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Foreign Affairs Committee

Global Britain and South America

Twentieth Report of Session 2017–19

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to the report*

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The Foreign Affairs Committee

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Summary

South America is a source of relatively untapped potential for the UK. The continent offers a wealth of opportunities to develop UK influence and promote mutual prosperity, security and stability.

The FCO's diplomatic and programming work across the continent has borne success, for example in the UK's support to the Colombian peace process. The FCO must now reinforce these efforts at multilateral level with likeminded partners. Security threats from the continent, arising from instability in Venezuela, the presence of serious organised crime and widespread corruption, compromise stability in the region, as well as facilitate the trafficking of illegal narcotics to the streets of the UK. The UK Government must continue to monitor and respond to these threats, ensuring they receive adequate resourcing. With Posts simultaneously pursuing multiple and diverse objectives, the FCO must be more selective in prioritising its activities in country to prevent its resources being spread too thinly.

UK companies have been reticent to maximise trade opportunities because of perceived barriers. The UK should highlight its competitive advantages in areas such as its legal tradition in order to compete against other countries with larger economic footprints in the region, such as China.

Human rights remain an area of concern across the continent, especially the rising number of attacks against human rights defenders. The FCO should focus its efforts upon support to human rights defenders at local level.

1 Introduction

1. In autumn 2018, we launched an inquiry considering the effectiveness of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's approach towards South America with the following terms of reference:

- Recent political developments in the region and the impact of these developments upon UK engagement with the region
- Economic developments and prospects within the region and their influence upon the political landscape (for example in Argentina and Venezuela); the impact on growth and development of free market reforms, for example in Chile, and the potential for their wider adoption
- Key industries and opportunities for trade
- The impact of the extractives industries on growth and development in the region
- Rule of law and human rights
- The impact of climate change and the role of countries in the region in tackling it
- Intra-regional co-operation and dynamics
- The work of the FCO in the region, especially in promoting the rule of law and human rights, tackling climate change and encouraging UK/ South American trade
- The interests and activities of external state actors in the region.

2. To inform our work, we took oral evidence over six sessions spanning from January to July 2019, together with inviting submissions of written evidence. We would like to thank everyone who provided oral and written evidence to the inquiry.¹ We also met with President Duque of Colombia during his official visit to the UK in June to discuss key developments in UK/Colombia relations, and visited Argentina and Colombia later that month. Given the broad nature of the inquiry, this report considers the most prominent topics raised during our discussions and their impact upon the UK's relations with the continent. It also addresses the spread of devastating large-scale fires across the Amazon, which came to prominence following the conclusion of our evidence sessions.

1 We took oral evidence from; John Dew (former UK Ambassador to Colombia), Professor Julia Buxton (Central European University), Cristina Cortes (Canning House), Professor Anthony Pereira (King's Brazil Institute), Dr Julia Calvert (University of Edinburgh), Michael Reid (The Economist), Dr Peter Collecott CMG (former UK Ambassador to Brazil), John Carroll (Santander UK), Wilson Del Socorro (Diageo), Stephen Hill (Eversheds Sutherland), Dr Marina Brilman (Law Society), Dr Par Engstrom (UCL Institute of the Americas), Andrei Gomez Suarez (Embrace Dialogue), Jonathan Dunn and Cristina Bruce (Anglo American), Nigel Baker (Head of Latin America Department, FCO) and Menna Rawlings (Director General, Economic and Global Issues, FCO). The then-Minister for Europe and the Americas, Sir Alan Duncan MP, resigned shortly before he was due to provide oral evidence.

2 Regional politics and security

Democracy in South America

3. 2018 was a politically significant year for South America with five changes of leadership across the continent, including the election of Ivan Duque in Colombia and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.² The election of these right-of-centre leaders was indicative of a region-wide shift away from the left wing ‘pink tide’ governments of the 2000s.³ The continent has also recently seen a series of high-profile anti-corruption trials. In Argentina, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has faced trial while concurrently running for Vice President in the forthcoming Presidential elections. In Brazil, former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is in jail following convictions for corruption and in Peru, former President Alberto Fujimori was returned to jail in January for embezzlement following the annulment of a previous pardon.

4. We asked regional experts for their analysis of the health of democracy in the region. Michael Reid commented that corruption “has taken its toll on the credibility of democratic politics”, but that there is “hope that there will be less impunity” in holding those accused of corruption to account than in the past.⁴ Examining the example of Bolsonaro’s victory in the Brazilian Presidential elections, Cristina Cortes concluded this was a reaction against endemic corruption and “a cry of wanting to get away from the previous system.”⁵ Professor Anthony Pereira noted that although the region’s democracies have inadequacies, “pretty much everywhere, with the exception of Venezuela, the basic institutions of democracy are functioning”.⁶ **Although democracy remains resilient in almost every country across the continent, we are concerned that corruption remains a significant threat to effective governance across South America.**

Crisis in Venezuela

5. As the kleptocratic Maduro regime has clung to power, the Venezuelan people have continued to suffer with food and medical supplies scarce and mass human rights violations.⁷ The crisis has driven a surge in migration to other countries in the region, characterised by the FCO as “comparable in scale to what has happened in Yemen or Syria”.⁸ Official estimates suggest that over four million Venezuelans have left the country, with Colombia hosting 1.3 million people.⁹ This has placed what the FCO describes as “an extreme burden on the neighbouring countries” in providing essential services such as healthcare and education and, in the case of Colombia, “putting a great strain on the

2 There were also changes of leadership in Chile, Paraguay and Peru.

3 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#))

4 [Q70](#) [Michael Reid]

5 [Q32](#) [Cristina Cortes]. It should be noted, however, that former leftist President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had been polling strongly before he was disqualified from running in the 2018 Presidential elections under Brazil’s Clean Slate Law by the Superior Electoral Court on 31 August 2018.

