Eleventh Special Report
On 5 March 2019, the International Development Committee published its Tenth Report of Session 2017–19, on Forced Displacement in Africa: “Anchors not Walls” (HC 1433). The Government response was received on 11 June 2019. The response is appended below.
Appendix
Executive Summary
This report contains the Government’s responses to the IDC recommendations given in the ‘Anchors not walls’ report. The IDC report provided 56 final points in the ‘conclusion and recommendation section’, of which only 34 are distinct recommendations. In summary, we fully agree with 22 recommendations, partially agree with 9 and disagree with only 3. All recommendations addressed to DFID are accepted or partially accepted. Of the 3 rejected recommendations, 2 are addressed to the Home Office and 1 is a cross-government issue.
DFID is firmly committed to addressing forced displacement in Africa, including through the Global Compact on Refugees and the increased involvement of the World Bank on this agenda. We are working with the UN Secretary General to establish a High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement and we will continue to support the Kampala convention and call for its respect. Many of the Committee’s recommendations are fully aligned with the UK Humanitarian Reform Policy, including to promote the localisation of aid, cash-based responses, multi-year financing, innovation, and the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. We acknowledge the importance of addressing the root causes of forced displacements and of finding durable solutions for uprooted populations. We are fully in agreement with the need to prioritise the protection of the most vulnerable including children, to fund education, and to support women who are not only the first victims of forced displacement but also the first responders. We have a zero-tolerance approach to fraud and corruption, to sexual exploitation and abuse, and to sexual harassment of any kind.
Responses to International Development Committee recommendations
(1)The UK Government should use its influence and example to encourage other donors to increase their contributions to refugee crises in Africa, particularly those, such as Burundi, that are frequently overlooked.
Government position: Agree
We agree to continue our engagement with other key donors to lobby their increased contributions to crises in Africa. We will do this through high level strategic forums both bilaterally and regionally, such as during official dialogues with the US, the EU and emerging donors. We also engage with other donors during the UNHCR executive committee sessions. We have been particularly active in encouraging the World Bank to contribute to refugee programmes. This is a long-term strategy and will take time but we are committed to ensuring other donors step up.
(2)The longstanding approach of campaigning for funding for each individual displacement crisis needs to be reformed in line with commitments made as part of the Refugee Compact. The UK should push for the development of international funding mechanisms and instruments which negate the need for a “begging bowl” approach and recognise that countries hosting refugees are providing a global public good. Any new mechanisms should not be predicated on requiring low and lower-middle income refugee-hosting countries to take on yet more debt.
Government position: Partially agree
We agree that refugee hosting countries provide a global public good and that responding to refugee displacement is a shared challenge and responsibility for the international community as a whole. We have repeatedly emphasised the importance of broadening the support base for refugee responses and agree with the importance of pushing for a more anticipatory approach to crises, including forced displacement. We are actively involved in work to improve prevention and preparedness and to ensure that funds are available if and when crises strike. This includes support through the Centre for Disaster Protection’s Innovation Lab to develop new ideas for risk-based financing for refugee responses. We also continue to support the International Development Association (IDA) 18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities (RSW), which provides a mix of loan and grant at highly concessional terms. While debt sustainability is an important issue, we believe that in this context the terms of the RSW reflect the intention to ensure that host communities also benefit and the need for country ownership of the crisis response.
(3)The UK Government must urgently tackle its inability to determine, or even robustly estimate, how much funding it is providing to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in African countries, and across the world. It must work with partners, in particular the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), to encourage greater transparency in this area and develop a reporting system that enables Parliamentarians and Ministers to identify and examine how much the UK is spending in support of refugees, how much in support of IDPs, and in which countries.
Government position: Partially agree
We are able to provide clear information and robust estimates on UK programmes and initiatives responding to forced displacement. We provided the Committee with extensive details of specific displacement-focussed programmes and spend in a number of African countries. As we made clear, however, our focus on vulnerability rather than status – i.e. providing support on the basis of need, rather than whether an individual is classified as a refugee or otherwise – means we cannot necessarily break down that support based on the migratory status of recipients to determine what percentage of beneficiaries are refugees, IDPs, members of a host community etc. This focus on need also means that refugees and IDPs may benefit from wider programmes not explicitly addressing forced displacement.
