Policing for the future Contents

Conclusions and recommendations

Introduction

1.Our extensive inquiry has enabled us to examine a range of issues in detail, painting an overall picture of a police service which still has great strengths, values and expertise, but which is struggling to deal with the fast-changing demands of the 21st century, using systems and structures that have barely changed since the 1960s. We will show that the current structure and funding model for policing in England and Wales is not fit for purpose, and that the Home Office needs to demonstrate far more leadership on crime and policing—particularly in areas where crimes are changing, and where national reform is required. (Paragraph 5)

2.Since we launched this inquiry, six police officers have lost their lives in the line of duty, including PC Keith Palmer GM, who died while defending the Palace of Westminster from a terrorist attack. On a daily basis, officers are faced with some of the most exacting and upsetting scenarios imaginable, and deal with them with dignity, dedication and commitment to public service. Many people spend the worst hours of their life in the reassuring presence of a police officer: the aftermath of a violent attack, an unexpected bereavement, a mental health crisis, or the anxious wait for a loved one who has gone missing. Policing is a service which, above all, depends on the people who work within it, and if they are not supported then the service will badly decline. (Paragraph 8)

3.We wish to put on record our immense gratitude to police officers, PCSOs, special constables and police staff across the UK for their service. We recognise the immense challenges inherent to any policing role, and the impact of this career on their health, wellbeing and family life. Recent figures on police officer morale and welfare paint a picture of a service under severe strain, which causes us serious concern. The Home Office must do more to protect and promote the welfare of the police workforce, who safeguard all our welfare on a daily basis. (Paragraph 9)

Changing trends in crime and policing

4.Many ‘volume’ crimes, including robbery, theft from the person, and vehicle-related theft, are now increasing at an alarmingly steep rate, after a long period of decline. While recorded crimes have risen by 32% in the last three years, the number of charges or summons has decreased by 26% and the number of arrests is also down. The wider Crime Survey also found recent steep increases in robbery and theft. If these trends continue, the service risks both a serious decrease in public safety and in confidence in the police and the CPS. (Paragraph 16)

5.Policing is facing both new challenges and rising demand from traditional crimes, yet resources in recent years have been strained, and forces are under considerable stress merely to keep up with existing pressures. Without a change of course, the current trends—fewer officers delivering a wider mission, under increasing demands—will continue, and policing will struggle to attract the talented individuals that it relies on in order to survive. (Paragraph 21)

Neighbourhood policing

6.Neighbourhood policing brings immense value to communities, particularly when officers or PCSOs are given the space and time to get to know local people and problems, develop tailored solutions, and build trust in policing. This is central to the British model of policing by consent. It is understandable that forces would be tempted to prioritise reactive, emergency work over proactive problem-solving within communities, but we regard this as a false economy. The relationships built by neighbourhood officers enable problems to be dealt with before they become emergencies, and encourage cooperation with the police at times of crisis. The decline in neighbourhood policing has therefore been a significant loss to communities. (Paragraph 30)

7.We welcome efforts to integrate policing with other public services, including through multi-agency teams based in the same location, which focus on individuals who come into repeat contact with authorities. We are concerned, however, that some forces may see this model as their sole ‘offering’ on neighbourhood policing. There can be no substitute for having officers and PCSOs who are embedded in their local communities. (Paragraph 31)

8.We are gravely concerned about the erosion of neighbourhood policing in a number of forces. The data we collected suggests that forces have lost at least a fifth of their neighbourhood policing capacity, on average. It is vital that neighbourhood officers and PCSOs are able to devote sufficient time to embedding themselves in their communities, and are not removed from this work to carry out reactive response or crime investigation work outside their dedicated area. It is clear, however, that some forces are struggling to respond to incoming urgent demands, and are using their neighbourhood officers to plug the gap. We welcome the College of Policing’s recent guidance on neighbourhood policing, but this is insufficient to prevent forces from deprioritising proactive neighbourhood work, when faced with competing demands and limited resources. (Paragraph 39)

9.Neighbourhood officers underpin the police service’s more specialist capabilities in crucial ways. In counter-terrorism policing, they allow intelligence to be gathered and shared at a local level, and create the trust that encourages people to share their concerns about radicalised individuals. As part of the police response to gangs and serious organised crime, neighbourhood officers get to know the young people locally who might be tempted to get involved with criminal activity, and can spot patterns of behaviour that other parts of the service might miss. Once lost, these relationships cannot be quickly rebuilt. Without the maintenance of a consistent and reliable police presence in communities, forces’ efforts to respond to the recent wave in volume and violent crime will be severely compromised. (Paragraph 40)

