2The uneasy path to peace and prosperity in the Western Balkans
The problems facing the Western Balkans
4.Less than 25 years ago, the Western Balkans was blighted by armed conflict, including some of the most extreme violence perpetuated against civilians in Europe since the Second World War. Since then, the region has, as Dr Dimitar Bechev from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill told us, “overcome many of the problems which bred violent conflict in the 1990s”. But, he said, “this is where the good news ends”.1 The Western Balkans remains hampered by a set of interwoven problems—state capture, chronic economic stagnation, bilateral disputes and ethnic conflicts—which prove that the region’s progress cannot be taken for granted.2 These problems are exacerbated by local elites who have an interest in the status quo. According to Timothy Less from Nova Europa and the University of Cambridge, these elites “are opposed to the kind of liberal reforms which would undermine their control of the national economy”.3 In its written submission to this inquiry, the FCO echoes this assessment of the fragile state of the WB6. It says that “risks and threats are increasing” in the Western Balkans because “vested interests, state capture and weak governance allow space for organised crime (including drugs and human trafficking), illegal migration, radicalisation and potential terrorism”.4
The difficult path to EU accession
5.The EU accession process has been a key driver of progress in the Western Balkans because the prospect of joining the EU incentivises the WB6 to implement root and branch reforms. Dr Spyros Economides from the London School of Economics (LSE) described EU membership as “the highest goal for the states in the region”, while Dr Denisa Kostovicova, also from the LSE, said that EU accession “remains the only driver for comprehensive political and economic reforms in the region”.5 This view was supported by the EBRD’s Peter Sanfey, who said that a “credible perspective of ultimate membership” is very important for investors and potential investors.6 Dr Koneska told us that public support for joining the EU is high in the Western Balkans.7 However, according to Dr Othon Anastasakis from St Anthony’s College Oxford, Kyril Drezov from Keele University and Dr Koneska, this is not reciprocated within the EU.8 According to Timothy Less, “only 39% of EU citizens favour EU enlargement and 49% are opposed, with an absolute majority opposed in 19 of the EU’s 28 members”.9 In short, as Mr Less told us, “on its current trajectory, the region will take decades to join the EU”.10 According to the EBRD’s Peter Sanfey, it could take “in the region of 50 or 60 years” for the WB6 to catch up with EU living standards. The region has, he concluded, made a lot of progress, but “there is still a lot more to be done”.11
6.The further the prospect of joining the EU recedes into the distance, the harder it becomes to entrench reforms, and there is evidence to suggest that this exacerbates the region’s problems. The British Council told us that the region is “experiencing a new phase of instability”, while Dr Bechev said that it had witnessed a “backslide into authoritarianism”, with international watchdogs registering “a general trend towards de-democratisation”.12 Dr Kostovicova told us that an already fragile civil society “is under increasing pressure from increasingly authoritarian leaderships.13 In turn, a weak civil society makes the fulfilment of civil rights more difficult. According to Stonewall, “high levels of discrimination and hate crime, lack of access to justice and restrictions on freedom of assembly, among other issues, prevent LGBTI people in the Western Balkans from exercising their rights”.14 The spiralling weaknesses of civil society are not helped by a fragile media environment.15
Filling a vacuum: other countries active in the Western Balkans
7.Outside actors such as Russia, China and Turkey have filled a void created by EU neglect of the Western Balkans over the past decade. Anastasakis, Drezov and Koneska told us that China and Turkey are big investors in the Western Balkans and that their reputations in the region were largely positive.16 Many suggested that, by contrast, Russian influence in the region is weak, not least because its economic presence is limited. Despite this, Russia is capable of exploiting the region’s problems and undermining its progress towards peace, prosperity and, ultimately, EU and NATO membership. Indeed, the FCO told us that one of the biggest threats facing the region is “Russia’s increased interference in the Western Balkans, as seen in the attempted coup plot in Montenegro in October 2016”, which it describes as “a brazen example of Russia’s risk-appetite and willingness to attempt disruption”.17 The FCO also highlighted Russia’s support for the “destabilising activities of political leaders in the Republika Srpska” in Bosnia and Herzegovina and cited media reports in early 2018 that local police were purchasing “long-barrelled weapons” from Russia, fuelling fears of Russia’s ability to destabilise the fragile peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzeogvina.18 The FCO’s assessment of the Russian threat was echoed by several of those who provided us with written and oral evidence. Sir Robert Cooper, for example, said: “The Russians, as they do in other places, are very good at making a bad situation worse. That is one of their great skills. This is a place where there are quite a lot of bad situations, and they work on them”.19 Tena Prelec said that “Russia plays a weak hand in the Balkans very well”.20 Oxford Analytica’s Michael Taylor made a similar point.21