6 [Q32](#) [Professor Anthony Pereira]

7 See for example Protection Approaches ([SAM0023](#)) para 14, Amnesty International UK ([SAM0017](#)) paras 52 & 53

8 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#))

9 “[Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela top Four Million](#)”, IOM and UNHCR, 6 July 2019

ability to cope, let alone on the ability to implement a proper peace process”.¹⁰ There have been reports of Venezuelan migrants and refugees experiencing hostility and violence in some surrounding countries, such as Ecuador and Brazil.¹¹

6. The UK has provided financial and diplomatic support to neighbouring countries to meet the challenges posed by the crisis. In late April 2019, DFID announced an £8 million contribution to the World Bank’s Global Concessional Financing Fund for Colombia to enable the Colombian Government to unlock low interest loans to deal with the crisis.¹² This funding is in addition to the £6.5 million emergency aid package announced by DFID in February 2019.¹³ The FCO has supported the Lima Group, a multilateral group of American states dedicated to finding a peaceful solution to the situation in Venezuela, in its work to find locally-led solutions to the crisis, with Sir Alan Duncan MP, then Minister of State for the Americas, attending the group’s meeting in Ottawa on 4 February.¹⁴

7. We heard how external actors are playing an instrumental role in propping up the Maduro regime. Both China and Russia have significant interests in Venezuela, and were described by Professor Julia Buxton, Professor of Comparative Politics at the Central European University, as “pivotal actors” with economic influence.¹⁵ The nature and scale of Russian military involvement in the country has been unclear; however, in March 2019 ‘The Times’ reported the presence of military aircraft in Caracas unloading troops and equipment.¹⁶ Michael Reid noted Cuba’s significant support to the regime through the provision of intelligence and security support, as well as the presence of Russian-backed mercenary forces in the country.¹⁷

8. The crisis has led to an absence of the rule of law in Venezuela, leading to increased instability across the region with a growth in illegal activities facilitated by its porous border with Colombia.¹⁸ We heard that when combined with significant Colombian coca production,¹⁹ this development poses a considerable security risk. Professor Julia Buxton told us how former Colombian right-wing paramilitary organisations are recruiting young Venezuelans displaced from the country and “undercutting local Colombians who are willing to join coca cultivation and collection, or organised crime groups”. She stated that “the situation is just getting deeper and deeper in terms of embedding cross-border criminality”.²⁰

9. The UK is seeking to reduce the growth in serious organised crime emanating from the continent, including countering the illegal narcotics trade, through Conflict, Stability

10 Oral evidence taken before the International Development Committee on 27 February 2019, “Humanitarian Situation in Venezuela”, HC1928, [Q33](#) [Nigel Baker]

11 [Q6](#) [Professor Julia Buxton], “[Venezuela migrants flee back across the border with Brazil](#)”. BBC News, 10 September 2018

12 Department for International Development, “[UK aid to help support Colombia as it hosts Venezuelan migrants and refugees](#)”, 30 April 2019

13 Department for International Development, “[UK aid to provide live-saving assistance for Venezuelans](#)”, 12 February 2019

14 HC Deb, 7 February 2019, [col 453](#) [Commons Chamber]

15 [Q20](#) [Professor Julia Buxton]

16 “[Moscow flies troops and equipment into Venezuela](#)”, The Times, 26 March 2019

17 [Q91](#), [Q99](#)

18 Oral evidence taken before the International Development Committee on 27 February 2019, “Humanitarian Situation in Venezuela”, HC1928, [Q32](#)

19 In 2018, coca plantations in Colombia reduced very slightly from 171,000 hectares to 169,000 hectares, but still constituting the world’s largest producer of coca “[Colombia coca cultivation down slightly, UN report says](#)”, Reuters, 2 August 2019, “[Coca crops in Colombia at all time high](#)”, UNODC, 19 September 2018

20 [Q11](#)

and Security Fund (CSSF)²¹ activities. The CSSF's Peru/Colombia Serious Organised Crime programme, delivered jointly by the National Crime Agency and Crown Prosecution Service with support from the FCO, seeks to improve the capability of the countries' law enforcement agencies and the effectiveness of criminal proceedings. The programme runs collaboratively with another CSSF programme, focused upon security and access to justice for peace, to tackle organised crime. These programmes protect communities in both South America and in the UK through restricting the flow of illegal narcotics to the streets of the UK.²²

10. Countries neighbouring Venezuela, such as Colombia, have taken in large numbers of migrants and refugees fleeing the crisis, placing a strain upon local services. *The UK Government should continue financial support to Colombia, through mechanisms such as the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Fund, to ensure essential support to migrants and refugees fleeing Venezuela. The FCO should continue to support regional-led efforts to find a solution to the crisis in Venezuela through the Lima Group, which represents the best opportunity to bring about a successful resolution.*

11. Instability in Venezuela is driving the growth in serious organised crime emanating from the continent, ultimately increasing the flow of illegal narcotics to the UK. *The Government should seek to use its diplomatic and programming presence, under the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund where applicable, to understand and anticipate the rapidly evolving challenges posed by serious organised crime groups in the region, including in Venezuela. It should also alert us, in confidence if necessary, to any future changes in levels of resourcing dedicated to countering serious organised crime across the continent.*

Colombian peace process

12. During our visit to Colombia in June 2019, we met with a broad range of interlocutors involved in the peace process, including Government officials, senior figures in the transitional justice system and former FARC combatants reintegrating into society. As the country begins the long path to peace and security, it was clear to us that Colombia faces significant challenges in implementing this hard-won peace, especially at sub-national level, ultimately threatening the sustainability of the peace process.

13. Pervasive inequality, tenuous land rights, a lack of economic development and state presence in remote areas, opposition to the transitional justice system and continued threats to the security of citizens from armed groups present significant hurdles in embedding peace.²³ We received evidence that suggested that these challenges have been compounded by the political climate within Colombia, which has undermined both the institutions and broader implementation of the peace process, notably through President Duque's recent challenge to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace²⁴ in Congress.²⁵ The FCO

21 The Fund's [website](#) defines its mission as, "A cross-government fund which supports and delivers activity to tackle instability and to prevent conflicts that threaten UK interests."

22 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, [Peru and Colombia Serious Organised Crime Programme Summary](#), 2018–19, accessed 1 August 2019

23 [Qq144–145](#), Colombian Caravana ([SAM0010](#)), ABColombia ([SAM0007](#))

24 The transitional justice mechanism of the peace process

25 [Q144](#), Amnesty International UK ([SAM0027](#)), Embrace Dialogue ([SAM0026](#))

is more optimistic of the prospects for long-term peace, however, noting the Government of Colombia's recent renewal of the UN Verification Mission and the candidacy of former FARC combatants in October's local elections.²⁶

14. The UK has played a key role in supporting the Colombian peace process, both through diplomatic channels and in programme support. At multilateral level, the UK is penholder for Colombia at the UN Security Council,²⁷ a contribution described as “fundamental” to the peace process by the Embassy of Colombia. As part of this, the UK recently led a Security Council visit to the country.²⁸ In oral evidence, Dr Par Engstrom noted that at this crucial time for the peace process the UK should consider extending this engagement,

There are of course other multilateral channels through which the UK could play potentially an important role in Colombia. The EU would have been—is, actually—one, if I may say so.²⁹

15. The UK also administers a large Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) peace process-focused programme, working with the Government of Colombia and other stakeholders in-country. The programme spans activities such as by addressing the facilitation of country-wide development plans and reintegration of combatants, improving citizen security (including the challenges of illicit economies) and support to the transitional justice system.³⁰ During our visit, we met with a range of interlocutors receiving support via the CSSF in implementing the peace process. We were especially impressed by the work of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, which has received UK support for its programmes in tackling issues connected to sexual violence during the conflict, and its resilient efforts in providing justice in such a challenging context.