10.Whilst this report has not examined the causes of the recent increase in ‘traditional’ crimes such as robbery, theft and vehicle related crime, we note that it is happening after several years of decline in the level of neighbourhood policing and community prevention work. We urge police forces and the Home Office to ensure that neighbourhood policing is not cut back further, and that forces instead start to reinvest in community capacity-building. It is absolutely vital that this cornerstone of British policing is reaffirmed throughout the country, to ensure that trust and legitimacy is maintained. This is particularly important in communities in which distrust of the police—and in public authorities more widely—is rife, and in which those local links are all the more important. Nevertheless, in all neighbourhoods, without local engagement, policing is at risk of becoming irrelevant to most people, particularly in the context of low rates of investigation for many crimes. The Government should report back to us within one month of the Comprehensive Spending Review, to explain what actions it has taken to maintain core neighbourhood policing functions in all forces, and to prevent officers from being diverted to other policing requirements. (Paragraph 41)

Online fraud

11.Despite efforts to improve its response to victims of fraud, Action Fraud has irretrievably lost the confidence of the public, and reasonable expectations from victims are not being met. It is sensible to have a centralised reporting facility for fraud, but this must not simply become a way to divert and fob off victims of crime. Most importantly, it must be accompanied by a proper system to investigate crimes and respond to victims, or it will become irrelevant. (Paragraph 50)

The police response to fraud

12.The proportion of fraud cases being investigated is shockingly low, in the context of 1.7 million offences per year and substantial costs to the UK economy, as well as to individual victims. Our findings indicate that, although multiple cases may relate to a single charge, as little as 3% of cases reported to Action Fraud may result in charges or summons. Of the 1.7 million offences committed annually, it appears highly unlikely that more than one in 200 victims ever sees their perpetrator convicted. Given the paltry number of justice outcomes, it is no surprise that so few fraud victims report their experience to the police or Action Fraud. While we recognise that many offences are committed overseas, it is nevertheless clear to us that the Government has failed to get a grip on this problem, and that major changes are needed to the way in which fraud is reported, investigated and prevented. We commend the City of London Police for its leadership, but one under-resourced police force, facing the same budget pressures as every other force, does not have the capacity or the leverage to introduce the sort of drastic improvements needed at a national and regional level. (Paragraph 60)

13.There is a lack of transparency in the way that fraud statistics are published. At present, two sets of records are available: recorded crime figures and outcomes, with no way of linking the two. The Office for National Statistics and other agencies should take immediate steps to ensure that figures can be published on the proportion of online fraud offences resulting in justice outcomes, and the proportion for which no suspect is charged. (Paragraph 61)

14.The police response to fraud is in desperate need of a fundamental overhaul, and we welcome Government ministers’ recognition that the current system is not fit for purpose. There remains a clear requirement for a national reporting and analysis centre, but the current system of tasking and undertaking investigations needs to be overhauled, and standards of victim support are often extremely poor. The Government must show leadership in this area, working with the City of London Police, the NPCC, the National Economic Crime Centre within the NCA and other key stakeholders to implement a ‘hub and spoke’ structure for fraud investigation and victim support, with all investigations undertaken at a national or regional level. (Paragraph 66)

15.This must be accompanied by proper resources and enhanced capabilities: the level of regional resource in this area is not commensurate with the threat or the cost to the economy of this growing form of crime. We return to the wider issue of police funding in Chapter 6. However, given that much online fraud takes place on platforms provided by extremely profitable global tech giants, or exploits weaknesses in the security of private sector companies, it is reasonable to expect the private sector to contribute to the funding of policing and safety online. Likewise, banks, credit card companies and insurance companies have a lot to lose from the continued escalation of this form of crime, so they too have a considerable interest in contributing to the policing of online fraud. (Paragraph 67)

16.Not enough is being done to identify and support vulnerable victims of fraud. This is compounded by pressures on Trading Standards offices. With investigative resources and capabilities focused at a national and regional level, forces should be given the space to focus predominantly on victim support, based on intelligence from Action Fraud. When reporting a crime to Action Fraud, victims should be asked a series of questions to assess their levels of vulnerability and their need for follow-up support. This information should be disseminated to forces immediately, so that neighbourhood officers or PCSOs can respond accordingly, with timely and tailored support. (Paragraph 68)