8.A number of witnesses also pointed to Russia’s support for Milorad Dodik, president of the autonomous Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who has, according to Dimitar Bechev, “engaged in brinkmanship, threatening repeatedly to initiate a referendum for secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina”.22 This is also an area where, according to Professor Kenneth Morrison from De Montfort University, there are known links between extreme right wing groups and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine, and these in turn have been implicated in the attempted coup in Montenegro. Professor Morrison pointed to this, among others, as reason “to treat Russia’s machinations in the region with suspicion”.23
9.In oral evidence, Sir Alan Duncan (FCO Minister of State for Europe and the Americas) spoke about the risks of outside interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fiona McIlwham (Director of the FCO’s Western Balkans Department) told us that the FCO was “very concerned about the situation in Bosnia”, where there are increased tensions between the three main ethnic groups.24 We asked Ms McIlwham whether Russia was aggravating this situation by rearming Bosnian Serb groups. She said that the Government had commissioned a report on the rearming of groups across the country, but there is concern about accounts of the purchase of long-barrelled weapons in Republika Srpska. The Minister of State said that it was difficult to say much before this report was finished.25
10.Sir Alan also pointed to the provisional agreement between Greece and Macedonia in June 2018 to resolve their long-running name dispute as an example of the region’s potential for progress.26 It was, he said, “very, very, very good news, and we welcome it unreservedly”.27 However, he cautioned that the agreement would have to be ratified by the parliaments and peoples of Greece and Macedonia—the point at which an agreement between the two sides in Cyprus fell down in 2017—and he agreed that there is a danger of “foreign interference through social media or the airwaves in a way that is designed to destabilise, rather than entrench something that is good”. He added that “we have to be on our guard, and I am sure we will offer every assistance that we possibly can”.28
11.The problems facing the Western Balkans are deeply-rooted and intricately interwoven. Its path to European integration will be long and halting and there is no guarantee of success. It is vital that the UK and its EU and NATO partners maintain their commitment to the region, but they must acknowledge the difficulties and risks involved and recognise that it will likely take a long time to make a substantive difference.
12.Russia is willing to do what it can to disrupt the Western Balkans’ path to stability and democracy. This is demonstrated by Russia’s support for an attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016 and reports of Russian attempts to supply arms to militant groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly, there is a risk that Russia will try to subvert or stop the ratification of the agreement recently reached between Greece and Macedonia to end their long-running name dispute, particularly in any referendum that may be held in Macedonia.
13.It is not for the UK to say whether the people of Greece and Macedonia should ratify the agreement recently reached between the two governments to resolve their name dispute. However, as one of the leading powers resisting Russian aggression, it is vital that the UK does what it can to help ensure that a decision can be made in a free, fair and open way. The FCO should tell us what the UK has done and will do, in concert with its regional, EU and NATO partners and allies, to ensure that the ratification process is not disrupted by malicious outside interference.
5 Dr Spyros Economides (WBS0012), para 22; Dr Denisa Kostovicova (WBS0016), para 1. See also: Dr Michael Taylor (WBS0011), para 11
17 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (WBS0009), para 8, 16. For more on the attempted coup in Montenegro, see: Dimitar Bechev, The 2016 Coup Attempt in Montenegro: Is Russia’s Balkans Footprint Expanding?
26 For more on the provisional agreement, see: Zoran Nechev, The Skopje-Athens agreement: A view from (North?) Macedonia (14 June 2018).
Published: 6 July 2018