14Sanctions on Venezuela
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Committee’s assessment |
Politically important |
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Cleared from scrutiny; drawn to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee |
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Document details |
(a) Proposal for a Council Decision concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela; (b) Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela |
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Legal base |
(a) Article 29 TEU; unanimity; (b) Article 215 TFEU; QMV |
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Department |
Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
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Document Numbers |
(a) (39191),—; (b) (39195), 13694/17, JOIN(17) 39 |
Summary and Committee’s conclusions
14.1Venezuela’s social, economic and political crisis drastically worsened in July this year, when President Maduro established a “Constituent Assembly” which has since usurped the legislative functions of the democratically-elected National Assembly.139
14.2In view of the country’s economic instability, the widespread repression of political dissent, and the numerous deaths at anti-government rallies, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council on 13 November approved a new legal framework for a sanctions regime against those “responsible for serious human rights violations or abuses or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Venezuela”.140 It also instituted an arms embargo against the country, and restricted the sale of equipment which could be used for internal repression. The proposals, which were drawn to our attention on 1 November, were adopted before the Committee had had a chance to scrutinise them.
14.3The new sanctions regime has the support of the UK Government, which voted in favour of its creation at the Foreign Affairs Council. In an Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan) expressed the Government’s concerns about “Venezuela’s continued authoritarian slide”, adding that “EU restrictive measures are a useful tool to encourage the Venezuelan Government to negotiate with the Opposition in good faith”.141
14.4We thank the Minister for the information about the new sanctions regime and its political context, and we accept his explanation for the Government’s override of scrutiny. Given the interest across the House in the situation in Venezuela, and considering this is an entirely new EU sanctions regime, we report these developments to the House and to the Foreign Affairs Committee in particular. Any further decisions by the Council to impose the tier II sanctions on specific people or bodies will be subject to scrutiny in their own right.
14.5We do not consider that these documents have any immediate implications in the context of Brexit. The Government has already introduced a Sanctions Bill to create the necessary legal framework to allow it to impose sanctions currently implemented through EU law.142 The consequences of Brexit for the UK’s cooperation with the EU on foreign policy more generally are less clear, and we await further clarification from the Minister in this respect in response to a previous Report on the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.143
Full details of the documents
(a) Proposal for a Council Decision concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela: (39191),—; (b) Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela: (39195), 13694/17, JOIN(17) 39.
Background
14.6Venezuela has been in the grip of a socio-economic crisis for several years, experiencing shortages of essential goods, hyperinflation and outbreaks of violence. A related political crisis, centred on the battle for legitimacy between the Government of President Nicolas Maduro and the opposition, came to a head in March 2017 when the Supreme Court—made up of supporters of the President—assumed the legislative functions of Congress after holding the latter “in contempt” of its powers. There have been numerous deaths at anti-Government rallies, as well as imprisonment of opposition figures.144
14.7Within the EU, the situation in Venezuela is of particular concern to Portugal and Spain—whose citizens make up the majority of the 600,000 EU nationals in the country—and the Netherlands, which is responsible for the foreign relations of Curacao, an island off the Venezuelan coast. In May 2017, the Foreign Affairs Council called on both the Venezuelan Government and opposition to “work in a constructive manner towards a solution to the crisis in the country, in full respect of the rule of law and human rights, the democratic institutions and the separation of powers”. It also called for the release of imprisoned political opponents and respect for constitutional rights, describing them as “crucial steps to building trust and helping the country to regain political stability”.145
14.8However, the situation deteriorated further over the course of the summer. Although the Supreme Court reversed its decision to take make itself the legislative branch, President Maduro subsequently announced that he would convene a “Constituent Assembly” to revise the country’s constitution, despite widespread opposition. This new Assembly was elected at the end of July, with all seats taken by Government-supporting candidates after the other political parties boycotted the election. Since then, Assembly members have dismissed the Attorney General, voted to put opposition leaders on trial for treason, and given itself the power to pass legislation.146
14.9With no end to the crisis in sight, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs (Federica Mogherini) asked the Foreign Affairs Council in October 2017 to establish a new EU sanctions regime in view of the situation in Venezuela. The regime would enable travel bans and asset freezes to be imposed against “natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious human rights violations or abuses or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Venezuela”. Furthermore, in view of the risk of further violence against protestors from excessive use of force and human rights abuses by the security forces, the sanctions framework imposes economic (tier III) restrictive measures in the form of an embargo on arms from any Member State to Venezuela, as well as specific restrictions on the sale of equipment that may be used for internal repression.
14.10The legal acts creating this new sanctions regime were approved by EU Foreign Affairs Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, on 13 November. The Council has not yet put forward proposals to subject any specific persons or entities to the tier II sanctions, but the arms embargo has entered into effect.
14.11The Minister for Europe (Sir Alan Duncan) submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on the High Representative’s proposals on 1 November.147 In it, he expresses the Government’s concerns about “Venezuela’s continued authoritarian slide”. He adds that the Government expects the actions of the Constituent Assembly to “continue to worsen the lack of respect for democracy and human rights”. He expresses his support for the new sanctions regime, arguing that “EU restrictive measures are a useful tool to encourage the Venezuelan Government to negotiate with the Opposition in good faith”.
14.12The sanctions regime will expire on 14 November 2018 unless a Decision is taken by the Council before that date to extend it further. Any such Decision would be subject to scrutiny in its own right.
Previous Committee Reports
None.
139 House of Commons Library briefing, “Political situation in Venezuela“ (1 September 2017).
141 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1 November 2017).
143 See our Report of 13 November 2017.
144 House of Commons Library briefing, “Political situation in Venezuela“ (1 September 2017).
145 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Venezuela (15 May 2017).
146 This latter development was strongly condemned by the Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan) on 19 August 2017.
147 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1 November 2017).
11 December 2017