218.A great deal of the evidence we received was critical of the current structure of policing in England and Wales, including the role of the Home Office and the 43-force model, questioning its suitability to meeting the challenges currently facing forces. Many witnesses have also criticised the allocation of responsibilities at a national, regional and local level. This Chapter summarises the evidence and draws conclusions on some of these overarching issues.
219.Several witnesses highlighted the fact that the Home Office’s role in setting policing policy and priorities has been significantly diminished in recent years, and the Department stated in written evidence that it “does not run policing but is supporting the sector to become self-reforming”.318 Crest Advisory, a consultancy specialising in the criminal justice system, said that in the past, the “challenge of adapting policing priorities to changing demand” would have been “picked up” by the Home Office. In the early years of the last Labour Government, this was done via the use of “top-down targets”, and later via a single target for public confidence and a set of ‘national entitlements’, outlining what the public could expect from the police.319 Crest said that PCCs now have the freedom to determine both “what the police prioritise and how they should focus their time/resources”, and that the only central direction from the Home Office is via the Strategic Policing Requirement, which sets out forces’ responsibilities in relation to national threats such as terrorism, serious and organised crime, cyber security, public order, civil emergencies and child sexual abuse.320
220.Chief Constable Thornton told us that “the recent focus has been on the local”, adding that “accountability is local” and “most budgets are local”, but she observed that this “does beg the question about what is the role of the centre and how do the various pieces at the centre”—including the Home Office, NPCC and NCA—work together.321 Similarly, Commissioner Dick said that the police service’s relationship with the Home Office “sometimes feels as if there is not much central push; it is, ‘Get on with it and good luck’”; and yet, “at the same time it has sometimes felt a bit parent-child”. She said that the Department could have a strong role in reviewing how to improve the volume of candidates for chief officer roles.322
221.The NAO’s recent report on the financial sustainability of forces stated that the Home Office has “devolved responsibility for police service transformation to a board which has limited resources and no powers”: the Police Reform and Transformation Board (PRTB), which is a voluntary association of its members (including the NPCC, APCC and Home Office). It argued that the PRTB’s “role as a national coordinator of the transformation of police services is limited as it has no budget, formal powers or levers to make transformational change happen across all forces”.323
222.When asked what her primary request would be of the Home Secretary, Chief Constable Thornton told us that it would be to “develop the role of the Home Office in providing that framework and architecture for law enforcement, security and policing”.324 Lynne Owens praised the model for counter-terrorism—which she described as “centralised and devolved at the same time”—and said that “there is a big role for the Home Office” in trying to negotiate new delivery models for other areas of policing.325
223.When asked about the role of the Home Office, including its ability to instruct forces to sign up to national programmes, the Policing Minister responded:
That has not been our model, but we are moving into a different phase now where the Home Office is considering our role in relation to the system. As many in the police system, my view is that the Home Office needs to take a stronger view on a number of things.
He concluded his evidence by stating: “On my watch the Home Office is stepping forward because the environment that we are policing together is a highly complex one”. He also conceded that “We are part of the police ecosystem that has not worked together as effectively as it should have in the past”.326
224.As the lead department for policing, the Home Office must step up to the plate and play a much stronger role in policing policy. Many of the challenges outlined in this report could benefit enormously from national leadership. Throughout our report, we have identified coordination problems between forces—particularly over new technology. We have also identified weaknesses in assessing and investing in the response to new and changing patterns of crime, weaknesses in engaging other organisations in the fight against crime or in public protection, and a lack of strategic direction. In all of those areas, it should be the Home Office that takes responsibility. When it comes to influencing or partnering with global internet companies, the NHS or the education system, individual forces cannot match the power and influence of a central government department. We urge the Home Office to play a much stronger role in driving reform in key areas, such as data-sharing between public services, the negotiation of national technology contracts, and the regulation of internet companies. Sitting back and leaving it to individual police forces is irresponsible. We welcome the Policing Minister’s recognition that “the Home Office needs to take a stronger view on a number of things”, which appears to signify a major shift in departmental policy.