16. The UK Government is to be commended for its long-term efforts in pursuit of peace in Colombia, first, in diplomatic terms as penholder on Colombia at the UN Security Council, where it has galvanised international support and led the international response, and in its actions on the ground through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. *The UK should maximise its good work as penholder at the UN Security Council on Colombia by pursuing other opportunities to reinforce peace at the international level with like-minded partners, including the EU. In the face of faltering Colombian domestic support, the UK should continue to provide explicit support for the institutions of the peace process, namely the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.*

External state actors

17. The influence of external state actors across the continent, notably China, continues to grow. The scale of China's involvement in the region is vast; for the period of 2015 to 2019, Xi Jinping set goals of achieving totals of \$500 billion in trade and \$250 billion in direct investment with the Latin America and Caribbean region.³¹ Witnesses gave us varying estimates of levels of actual Chinese economic investment over the period, from

26 [Q245](#)

27 Embassy of Colombia, United Kingdom ([SAM0019](#)) para 8

28 [Q245](#)

29 [Q146](#)

30 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, “[Colombia: Security and access to justice for peace](#)”, accessed 1 August 2019

31 “[China's investment in Latin America](#)”, Brookings Institute, accessed 7 August 2019

\$141 to \$200 billion³² (by comparison, as of 2017, the value of total UK investment to South America was £16.1 billion).³³ This has taken the form of funding for large infrastructure programmes throughout the continent³⁴ as well as through trade.³⁵ We asked witnesses whether this trend was positive or negative for the region. Dr Peter Collecott highlighted the potential for political leverage that Chinese loans may provide for Beijing, given their substantial size (ranging from 25% to 80% of a country's debt)³⁶. Dr Julia Calvert said,

The region needs capital to grow, but the kinds of things that China has been investing in are areas that narrow its export profile to commodities, rather than value-added goods that will create the kinds of jobs and income generation in Latin America that will allow it to grow in a sustainable and inclusive way. That is not necessarily good, but is some capital better than none? That is another question.³⁷

18. In addition to economic influence, China has also sought to increase its soft power across the continent through the growth of Confucius Institutes. Russia has also followed this trend, increasing the South American footprint of the Russkiy Mir Foundation with a new office in Brazil and increasing the number of RT viewers in the region.³⁸ The FCO notes that “Russia is a growing presence in South America”, especially through its assistance to the Maduro regime in Venezuela.³⁹

19. *The Government should monitor the presence of Chinese and Russian activities throughout the continent, assessing whether their increasing influence will translate into security concerns. It should provide a report to the National Security Council on this matter and provide us with an initial assessment at the end of the year (in confidence if necessary) and provide further reports thereafter.*

32 [Q84](#)

33 Figure from House of Commons Library

34 For example, hydroelectric dams in Argentina and Ecuador and the bi-oceanic railway between Brazil and Peru

35 China is the single largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay (Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#)))

36 [Q84](#), For example, as of 2018, Chinese loans totalled \$67.2 billion in Venezuela and \$18.4 billion in Ecuador (Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2019) [China-Latin America Finance Database](#), Washington: Inter-American Dialogue.)

37 [Q84](#) [Dr Julia Calvert]

38 British Council ([SAM0015](#))

39 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#))

3 Developing UK trade and investment

20. In 2017, the UK exported £6.3 billion of goods and services to South America and imported £5.5 billion. This was equal to around 1% of UK exports and imports, and the lowest of any region in the world.⁴⁰ Other European countries outperform the UK in trade with the region consistently⁴¹ and evidence submitted to the inquiry suggests that the UK is simply failing to maximise existing opportunities. Canning House argue,

Whether inside or outside the EU, plenty of opportunities for UK success already exist in the region. Many of these opportunities are currently being enjoyed by German, Indian and Chinese companies, and by certain UK companies.⁴²

21. UK Government activity to promote and support UK trade and investment with South America is delivered through collaboration between the FCO and the Department for International Trade (DIT), with in-country activity by Posts, Trade Envoys and the regional Trade Commissioner, Joanna Crellin. The FCO wants to “strengthen significantly the UK’s absolute and relative trade with the region over the next 5 years” to increase the UK’s market share”.⁴³ In oral evidence, Menna Rawlings, Director-General of Global and Economic Issues, acknowledged that “there is no doubt that we are not yet punching above our weight in South America when it comes to trade” but that “there are a lot of positive developments, particularly around inward investment”.⁴⁴ To date, the UK has signed two trade continuity agreements⁴⁵ with countries in the region; one with Chile and the other with the Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru).⁴⁶

22. We heard that perceived barriers and difficulties are stymying UK trade and investment with the region. These barriers include language, corruption and poor adherence to the rule of law, a perception of the complexity of local legislation, high tariffs and protectionist policy.⁴⁷ However, evidence suggested that the scale of these barriers was exaggerated. Santander UK said,

the reality is that issues such as corruption and ease of doing business are no more acute than in countries such as India and China, both of which are heavily promoted as business destinations for the UK, and where many UK business operate successfully.⁴⁸

40 Figures from ONS, [Pink Book 2018](#)

41 For example, in 2016, the UK’s share of regional imports was 0.92%, whereas Germany accounted for 4% and France accounted for 1.6% (Revitalising UK-Latin America Engagement Post-Brexit”, British Foreign Policy Group, November 2018, page 7), see also Jacques ARNOLD ([SAM0002](#))

42 Canning House ([SAM0014](#))

43 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#)) page 12

44 [Q241](#)

45 These agreements seek to provide continuity for existing EU trade agreements and will not come into force while current EU trade agreements apply to the UK.

46 In June, the Mercosur-EU trade agreement was finally agreed after 20 years of talks. See [Q251](#) for the FCO’s assessment of the application of this agreement to future UK trade relations. At time of publication, France and Ireland have threatened to vote against the agreement unless Brazil takes greater action on its environmental commitments.