The UK is committed to transparency of our work and we firmly believe that this will lead to more effective programmes and greater accountability to taxpayers and those we aim to help. We continue to improve our data collection and analysis, but recognise that there is more to be done and are currently testing new internal approaches that may further support this. We are also pleased that UNHCR is delivering on its commitment to be more transparent in the Grand Bargain, and is now publishing its results, including by country via the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). In line with the Grand Bargain, we are also encouraging all humanitarian organisations to be more transparent and to publish to the IATI.
(4)In line with the commitments made in the Refugee Compact, DFID should work with host governments and communities to facilitate the integration of refugees into national education systems and provide appropriate financial and technical support, encouraging other donors to do the same. Where governments have already made commitments, such as through the Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education, DFID’s education programmes should be aligned with this approach.
Government position: Agree
The UK has been at the forefront of pushing for quality education for refugee children. UK support for UNICEF’s No Lost Generation Initiative helped provide education and support to more than half a million displaced Syrian children. We have committed more than £400 million extra to the Girls’ Education Challenge, to ensure up to 1.5 million marginalised girls are supported to access quality education and learning - including 20,000 girls in refugee camps in Kenya. We agree on the importance of working with host governments and communities to facilitate the integration of refugees into national education systems. That is reflected in the key role we played in developing Uganda’s first ever education response plan, which aims to support more than 550,000 refugee and host community children - or in our multi-year £160 million support to the Government of Lebanon’s ambitious RACE II (Reaching All Children with Education) plan to deliver high quality inclusive education for Lebanese and refugee children.
(5)For DFID to maintain its role as a global leader on education in emergencies, it must continue to prioritise the education of children caught up in crisis—as outlined in its 2018 global education policy, “Get Children Learning”. We recommend the Department makes an early, and significantly higher, financial commitment to Education Cannot Wait when the fund is open for replenishment later this year.
Government position: Partially agree
DFID is continuing to prioritise education in emergencies and protracted crises by scaling up our financial investments and building technical expertise. New bilateral education programmes in Ethiopia, South Sudan and Nigeria all include components on education for children affected by crises, including those forcibly displaced. The UK’s current investment £34.3 million in Education Cannot Wait (ECW) ends in 2019. We are reviewing the success of our contribution to date and expect to play a full part in ECW’s forthcoming replenishment.
(6)DFID should continue to support host countries to provide refugees with the right to work. Although schemes, such as the Ethiopia Jobs Compact, must be considered carefully to avoid any unintended consequences, they are a step in the right direction in providing refugees with livelihood opportunities and aiding integration with host communities.
Government position: Agree
We agree that providing opportunities for sustainable jobs, livelihoods and skills training is as an important component of strengthening the self-reliance of forcibly displaced people and the communities that host them. This approach is also an important component of the Global Compact on Refugees. UK support is actively advancing this, whether through the Ethiopia or Jordan Compacts (which, importantly, aim to create employment opportunities for host communities as well as refugees) or wider work to support market creation, stimulate local trade and strengthen longer term economic opportunities in refugee-hosting areas.
(7)The UK Government needs to lead by example. DFID cannot continue to ask the poorest countries in the world to grant refugees the right to work whilst the UK Government significantly limits asylum seekers’ right to work in the UK. The Government must urgently reassess this policy. Nothing would carry more weight with partner governments in Africa than the UK Government practising what it has preached. This is something the Home Affairs Committee has addressed recently and we will be encouraging them to look at in more detail.
Government position: Disagree
The Home Office confirms that the UK Government already provides refugees with immediate and unrestricted access to the labour market, which is what we are promoting among other countries. Asylum-seekers can work in the UK if their claim has been outstanding for 12 months, through no fault of their own. Those allowed to work are restricted to jobs on the Shortage Occupation List, which is published by the Home Office and based on expert advice from the Migration Advisory Committee. During the Meaningful Vote debate on 5 December, the Home Secretary stated that although there are no current plans to change the current policy, it is an area he wished to review, and work on this is ongoing. In making any policy changes, it is important to distinguish between those who need protection and economic migrants, who can apply for a work visa under the Immigration Rules. Our wider policy could be undermined if migrants could bypass work visa routes by lodging unfounded asylum claims.
