



House of Commons  
Foreign Affairs Committee

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# Stemming the flow: An urgent look at tackling a culture of leaks

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**Nineteenth Report of Session 2017–19**

*Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report*

*Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 22 July 2019*

## The Foreign Affairs Committee

The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated public bodies.

### Current membership

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[Chris Bryant MP](#) (*Labour, Rhondda*)

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### Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via [www.parliament.uk](http://www.parliament.uk).

### Publication

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### Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Samir Amar Setti (Clerk), Hannah Bryce (Clerk), Estelle Currie (Media Officer), Clare Genis (Senior Committee Assistant), Ashlee Godwin (Senior Committee Specialist), Tom Goldsmith (Clerk), Adrian Hitchins (Committee Specialist), James Hockaday (Committee Specialist), James Jennion (Committee Specialist), Emma Makey (Committee Specialist), Paul Simpkin (Senior Committee Assistant), Hannah Stone (Committee Specialist) and Nicholas Wade (Committee Specialist).

### Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6105; the Committee's email address is [fac@parliament.uk](mailto:fac@parliament.uk).

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## Summary

Confidentiality is of the essence of diplomacy. Diplomats have to be able to speak openly and freely without fear that their words will be relayed either in part or in whole to other interested parties. They must be able to give advice and provide an assessment of risks of any particular course of action without worrying that colleagues or those with malicious intent will leak that advice to others. They also need to know that they have the full and unambiguous backing of Her Majesty's Government, so they can give honest and unimpeachable advice.

Leaks are corrosive and undermine the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the civil service, and the Government more broadly. They damage the reputation of the British diplomatic service, place civil servants in untenable situations, and put our relationships with friends and allies under unnecessary strain. They are a betrayal of the trust the British people place in those charged with serving the nation. Those who leak are reckless and dangerous and the Government should never tolerate such actions. It would be wholly disingenuous to suggest that this is the altruistic work of a whistleblower. The culprit (or culprits) has done significant harm to British interests abroad and should feel the full force of the law.

Leaks must be dealt with consistently and robustly if a growing culture of leaks is to be stopped. It is essential that civil servants feel confident in the systems and processes in place so that they can provide the excellent analysis and assessments that are so essential to the effective functioning of Government. That we have lost one of our most senior diplomats as a result of this most recent leak is a matter of great regret, and one that might have been avoided. The Committee recommends strengthening the appointment process of ambassadors by introducing a pre-appointment hearing component that allows the Committee to share its views with the Government on candidates.

The Committee has identified a number of measures that the FCO should consider in order to minimise the risk of future leaks. The FCO should reassess its classification and distribution practices in light of this most recent leak to ensure they are fit for purpose. The roll out of the new secure communication system should be monitored regularly and assessed for its usability as well as its security functions. The sanctions available to deter would-be leakers need to be reconsidered to make sure that the consequences for those who leak are as serious as the consequences of the leak itself.

# 1 Introduction

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1. On 6 July 2019 the contents of confidential communications from the UK's Ambassador to the USA, Sir Kim Darroch, were published in the Mail on Sunday.<sup>1</sup> Further material was published in the same newspaper a week later. Thus far we have been assured that these events were as the result of a leak, rather than a hack, although many of the points we make apply equally to the deliberate hacking of British systems by a foreign state actor.<sup>2</sup> The documents included letters, memos and diplomatic telegrams (diptels), and provided the Ambassador's assessment of a range of policy issues, including US-UK relations, aspects of US foreign and domestic policy, and on the leadership and administration of President Trump. All were disclosed apparently illegally and against the interests of the British government. President Trump reacted negatively to the criticism and issued a series of tweets that criticised Prime Minister Theresa May and the Ambassador, stating with regards the latter that "We would no longer deal with him."<sup>3</sup> Shortly afterwards Sir Kim resigned from the role, explaining in his letter of resignation that "The current situation is making it impossible for me to carry out my role as I would like."<sup>4</sup>