225.Many witnesses criticised the 43-force structure, showing significant appetite for national reform. The PSAEW’s submission to this inquiry voiced support for localism as “the bedrock of policing”, with its members as “identifiable police commanders, known by and accountable to their communities for the delivery of local policing services”. But it argued that “current force structures” are “a major obstacle to the achievement of reform and greater efficiencies and effectiveness”, and called for a “complete review of the structure of policing”.327 While accepting that local variation in services will need to exist, to reflect the priorities and needs of local communities, the PSAEW called for national coordination and oversight of how the service as a whole responds to emerging challenges and changing demands. It advocated for a “service-wide strategic vision” to identify risks, opportunities and threats for policing up to 2040, to provide “a much-needed long-term strategic context for both policy makers and the service’s leadership”.328
226.The Police Federation also challenged the current structure of policing, criticising the “43 fiefdoms, with different ways of working and different systems and multiple procurement processes”. Its submission called for a “Royal Commission on Policing” to look at “the entire structure, function, roles and funding of the police service”, to allow for “radical, long-term, strategic thinking”, rather than “knee-jerk responses and tinkering based on political whim”.329 Chief Constable Thornton told us in June that the 43-force model is a “strength and a weakness”, with problems apparent in the response to national and transnational crime, and in the implementation of new technology or new ways of working. She said that resistance to national structures and mergers was political, rather than operational.330
227.Commissioner Dick described the current force structure as “quite a curious configuration” which “puts a lot of barriers in the way of change and development”.331 Chief Constable Thornton and Lynne Owens both spoke of the challenges of driving collaboration between forces, which sometimes take place at a “glacial” pace: Ms Owens said that if every new policing capability “has to be negotiated in slow time over months through 86 [PCCs and chief constables], I am concerned that we are going to get left behind”.332
228.Ms Owens also drew contrasts between the structures applied to counter-terrorism and those involved in the response to serious organised crime, where the funding and governance structure is more localised.333 Counter-terrorism policing is coordinated at a national level by the National Counter-Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTPHQ). The NCTPHQ devises policy and strategy, advises the Government on how counter-terrorism budgets should be allocated to police forces in England and Wales, and provides corporate and support services to a network of counter-terrorism units (CTUs) and counter-terrorism intelligence units, which gather local intelligence. Five CTUs make up the National Counter-Terrorism Network, and together are accountable to the NPCC’s Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee.334
229.Commissioner Dick and Chief Constable Thornton both told us that counter-terrorism policing is the area in which they feel most confident about the police service’s ability to respond to new challenges, with CC Thornton adding: “The way in which we have developed the structures for terrorism, the way we have developed capability over the last 13 years, working very closely with the security agencies, is something that we are proud of”.335 Ms Owens said that the Commissioner has “impressively led” a “very good whole-system response to counter-terrorism”.336
230.The possibility of force amalgamation or mergers, or even the creation of two national police forces for England and Wales, has been the subject of heated debate for decades. In 2004, the PSAEW called for the creation of a single national police force, and in 2005, HMIC proposed the merger of smaller forces, arguing that the 43-force structure was “no longer fit for purpose”.337 Subsequent efforts to implement change, with the aim of establishing 17 forces across 10 regions in England and Wales, were beset by difficulties. By February 2006, only Cumbria and Lancashire had reached a clear agreement to merge.338 In July 2006, the plans were abandoned altogether, with the then Prime Minister Tony Blair stating that it would not be “sensible” to force them on police forces.339
231.Since then, efforts have been focused on sharing specialist capabilities across forces, with regional organised crime units (ROCUs) established to enable forces to pool capabilities in areas such as undercover policing, specialist surveillance and cybercrime. An HMIC review of ROCUs in 2015 concluded that they provided a “strong foundation” for tackling serious and organised crime, but that they had evolved in a “piecemeal way” and had developed inconsistently. They ranged from “highly ambitious and effective cross-force collaborative units to smaller and less effective units”, which could “compromise effectiveness or duplicate capabilities unnecessarily”.340
232.Lynne Owens told us that serious organised crime needs a “whole-system response”, and that “the current structure of funding and governance does not meet a need that is not bounded just in a single geography”. The Security Minister confirmed recently that the number of county lines operations has doubled to 1,500 in the last year, and told the House of Commons that “The problems are getting worse” in this area of criminal activity.341 Ms Owens criticised short-term investments in different coordination centres, including for CSA, human trafficking and modern slavery, and said she would prefer “one system, investment in a national assessment centre within the National Crime Agency”, with a “system joined-up approach to data”.342 She also called for a review of capabilities at a national, local and regional level, outlining the challenges facing the NCA and other national bodies:
There [ … ] needs to be a conversation about what capabilities we need at regional level and what capabilities should sit at national level. If all the money just gets passported locally to individual Chief Constables and individual Police and Crime Commissioners, then there is a hell of a job for Cress and Sara and I to negotiate with a minimum of 86, more if you add in other partners. My fear about that issue always goes to the lowest common denominator and that will not deal with the threats that we are currently facing.343