(8)DFID and its partners should consider putting local women at the forefront of responses to forced displacement, to enhance protection for women and girls and provide them with a role that would give them more power in camps or informal settlements.
Government position: Agree
DFID has committed to not only protect women and girls, but also empower them to participate in and lead responses. We recognise the importance of working with local women’s rights and women-led organisations (WROs) to deliver more effective and safer responses. Sub-contracting our practices to local partners also ensures continuity as efforts shift to the medium/longer term. We advocate on international platforms for humanitarian responses to engage more women led organisations, including understanding and addressing the specific barriers for women led organisations in accessing funds. Women are often the first responders in humanitarian crises but can be displaced as the international humanitarian response kicks in. Our programming in protracted crisis aims to provide continuing support and engagement with WROs to tackle the drivers of gender inequality and gender-based violence.
(9)DFID should prioritise enabling self-reliance amongst displaced women, including supporting them into work. Having a source of income and position in the community can reduce the risk of vulnerable women suffering exploitation and abuse.
Government position: Agree
Our aim in protracted displacement crises is to go beyond protection and immediate needs, towards support for initiatives that reflect the lived realities of women and girls and enable them to take more control of their lives. Support for women’s economic empowerment and increased self-reliance is an important component of this, alongside programming to tackle the discriminatory social and gender norms that drive gender inequality. Throughout the consultation process on the Global Compact on Refugees we also pushed for strong language on gender and welcomed the inclusion of the ‘Women and Girls’ section of the final Compact. This included clear recognition of the need for “…equality of access to services and opportunities” for girls and women and highlighted the importance of support for measures “…to strengthen the agency of women and girls, to promote women’s economic empowerment and to support access by women and girls to education.” It is critical that support for women’s economic empowerment also addresses the systemic barriers to women’s full and equal participation in the economy.
(10)The UK Government should ensure the establishment of high safeguarding standards, and effective mechanisms on the ground, by all organisations it supports, throughout the contractual chain, using the leverage of DFID’s example, expertise and provision of funding where necessary.
Government position: Agree
DFID is at the forefront of international efforts to improve safeguarding standards across the aid sector. We know that sexual exploitation and abuse is a significant risk in humanitarian emergencies, especially in situations of protracted crisis and refugee settings. The commitment document which we and 21 other donors presented at the October 2019 Safeguarding Summit is clear that one or both of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) minimum Operating Standards on Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, and the safeguarding aspects of the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) on Quality and Accountability must be adhered to in all the programmes we fund. DFID continues to provide guidance and support to implementing partners to help them adhere to those standards.
Earlier in 2018, DFID had introduced enhanced safeguarding due diligence standards which are aligned with and in places go beyond the IASC and CHS standards. If DFID assess that a potential partner does not meet those standards then we will not fund them. DFID has also strengthened the language in our funding agreements with all partners setting out the standards that we expect, including that they must carry out similar checks on any downstream partners to ensure that they also have robust safeguarding measures in place. DFID uses regular monitoring processes on the ground to check how the standards are being adhered to and has standard protocols for responding to any incidents in the contractual chain involving DFID funding.
(11)Displaced children face a myriad of horrifying threats on their journey to safety. Child protection must be central to any refugee response programme carried out by DFID and its partners. In its response to our Report, we ask DFID to lay out its approach to child protection in refugee situations.
Government position: Agree
The UK remains at the vanguard of work to shape and reform the international architecture for responding to the needs of displaced children, including to improve safeguarding standards across the aid sector. Our Safeguarding Summit in 2018 brought together representatives from across the sector, including those working with displaced children, to agree measures to raise safeguarding standards and tackle abuses. Central to our approach is creating long-term solutions by supporting national governments to strengthen child protection systems. At the same time, we support country-specific initiatives, such as the operation of a child protection hotline in Lebanon and continue to push key partners who work in displacement environments to strengthen their procedures to prevent and address the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse.
A new package of UK programmes is focussing specifically on child slavery across Africa and Asia, including support for up to 400,000 girls and boys at risk of slavery in the Horn of Africa and along dangerous migratory routes such as Sudan and Ethiopia. One of our programmes across six Asian countries will also include work to clamp down on child trafficking. We also emphasise the importance of providing mental health and psychosocial support for displaced children. We have set up the first donor group on this issue with the Government of the Netherlands, match-funded War Child’s support to children traumatised by war in the Central African Republic, and this is a core element of our support for the No Lost Generation Initiative for children displaced by the Syria conflict.