47 See for example Canning House ([SAM0014](#)), Santander UK ([SAM0020](#))

48 Santander UK ([SAM0020](#))

UK's competitive advantage

23. Witnesses referenced the UK's competitive advantage in trade compared to alternatives from other, potentially cheaper, sources. Stephen Hill from Eversheds Sutherland noted that English remains the language of international business⁴⁹ and the UK's legal history brings certainty to the buyer,

Sometimes we can't compete on price, because our cost of labour or materials is higher, but we can compete in terms of long-term security that the buyer of that kit has, because they will be more confident that they can rely on that contract. If anything ever goes wrong, they will be able to bring a claim against that company, and the rule of law will survive.⁵⁰

The UK's reputation as a fair business partner is underpinned through the presence of human rights stipulations within the newly rolled-over trade agreements with Chile and the Andean countries, underscoring UK commitments to values within the international marketplace.⁵¹

Role of the Trade Commissioner

24. Witnesses to our inquiry were complimentary about the work of the Trade Commissioner, Joanna Crellin. Crellin is based in Brazil and is responsible for representing the UK's trade and investments interests throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. John Carroll from Santander UK noted "a substantial improvement" in trade relations since her appointment. In particular, he referenced the importance of her work in showcasing and promoting continent-wide opportunities to businesses throughout the UK.⁵² This has included activities such as the Latin America and the Caribbean Roadshow held in March 2019.

A more co-ordinated approach across Whitehall

25. Witnesses commented that teams in the FCO and DIT were helpful individually but that working was still siloed. Wilson del Socorro from Diageo said,

Across Whitehall, the Departments could perhaps be a little more co-ordinated, particularly here in London. We do very well with FCO and DIT—they are fantastic—but I wonder whether we could also leverage the skills in other Departments to ensure a joined-up approach to promoting exports.⁵³

Del Socorro added that other EU Member states and the US offer specialist local expertise in areas such as customs in their Posts worldwide. He said this is helpful for companies seeking to trade, and that "as the UK looks to build up its own capacity and capability, it is

49 [Q110](#)

50 [Q116](#)

51 As recommended in our report [Global Britain: Human rights and the rule of law](#), Thirteenth Report of Session 17–19, HC874, para 33

52 [Q129](#)

53 [Q102](#)

worth looking at that and learning from those models.”⁵⁴ ⁵⁵ Additionally, other evidence suggested that expertise could be fed into Government approaches to trade with the region through harnessing the networks and experience of chambers of commerce and organisations such as Canning House.⁵⁶

Business practices in the extractives sector

26. The extractives industry is central to the economies of South America. We received written evidence expressing concern about industry practices across the continent, specifically with regard to the prevalence of socio-environmental conflicts connected to extractive activities, including poor consultation of communities. We also received evidence expressing concern about the environmental and health impacts of mining operations for local communities.⁵⁷ For example, written evidence cited inadequate consultation and resettlement of communities at the Cerrejon mine in Colombia and the environmental impact of the failure of the Fundao tailings dam in Brazil.⁵⁸

27. A number of UK registered companies operate in the sector across South America. In oral evidence, we asked Anglo American how they ensure that their activities in the region are carried out in a sustainable way. They told us that they pursue dialogue with affected communities, citing the Quellaveco dialogue table in Peru, and have procedures in place to minimise environmental damage when operations cease.⁵⁹

28. Governments and companies operating in the sector may choose to sign up to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights—a set of principles established to guide businesses in ensuring the safety and security of their operations and adherence to human rights, and a tool for implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.⁶⁰ The FCO has played a leading role in oversight of the principles, with the UK taking the Chair in March 2018.⁶¹ In oral evidence, we asked Anglo American whether the principles should be mandatory rather than voluntary. They said,

For us, the showing of commitment should be enough. We do not take a strong view as to whether they should be mandatory or not. We would like to see more countries, more companies, committing to the voluntary principles.⁶²

29. South America is a source of relatively untapped potential for UK businesses, accounting for only 1% of the UK’s global imports and exports. Yet it offers a wealth of opportunities for trade and investment in the future.

54 [Q124](#) [Wilson Del Socorro]

55 As part of our inquiry into [Delivering Global Britain: FCO Skills](#), the FCO told us that trade policy and negotiations formed a key part of its ‘Priority Skills Statement 2020’.

56 Jacques ARNOLD ([SAM0002](#)), [Q120](#) [Stephen Hill]

57 See for example London Mining Network ([SAM0009](#)), ABColombia ([SAM0007](#)), Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) ([SAM0004](#))

58 ABColombia ([SAM0007](#)), London Mining Network ([SAM0009](#)). In January 2019, the collapse of the Brumadinho dam led to the release of 11.7 million cubic metres of toxic mud and the deaths of nearly 300 people (“[Brazil’s Dam Disaster](#)”, BBC News, accessed 21 August 2019)

59 [Q179](#), [Qq175–176](#)

60 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “[Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for businesses operating in fragile environments: 2018 UK annual report](#)”. 22 March 2019

61 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “[Human Rights and Democracy The 2018 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report](#)”. CP104. July 2019, page 15

62 [Q201](#)

30. Although the work of the Trade Commissioner has helped to foster increased familiarity between UK business and the continent, there is still much work to be done in transforming the perception of the continent amongst UK businesses. *Given the wide geographical scope of the Trade Commissioner's portfolio, which covers the entirety of the Latin America and Caribbean region, together with the increasing trade and investment workload, the Government should keep resourcing to her team under active review. We also recommend that the FCO and DIT should increase the technical knowledge of both Whitehall-based and in-country staff in complex areas such as local tax law.*

31. *The UK should draw upon its background of legal tradition and respect for human rights in its pursuit of regional trade opportunities in future, to include a willingness to trigger human rights stipulations in rolled-over trade agreements in the appropriate circumstances. All UK companies operating in the region should apply best practice in human rights by applying the Voluntary Principles, and the FCO should continue to take an active role in providing appropriate guidance and monitoring compliance.*

4 Human rights

32. Respect for human rights remains problematic across the continent. Together with Central America, South America is the most dangerous region in the world for human rights defenders (HRDs), with HRDs working on land, indigenous and environmental rights at particular risk.⁶³ Female HRDs also face increased risks.⁶⁴ This chapter considers Colombia as a case study of the human rights challenges facing the region.⁶⁵ Since the signing of the peace agreement, attacks on HRDs in Colombia have risen and in 2018 Amnesty International reported that 123 of the 312 HRDs killed globally were Colombian.^{66 67}

33. The slow implementation of the Colombian peace process has provided an environment in which human rights abuses can thrive. During our visit, we heard how a lack of state presence, combined with the withdrawal of the FARC, has created power vacuums across Colombia's regions where the rule of law is absent, into which neo-paramilitary (including narco-paramilitary) groups have arrived and exert control.⁶⁸ In oral evidence, Dr Marina Brilman told us that in many areas of Colombia,

there is an almost complete absence of the state. If the state has any presence at all, it is a military presence—it is the armed forces—but there are no other state institutions to provide healthcare, education or anything else, so the people who live there are basically left to their own devices.⁶⁹