233.The Police Foundation argued that collective decision-making is hindered by current structures and processes, because “consensus is generally required in order for a decision to be taken forward nationally”, and chief constables have the right to derogate from decisions taken nationally. It recommended “a shift to a more democratic system”, in which “every PCC and Chief would get one vote”. A majority of two-thirds of both PCCs and chief constables, or “another agreed threshold”, could then “enable a decision to be taken forward and be binding on all members”. Without such mechanisms for making decisions together, it argued, “it will be impossible to achieve the Government’s ambition of a ‘self-improving police service”.344
234.The Policing Minister appeared to have sympathy for the views outlined in this Chapter. He told us that there are “advantages in the 43-force model for local accountability, closeness to the public, accountability to the public”, and “In theory it is a system where people can try different things”. But he conceded that the “fundamental challenge in the police system” is “how you develop more consistent standards and public experience across this fragmented system”. He added:
The challenge for us—and I put the Home Office firmly on the pitch on this—is how we work together more effectively as one system in a place that increasingly does not recognise boundaries [ … ]. [ … ] there is a frustration in the system about how difficult it is to drive change through the system at pace, how difficult it is sometimes to align capabilities, the degree to which police and crime commissioners, who have strong local accountability to their electors, are conditioned to respond to national threats. [ … ] Ironically, when you read the history of police reform in this country [ … ] One of the questions they have asked themselves over the centuries is: why do we have so many police forces?345
235.When questioned about problems being experienced in Scotland, where a national force was established in 2013, the Minister clarified that “the official policy of the Home Office is not to be pushing for a major top-down reorganisation of the 43-force model”. But he said that there is “a recognition that we—and the Home Office has to play its part in this—have to do a lot more to make this system work smarter as one system in the face of the threats that we see”.346
236.The current allocation of responsibilities in policing at a national, regional and local level is broken, and in dire need of review. Policing structures remain largely unchanged since the 1960s, and whilst the creation of PCCs has enabled leadership and new partnerships within many force areas, collaboration between forces is still a problem in those areas where regional or national action is required. Local identity is a significant strength in UK policing, but our evidence on neighbourhood policing indicates that relationships with officers at a neighbourhood and community level are more important than the 43-force structure. As the Policing Minister acknowledged, the current structure is a significant barrier to the service’s ability to tackle national and transnational threats, which require an advanced level of specialist capability.
237.We recognise that previous force mergers have been beset by difficulties, and that the Government is unlikely to reduce the number of forces. We believe that a more strategic, evidence-based approach is required. Before the end of November, the Home Office should launch a transparent, root-and-branch review of policing, publishing proposals by the end of February, which should focus on the allocation of responsibilities and capabilities at a local, regional and national level. Based on what we have seen, we propose that local policing should be given the space to focus on community relations and local crime and disorder, including inter-agency working to reduce harm and address repeat offending. The driving force for restructures, such as mergers of whole forces, back offices, or between police and fire and rescue services, should be service improvement, rather than the hope of savings. At a national and regional level, forces need to pool resources and capabilities to a far greater extent, particularly for online crimes such as fraud, but also in complex areas where crimes often cross force borders, such as organised crime, county lines and modern slavery. The structure for counter-terrorism policing, which is frequently singled out for praise, could serve as a model for other areas of policing.
238.An ambitious reform programme of this kind will be impossible without stronger national leadership, and a more dynamic and transparent approach to policing policy-making. It is vital that the operational independence of chief officers is maintained, and that PCCs are able to act on local priorities and local problems. But the current state of police ICT and communications systems is a striking example of the problems generated by this fractured system of policy-making and governance.
239.The Government should create a National Policing Council, chaired by the Home Secretary and comprising representatives of the APCC, NPCC, officer/staff associations, College of Policing and HMICFRS. Proposals for reform could be put to a National Police Assembly comprising all PCCs and chief constables in England and Wales. The Home Office should consider key policy areas where decisions of the Council and Assembly could then be binding on all forces.
240.This report has set out the many complex and changing demands on policing in the 21st century, in the context of a system of funding and governance that is ill-suited to dynamic reform. In the absence of strategic direction from the Home Office, operating under a fractured leadership structure, forces are plugging the gaps left by other public services in an attempt to protect the most vulnerable people from harm. In the meantime, ‘traditional’ crimes such as violence and theft are on the increase, and an overstretched justice system is bringing forward a decreasing number of charges. It is time for the Government to demonstrate clear ownership of policing policy and funding, and stop abdicating responsibility. The Home Secretary must make it clearer to the police service what areas he expects it to prioritise, where to focus its limited resources, and what he will do to drive much-needed reform at a national level.
323 National Audit Office, Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales 2018 (HC 1501), 11 September 2018
334 NPCC website, Counter Terrorism Policing, accessed 8 October 2018
337 HMIC, Closing the Gap, 13 September 2005
338 BBC News, Setback for police merger plans, 24 February 2006
339 BBC News, Police mergers ‘still on agenda’, 12 July 2006
340 HMIC, Regional Organised Crime Units should build on their strong foundations, 1 December 2015
341 House of Commons Hansard, Drug Trafficking: County Lines (Adjournment Debate), Vol 647, Columns 759–760
Published: 25 October 2018