**2. The unauthorised disclosure of material sent by Sir Kim Darroch makes one thing very clear: those who leak are reckless and dangerous. In this case they have caused the resignation of a dedicated and skilled public servant, undermined the influence of the United Kingdom around the world and, potentially, caused a damaging rift with our most important ally. That is why we undertook this urgent inquiry to attempt to counter what we fear is becoming a corrosive culture of leaking.**

3. This short report will consider: if the FCO's security and management of sensitive information is adequate; the extent and types of damage caused by leaks; and whether the response to previous leaks has been robust and consistent. Sir Kim's resignation and the events which led up to it raise wider issues which are important but beyond the scope of this urgent inquiry, such as the appropriate response by ministers and others in public life when one of the UK's ambassadors is subjected to such public criticism by the head of state of an apparently friendly ally. Further, it is too early to comment on the government's leak inquiry while, for understandable operational reasons, the details of that inquiry are not fully in the public domain. The Committee intends to follow up with a further report, however, after the conclusion of the leak inquiry. How that leak inquiry is handled is of utmost importance because as Lord Hague told us 'the biggest disincentive [to leaking] is a high likelihood of being found out'.<sup>5</sup> The Committee will be following the leak inquiry's progress closely.

4. The Committee took oral evidence from Sir Simon McDonald, Permanent Under Secretary and Head of the Diplomatic Service at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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1 [Leaked secret cables from UK Ambassador to the US](#), The Mail on Sunday, 6 July 2019

2 Whilst Sir Simon McDonald, Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) and Head of the Diplomatic Service at the FCO, confirmed when giving evidence that the possibility of a hack has not been excluded, Sir Alan Duncan MP, Minister of State at the FCO, told the House of Commons that "We do not at the moment have any evidence that this was a hack, so our focus is on finding someone within the system who has illicitly released these communications..."

HC Deb, 11 July 2019, [Col 456](#) [Commons Chamber]

3 Twitter, [@realdonaldtrump](#), 8 July 2019

4 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, [Press Release: Sir Kim Darroch, HM Ambassador to USA, to resign](#), 10 July 2019

5 [Q133](#)

(FCO), Edward Hobart, Director for Estates and Security at the FCO, Paul Williams, Chief Information Officer at the FCO, Sir Ivan Rogers, former UK Permanent Representative to the EU, Sir Adam Thomson, former UK Permanent Representative to NATO and Director of the European Leadership Network, Sir Peter Westmacott, former UK Ambassador to the USA, France and Turkey, and Lord Hague of Richmond, former Foreign Secretary. We would particularly like to thank these individuals for making time to give evidence at short notice.

## 2 A Culture of Leaks

5. Recent leaks have not been handled consistently by the Government and this has helped lead to an insidious culture of leaks being allowed to develop. In addition to serious and high-profile leaks of information, such as the April 2019 leak of discussions in the National Security Council regarding Huawei's involvement in the 5G network, the FCO has experienced leaks that whilst not of the same gravity were significant. In 2016 The Sunday Times reported a leaked telegram from Sir Kim Darroch which set out the Ambassador's initial assessment of President Trump's election victory.<sup>6</sup> The leaked material made clear that the Embassy had good contacts within the nascent administration. When asked how the FCO responded to that leak the PUS told the Committee in a follow-up email that,

In November 2016, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office carried out an IT security investigation, the results of which were inconclusive.<sup>7</sup>

This contrasts starkly with the current inquiry which is cross-Government, led by the Cabinet Office, and, which the PUS confirmed, involves the police.<sup>8</sup>

6. A failure properly to investigate all leaks sends the message that some may be tolerable, diminishing what little deterrence there is against future leaks. The Committee heard repeatedly from witnesses who gave oral evidence that the key factor in protecting against leaks, 'the decisive one', was the human factor.<sup>9</sup> Sir Peter Westmacott told the Committee that "the confidentiality and integrity of our secure communication systems are only as good as the integrity of the people who operate them."<sup>10</sup> In the Committee's view that integrity must be preserved when dealing with leaks by an unambiguous response that conveys clearly that any leak will not be tolerated.