(12)DFID works closely with UNHCR and the Kenyan Government, providing millions of pounds of UK Aid in support of their efforts. It should use its considerable influence to ensure that proper process is being followed with regards to voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya. The push factors—including the deteriorating conditions in the Dadaab camps—must be addressed, and comprehensive, up-todate information on conflict and food security in the country must be given to those contemplating a return to Somalia.
Government position: Agree
Under the Support for Protection and Assistance of Refugees in Kenya (SPARK) programme over 2016 to 2018, DFID provided £6m to support voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from Dadaab camp to Somalia. This included support for integrated return help desks jointly managed by UNHCR, Norwegian Refugee Council and the Government of Kenya (GoK), which provided up to date information on the situation in Somalia as part of the voluntary repatriation process. Building on this experience, DFID’s new five-year £84 million ‘Kenya Integrated Refugee and Host Community Support Programme’ (PAMOJA), started in Oct 2018 and includes support for Dadaab camp. Assistance for voluntary repatriation is included within PAMOJA’s allocation to UNHCR. We will work closely with UNHCR and DFID Somalia to ensure accurate and timely information is provided to refugees considering voluntary repatriation.
(13)DFID should continue to press UNHCR to improve its systems for voluntary returns, to ensure that those considering repatriation have access to comprehensive information about the situation they will return to and sufficient support for reintegration.
Government position: Agree
Voluntary returns is one of the key durable solutions for refugees. Providing accurate and up to date information on the situation that refugees will be returning to is essential if refugees are to be able to return home freely, voluntarily and in dignity, and for this to be sustainable. This will continue to be the subject of dialogue between UNHCR and the UK both at the country level and the global level. We will work with UNHCR to both learn from recent experiences and to ensure that we are best able to support refugees returning home.
(14)DFID, alongside other international donors, should support host governments to find pathways to integration for refugees whose prospects of returning home are limited or non-existent. This will require financial and technical support from the international community; these countries must not be left to bear the burden alone.
Government position: Agree
The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) makes clear that one of its primary aims is to facilitate access to durable solutions, including local integration. In practice, this means measures to boost refugees’ self-reliance by increasing access to jobs, training, education and other services, and delivered in a way that also benefits host communities and countries. This is an approach that the UK has helped to pioneer and champion, for example, in Jordan and Ethiopia. We were also actively involved in the consultation process in developing the GCR and we remain steadfastly supportive of its aims and committed to playing our part in its delivery. We are also clear that host countries must not be left to bear the burden alone and repeatedly emphasise – in GCR consultations, specific refugee responses and more broadly – the importance of other donors stepping up and of broadening the support base.
(15)The UK Government must also look at the example it is setting through its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK. It cannot encourage host governments in Sub-Saharan Africa to integrate refugees without showing some willingness to do the same.
Government position: Partially Agree
The Home Office confirms the UK have committed to resettle 20,000 vulnerable refugees who have fled Syria by 2020. Over 14,900 refugees have found safety in the UK to rebuild their lives through the scheme and we are on-track to deliver the full commitment by 2020. The UK has also committed to resettle up to 3,000 vulnerable children and their families to the UK from the Middle East and North Africa. This is in addition to those we resettle under Gateway and Mandate, and the thousands who receive protection in the UK under other asylum procedures.
The UK has a proud history of providing protection to those that need it – and this Government is committed to ensuring that refugees can take positive steps towards integration as they rebuild their lives in the UK. Refugees in the UK have access to mainstream benefits and services to enable their integration; and we are working across Government to ensure services meet the needs of refugees. The Government published the Integrated Communities Action plan in February 2019. In the action plan we have committed to increase integration support for all refugees in the UK. We will focus on supporting refugees with English language, employment, mental health, and cultural orientation to life in the UK.
(16)We support the call for the UK Government to increase its resettlement numbers to 10,000 places annually—as advocated by UNHCR—in a new, consolidated resettlement scheme. Any such scheme should reserve at least a quarter of places for refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa, in line with the percentage of the global refugee population residing in the region.
