Strategy on Afghanistan”, was published in June 2017.368 It provides a bleak assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, saying it is “confronted with a deteriorating security situation and increasing insurgent and terrorist pressure”, with weak human rights protections and cautious economic development at risk of being reversed.
31.3The Commission’s new draft strategy reiterates the EU’s existing focus for its activities in Afghanistan, namely promoting peace and stability; strengthening democracy and the rule of law; and supporting economic development. This includes financial assistance to promote its economic development, and cooperation to facilitate Afghanistan’s international trade links (see “Background” for more information).
31.4Given the large influx of Afghan refugees into the EU in recent years, the fourth priority is “addressing challenges relating to migration”. This is likely to be the most controversial element of the EU’s approach, as it has a policy of returning Afghan nationals to their country of origin despite the increased violence and risk of terrorist attacks. In September 2016, it was reported that the EU was considering making €200 million (£184 million) of development assistance payments for “state-building efforts” conditional on Afghan cooperation on “migration and return” (see “Background” below for more information).
31.5The Minister for Europe (Sir Alan Duncan) submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on the document on 9 August 2017.369 In it, he calls the Joint Communication a “welcome signal” of the EU’s ongoing commitment to support Afghanistan, and notes that its priorities are “broadly consistent with UK priorities for the EU in Afghanistan”. With respect to the increased focus on migration, the Minister says that the Government believes the new strategy should “situate the EU’s focus on migration as part of its wider work on building sustainable security, prosperity and opportunity in Afghanistan. Afghans are unlikely to stop seeking opportunities to migrate to Europe while the two key motivators for outward migration—insecurity and lack of economic opportunity—remain”. EU Foreign Affairs Ministers unanimously endorsed the finalised Strategy at their meeting on 16 October 2017.370
31.6Separately, in September 2017, the Government published its “future partnership paper” on post-Brexit cooperation with the EU on matters of foreign policy.371 It offers the EU “a future relationship that is deeper than any current third country partnership” which would be “unprecedented in its breadth (…) in the degree of engagement that [the Government] envisage”. It does not, however, offer any detail about the mechanisms or structures that would need to replace the UK’s current participation in the EU’s decision-making structures to make this level of cooperation and engagement work in practice, for example to ensure UK representation in the operational planning of EU CFSP missions.
31.7We thank the Minister for his assessment of the new Strategy on Afghanistan. While many of its objectives may be straightforward, their means of delivery are not. Given the deteriorating security and economic situation in the country, the priorities set by the Commission and the EEAS seem highly ambitious. We also note that the Strategy is “broadly”, but not “fully”, consistent with the UK’s priorities for Afghanistan. We would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification of any areas of divergence; whether the Government was able to address these ahead of the Strategy’s endorsement by the Foreign Affairs Council; and how the Council’s conclusions differ substantively from the draft Strategy presented by the Commission.
31.8We also note that the EU’s policiy to facilitate repatriation of Afghan nationals, despite the continued—and increasing—violence, is likely to remain controversial. We ask the Minister to confirm whether, as was reported in September last year, the €200 million “state building” contract signed by the EU and Afghanistan in October 2016 was made “migration sensitive” and linked to the Afghan Government’s policy on migration and return.
31.9We have also considered the document in the context of Brexit, and in particular the Government’s aim of agreeing a “deep and special partnership” with the EU, “taking in both economic and security cooperation”.372 The Strategy itself, as a set of high-level objectives rather than concrete legal or financial commitments, has no immediate implications for the UK in the context of Brexit. However, the Government will have to take over responsibility for the trade and development aspects of UK-Afghanistan relations in support of the latter’s stability and development that are currently managed through the EU.
31.10In particular, we still await further information from the Government about its pledge to use Brexit to “free up trade with the world’s poorest”, given that countries such as Afghanistan already enjoy duty- and quota-free access to the UK (and EU) market.373 The Government will also need to consider whether the UK will increase its bilateral development assistance for Afghanistan once its multilateral contribution through the EU falls away. We are writing to the Department for International Development separately for its assessment of the broader impact on developing countries of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, its trade policy towards developing countries, and its instruments for development aid.
31.11There is also the general issue of the UK’s post-Brexit cooperation with the EU on matters of foreign policy. While the Government has offered an “unprecedentedly deep” partnership with the EU, for example on sanctions and the planning of EU civilian and military missions in third countries, its position paper does not make clear what structures would be necessary to make this work in practice, or whether they can be established in time for the UK’s planned departure from the EU in 2019. We ask the Minister to clarify as soon as possible how the Government proposes to ensure a close alignment between UK and EU foreign policy decision-making post-Brexit, and what the consequences of failing to do so might be for our bilateral approach to Afghanistan.