We heard how Colombia's geography makes extending state control practically difficult in many areas (such as along the Pacific coast), but also heard worrying reports of paramilitary activity and human rights abuses in areas close to major cities such as Cali. Figures published by the Colombian Government's Presidential Advisory Body for Human Rights and International Affairs note that in 2018 the departments with the highest numbers of homicides of HRDs were Antioquia and Norte de Santander.⁷⁰

34. The Embassy of Colombia in the UK argues that many citizens have experienced an improvement in the security situation since the signing of the peace agreement, but recognises the ongoing problems for HRDs targeted by what it describes as “criminal structures trying to protect their illegal economies”.⁷¹

63 Amnesty International UK ([SAM0027](#)), ABColombia ([SAM0007](#)) para 5.2

64 Peace Brigades International ([SAM0025](#)) para 2.5 referring to Colombia, “extreme violence and brutality against women defenders has increased significantly”

65 We also received evidence expressing concern about adherence to human rights principles in countries across the continent, including Brazil and Peru.

66 Amnesty International UK ([SAM0027](#))

67 Official figures produced by the Government of Colombia state 114 homicides (Presidential Advisory Body for Human Rights and International Affairs, “Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders FAQs”, June 2019)

68 Peace Brigades International ([SAM0025](#)), Amnesty International UK ([SAM0027](#)), ABColombia ([SAM0007](#)) para 2.2–2.3, [Q144](#)

69 [Q144 \[Dr Marina Brilman\]](#)

70 Presidential Advisory Body for Human Rights and International Affairs, “Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders FAQs”, June 2019

71 Embassy of Colombia, United Kingdom ([SAM0019](#)), para 16

35. Evidence submitted to our inquiry also highlighted the state’s adoption of a securitised approach towards the protection of HRDs, rather than attempting to move political dialogue away from a culture of blame and stigmatisation.⁷² John Dew discussed whether comments from political leaders were contributing to the climate of attacks against HRDs,

you have to ask, who is doing this? What kind of nod, wink or nudge—or sense of entitlement—do they get from the way that broader politics is going?⁷³

36. Our discussions in Colombia reinforced our concerns about practical inadequacies in the level of protection offered by the National Protection Unit to HRDs, driven by insufficient resourcing and the challenging geography of the country.⁷⁴ Colombia Caravana say,

The measures included in the schemes do not consider the context in which the lawyers work, for example, by providing a mobile phone and a bulletproof vest to defenders that work in areas where there is no phone reception, or in a climate in which wearing a bulletproof jacket is simply not sustainable.⁷⁵

We also heard concerns about the outsourcing of the Unit’s staffing, with some staff found to have “dirty ties” to criminal organisations.⁷⁶

37. A number of witnesses, including Peace Brigades International, also expressed concern about the

extremely high levels of impunity [which] still exist in Colombia in relation to threats (almost 100%), assassinations, and other infringements on the rights of defenders.⁷⁷

Until those responsible for such criminal activity are held to account in the judicial system, the situation of HRDs is unlikely to improve, and the peace process could be put at further risk. Addressing impunity will necessitate a renewed political commitment, as highlighted by Colombia Caravana, to remedy the current

widespread failure by State bodies to act with due diligence in relation to the State’s duty to investigate and prosecute all forms of intimidation, harassment and attacks against these individuals, ... who have been victimised due to their work.⁷⁸

38. We received many positive comments about the British Embassy in Colombia’s work on human rights, especially in support of HRDs,⁷⁹ with the Embassy widely seen to be leading in best practice in these areas within the FCO. Embassy funding is available for projects which meet the Embassy’s priorities of prevention of sexual violence in conflict

72 Peace Brigades International ([SAM0025](#)), Colombian Caravana ([SAM0010](#)) para 17

73 [Q10](#) [John Dew]

74 Peace Brigades International ([SAM0025](#))

75 Colombian Caravana ([SAM0010](#)) para 16

76 [Q159](#) [Andrei Gomez-Suarez]

77 Peace Brigades International ([SAM0025](#)) para 3.5

78 Colombian Caravana ([SAM0010](#)) para 9

79 For example ABColombia ([SAM0007](#)) para 7.1, [Q161](#)

and support for HRDs. In Bogota, we visited two projects which receive UK funding. Extending this good work to include a greater focus upon Colombia's regions would help to reinforce the UK Government's other efforts in embedding peace in the country.

39. We are concerned by ongoing violence against human rights defenders across the continent. Breaking the cycle of violence can only happen with the active involvement and political will of Governments across South America. This problem is especially acute in the sub-national regions, where a lack of state presence and the provision of key state services goes hand in hand with threats to the security of communities and their leaders living in remote areas. Improving state presence, therefore, is crucial, if challenging, as is ensuring that paramilitary-type structures are dismantled.

40. The FCO should focus its human rights work in South America upon protection of human rights defenders in the regions including the implementation of the recently launched 'UK Support to Human Rights Defenders'. In Colombia, the British Embassy should extend its positive work with HRDs to provide further support to social leaders in remote areas, including indigenous and female leaders. HRD programmes should include a specific priority relating to indigenous and female leaders in addition to the existing criteria, reflecting the particular challenges and dangers faced by these individuals. More generally, the British Embassy should continue to support projects and programmes which combat impunity for attacks against HRDs, including trial monitoring, as well as those which focus on the dismantling of paramilitary-type structures.

5 FCO resourcing and regional priorities

Resourcing

41. FCO priorities in South America are based upon the Government's 2010 Canning Agenda, which identified "three areas of common endeavour" upon which UK policy on the continent should be based: democracy and the rule of law, fighting inequality and tackling climate change.⁸⁰ In 2018, then-Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson visited Peru, Argentina and Chile and stated that,

For Latin America and for Britain there are realms of gold on either side of the Atlantic. All we need now is to rediscover that global spirit.⁸¹

42. In its written evidence, the FCO characterised the relationship in similar terms, identifying South America as "a region of growing economic potential" with an important role in extending UK influence in multilateral fora.⁸² It added that,

South America represents an opportunity to forge new partnerships with those that share our values, believe and operate in the rules-based international system, and are keen to seize the opportunities that leaving the EU brings.