Government position: Disagree
The Home Office confirms that the UK has already committed to resettling 23,000 of the most vulnerable refugees from the Middle East and North Africa region by the year 2020 through our Vulnerable Persons and Vulnerable Children’s resettlement schemes, and we have no plans to increase this at the present time.
The Gateway Protection Programme also demonstrates the UK’s proud tradition of providing protection to refugees from across the globe; and of the UK’s commitment to supporting UNHCR’s global effort to provide durable solutions to the plight of refugees. This includes resettling the most vulnerable refugees from sub-Saharan countries.
(17)We cannot, and would not, ignore the cases of corruption, mismanagement, or other harmful conduct, that have come to light during this inquiry or our previous inquiry into ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Aid Sector’. We have also paid due attention to questions of UNHCR’s continued relevance and ability to perform its function. We are pleased that the cases mentioned have been dealt with quickly and that DFID acted swiftly and decisively to restore funding once resolutions were reported. UNHCR must ensure that where cases emerge, it acts urgently to put safeguards in place and prevent disruption to its life-saving operations. DFID, in turn, should react swiftly and proportionately to protect UK Aid, whilst limiting the impact on vulnerable refugees.
Government position: Agree
DFID has a zero-tolerance approach to fraud and corruption, to sexual exploitation and abuse, and to sexual harassment of any kind. We expect partners to investigate any allegations of impropriety promptly and for those relating to DFID funding to be reported to us. DFID’s Counter-Fraud and Safeguarding Investigations teams can then follow up as appropriate. Where misconduct has taken place or where British taxpayers’ money has been misused, we expect our partners to take firm and immediate action.
Where the UK has suspended funding as a result of fraud or safeguarding allegations, we channel funding to the refugee response through other actors to ensure that the needs of vulnerable refugees and displaced persons are not impacted. In recent years, UNHCR has taken steps to strengthen its internal controls building on experiences in Kenya and Uganda. The High Commissioner has made an enhanced approach to risk management and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and harassment as priorities for the coming year. We will continue to work closely with UNHCR to strengthen these controls and to ensure that it has the appropriate mechanisms in place to protect its staff, refugees and other displaced persons and to safeguard British taxpayers’ funds.
(18)Questions around the reform of UNHCR remain and DFID should continue to drive institutional reform, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. UNHCR has set an ambitious agenda in the Refugee Compact and its viability for the future will perhaps be borne out by the success or shortcomings of that agenda.
Government position: Agree
The UK has an ambitious reform vision for the humanitarian system which builds on the outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit and the Grand Bargain. This is set out in the UK Humanitarian Reform Policy, published in 2017. As part of this, we look to UNHCR to promote the use of cash, to enhance coordination with the rest of the system, including through joint needs assessments, and to place accountability to affected populations at the heart of its work. UNHCR also has an essential role to play in bridging the humanitarian and development divide bringing in the expertise of development actors and catalysing new actors including the private sector to support refugee emergencies. The Global Refugee Compact sets an ambitious agenda which seeks to achieve this and builds on the longer-term approaches that the UK has championed in refugee contexts including Jordan and Ethiopia. The UK has supported the roll out of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in several countries in Africa and will continue to support UNHCR as it looks to roll-out the Compact.
(19)DFID should push for robust accountability processes at the international level, including the development of indicators to track progress, in order to ensure continued commitment to, and tangible results from, the Refugee Compact.
Government position: Agree
We have been consistently clear on the need for meaningful indicators to track progress against the aims of the Global Compact on Refugees and are actively involved in the process to develop these, including through the Preparatory Meetings in the run up to the first Global Refugee Forum in December. We also support proposals in the Compact on the development of a mechanism for tracking implementation of pledges, and that follow-up and review will be primarily conducted through the Global Refugee Forum. These will be held every four years and the high-level officials’ meetings held every two years between Forums, as well as UNHCR’s annual reporting to the UN General Assembly. We are also engaged with and supporting UNHCR’s current work to measure the impact arising from hosting, protecting and assisting refugees, which is intended to inform stocktaking at the Forums.
(20)The progress of the UK Government on the commitments made in the Refugee Compact should also be monitored and, as a Committee, we intend to play our part. We therefore ask the Government to report to us annually, starting in March 2020, on how the UK is contributing to the Refugee Compact’s objectives.