7. That Sir Kim had to resign as a result of this most recent unauthorised disclosure of documents illustrates the impact that leaks can have on individuals and on the civil service as a whole. The ramifications of leaks on diplomats being able to do their job are particularly serious. Lord Hague of Richmond, a former Foreign Secretary, told us that,

On the information, you really need to know that the ambassador in that country is giving it to you straight. It would be very serious if the Foreign Office officials drafting diptels, and the ambassadors writing or amending them, worried about that and changed their behaviour because they thought they might regularly appear in the newspapers.<sup>11</sup>

8. Leaks erode the confidence of staff in their ability to communicate securely and could discourage them from providing the full and frank assessments that are so critical to the effective running of the FCO. Asked if he had had concerns about the security of his communications, Sir Peter Westmacott told the Committee,

I would say definitely yes, partly because of what has happened previously, and partly because, whether or not they have directly affected you, there

6 [Britain's plan to tame Trump](#), The Times, 13 November 2016

7 Provided by an FCO official in an email to Committee staff on 12 July 2019

8 [Q31](#)

9 [Q14](#)

10 [Q101](#)

11 [Q130](#)

have been unfortunate leaks. I think most of us—I am certainly speaking for myself—paid very careful attention to what we were saying and how we were sending it back.<sup>12</sup>

9. If officials do not have confidence in their ability to transmit sensitive information securely that impacts on their ability to do their jobs properly. This means the FCO cannot function as effectively as it should because the confidence of diplomats to report frankly and with candour has been damaged by the practice of leaking. As Lord Hague said in evidence,

If the people writing these reports from around the world thought that it could easily be compromised, it would change their behaviour and then it would reduce the value to the reader. If you are going to read that many reports from embassies and consulates around the world in a day, you really want crisp, clear, well-expressed, frank advice. A lot of it is about situations more dire than a dysfunctional White House ... You do not want these things to be hinted at; you want them to be clearly expressed.<sup>13</sup>

10. The Government's immediate response to a leak is of paramount importance. A formal inquiry is key to establishing the source of the leak and ensuring that appropriate sanctions follow. But it is also vital that short term measures are identified to reassure staff that they can communicate securely. The Committee found that, while the PUS had taken a strong leadership stance in addressing staff about the leaks and Sir Kim Darroch's resignation, there was little evidence of concrete measures that had been taken by the FCO to reassure staff that they could communicate securely. When the Committee asked the PUS what actions he was planning to take to reassure staff he responded that he would assure them that "we will pursue the culprits with all the means at our disposal" and "I will encourage them to continue to work in the necessary traditional way. We cannot serve our Secretaries of State if we start concealing key information, but I will encourage them to think even more carefully about how they transmit their most sensitive information."<sup>14</sup>

**11. Leaks are a canker in the civil service and if permitted at any level will corrode the heart of the institutions that deliver Government policy. Not all leaks have been treated equally in the recent past across Government and specifically in the FCO. It is difficult not to conclude that where leaked information appears to show the FCO in a favourable light, then the Department's determination to find the source of the leak has not been sufficiently robust. However, the FCO (and Government more widely) must not pick and choose with leaks: if it sends out a message that some leaks can be tolerated it helps create a culture where those who are tempted to leak are emboldened to do so. That culture has manifested itself most recently in the leak of sensitive communications from Sir Kim Darroch. The Committee condemns this leak and greatly regrets that it resulted in Sir Kim's resignation after such a long and distinguished diplomatic career. This decision highlights the direct impact that leaks can have on individuals who are simply doing their job, putting them at the centre of the political debate when their fundamental role is one based on objectivity and impartiality.**

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12 [Q92](#)

13 [Q130](#)

14 [Q26](#)