The Joint Fraud Taskforce

17.The Joint Fraud Taskforce is a welcome initiative, but it has little to show for two and a half years of work and at the moment we are not sure what the point of it is, in practice. We agree with Which? that more transparency is needed, including a clear action plan and ownership of key tasks, regular reports on progress against that plan, and measurements of success in key areas, including public awareness campaigns. It is disappointing that the first annual report, promised for summer 2018, has not yet appeared. By the end of November, the Government should also publish the recent independent review of the Taskforce, which is referred to in the minutes of the June Management Board meeting, along with an action plan to address the weaknesses identified in that review. (Paragraph 71)

The role of industry

18.The private sector could do much more to reduce the demand on policing from online fraud. This problem can only be addressed effectively with a whole-system approach, including by regulatory reform, if necessary, to force companies to be ‘secure by design’. Key private sector companies—those whose customers create the most substantial workload for the police and NCA—should also employ analysts internally to facilitate evidence-gathering by law enforcement agencies. If industry partners will not do so voluntarily, the Government should consider imposing statutory requirements on companies to cooperate with law enforcement agencies. (Paragraph 76)

19.We agree with the Public Accounts Committee that data should be available on banks’ relative performance in preventing and responding to fraud, including online fraud. The key counter-argument—that this could expose vulnerabilities that could be exploited by criminals—could equally have applied to the publication of statistics on car thefts by manufacturer, which had a significant impact on the incidence of vehicle theft. Consumers have the right to choose their banking provider based on the full knowledge of the risks they may be taking with their finances. Greater transparency may provide the commercial impetus required to ensure that industry does more to tackle this problem at source, and reduce demand on an overstretched police service. (Paragraph 77)

Child sexual abuse

20.The growth of online indecent images of children (IIOC) is one of the most disturbing by-products of the digital age. Its impact on victims is devastating and long-lasting, so we were shocked by how little is known about IIOC offenders. We welcome the Government’s recent announcement of funding for collaboration with child protection organisations, to increase understanding of offender behaviour and prevent future offending. This must seek to identify the key characteristics of online CSA offenders, risk factors for viewing IIOC, the effectiveness of current child protection measures, including the Disclosure and Barring Service, and the likely success of preventative measures to educate young people at an early stage about the impact of this crime on its victims. (Paragraph 86)

21.Based on inspections by HMICFRS and evidence received by witnesses, it appears that many police forces are woefully under-resourced for the volume of online child sexual abuse investigations they now need to undertake. It is unacceptable that officers are forced to investigate CSA cases with no specialist training at all, and that forces have insufficient resources to manage the risks posed to children by registered sex offenders, constantly playing ‘catch-up’ with a backlog of visits. We welcome efforts by the College of Policing to prioritise this issue, but we call on the Home Secretary to take urgent action to ensure that all forces have sufficient specialist CSA investigators, properly trained to undertake this vital and urgent child protection work. This may require more resources and capabilities to be provided at a regional level, as we will explore in Chapter 9. (Paragraph 94)

The police response to online CSA

22.We share the Justice Committee’s concerns that police forces are not adequately equipped to handle the volume or type of digital evidence now generated, including in online child sexual abuse cases. Although reforms to the disclosure regime are clearly needed, this is undoubtedly having an impact on the speed of investigations, too, as identified by HMICFRS. It is also symptomatic of broader problems facing a police service which appears increasingly ill-equipped for the challenges of the digital age. Addressing this will require fundamental reforms to the structure, culture and workforce of policing, which we will return to in chapters 7–9 of this report. (Paragraph 97)

23.Child sexual abuse online is reaching epidemic levels, and there is absolutely no room for complacency. We received strong assurances that the police are pursuing offenders and are not stepping back from this activity, despite the vastly-increased volume of demand. But the NCA estimates that 80,000 people in the UK present some form of sexual threat to children online—yet our figures show that only 2,017 charges were brought in the year ending March 2018. The figures we received also suggest a very large gap between the number of recorded IIOC crimes and the number of arrests, with just one arrest for every ten recorded incidents, and a reduced number of charges in the last year. Whatever the causes of this attrition—lack of capacity, lack of technological capability, or lack of expertise at a force level, for example—we are extremely worried about the number of children who might be at risk of abuse from unidentified offenders in the same home, community or school, or online. (Paragraph 103)

24.We are concerned that the police response to online CSA is still nowhere near the scale needed, especially given the risk that online CSA may either be an indicator of current or future contact child abuse or a contributing factor towards an offender engaging in physical child abuse in future. It is particularly troubling that an increasing number of IIOC cases are being abandoned without charge due to ‘evidential difficulties’, or because no suspect can be identified after an offence is detected. The technological capabilities available to officers are not keeping up with those being exploited by offenders, and many cases are being abandoned because offenders cannot be traced to a precise location. (Paragraph 104)