The FCO identifies priority country relationships with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru.⁸³

43. We asked Menna Rawlings, Director-General of Economic and Global Issues, whether South America was a global priority region for the FCO. She told us,

In terms of relative ranking, it is a really interesting question. We tend to focus a lot on other regions of the world, including the Indo-Pacific for example, where there are huge opportunities and also threats. South America has not necessarily been seen as so much in the British sphere of influence as some other parts of the world, but we certainly see a lot of opportunities there over the coming years, as well as some continuing threats on security, governance and the rule of law.⁸⁴

44. In written evidence, the FCO expressed concern as to whether current resourcing across the continent is sufficient to deliver the FCO's policy ambitions and maximise opportunities. The UK has an embassy in all ten South American countries following the re-opening of the embassy in Paraguay in 2013. Four of the embassies in the region are small posts (with two UK-based staff and a small local team). In written evidence, the FCO told us that,

80 ["Britain and Latin America: historic friends, future partners"](#). Speech delivered at Canning House, November 2010

81 ["We have neglected Latin America's realms of gold for too long"](#). Boris Johnson in The Telegraph, 28 May 2018

82 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#)) page 10

83 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#))

84 [Q238](#)

capitalising upon these opportunities would require additional resource, which would have to be weighed against non-South America priorities in the usual way.⁸⁵

45. In a world of competing priorities it is understandable that South America would not form the FCO's top regional priority. However, there are considerable opportunities for UK influence in South America, such as through trade, which are not currently being maximised. Furthermore, there are also indirect security threats emanating from the continent, such as the growth of the narcotics trade, which require mitigation.

46. We are also concerned that ministerial oversight for the region falls within the large portfolio of the Minister for Europe and the Americas. By including South America in such a large portfolio, the continent struggles to receive the attention it deserves at ministerial level. *We recommend that the FCO should review current ministerial portfolios to ensure that roles are not overloaded.*

Environmental Priorities

47. Tackling climate change and environmental protection has formed a core component of UK diplomatic and programming efforts in the region,⁸⁶ providing support to countries across the continent to meet their commitments under the Paris Agreement - for example, through mechanisms such as International Climate Finance.⁸⁷ South America is likely to face severe challenges as a result of climate change; in Colombia, changes to the climate are estimated to cause an annual loss of 0.49% of the country's annual GDP for the 2010–2100 period.⁸⁸ As part of President Duque's visit to London in June 2019, the UK and Colombia strengthened their joint commitment to action on climate change by signing a new £8.5 million climate partnership. The partnership protects the country's ecosystem and builds upon existing partnerships including projects which tackle deforestation through sustainable farming.⁸⁹

48. The importance of this regional work has been underlined by the recent large-scale fires in the Amazon, described by the Prime Minister as “an international crisis”.⁹⁰ Evidence submitted to this inquiry expressed concern about deforestation in Brazil under previous administrations through the downgrading and downsizing of areas of protected forest.⁹¹ However, this trend appears to have increased dramatically under the Bolsonaro government. The WWF reports that Brazil has experienced 73,000 fires in 2019 so far, 85% more than in the whole of 2018. It states that

85 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#))

86 Tackling climate change is a FCO strategic objective (see Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [Annual Report and Accounts 2018–19](#), HC2393, page 53)

87 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#)). International Climate Finance is administered by BEIS, DFID and DEFRA and aims to address the challenge of climate change. The fund is worth £5.8 bn from 2016–2021. UK Government climate activities in South America are supplemented by the Prosperity Fund, Newton Fund and Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF).

88 “Overview: UK Climate Change and Green Growth Work with Colombia”. British Embassy Colombia, June 2019

89 “[UK and Colombia mark new climate partnership](#)”. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 18 June 2019

90 Tweet by Boris Johnson, 23 August 2019

91 WWF ([SAM0013](#)), WWF ([SAM0021](#))

The fires are a direct result of soaring deforestation rates to clear or prepare land for agriculture and cattle farming ... the direct result of increases in deforestation rates by farmers going largely unchecked by the Brazilian government.⁹²

49. The fires in the Amazon underline the fragility of this biodiverse region. The protection of this region is crucial to the shared global environment. We welcome the UK Government's efforts at bilateral and multilateral level to work with South American partners to tackle the causes and effects of climate change, and especially deforestation. We support the FCO's continued efforts in this regard and encourage greater work with indigenous communities to protect this fragile environment. *This must be considered as a matter of urgency by the international community, including the UK Government.*

Regional Priorities and Official Development Assistance

50. During our visit to Argentina and Colombia in June 2019 we saw first-hand the excellent work of UK Government staff in the region. In particular, we were impressed by the work of HMA Mark Kent, British Ambassador to Argentina, in rebuilding UK/Argentina relations through sensitively managed projects such as next-of-kin visits to the graves of Argentine soldiers killed in the Falklands conflict, adopting an approach based upon empathy.⁹³

51. During our visit, we noted the increasing amount of UK embassy activities undertaken by non-FCO staff. We also noted the growing proportion of embassy budgets in the region that are Official Development Assistance (ODA).⁹⁴ This means that the FCO is restricted in how it can spend this money.⁹⁵ In Colombia, a plethora of different government funds are administered by embassy staff from different government departments, covering policy areas as diverse as tackling climate change, increasing scientific co-operation and supporting the peace process.⁹⁶ In oral evidence, the FCO discussed how the growth of policy areas other than the peace process, namely the Prosperity Fund, reflects the changing domestic climate in Colombia.⁹⁷ The growth of these funds has changed the nature of the Embassy's work to place a much greater emphasis upon programming.⁹⁸

52. We note the hard work of HMG staff throughout the region and saw first-hand the positive impact of their efforts during our visit to Argentina and Colombia. We are concerned that budgets may be being allocated to Posts primarily on the basis of their eligibility for Official Development Assistance (ODA), and that this is skewing

92 ["5 Things You Can Do To Help the Amazon Rainforest"](#). World Wildlife Fund, accessed 28 August 2019

93 Falkland Islands Government ([SAM0029](#))

94 In 2010, 6% of the FCO's total spend was ODA-eligible, whereas in 2019, 50% of the FCO's total spend is expected to be ODA-eligible (Oral evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee on Monday 8 July 2019, "The effectiveness of Official Development Assistance expenditure", HC2048, [Q42](#) [Sir Simon McDonald])

95 ODA-eligible spending must have the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries (as defined on the OECD DAC list of eligible countries) as its main objective.