12. *The Committee urges the Government in general, and the FCO in particular, to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to leaks and to respond to all leaks robustly—whether from ministers, civil servants or others—and with an absolute determination to identify and punish the source. Failure to do so in the past has led to what appears to be a culture of leaks. This threatens to undermine the trust and confidence of those working in the diplomatic service, often in sensitive environments in hostile states, ministers, and the public, who see the institutions tasked with implementing policy being leveraged for political gains. The Government must show that they take all leaks seriously to prevent the impression forming that some leaks are acceptable, or even welcome.*

13. Civil servants must feel confident that they have the complete backing of those they serve when undertaking the often complex and sensitive tasks that allow Government to function effectively. This recent leak has resulted, according to Lord Hague, in ‘making an ambassador’s position untenable’.<sup>15</sup> Lord Hague further referred to the ‘dangerous precedent’ of the failure of a former Foreign Secretary appearing not to have backed the Ambassador:

Ian Murray: Can I rewind, Lord Hague, to an answer you gave before in relation to Sir Kim Darroch? I think you said that everyone should robustly stand behind whoever is targeted in these leak situations. Do you think that the fact that the former Foreign Secretary and favourite to be Prime Minister did not stand robustly behind Sir Kim Darroch affected the situation? Has the resignation itself set a dangerous precedent if people think that leaking from the Foreign Office can get rid of someone they do not particularly like?

Lord Hague: I certainly think it has set a dangerous precedent. Of course, there was also the resignation of Sir Ivan Rogers; I know you had him giving evidence to the Committee. It certainly sets a dangerous precedent. I think it was most unfortunate that not all former Foreign Secretaries could give robust and unequivocal support, but there is an opportunity to put that right. As I say, there will be, in some form, a new Cabinet next week. Again, I would suggest that that is a good moment to make it clear how the British Government will approach these things, and to inform the civil service how the British Government will approach these things. It is regrettable if there is any equivocation about this.<sup>16</sup>

The Committee believe that it is essential to reassure current and future ambassadors that they will have the complete support of the Government and of Parliament. As things stand, the US President has effectively removed a British ambassador from his post. As Sir Simon McDonald made abundantly clear, this is a completely exceptional instance.<sup>17</sup> Everything must be done to ensure it remains so.

14. *Given the importance of the appointment of the next UK Ambassador to the USA we request that the Government’s proposed successor be subject to a pre-appointment hearing with this Committee. Whilst the Government has not previously accepted the case for ambassadorial appointments to be subject to pre-appointment scrutiny we*

15 [Q121](#)

16 [Q131](#)

17 [Qq2-3](#)

*believe strongly that it would be beneficial, as a matter of practice, to have candidates for senior appointments give oral evidence to the Committee. Such a hearing would not offer the Committee a veto on any proposed appointment as the decision whether or not to appoint would remain solely that of the Government's. However, it would allow for a better-informed decision to be taken; and at a time when the civil service is being thrust into the centre of the political debate including an additional layer of scrutiny to the appointment process would provide extra protection against unfair and unfounded claims of political bias of civil servants that incidents such as leaks can generate.*

### 3 The Classification and Sharing of Information

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15. Sir Simon McDonald told us “Every communication these days is electronic, and every machine has a forward button.”<sup>18</sup> Although it is not possible to forward material outside of secure networks, his point that communications can readily be forwarded is a major concern in the secure management of sensitive information.

16. The number of people who receive a communication will depend on the type of communication and its level of classification. Whilst diptels may be received widely, ‘in many cases all round the world’,<sup>19</sup> the most sensitive letters have a distribution of as few as 5–10 people.<sup>20</sup> The ability of officials to be able to share information with a wide range of colleagues is what Sir Ivan Rogers described as ‘a massive strength’<sup>21</sup> of the British diplomatic system and one that adds value to work across government for those who have access to it. But such wide distribution lists are also a potential vulnerability: it only takes one person to leak. The benefits of shared knowledge therefore must be offset against the vulnerabilities to the system that wide distribution of sensitive communication introduces.