25.We welcome the Home Secretary’s recent announcement of additional resources, and we urge the Government to continue treating this as a high priority area for investment, ensuring that the police service has access to advanced tools to track down offenders and bring them to justice. This extremely dangerous crime cannot be treated simply as ‘too difficult to solve’. The NCA must also be supported to ensure that it can build the capabilities required to tackle offenders on the dark web. By the end of November, the Home Office should provide us with a breakdown of how the additional funding for CSA policing will be allocated. (Paragraph 105)

Rehabilitation

26.We welcome the personal commitment of the Home Secretary to lead action in this area, and we commend the work of the National Crime Agency and the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s lead, Chief Constable Simon Bailey, in seeking to combat the destructive and growing threat of child sexual abuse. We have serious concerns, however, about the current scale of the policing response to this growing crime, in the context of a relatively small number of convictions, an even lower number of custodial sentences, and evidence that most offenders are undergoing no rehabilitation at all. (Paragraph 110)

27.Relative to the scale of the problem, only a tiny number of offenders are being charged or convicted for the possession of IIOC—there were just 385 convictions last year. The deterrent effect against potential offenders is therefore minimal. Many of those who may pose a threat to children online will continue to have direct contact with children. We are deeply concerned about the collective failure to protect those children, and a comprehensive strategy led by the Home Office is needed to address this. It must include engagement with other Government departments, as well as the police and criminal justice system, internet and tech companies, children’s services, schools and community organisations. It should also review the interaction between the police and the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) in responding to IIOC offences, to prevent dangerous contact with children. (Paragraph 111)

28.This evidence also calls for a major focus on prevention and child safety. All cases referred to police forces must lead to an investigation of whether or not the suspected offender is in contact with children, and whether action is needed to protect children through safeguarding work. Leaving children at risk because police forces don’t have the capacity or expertise they need, or because of failings in co-ordination and the lack of a wider strategy against online child abuse, would be unforgivable. Without urgent action, future generations will look back and be appalled at how slow the system was to respond to this new threat. (Paragraph 112)

29.It is vital that the police continue to pursue these offenders and bring them to justice, but there is also a pressing need to tackle offending and recidivism. The Government must invest urgently in research on effective prevention work, including the rehabilitation of child sexual abuse offenders. (Paragraph 113)

The online space

30.Like many of the trends identified in this report, responsibility for cracking down on online child sexual abuse is falling almost entirely on an overstretched and under-resourced law enforcement community, with inadequate cooperation from the internet giants. While we acknowledge that the Internet Watch Foundation plays an important role in removing abusive material, law enforcement witnesses were clear that tech companies are not doing enough to reduce the number of child abuse images online. We agree with the Home Secretary that the web giants need to do much more to combat online CSA. The wealth, power and influence of these companies means that there is no excuse for complacency in removing illegal content from their platforms and ensuring the safety of their users. (Paragraph 118)

31.We urge the Government to include in its Online Harms White Paper the imposition of statutory duties on companies to cooperate with investigators in the pursuit of online child abuse offenders, including by providing more comprehensive intelligence packages to CEOP and other investigators. The Government should also establish a regulator with statutory powers to hold internet companies to account against a clear code of practice, developed in consultation with law enforcement experts. Failure to adhere to this code, such as providing inadequate protections against online grooming and the proliferation of child abuse images. should result in penalties being imposed, including fines and other sanctions as appropriate. (Paragraph 119)

Mental health work

32.We welcome the reduction in the use of police custody for individuals detained under section 136 of the Mental Health Act. We remain concerned, however, that lessons are not being learned by all forces about the use of these powers in a lawful and appropriate way, including the use of restraint against individuals experiencing acute mental distress, and we are very troubled by the increase in the number of deaths in police custody. The Government should provide us with an annual update regarding progress against Dame Eilish Angiolini’s recommendations, and explain why the number of deaths in police custody have increased in the last recorded year. (Paragraph 133)

33.If an individual requires a health-based place of safety for a mental health crisis, the police service’s involvement in their care should end at the point at which they are sectioned. It is unacceptable that the majority of section 136 cases involve police transport to a health facility, frequently because an ambulance is not available in time. This is an inappropriate way to care for patients, and leaves police forces overstretched. We have also heard evidence of the police spending hours trying to find a treatment provider, and remaining in hospital with a mental health patient while an inpatient bed is found for them. These are risks which the NHS should be responsible for managing, and has the expertise to manage—it is completely inappropriate to leave the police to pick up the pieces in this way. The NHS is currently advancing Integrated Care Systems as an attempt to integrate local health and social care services more effectively. These should take into account the effects of local health needs on the police. (Paragraph 134)