31.12In the meantime, given the non-binding nature of the Commission’s proposed Afghanistan Strategy and in view of the fact it has been endorsed unanimously by the Foreign Affairs Council, we are content to clear the document from scrutiny. We also report this document to the House, and draw it to the particular attention of the Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees.
Full details of the documents
Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy on Afghanistan: (38937), 11482/17, JOIN(2017) 31.
Background
31.13Afghanistan is on the United Nation’s list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and has been since 1971.374 The World Bank ranks it 166th out of 178 countries for GDP per capita, making it one of the most impoverished countries in the world.375 Average life expectancy at birth is 60 years, and it has one of the lowest Human Development Indexes globally. Development aid constitutes forty per cent of its GDP.
31.14The country has known conflict continuously for nearly forty years,376 and—faced with a resurgent Taleban—troops from NATO countries including the US377 and the UK378 remain in the country as of 2017. The violence since 1978 has led to an estimated 1.5 million deaths, and triggered a large outflow of Afghan refugees which currently numbers over 2.5 million people, who reside primarily in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. There are also over a million people internally displaced.379
31.15Since 2001, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have partnered with Afghanistan and the wider international community in pursuit of a common strategic interest in combating extremism and terrorism while simultaneously working towards peace and development in the country. The EU has adopted a number of documents setting out its policy towards the country, most recently in the 2014–16 EU Strategy for Afghanistan, which was endorsed by the Foreign Affairs Council in June 2014.380
31.16Afghanistan is also a beneficiary of existing EU instruments for trade and development, as part of a broader effort to allow Afghanistan to develop its economy in a sustainable way. It qualifies for the “Everything but Arms” arrangement under the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences, which entitles it to export its goods duty- and quota-free to the EU.381 In addition, the EU’s 2014–2020 development assistance programme for the country foresees development funding totalling €1.4 billion (£1.25 billion) over that period382 under the Development Cooperation Instrument.383
31.17In addition, in July 2015 the EU and Afghanistan initialled a Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD).384 The Agreement, which had been under negotiation since 2011, provides a framework for further engagement, reflecting shared priorities such as conflict resolution, economic development and good governance.385 The CAPD was formally signed in February 2017, and many of its provisions (including on political dialogue and trade cooperation) are now provisionally applied.386 Full ratification of the Agreement is still underway.
31.18In July 2016, the Foreign Affairs Council asked the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to produce a new strategy document for the EU’s approach to Afghanistan to reflect the situation on the ground.387
31.19The resulting Joint Communication, entitled “Elements for an EU Strategy on Afghanistan”, was published in June 2017.388 Its assessment of the situation in Afghanistan gives little cause for optimism, noting that progress made in the last fifteen years towards economic development risks being eroded:
“Afghanistan has been confronted with a deteriorating security situation and increasing insurgent and terrorist pressure. Despite some improvements, democratic institutions and the legal framework for elections are still weak. Human rights are precarious, in particular in relation to women and children. Afghanistan has made progress in its economic and social development but a fragile economic framework, lack of infrastructure and high numbers of Afghans returning from neighbouring countries, put this progress into danger. Furthermore, rising insecurity coupled with a lack of economic perspective has led many Afghans to leave the country, triggering an increased irregular migration flow, notably towards Europe.”389
31.20The Commission’s new strategy proposes that the EU focuses its work in Afghanistan on the following areas:
- promoting peace, stability, and regional security;
- strengthening democracy, the rule of law and human rights and promoting good governance and women’s empowerment;
- supporting economic and human development; and
- addressing challenges relating to migration.
31.21According to the Commission, the focus of the new strategy is on “shaping the necessary conditions for a political process that can pave the way for a political solution to the conflict, while further developing the country’s institutions and economy to improve resilience and move it out of fragility”.
31.22The priorities outlined in the document are largely identical to those of the 2014–16 Strategy, with the exception of the “challenges relating to migration”. This has moved up the political agenda because of the broader issue of increased flows of migration towards Europe from Africa and the Middle East, including many Afghans trying to reach the EU via Iran and Turkey.390 The EU and Afghanistan have already agreed on a “Joint Way Forward on migration issues” which covers the return, readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants, as well as fighting against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.391 Implementation of this joint approach is one of the Commission’s priorities under its new strategy.392
31.23The EU’s approach to addressing migratory flows from Afghanistan has been controversial, because it leads to the return of refugees despite the assessment of the European External Action Service that the country faces a “deteriorating security situation and increasing insurgent and terrorist pressure”.393 In 2015 alone, 11,000 Afghans died in terrorist attacks, and the EEAS itself has predicted that both the security situation and the prospects for economic development are likely to deteriorate further. In September 2016, it was reported that the EU was considering making €200 million (£184 million) of development assistance payments for “state-building efforts” conditional on Afghan cooperation on “migration and return”.394
31.24More generally, the Commission document does not propose many specific actions, but lists broad objectives such as “supporting an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process”, “strengthening Afghanistan’s efforts in fighting against money laundering and countering terrorist financing” and “assisting with the drafting of relevant human rights legislation”. The Commission says it will work to implement the Strategy jointly with the Afghan authorities under the auspices of the Cooperation Agreement signed in February 2017 (see paragraph 0.17 above).