17. The Government’s Security Classifications policy, May 2018, sets out how the Government classifies information assets and how,

Everyone who works with government has a duty to respect the confidentiality and integrity of any HMG information and data that they access, and is personally accountable for safeguarding assets in line with this policy.<sup>22</sup>

18. This policy defines three levels of classification which indicate the sensitivity of information: official, secret and top secret. The higher the classification the greater the protective measures used to defend against accidental or deliberate compromise.<sup>23</sup> The current policy on classification was launched in 2014 and as a part of that process the classification of Confidential was removed.<sup>24</sup> Both Sir Adam Thomson and Sir Peter Westmacott referred to the gap the removal of Confidential created in the classification system. The Committee believes this gap, whether perceived or actual, may be indicative of a lapse in confidence in the classification system which suggests that the system is not working as effectively as it could, or indeed has in the past.

19. Sir Adam Thomson told us that the more robust secure systems (for documents classified higher than official) within the Foreign Office are ‘clunkier’<sup>25</sup> and Sir Peter Westmacott described it as a ‘bit of a clog dance to get access to it.’<sup>26</sup> If a secure system is impractical for the users then it may inadvertently have deterred users from utilising the

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18 [Q29](#)

19 [Q92](#)

20 [Q29](#)

21 [Q114](#)

22 The Cabinet Office, [Government Security Classifications](#), May 2018, p3

23 The Cabinet Office, [Government Security Classifications](#), May 2018, p4

24 The Cabinet Office, [Government Security Classifications: Core brief for 3rd party suppliers](#), October 2013, p4

25 [Q95](#)

26 [Q94](#)

system. Sir Simon McDonald confirmed that a new secure communication system Rosa had been rolled out already and that this system “is critically important to what happens next.”<sup>27</sup>

*20. The Government should review its classification and distribution policy and assess whether it is fit for purpose. As part of that review it should consider whether additional levels of classification would be useful to help further demarcate the level of sensitivity of communications, if more explicit guidance on distribution and onwards dissemination should be produced, and whether a ‘no forward’ function should be applied as standard to any sensitive communications going out and the ability to forward to be removeable on the new Rosa system. Instead if a recipient wanted to pass the email on they would have to go back to the originator to request that they forward it instead. Whilst the Committee acknowledges the importance and advantages of sharing information, the Government must make sure that the risks do not outweigh the benefits.*

*21. In the Government’s response to this report the Committee would like to know how the effectiveness of the new Rosa system will be assessed, what steps are being taken to make sure it is as user friendly as possible, who is the Senior Responsible Owner, how regularly will the system be reviewed and what contingency plans are in place if the system fails.*

## 4 Sanctions

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22. The leak of Sir Kim’s communications is an egregious act by the leaker and the Committee urges the Government to use all its resources to identify and apprehend the leaker and apply the toughest of sanctions at its disposal. The Committee believes however that the sanctions available under the Official Secrets Act are not necessarily sufficient for penalising breaches of the gravity of this most recent leak. In any event, it is evident that those penalties did not act as a sufficient deterrent.

23. Section 10 of the Official Secrets Act 1989 sets out the penalties for breaching the provisions of the Act. Section 10 (1) states:

A person guilty of an offence under any provision of this Act other than section 8(1), (4) or (5) shall be liable—

- a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both;
- b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.<sup>28</sup>

24. *The PUS told us in oral evidence that “Generally, when we have suffered a leak, it has been because a person has consciously done something wrong.”<sup>29</sup> The Government must consider alternative ways of sanctioning those who seek to harm through the unauthorised disclosure of information and who betray the trust of the public in so doing. The penalties of the most serious breaches must be severe enough to deter others from taking such reckless decisions. Therefore, the Government should review whether the current sentencing framework as set out in Section 10 of the Official Secrets Act is sufficient.*