34.From the evidence we received, it appears that some police forces see mental health training as a ‘nice-to-have’, rather than an essential part of their officers’ knowledge base and skillset. We appreciate that it is extremely challenging to remove officers and PCSOs from the frontline in order to train them for two days, as per the College of Policing’s guidance. But we urge forces to consider the cost of a single death in police custody of an individual experiencing a mental health crisis—not just in monetary terms, but to that individual’s loved ones, and to society as a whole. It is ludicrous that officers receive a three-week course in police driving, while dealing regularly with acute mental health crises with just a few hours of training. The College of Policing should take immediate steps to mandate a minimum two-day mental health course for all officers and PCSOs. We urge chief constables to regard this as an investment rather than a chore. (Paragraph 139)

35.Joint triage schemes between the NHS and the police have been spoken of positively by many witnesses, and efforts to encourage data-sharing and cooperation between the police and local health providers are to be encouraged. We are concerned, however, that they are promoting further reliance on the police as the first-point-of-call for individuals who witness or experience a mental health crisis. People who require mental health treatment in a crisis need an urgent, NHS-led response, not a police car. (Paragraph 142)

36.In too many areas, the police are the only emergency service for those in crisis, and they are being used as a gateway to healthcare for those in desperate need of help. This is an extremely poor use of public funds and one of the worse examples of cost-shunting between public services. The NHS is expected to receive a £20bn funding uplift in the upcoming Budget. This should take into account the significant disparity in funding for mental health, relative to physical health, so that the NHS is better able to support those with mental health needs, rather than relying on the police. (Paragraph 143)

Missing people

37.The demand on policing arising from cases involving missing people—particularly children—appears to be the result of a perfect storm generated by funding reductions to other public services, the extensive use of out-of-area placements for looked-after children, a lack of data and intelligence-sharing between the police and other public agencies, and an excessive dependence on the police as a service-of-last-resort for vulnerable individuals, including the safeguarding of children at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. We do not lament the police’s involvement in this important area of work, but their increasing workload appears to be the result of failures in other services and in partnership working, rather than a political or strategic decision. We are also concerned that there appears to have been little progress since HMICFRS published its 2016 report on this subject. This is one of many areas in which the national policing lead seems to have insufficient leverage to enact fundamental change at a local level. (Paragraph 150)

38.We are concerned that there has been a serious lack of Ministerial leadership in relation to the threat of child sexual abuse in England and Wales, including the response to missing children, the proliferation of child abuse images, and the join-up between agencies on child protection work. Police activity is fragmented, under-resourced and subject to competing demands; information-sharing between agencies is woeful; rehabilitation for CSA offenders is virtually non-existent; and there is nowhere near enough proactive activity taking place to stem the tide of child abuse images online, and the associated growth in known paedophiles. We welcome the Home Secretary’s personal commitment to driving progress in this area. The Government should appoint a Commissioner for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse to work across departments and agencies, work closely with private and non-profit organisations, and produce a bold and comprehensive cross-Government strategy on child protection and the prevention of child sexual abuse. (Paragraph 151)

39.Even if our recommendations are implemented effectively, the police will still have an important role to play in protecting vulnerable people from harm, including managing the risk from sex offenders, referring vulnerable offenders to other agencies, and tracking down missing people. However, our findings strongly point to the need for agencies to be much more joined-up in their approach, with more pooling of resources and a less risk-averse approach to data-sharing. We return to this issue in the next chapter. (Paragraph 152)

Police funding

40.The Government must be clear and accurate about police funding, and the resource pressures facing forces. We welcome the Home Secretary’s commitment to prioritising police funding in the next Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), and the Policing Minister’s clear recognition that the service requires additional resources to enable it to meet changing demands. We agree with them. Policing urgently needs more money. We strongly recommend that police funding is prioritised in both the upcoming Budget and the next CSR. (Paragraph 164)

41.Given the complex challenges outlined in this report, we have no doubt that a failure to provide a funding uplift for policing would have dire consequences. Efficiency savings can only go so far, in the context of the challenges that forces now face: substantial increases in serious violence and volume crime; a rise in complex cases, including child sexual offences and domestic abuse; an ever-growing workload from safeguarding vulnerable people, and an explosion of internet crime, with the evidential challenges that creates. Without extra funding, something will have to give, and the police will not be able to fulfil their duties in delivering public safety, criminal justice, community cohesion and public confidence. (Paragraph 165)