31.25The Minister for Europe (Sir Alan Duncan) submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on the document on 9 August 2017.395 In it, he calls the Joint Communication a “welcome signal” of the EU’s ongoing commitment to support Afghanistan, and notes that its priorities are “broadly consistent with UK priorities for the EU in Afghanistan”. He adds:
“The emphasis on peace, stability and regional security is in line with the UK view that the only sustainable solution to reduce the violence in Afghanistan in the long-term is an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led political process leading to a peace settlement. The commitment to supporting human rights, including women’s rights, is a welcome continuation of the EU’s leading role in this area. The inclusion of support to democratic processes is pertinent as Afghanistan faces the prospect of two significant elections in 2018 and 2019.”
31.26With respect to the increased focus on migration, the Minister notes that the influx of Afghan refugees into the EU “has become an important factor in the prism through which many Member States view Afghanistan (…). The UK view is that the new strategy should situate the EU’s focus on migration as part of its wider work on building sustainable security, prosperity and opportunity in Afghanistan. Afghans are unlikely to stop seeking opportunities to migrate to Europe while the two key motivators for outward migration—insecurity and lack of economic opportunity—remain.”
31.27Separately, in September 2017, the Department for Exiting the EU published its “future partnership paper” on post-Brexit cooperation with the EU on matters of foreign policy. It offers the EU “a future relationship that is deeper than any current third country partnership” which would be “unprecedented in its breadth, taking in cooperation on foreign policy, defence and security, and development, and in the degree of engagement that [the Government] envisage”. It does not, however, offer any detail about the mechanisms or structures that would need to replace the UK’s current participation in the Foreign Affairs Council, the Political & Security Committee and other EU foreign policy bodies to make this level of cooperation and engagement work in practice.
31.28The Foreign Affairs Council, with the UK Government’s support, endorsed the Commission’s Strategy at its meeting on 16 October 2017.396 We have asked the Minister to clarify the Government’s position on the contents of the Council’s position, and to what extent they modified the draft Strategy put forward by the Commission (see paragraph 0.7 above).
Our assessment
31.29We thank the Minister for his assessment of the new Strategy on Afghanistan. While many of its objectives may be straightforward, their means of delivery are not. Given the deteriorating security and economic situation in the country, the priorities set by the Commission and the EEAS seem highly ambitious.
31.30The Committee also notes that the EU’s policy relating to repatriation of Afghan nationals despite the continued—and increasing—violence is likely to remain controversial. We ask the Minister to confirm whether, as was reported in September last year, the €200 million “state building” contract signed by the EU and Afghanistan in October 2016 was made “migration sensitive” and linked to the Afghan Government’s policy on migration and return.
Implications of Brexit for UK-Afghanistan relations
31.31Given that the UK has formally notified the other Member States of its impending withdrawal from the European Union under Article 50 TEU, we now also routinely consider every document in the context of Brexit. We have taken note of the fact the Government has repeatedly said its aim is to agree a “deep and special partnership” with the EU, “taking in both economic and security cooperation”.397
31.32The Afghanistan Strategy itself, as a set of high-level objectives rather than concrete legal or financial commitments, has no immediate implications for the UK in the context of Brexit. From March 2019, the UK will be free to pursue its own policies in Afghanistan independently of any efforts under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, given that EU foreign policy decisions are taken by the Member States unanimously and the Government has said this latest Strategy is “broadly consistent” with the UK’s own priorities, we do not expect Brexit to lead to a substantially different approach to Afghanistan.
31.33Nevertheless, Brexit may still have implications for UK-Afghanistan relations. In particular, initiatives related to trade and economic development are currently largely decided, implemented and managed through the EU. Afghanistan enjoys duty- and quota-free access to the entire Single Market, and receives substantial amounts of development assistance from the EU. Post-Brexit, the Government will have to decide how to make it easier for Afghan exports to reach the UK market, to make good on its promise to use Brexit to “free up trade with the world’s poorest”.398 It will also need to consider how the UK will approach bilateral development assistance for Afghanistan (and other developing countries) once its multilateral contribution through the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument falls away.
31.34There is a broader issue of the UK’s post-Brexit cooperation with the EU on matters of foreign policy. While the Government’s paper has set out its ambitions, it offers little detail on the means of delivery for the level of cooperation envisaged on issues including sanctions, CSDP missions, and conflict management tools. As the relationship proposed by the Government would be “unprecedented”, it would follow logically that the mechanisms to facilitate policy alignment on a day-to-day basis would have to go beyond what exists currently for non-EU countries.