25. *In addition to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, the Government should consider the availability and utility of other sanctions against those found to have leaked. These sanctions could include loss of pension or other employment-related benefits, and retrieval of costs for damages caused by leaks and for the expense of investigating them. In its response the Government should set out whether in principle it would support such sanctions in the case of leaks of sensitive material.*

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28 Official Secrets Act 1989, [Section 10](#)

29 [Q24](#)

# Conclusions and recommendations

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## Introduction

1. The unauthorised disclosure of material sent by Sir Kim Darroch makes one thing very clear: those who leak are reckless and dangerous. In this case they have caused the resignation of a dedicated and skilled public servant, undermined the influence of the United Kingdom around the world and, potentially, caused a damaging rift with our most important ally. That is why we undertook this urgent inquiry to attempt to counter what we fear is becoming a corrosive culture of leaking. (Paragraph 2)

## A Culture of Leaks

2. Leaks are a canker in the civil service and if permitted at any level will corrode the heart of the institutions that deliver Government policy. Not all leaks have been treated equally in the recent past across Government and specifically in the FCO. It is difficult not to conclude that where leaked information appears to show the FCO in a favourable light, then the Department's determination to find the source of the leak has not been sufficiently robust. However, the FCO (and Government more widely) must not pick and choose with leaks: if it sends out a message that some leaks can be tolerated it helps create a culture where those who are tempted to leak are emboldened to do so. That culture has manifested itself most recently in the leak of sensitive communications from Sir Kim Darroch. The Committee condemns this leak and greatly regrets that it resulted in Sir Kim's resignation after such a long and distinguished diplomatic career. This decision highlights the direct impact that leaks can have on individuals who are simply doing their job, putting them at the centre of the political debate when their fundamental role is one based on objectivity and impartiality. (Paragraph 11)
3. *The Committee urges the Government in general, and the FCO in particular, to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to leaks and to respond to all leaks robustly—whether from ministers, civil servants or others—and with an absolute determination to identify and punish the source. Failure to do so in the past has led to what appears to be a culture of leaks. This threatens to undermine the trust and confidence of those working in the diplomatic service, often in sensitive environments in hostile states, ministers, and the public, who see the institutions tasked with implementing policy being leveraged for political gains. The Government must show that they take all leaks seriously to prevent the impression forming that some leaks are acceptable, or even welcome.* (Paragraph 12)
4. *Given the importance of the appointment of the next UK Ambassador to the USA we request that the Government's proposed successor be subject to a pre-appointment hearing with this Committee. Whilst the Government has not previously accepted the case for ambassadorial appointments to be subject to pre-appointment scrutiny we believe strongly that it would be beneficial, as a matter of practice, to have candidates for senior appointments give oral evidence to the Committee. Such a hearing would not offer the Committee a veto on any proposed appointment as the decision whether or not to appoint would remain solely that of the Government's. However, it would*

*allow for a better-informed decision to be taken; and at a time when the civil service is being thrust into the centre of the political debate including an additional layer of scrutiny to the appointment process would provide extra protection against unfair and unfounded claims of political bias of civil servants that incidents such as leaks can generate. (Paragraph 14)*

### The Classification and Sharing of Information

5. *The Government should review its classification and distribution policy and assess whether it is fit for purpose. As part of that review it should consider whether additional levels of classification would be useful to help further demarcate the level of sensitivity of communications, if more explicit guidance on distribution and onwards dissemination should be produced, and whether a 'no forward' function should be applied as standard to any sensitive communications going out and the ability to forward to be removeable on the new Rosa system. Instead if a recipient wanted to pass the email on they would have to go back to the originator to request that they forward it instead. Whilst the Committee acknowledges the importance and advantages of sharing information, the Government must make sure that the risks do not outweigh the benefits. (Paragraph 20)*
6. *In the Government's response to this report the Committee would like to know how the effectiveness of the new Rosa system will be assessed, what steps are being taken to make sure it is as user friendly as possible, who is the Senior Responsible Owner, how regularly will the system be reviewed and what contingency plans are in place if the system fails. (Paragraph 21)*