42.We are extremely concerned by the National Audit Office’s recent conclusion that the Home Office does not know whether or not the police system is financially sustainable, and cannot be sure that funding is being directed to the right places. Future investment must be strategic and evidence-based, ensuring that resources are focused in the areas in which they can have the most impact on crime prevention and harm reduction, and not just those areas that might attract the most favourable press coverage. (Paragraph 166)

43.The current model for police funding is not fit for purpose, and should be fundamentally revised and restructured. Such heavy reliance on the council tax precept for additional funding is also unsustainable. It is time to stop kicking this problem into the long grass, and create a funding settlement for forces that is fit for the 21st century, recognising the true cost of policing. This must be based on robust evidence on resource requirements arising from diverse and complex demands. It is also likely to require more resource to be channelled to regional levels, to address the structural challenges outlined later in this report. (Paragraph 167)

44.As we outlined in Chapter 5, the police service is playing an increasing role in managing vulnerability and risk across public services, and many individuals have complex needs which cross organisational boundaries. In Chapter 2, we referred to models involving the co-location of police officers or PCSOs with other agencies, to work on interventions for individuals in greater need of holistic support. The Government should undertake a review of models that enable the police to pool resources with other public agencies, and facilitate these arrangements where they would enable a more joined-up, effective and cost-efficient response. (Paragraph 168)

45.Many witnesses highlighted the challenges created by the short-term approach to police funding. This is an unnecessary obstacle to investment in innovation, and it disincentivises medium- and long-term financial planning. The Government should move to a longer-term funding structure, to enable the service to frontload investment in the technology that will enable it to make the best use of its resources and assets. The Police Transformation Fund is a piecemeal and ad hoc method for funding innovation and new technology in policing, and a much more coordinated, long-term approach is required. (Paragraph 169)

Police technology

Cyber and digital skills

46.We have serious concerns about the police service’s digital capabilities, including the skills base of officers and staff and the technological solutions available to them. We were impressed by the digital and data exploitation capabilities available to counter-terrorism policing, but we note comments by Lynne Owens, Director General of the NCA, regarding the inequitable provision of resources available to other threats, including serious organised crime. Previous chapters have outlined our concerns about digital capabilities in other fields, including child sexual abuse and online fraud, and we fear this may be a systemic problem throughout the police service. (Paragraph 176)

47.Based on the National Digital Exploitation Service model, used for counter-terrorism policing, we believe that a prestigious national digital exploitation centre for serious crime—possibly with regional branches—would be better able to attract and retain talent, alongside the likes of GCHQ. It would also have the purchasing power to invest in innovative methods of digital forensics and analysis, from which all forces could then benefit. We call on the Government and the police service to take steps urgently to cost such a model, in time to account for the required funding in the next Comprehensive Spending Review. (Paragraph 177)

48.At force-level, there is a clear need to upskill the existing workforce and bring in more staff and officers with advanced cyber skills. We also endorse the Police Superintendents’ Association’s suggestion that the Special Constabulary could be transformed into an effective reserve force, and suggest that resources should be devoted to scoping this as a national model, focused on cyber and digital skills. (Paragraph 178)

Technology and data-sharing between forces

49.Police forces’ investment in and adoption of new technology is, quite frankly, a complete and utter mess. We welcome the Policing Minister’s recognition that police technology requires additional investment to enable the service to meet the challenges of the 21st century. This is clearly correct, although we do not think the level of investment is the only problem. Forces are facing rapidly-evolving threats from criminals who exploit new technology in advanced and innovative ways, yet their own technological solutions are not always up to the task. There are enormous opportunities for policing, including greater use of artificial intelligence and the exploitation of data, but the service is often failing to take advantage of them. (Paragraph 186)

50.We believe that the biggest failing in this area is not the level of funding, but rather the complete lack of coordination and leadership on upgrading technology over very many years. This is badly letting down police officers, who are struggling to do their jobs effectively with out-of-date technology. It is astonishing that, in 2018, police forces are still struggling to get crucial real-time information from each other, and that officers are facing frustration and delays on a daily basis. The National Enabling Programme and the ongoing reforms to the Police National Database, though welcome, are woefully unambitious, and will not solve the problem. Criminals don’t recognise police force boundaries, and neither should the data that is gathered on them. The Home Office must make it a clear and stated aim to unify all police databases and communications systems according to a clear timetable, with all new force-level contracts negotiated accordingly, so they can fit into a national framework or contract in future. (Paragraph 187)

