14Military mobility in the EU
|
Committee’s assessment |
Politically important |
|
Cleared from scrutiny; drawn to the attention of the Defence Committee |
|
|
Document details |
Joint Communication on Improving Military Mobility in the European Union |
|
Legal base |
— |
|
Department |
Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
|
Document Number |
(39202), 14237/17, JOIN(17) 41 |
Summary and Committee’s conclusions
14.1As part of the 2016 European Defence Action Plan, the Commission had committed to “increase coherence and synergies between defence issues and other Union policies where an EU added-value exists”.114 In November 2017 it published a Communication setting out its initial assessment of EU-level initiatives that could facilitate the movement of both military personnel and equipment within the EU.
14.2The Communication enumerates several obstacles that inhibit the smooth movements of military transports across Member State borders, including EU customs legislation on dangerous goods and gaps in the necessary transport infrastructure, in particular for military flights. The Commission will publish an Action Plan in March 2018 with a list of concrete policy initiatives to address the problems identified. These will also be linked to the newly-launched Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) between 23 Member States (not including the UK), as part of which they undertake to make their national approaches for troop movements and the development of military technology more coherent.115 The Foreign Affairs Council welcomed the Commission’s intentions at its meeting on 13 November 2017.116
14.3The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan) submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on the document on 4 December 2017.117 In it, he recognises “the need to improve military mobility within Europe and to resolve common impediments across the areas outlined [by the Commission]”. He adds that “EU exit issues do not play a critical role” in the scope of the work outlined by the Commission, but he then goes on to say that “the UK will be keen to ensure that the proposed work-plan is taken forward with key stakeholders outside of the EU, particularly NATO”, as otherwise “there is considerable risk of duplication and for any proposed action plan to be substantially less valuable”.
14.4We consider this Commission Communication to be of political importance. While no concrete announcements are made for policy initiatives, the document makes a number of intriguing suggestions as to how the EU could use its existing competences to facilitate mobility of personnel and materiel between Member States. Some, including the possible use of EU budget funding to invest in dual-use civilian-military transport infrastructure, are likely to be controversial. We will examine the impact of any concrete proposals more closely when the Action Plan is deposited for scrutiny next year.
14.5This policy paper should be seen in the broader context of recent developments at EU-level to facilitate closer cooperation on defence matters, in particular the creation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) unit for non-executive CSDP missions and the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which we have considered separately and which we have recommended for debate on the floor of the House.118
14.6We accept the Minister’s assertion that the EU exit implications of this particular Commission document are minimal. However, given the current uncertainty about the parameters of the post-Brexit partnership between the UK and the EU on defence policy, it is unclear what the overall implications of further long-term EU action to facilitate military mobility might be in the UK. Although the Commission refers to the need to expedite military mobility “both within [EU] borders as well as with a view to rapidly deploying military operations abroad”, we cannot judge at this junction how the Action Plan might affect transport of British troops and materiel to or through the EU after Brexit.
14.7It is clear, however, that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU means that any initiatives of a regulatory or legislative nature, which are meant purely to facilitate intra-EU movements, are unlikely to be of benefit as the UK will no longer be bound by EU law or a full member of its regulatory systems on customs or transport. Of course, the Government may seek to negotiate UK participation in specific initiatives where it believes this to be in the country’s interest. The extent to which that is politically and legally possible (and desirable) will depend on the specific policy measures the Commission outlines in its upcoming Action Plan. We will expect more detail from the Minister about these implications when we assess that document in due course.
14.8We are also conscious of the fact that it remains possible that any legislative proposals relating to the Military Mobility Action Plan might still apply in the UK, if they become applicable during the Government’s post-Brexit “implementation period”.
14.9We now clear this document from scrutiny, but ask the Minister to write to us by 12 January 2018 setting out which specific initiatives on military mobility the UK would like to see included in the Commission Action Plan. We also draw these developments to the attention of the Defence Committee.
Full details of the documents
Joint Communication on Improving Military Mobility in the European Union: (39202), 14237/17, JOIN(17) 41.
Background
14.10In its 2016 European Defence Action Plan, the European Commission said it would work to “increase coherence and synergies between defence issues and other Union policies where an EU added-value exists”.119 In November 2017 the Commission published a policy paper on one of the areas where it has identified such added value exists: military mobility. It uses this phrase to refer to the “movement of military equipment and personnel across the EU with the aim of facilitating and expediting their mobility to react in a fast and effective way to internal and external crises”.120
14.11According to the Commission, obstacles remain to the hassle-free movement of personnel and materiel which should be addressed at EU-level, “both within our borders as well as with a view to rapidly deploying military operations abroad”. Although it acknowledges that it remains the sovereign decision of each Member State whether to allow foreign troops to enter their territory, the Commission argues that certain obstacles could be removed to allow EU countries to move troops and equipment “swiftly and smoothly” where they have decided to deploy them.