### Sanctions

7. *The PUS told us in oral evidence that "Generally, when we have suffered a leak, it has been because a person has consciously done something wrong." The Government must consider alternative ways of sanctioning those who seek to harm through the unauthorised disclosure of information and who betray the trust of the public in so doing. The penalties of the most serious breaches must be severe enough to deter others from taking such reckless decisions. Therefore, the Government should review whether the current sentencing framework as set out in Section 10 of the Official Secrets Act is sufficient. (Paragraph 24)*
8. *In addition to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, the Government should consider the availability and utility of other sanctions against those found to have leaked. These sanctions could include loss of pension or other employment-related benefits, and retrieval of costs for damages caused by leaks and for the expense of investigating them. In its response the Government should set out whether in principle it would support such sanctions in the case of leaks of sensitive material. (Paragraph 25)*

# Formal minutes

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**Monday 22 July 2019**

Members present:

Tom Tugendhat, in the Chair

Chris Bryant                  Priti Patel  
Stephen Gethins

Draft Report (*Stemming the flow: An urgent look at tackling a culture of leaks*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 25 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

*Resolved*, That the Report be the Nineteenth Report of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

*Ordered*, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 23 July at 2.15pm]

## Witnesses

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The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

### Wednesday 10 July 2019

**Sir Simon McDonald**, KCMG, KCVO, Permanent Under Secretary and Head of the Diplomatic Service, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, **Edward Hobart**, Director Estates and Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, **Paul Williams**, Chief Information Officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

[Q1–82](#)

### Tuesday 16 July 2019

**Sir Ivan Rogers**, KCMG, former UK Permanent Representative to the EU, **Sir Adam Thomson**, KCMG, former UK Permanent Representative to NATO and Director of the European Leadership Network, **Sir Peter Westmacott**, GCMG, LVO, former UK Ambassador to the US, France and Turkey

[Q83–115](#)

### Thursday 18 July 2019

**Lord Hague of Richmond**, former Foreign Secretary

[Q116–145](#)

## List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

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All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website. The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

### Session 2017–19

First Report	Violence in Rakhine State and the UK's response	HC 435
Second Report	The future of UK diplomacy in Europe	HC 514
Third Report	Kurdish aspirations and the interests of the UK	HC 518
Fourth Report	2017 elections to the International Court of Justice	HC 860
Fifth Report	The UK's response to hurricanes in its Overseas Territories	HC 722
Sixth Report	Global Britain	HC 780
Seventh Report	Global Britain and the 2018 Commonwealth Summit	HC 831
Eighth Report	Moscow's Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK	HC 932
Ninth Report	The FCO's preparations for the 2018 World Cup	HC 1011
Tenth Report	Global Britain and the Western Balkans	HC 1013
Eleventh Report	UK arms exports during 2016	HC 666
Twelfth Report	Global Britain: The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention	HC 1005
Thirteenth Report	Global Britain: Human rights and the rule of law	HC 874
Fourteenth Report	Global Britain: FCO Skills	HC 1254
Fifteenth Report	Global Britain and the British Overseas Territories: Resetting the relationship	HC 1464
Sixteenth Report	China and the Rules-Based International System	HC 612
Seventeenth Report	Fragmented and incoherent: the UK's sanctions policy	HC 1703
Eighteenth Report	Building Bridges: Reawakening UK-India ties	HC 1465

First Special Report	The United Kingdom's relations with Russia: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2016–17	HC 322
Second Special Report	The UK's relations with Turkey: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 333
Third Special Report	'Political Islam', and the Muslim Brotherhood Review: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2016–17	HC 334
Fourth Special Report	Violence in Rakhine State and the UK's response: Government Response to the Committee's First Report	HC 868
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