51.Stronger national leadership from the Home Office on technology is essential—Ministers need to take ultimate responsibility for the failure of this crucial public service to properly upgrade its technology to deal with the threats of the 21st century. However, this must be accompanied by enhanced capacity and capabilities within the Department: its abject failure to deliver the promised savings from reforms to the Emergency Service Network (ESN) demonstrates what can happen when national projects are poorly managed. (Paragraph 188)

Police workforce and culture

Mandatory training

52.Policing is a challenging and complex vocation, and officers face increasingly difficult demands, requiring a high level of skill, knowledge and understanding. These demands may vary between rural and urban forces, but every force requires access to key specialisms, and every officer, PCSO or staff member—be they forensic analysts, child abuse investigators or safer schools officers—deserves to be given the tools with which to perform to the best of their abilities. This includes being equipped with evidence of ‘what works’, clear referral routes for certain incidents or scenarios, and relevant data from around the country. Based on what we have seen during the course of this inquiry, that is a long way from the current state of affairs. Training is a long-term investment in the most important resource that police forces have—their workforce. Without time to train and continuously learn, it will be even harder to meet the short-term challenges facing policing, and staff will be put under even greater pressure. (Paragraph 200)

53.Throughout this report, we have identified a number of areas in which specialist knowledge appears to be lacking, and in which underqualified and inexperienced officers are being forced to take on responsibilities for which they are inadequately prepared. We urge the Government and the College to review urgently the amount of training that is mandated, the scope for introducing compulsory licenses to practice for a wider range of specialisms, and the resource and cultural issues standing in the way of the provision of a higher level of specialist, continuous professional development for police officers and staff. (Paragraph 201)

New recruitment and training routes

54.This inquiry has not included a detailed examination of the College of Policing’s plans for degree-level accreditation and apprenticeships for officers. We agree that police officers need to be able to move the service away from the sort of crisis interventions that result from negative inspections and complaints, and towards the maintenance of consistent quality standards, based on accredited professional qualifications, a well-established evidence base, and high levels of practitioner knowledge. But forces must also be able to maintain diversity within their workforce, and ensure an increasingly-wide range of routes into policing, including continuing to encourage entry from those who have not pursued a degree. (Paragraph 202)

55.By March, the Home Office and College of Policing should publish a comprehensive impact assessment of the police apprenticeship (based on the plan to implement it from 2019/2020), including the likely impact on neighbourhood policing (time spent by new recruits in dedicated wards), response times to calls for service, the resources available for training existing staff and officers, and the diversity of new recruits. (Paragraph 203)

56.We are gravely concerned about the severe detective shortages being experienced by police forces in England and Wales, which is undoubtedly impacting on police welfare, access to justice for victims, and the safety and security of the general public. We welcome efforts to recruit detectives directly, provided they are given the requisite training and support, but this will only fill a quarter of existing vacancies. The Government should revisit Sir Thomas Winsor’s previous recommendation for additional allowances for detectives, and consult the profession on their introduction. It must also work with the Police Federation, PSAEW and NPCC to identify ways of enhancing the support offered to detectives in managing their caseload and taking appropriate risks, providing the necessary funding to ensure that a detective career becomes a more attractive prospect for existing officers. (Paragraph 206)

Recruitment and retention problems

57.Although the detective shortage is one of the most acute problems facing the police workforce, and requires urgent action, a piecemeal approach to pay and workforce reform will ultimately be unsustainable. The evidence we have received suggests that new approaches to recruitment and reward are likely to be required across the police workforce, if the service is to respond effectively to growing and emerging demands. (Paragraph 207)

58.We welcome the focus by the leaders of the police service on problems with chief officer recruitment, including the very low number of applicants for each role. We urge the Government to undertake a review of the relationship between chief officers and PCCs, to identify issues on either side. It should also eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to promotion, addressing any problems with pension and taxation rules, to ensure that capable candidates are not disincentivised from taking on the enormous responsibility of running a police force. (Paragraph 210)

Police culture

59.It was striking that our roundtable participants—some of them relatively new to policing—were confident in identifying deeply-entrenched cultural barriers to reform in policing. These included the impact of rank structures and hierarchies, including long chains of command; the effect of the PCC election cycles on reform, and the ability of forces to plan long-term; and the root causes of a systemic resistance to innovation and change. (Paragraph 216)