96 Funds administered include the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, Prosperity Fund, International Climate Fund, Newton Fund, Global Challenges Research Fund, Human Rights Fund, Chevening scholarships

97 [Q256](#)

98 During our visit to Colombia we visited a Prosperity Fund project to improve sanitation in Valledupar. While in Argentina, we visited an International Programme Fund project to improve the provision of scientific advice in the Argentine Congress (a joint project with the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology). See Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology ([SAM0030](#)) for further details.

continent-wide policy priorities and local expenditure. We are concerned that in large Posts, such as Bogota, the UK is simultaneously pursuing multiple and diverse objectives, risking spreading itself too thinly. *We recommend that Posts across the region are more selective and strategic when identifying priority policy areas that reflect local need and UK national interest.*

Conclusions and recommendations

Regional politics and security

1. Although democracy remains resilient in almost every country across the continent, we are concerned that corruption remains a significant threat to effective governance across South America. (Paragraph 4)
2. Countries neighbouring Venezuela, such as Colombia, have taken in large numbers of migrants and refugees fleeing the crisis, placing a strain upon local services. *The UK Government should continue financial support to Colombia, through mechanisms such as the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Fund, to ensure essential support to migrants and refugees fleeing Venezuela. The FCO should continue to support regional-led efforts to find a solution to the crisis in Venezuela through the Lima Group, which represents the best opportunity to bring about a successful resolution.* (Paragraph 10)
3. Instability in Venezuela is driving the growth in serious organised crime emanating from the continent, ultimately increasing the flow of illegal narcotics to the UK. *The Government should seek to use its diplomatic and programming presence, under the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund where applicable, to understand and anticipate the rapidly evolving challenges posed by serious organised crime groups in the region, including in Venezuela. It should also alert us, in confidence if necessary, to any future changes in levels of resourcing dedicated to countering serious organised crime across the continent.* (Paragraph 11)
4. The UK Government is to be commended for its long-term efforts in pursuit of peace in Colombia, first, in diplomatic terms as penholder on Colombia at the UN Security Council, where it has galvanised international support and led the international response, and in its actions on the ground through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. *The UK should maximise its good work as penholder at the UN Security Council on Colombia by pursuing other opportunities to reinforce peace at the international level with like-minded partners, including the EU. In the face of faltering Colombian domestic support, the UK should continue to provide explicit support for the institutions of the peace process, namely the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.* (Paragraph 16)
5. *The Government should monitor the presence of Chinese and Russian activities throughout the continent, assessing whether their increasing influence will translate into security concerns. It should provide a report to the National Security Council on this matter and provide us with an initial assessment at the end of the year (in confidence if necessary) and provide further reports thereafter.* (Paragraph 19)

Developing UK trade and investment

6. South America is a source of relatively untapped potential for UK businesses, accounting for only 1% of the UK's global imports and exports. Yet it offers a wealth of opportunities for trade and investment in the future. (Paragraph 29)

7. Although the work of the Trade Commissioner has helped to foster increased familiarity between UK business and the continent, there is still much work to be done in transforming the perception of the continent amongst UK businesses. *Given the wide geographical scope of the Trade Commissioner's portfolio, which covers the entirety of the Latin America and Caribbean region, together with the increasing trade and investment workload, the Government should keep resourcing to her team under active review. We also recommend that the FCO and DIT should increase the technical knowledge of both Whitehall-based and in-country staff in complex areas such as local tax law.* (Paragraph 30)
8. *The UK should draw upon its background of legal tradition and respect for human rights in its pursuit of regional trade opportunities in future, to include a willingness to trigger human rights stipulations in rolled-over trade agreements in the appropriate circumstances. All UK companies operating in the region should apply best practice in human rights by applying the Voluntary Principles, and the FCO should continue to take an active role in providing appropriate guidance and monitoring compliance.* (Paragraph 31)

Human rights

9. We are concerned by ongoing violence against human rights defenders across the continent. Breaking the cycle of violence can only happen with the active involvement and political will of Governments across South America. This problem is especially acute in the sub-national regions, where a lack of state presence and the provision of key state services goes hand in hand with threats to the security of communities and their leaders living in remote areas. Improving state presence, therefore, is crucial, if challenging, as is ensuring that paramilitary-type structures are dismantled. (Paragraph 39)
10. *The FCO should focus its human rights work in South America upon protection of human rights defenders in the regions including the implementation of the recently launched 'UK Support to Human Rights Defenders'. In Colombia, the British Embassy should extend its positive work with HRDs to provide further support to social leaders in remote areas, including indigenous and female leaders. HRD programmes should include a specific priority relating to indigenous and female leaders in addition to the existing criteria, reflecting the particular challenges and dangers faced by these individuals. More generally, the British Embassy should continue to support projects and programmes which combat impunity for attacks against HRDs, including trial monitoring, as well as those which focus on the dismantling of paramilitary-type structures.* (Paragraph 40)

FCO resourcing and regional priorities

11. In a world of competing priorities it is understandable that South America would not form the FCO's top regional priority. However, there are considerable opportunities for UK influence in South America, such as through trade, which are not currently being maximised. Furthermore, there are also indirect security threats emanating from the continent, such as the growth of the narcotics trade, which require mitigation. (Paragraph 45)

12. We are also concerned that ministerial oversight for the region falls within the large portfolio of the Minister for Europe and the Americas. By including South America in such a large portfolio, the continent struggles to receive the attention it deserves at ministerial level. *We recommend that the FCO should review current ministerial portfolios to ensure that roles are not overloaded.* (Paragraph 46)
13. The fires in the Amazon underline the fragility of this biodiverse region. The protection of this region is crucial to the shared global environment. We welcome the UK Government's efforts at bilateral and multilateral level to work with South American partners to tackle the causes and effects of climate change, and especially deforestation. We support the FCO's continued efforts in this regard and encourage greater work with indigenous communities to protect this fragile environment. *This must be considered as a matter of urgency by the international community, including the UK Government.* (Paragraph 49)
14. We note the hard work of HMG staff throughout the region and saw first-hand the positive impact of their efforts during our visit to Argentina and Colombia. We are concerned that budgets may be being allocated to Posts primarily on the basis of their eligibility for Official Development Assistance (ODA), and that this is skewing continent-wide policy priorities and local expenditure. We are concerned that in large Posts, such as Bogota, the UK is simultaneously pursuing multiple and diverse objectives, risking spreading itself too thinly. *We recommend that Posts across the region are more selective and strategic when identifying priority policy areas that reflect local need and UK national interest.* (Paragraph 52)

Formal minutes

Wednesday 4 September 2019

Members present:

Tom Tugendhat, in the Chair

Bob Seely

Catherine West

Royston Smith

Draft Report (*Global Britain and South America*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 52 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Twentieth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 10 September at 1pm

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Tuesday 29 January 2019

John Dew, former UK Ambassador to Colombia, **Professor Julia Buxton**, Professor of Comparative Politics, Central European University [Q1–31](#)

Cristina Cortes, Chief Executive Officer, Canning House, **Professor Anthony Pereira**, Director, King's Brazil Institute [Q32–49](#)