14.12The Commission’s initial analysis is that military mobility is affected by a wide range of obstacles—of a physical, legal and regulatory nature—in a number of fields, including transport, customs, environment and health. The purpose of this latest policy paper is to set out how the EU, including with its existing policies, will work to “facilitate and help to expedite military mobility ranging from day-to-day needs to strategic pre-deployment of military forces and resources, in synergy with non-military activities and without disrupting civilian use of infrastructure [and] avoiding unnecessary inconveniences”.
14.13The European Commission, with the Member States and the European Defence Agency, will examine the existing bottlenecks and barriers further to “develop a shared understanding of the needs and requirements”. In March 2018, it will present the results of that exercise to the Council in the form of a Military Mobility Action Plan, covering:
- Coordination mechanisms between national and EU military and civilian authorities, including systematic exchange of information and data;
- Gaps in physical infrastructure which comply with the necessary technical requirements for all military transport, including the way in which military transports can be prioritised over civilian traffic;
- The legal and regulatory framework governing transport of both personnel and equipment, including export and import formalities for dangerous goods; and
- Protection for, and liability of, military personnel, equipment and restricted data in transit.
14.14The Commission clearly envisages that EU legislation or non-legislative initiatives would contribute to resolving barriers to military transports, noting that these areas are “subject to legislation, procedures and investment instruments which would need to be adapted, including at EU level, to make them suitable for military uses”. The Commission adds, rather ambiguously, that “EU legislation in other areas could also be looked at for possible relevance to military mobility”.
14.15The Commission has already made some initial suggestions for EU interventions to tackle known obstacles, including:
- Using the EU budget to invest in transport infrastructure that benefits both civilian and military traffic;
- Introducing streamlined customs procedures for cross-border transports of military goods under the Union Customs Code;
- Extending the applicability of the Dangerous Goods Directive121 to military transports; and
- Harmonising procedures for movements of troops.
14.16The Commission paper acknowledges the need for any EU-level initiatives in this area to be compatible and coherent with existing projects to facilitate the movement of troops and equipment, both EU and NATO-led.122
The Government’s view
14.17The Minister for Europe (Sir Alan Duncan) submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on the document on 4 December 2017.123 In it, he states:
“The UK recognises the need to improve military mobility within Europe and to resolve common impediments across the areas outlined in the [Commission document]. To this end, the UK will continue to engage in the Ad Hoc Working Group which will shape the action plan to be delivered by March 2018, offering expertise by consulting relevant stakeholders across Defence and across other Whitehall departments as required.”
14.18The Minister states that “EU exit issues do not play a critical role” in the scope of the work outlined by the Commission, as the Action Plan is due well before the UK’s withdrawal in March 2019. However, he then goes on to say that “the UK will be keen to ensure that the proposed work-plan is taken forward with key stakeholders outside of the EU, particularly NATO”, as otherwise “there is considerable risk of duplication and for any proposed action plan to be substantially less valuable”. The Memorandum also reiterates that the UK is leaving the EU but “remains committed to European defence and security, and protecting the interests of UK industry”.
14.19In addition, on 13 November 2017, the Foreign Secretary supported the adoption of a set of Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on security and defence, which included a section on military mobility.124 The Ministers welcomed the “timely presentation” of the Commission Communication, and called on 2018 Action Plan to “consider comprehensively the infrastructural, procedural and regulatory issues in light of the military requirements defined by Member States to facilitate mobility of personnel and assets across the EU”.
14.20The Council also recognised the link between this initiative and recent launch Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) between 23 EU Member States on development and acquisition of military equipment,125 stating that the PESCO participating Member States’ commitment to simplifying and standardising cross-border military transport “should be coherent with the respective NATO initiatives in this area”.
Previous Committee Reports
None.
114 For more information on the European Defence Action Plan, see our predecessors’ Report of 22 March 2017.
115 We have considered the launch and implications of PESCO separately elsewhere in this Report.
117 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (4 December 2017).
118 See chapter 1 of this Report.
119 For more information on the European Defence Action Plan, see our predecessors’ Report of 22 March 2017.
120 European Commission, “The European Union is stepping up efforts to improve military mobility“ (10 November 2017).
122 Including, for example, the existing EDA-led initiatives on standards for dual-use equipment, the Multimodal Transport Hub on troop movements and the Diplomatic Clearances Agreement for military flights.
123 Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (4 December 2017).
125 We have considered the launch of PESCO in a separate Chapter in this Report.
22 December 2017