60.The College of Policing should undertake a review of barriers to innovation and reform, and ensure that the new Policing Education Qualifications Framework promotes a more open and innovative culture. While acknowledging the need to maintain discipline, this should encourage constructive challenge from officers at junior ranks, and discourage the promotion of ‘continuity at all costs’ over innovation and change. Police culture needs to shift away from blame-and-claim and towards learning from failure, and policing leaders need to take a much more consultative approach to their oversight of more junior colleagues. (Paragraph 217)

The role of the Home Office and allocation of responsibilities

61.As the lead department for policing, the Home Office must step up to the plate and play a much stronger role in policing policy. Many of the challenges outlined in this report could benefit enormously from national leadership. Throughout our report, we have identified coordination problems between forces—particularly over new technology. We have also identified weaknesses in assessing and investing in the response to new and changing patterns of crime, weaknesses in engaging other organisations in the fight against crime or in public protection, and a lack of strategic direction. In all of those areas, it should be the Home Office that takes responsibility. When it comes to influencing or partnering with global internet companies, the NHS or the education system, individual forces cannot match the power and influence of a central government department. We urge the Home Office to play a much stronger role in driving reform in key areas, such as data-sharing between public services, the negotiation of national technology contracts, and the regulation of internet companies. Sitting back and leaving it to individual police forces is irresponsible. We welcome the Policing Minister’s recognition that “the Home Office needs to take a stronger view on a number of things”, which appears to signify a major shift in departmental policy. (Paragraph 224)

62.The current allocation of responsibilities in policing at a national, regional and local level is broken, and in dire need of review. Policing structures remain largely unchanged since the 1960s, and whilst the creation of PCCs has enabled leadership and new partnerships within many force areas, collaboration between forces is still a problem in those areas where regional or national action is required. Local identity is a significant strength in UK policing, but our evidence on neighbourhood policing indicates that relationships with officers at a neighbourhood and community level are more important than the 43-force structure. As the Policing Minister acknowledged, the current structure is a significant barrier to the service’s ability to tackle national and transnational threats, which require an advanced level of specialist capability. (Paragraph 236)

63.We recognise that previous force mergers have been beset by difficulties, and that the Government is unlikely to reduce the number of forces. We believe that a more strategic, evidence-based approach is required. Before the end of November, the Home Office should launch a transparent, root-and-branch review of policing, publishing proposals by the end of February, which should focus on the allocation of responsibilities and capabilities at a local, regional and national level. Based on what we have seen, we propose that local policing should be given the space to focus on community relations and local crime and disorder, including inter-agency working to reduce harm and address repeat offending. The driving force for restructures, such as mergers of whole forces, back offices, or between police and fire and rescue services, should be service improvement, rather than the hope of savings. At a national and regional level, forces need to pool resources and capabilities to a far greater extent, particularly for online crimes such as fraud, but also in complex areas where crimes often cross force borders, such as organised crime, county lines and modern slavery. The structure for counter-terrorism policing, which is frequently singled out for praise, could serve as a model for other areas of policing. (Paragraph 237)

64.An ambitious reform programme of this kind will be impossible without stronger national leadership, and a more dynamic and transparent approach to policing policy-making. It is vital that the operational independence of chief officers is maintained, and that PCCs are able to act on local priorities and local problems. But the current state of police ICT and communications systems is a striking example of the problems generated by this fractured system of policy-making and governance. (Paragraph 238)

65.The Government should create a National Policing Council, chaired by the Home Secretary and comprising representatives of the APCC, NPCC, officer/staff associations, College of Policing and HMICFRS. Proposals for reform could be put to a National Police Assembly comprising all PCCs and chief constables in England and Wales. The Home Office should consider key policy areas where decisions of the Council and Assembly could then be binding on all forces. (Paragraph 239)

66.This report has set out the many complex and changing demands on policing in the 21st century, in the context of a system of funding and governance that is ill-suited to dynamic reform. In the absence of strategic direction from the Home Office, operating under a fractured leadership structure, forces are plugging the gaps left by other public services in an attempt to protect the most vulnerable people from harm. In the meantime, ‘traditional’ crimes such as violence and theft are on the increase, and an overstretched justice system is bringing forward a decreasing number of charges. It is time for the Government to demonstrate clear ownership of policing policy and funding, and stop abdicating responsibility. The Home Secretary must make it clearer to the police service what areas he expects it to prioritise, where to focus its limited resources, and what he will do to drive much-needed reform at a national level. (Paragraph 240)





Published: 25 October 2018