Tuesday 5 March 2019

Dr Julia Calvert, Lecturer in Political Economy, University of Edinburgh, **Michael Reid**, The Economist, **Dr Peter Collecott CMG**, former UK Ambassador to Brazil [Q50–101](#)

Wednesday 3 April 2019

John Carroll, Head of International Trade, Santander UK, **Wilson Del Socorro**, Global Director of Government Affairs, Diageo, **Stephen Hill**, Partner, Eversheds Sutherland [Q102–141](#)

Tuesday 30 April 2019

Dr Marina Brilman, International Human Rights Policy Adviser, Law Society, **Dr Par Engstrom**, Senior Lecturer in Human Rights, Institute of the Americas, University College London, **Andrei Gomez-Suarez**, Co-founder, Rodeemos el Dialogo (Embrace Dialogue) [Q142–170](#)

Tuesday 2 July 2019

Jonathan Dunn, Head of International Policy and Planning, Anglo American Plc, **Cristina Bruce**, Head of International Relations, Anglo American Plc [Q171–236](#)

Tuesday 23 July 2019

Nigel Baker, Head of Latin America Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, **Menna Rawlings**, Director General Global and Economic Issues, Foreign and Commonwealth Office [Q237–264](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

SAM numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 ABColombia ([SAM0007](#))
- 2 Amnesty International UK ([SAM0017](#))
- 3 Amnesty International UK ([SAM0027](#))
- 4 Anglo American ([SAM0024](#))
- 5 Anglo American ([SAM0028](#))
- 6 ARNOLD, Jacques ([SAM0002](#))
- 7 British Council ([SAM0015](#))
- 8 Canning House ([SAM0014](#))
- 9 Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) ([SAM0004](#))
- 10 City of London Corporation ([SAM0011](#))
- 11 Colombian Caravana ([SAM0010](#))
- 12 Earlham Institute ([SAM0005](#))
- 13 Embassy of Colombia, United Kingdom ([SAM0019](#))
- 14 Embrace Dialogue ([SAM0026](#))
- 15 Falkland Islands Government ([SAM0029](#))
- 16 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([SAM0018](#))
- 17 The Law Society ([SAM0006](#))
- 18 London Mining Network ([SAM0009](#))
- 19 Mendes, Matheus ([SAM0012](#))
- 20 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) ([SAM0030](#))
- 21 Peace Brigades International ([SAM0025](#))
- 22 Peru Support Group ([SAM0001](#))
- 23 Protection Approaches ([SAM0023](#))
- 24 Santander UK ([SAM0020](#))
- 25 Santander UK ([SAM0022](#))
- 26 WWF ([SAM0013](#))
- 27 WWF ([SAM0021](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website. The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2017–19

First Report	Violence in Rakhine State and the UK's response	HC 435
Second Report	The future of UK diplomacy in Europe	HC 514
Third Report	Kurdish aspirations and the interests of the UK	HC 518
Fourth Report	2017 elections to the International Court of Justice	HC 860
Fifth Report	The UK's response to hurricanes in its Overseas Territories	HC 722
Sixth Report	Global Britain	HC 780
Seventh Report	Global Britain and the 2018 Commonwealth Summit	HC 831
Eighth Report	Moscow's Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK	HC 932
Ninth Report	The FCO's preparations for the 2018 World Cup	HC 1011
Tenth Report	Global Britain and the Western Balkans	HC 1013
Eleventh Report	UK arms exports during 2016	HC 666
Twelfth Report	Global Britain: The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention	HC 1005
Thirteenth Report	Global Britain: Human rights and the rule of law	HC 874
Fourteenth Report	Global Britain: FCO Skills	HC 1254
Fifteenth Report	Global Britain and the British Overseas Territories: Resetting the relationship	HC 1464
Sixteenth Report	China and the Rules-Based International System	HC 612
Seventeenth Report	Fragmented and incoherent: the UK's sanctions policy	HC 1703
Eighteenth Report	Building Bridges: Reawakening UK-India ties	HC 1465

Nineteenth Report	Stemming the flow: An urgent look at tackling a culture of leaks	HC 2541
First Special Report	The United Kingdom's relations with Russia: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2016–17	HC 322
Second Special Report	The UK's relations with Turkey: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 333
Third Special Report	'Political Islam', and the Muslim Brotherhood Review: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 334
Fourth Special Report	Violence in Rakhine State and the UK's response: Government Response to the Committee's First Report	HC 868
Fifth Special Report	The future of UK diplomacy in Europe: Government response to the Committee's Second Report	HC 918
Sixth Special Report	Kurdish aspirations and the interests of the UK: Government response to the Committee's Third Report	HC 983
Seventh Special Report	2017 elections to the International Court of Justice: Government response to the Committee's Fourth Report	HC 1012
Eighth Special Report	Article 50 negotiations: Implications of "No Deal": Government response to the Committee's Ninth Report	HC 1053
Ninth Special Report	The UK's response to hurricanes in its Overseas Territories: Government response to the Committee's 5th Report	HC 1052
Tenth Special Report	Global Britain: Government response to the Committee's 6th Report	HC 1236
Eleventh Special Report	Global Britain and the 2018 Commonwealth Summit: Government response to the Committee's 7th Report	HC 1427
Twelfth Special Report	Moscow's Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK: Government response to the Committee's 8th Report	HC 1488
Thirteenth Special Report	The FCO's preparations for the 2018 World Cup in Russia: Government response to the Committee's 9th Report	HC 1507
Fourteenth Special Report	Global Britain and the Western Balkans: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report	HC 1572
Fifteenth Special Report	Global Britain: The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention: Government response to the Committee's Twelfth Report	HC 1719
Sixteenth Special Report	Global Britain: Human rights and the rule of law: Government response to the Committee's Thirteenth Report	HC 1759

Seventeenth Special Report	Global Britain and the Western Balkans: Supplementary Government response to the Committee's Tenth Report	HC 1760
Eighteenth Special Report	UK arms exports during 2016: Government Response to the Committees' First Joint Report	HC 1789
Nineteenth Special Report	Delivering Global Britain: FCO Skills: Government Response to the Committee's Fourteenth Report	HC 1937
Twentieth Special Report	Global Britain and the British Overseas Territories: Resetting the relationship: Government response to the Committee's Fifteenth Report	HC 2174
Twenty-First Special Report	China and the Rules-Based International System: Government Response to the Committee's Sixteenth Report	HC 2362
Twenty-Second Special Report	Building Bridges: Reawakening UK-India ties: Government Response to the Committee's Eighteenth Report	HC 1617