31.35A smooth transition to the new relationship on foreign policy cooperation will depend heavily on clear statements of expectations and commitments from both sides, as well as the necessary institutional arrangements to replace the UK’s withdrawal from the Foreign Affairs Council and its preparatory bodies, including in particular the Political & Security Committee. It is disappointing that the Government’s paper did not make any explicit proposals in this area. We have therefore asked the Minister to clarify, as soon as possible, how the Government’s proposals for the future “deep and special partnership” with the EU in the field of foreign policy, defence and security would work in practice.
Previous Committee Reports
None.
362 See World Bank, “GDP per capita“ (accessed 22 August 2017).
363 UN Committee for Development Policy, “List of Least Developed Countries“ (June 2017).
364 For an abridged history of Afghanistan since 1978, see: BBC, “Afghanistan profile—Timeline“ (accessed 23 August 2017).
365 €1 = £0.91973 or £1 = €1.08728 as at 1 September 2017.
366 European Commission, “Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for Afghanistan 2014–2020“ (accessed 26 October 2017).
367 Foreign Affairs Council, “Council conclusions on Afghanistan“ (18 July 2016).
368 See document JOIN(2017) 31, “Elements for an EU strategy on Afghanistan“ (24 July 2017).
369 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (9 August 2017).
370 Foreign Affairs Council, “Council conclusions on Afghanistan“ (16 October 2017).
371 DExEU, “Foreign policy, defence and development: a future partnership paper“ (12 September 2017).
372 Letter from Prime Minister Theresa May to President of the European Council Donald Tusk (29 March 2017).
373 In June 2017, the Government reiterated its pledge to “help improve access to UK markets for world’s poorest countries post-Brexit”, but announced no details beyond “securing their existing duty-free access to UK markets” under current EU trading arrangements, breaking down unspecific barriers to trade, and committing to “explore options to expand on relationships with developing countries”.
374 UN Committee for Development Policy, “List of Least Developed Countries“ (June 2017).
375 See World Bank, “GDP per capita“ (accessed 22 August 2017).
376 For an abridged history of Afghanistan since 1978, see: BBC, “Afghanistan profile—Timeline“ (accessed 23 August 2017).
377 On 22 August 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that the number of US troops in Afghanistan would be increased from 8.400 to over 12.000.
378 The UK has over 500 military personnel in Afghanistan as of August 2017. See The Guardian, “UK not yet planning to increase troop numbers in Afghanistan“ (22 August 2017).
380 Commission document JOIN(2014) 17 (30 April 2014). See also the previous Committee’s Reports of 18 June 2014, 5 November 2015 and 25 February 2015. The 2014–16 Strategy was debated in European Committee B on 25 April 2016, and cleared from scrutiny.
381 See Article 1(2)(c) of Regulation 978/2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences.
382 European Commission, “Multi-annual indicative programme (Afghanistan) 2014–2020“ (December 2014).
383 See Regulation 233/2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014–2020.
385 See our predecessors’ Report of 22 February 2017, and the Explanatory Memorandum on the CAPD submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in January 2017.
386 The Agreement was signed by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and the Minister of Finance of Afghanistan Eklil Ahmad Hakim on 18 February 2017. Signature was authorised by Council Decision 2017/434 of 13 February 2017.
387 Foreign Affairs Council, “Council conclusions on Afghanistan“ (18 July 2016).
388 See document JOIN(2017) 31, “Elements for an EU strategy on Afghanistan“ (24 July 2017).
390 According to the Commission, in 2015 and 2016 Afghans were the second largest group of irregular migrants into the EU.
391 EEAS, “Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU“ (October 2016).
392 In addition, Article 28 of the EU-Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development provides for the possibility of a legally-binding readmission agreement, which if concluded would supersede the “Joint Way Forward”.
393 See for example Amnesty International, “They fled Afghanistan fearing for their lives but Europe forced them back“ (June 2017).
394 The Guardian, “EU’s secret ultimatum to Afghanistan: accept 80,000 deportees or lose aid“ (28 September 2016).
395 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (9 August 2017).
396 Foreign Affairs Council, “Council conclusions on Afghanistan“ (16 October 2017).
397 Letter from Prime Minister Theresa May to President of the European Council Donald Tusk (29 March 2017).
398 The Department for International Development said in its December 2016 Bilateral Development Review that the UK’s exit from the EU would allow the UK to “free up trade with the world’s poorest people”. Given that the least developed countries already enjoy tariff- and quota-free access to the EU for their exported goods, our predecessors concluded that the Government must be therefore be considering adjusting non-tariff barriers, such as minimum product standards, for exporters based in developing countries. We asked the Department for clarification on this point, but have not to date received an answer. See our predecessors’ Report of 25 January 2017, paras. 2.9 and 2.12.
1 December 2017