Government position: Partially Agree
As per the response to recommendation 19, we are supporting and engaged with the development both of robust indicators for the implementation of the GCR, and of a mechanism for tracking implementation of pledges. We are also supportive of proposals that the Global Refugee Forums and intervening high-level officials’ meetings (every two years) will provide the key platform to review progress and implementation. We would expect to report on UK progress against our GCR commitments through these mechanisms and would propose sharing our reporting with the Committee. This would help avoid establishing separate processes and the duplication of existing reporting.
(21)What is clear is that 13 million vulnerable IDPs in Africa are being failed, by their governments and by the international community. DFID must place greater emphasis on targeting and supporting IDPs through its humanitarian and development programmes, working, where appropriate, in partnership with governments to do so.
Government position: Partially Agree
We agree on the need to put more emphasis on IDPs however IDPs remain the primary responsibility of their respective governments and the International Community should play a supporting role. To emphasise, most IDPs in Africa are the result of internal conflicts, with people displaced by natural hazards limited in number and in terms of displacement duration and distance. Access to IDPs in internal conflict contexts is increasingly difficult and the UK Government continuously calls for respect of international humanitarian law and the Kampala convention. We also acknowledge that in most contexts it is the populations hosting IDPs that bear the greatest burden and also need to be supported by their governments and the international community.
(22)DFID must also make greater efforts to define this stream of work and to establish exactly who they are providing support to and where. This is essential if DFID wishes to ensure IDPs are not “left behind” as the world strives to achieve the SDGs.
Government position: Agree
DFID is a significant humanitarian donor in African countries with the highest IDP populations—DRC, South Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Somalia. However, in these contexts DFID and its humanitarian partners do face challenges around clearly defining and delineating work to support IDPs given issues around classification, registration and access that the IDC’s report has also highlighted. Accordingly, we agree with the need for a more robust international framework that could better enable the profiling of IDPs.
This is why the UK is working with UN Member States and the UN Secretary General to establish a UN High Level Panel on IDPs. The overarching goal of the High-Level Panel will be to galvanise political and operational action to reduce the number of internally displaced persons and provide more effective protection and assistance, including work to consider issues relating to definition and identification.
(23)DFID should support partner governments in Africa to fully implement the word and spirit of the Kampala Convention, and encourage those countries that have not yet signed up to do so.
Government position: Agree
The UK supports the Kampala Convention, which provides a foundation to better protect and consider the needs of internally displaced persons in Africa. We are supporting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to work with African States to adopt and implement the Kampala Convention through our core funding of £63 million per year. The UK is the second largest donor to the ICRC. We will support possible initiatives by the African Union to strengthen the implementation of the Kampala convention.
(24)DFID’s approach to forced displacement must look at the whole cycle of displacement, from tackling root causes to providing long-term, durable solutions for refugees and IDPs.
Government position: Agree
DFID is exceeding the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) commitment of spending at least 50% of our budget in fragile states. DFID is committed to genuinely tackling the drivers of conflict and building long-term stability through applying the Building Stability Framework across our development portfolio in fragile and conflict affected states. This also includes making practical changes to DFID’s operating model (staffing, skills, geographies, processes, incentives). In addition, DFID is working with the multilateral system to address conflict drivers proactively, adopt politically informed approaches, and ensure earlier and more joined-up engagement to support key moments on the road to stability. DFID has also tripled its funding to the Peacebuilding Fund, the SG’s only dedicated mechanism to support conflict prevention.
Further, recognising that violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law are key drivers of displacement, the UK’s Humanitarian Reform Policy prioritises the protection of civilians and commits to ensuring that UK funded organisations place protection at the centre of their work. We are also clear in our support for durable solutions for refugees and IDPs, as per the response to recommendation 14. This includes returns (where voluntary and conducted in safety, dignity and in line with international refugee law and international human rights law) and resettlement, including the UK’s own resettlement offer.
(25)We therefore add our voice to the call for global action on internal displacement, including the establishment of a UN High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, to encourage attention at the highest levels of Government. We recommend that DFID continue to support—and push for—the panel to be launched this year, to mark the 10th anniversary of the Kampala Convention.
Government position: Agree
The UK is and will continue to work with the UN and member states to support the UN Secretary General to establish a High-Level Panel on internally displaced persons. We believe that the 10th anniversary of the Kampala Convention is an opportune time for the Secretary General to establish this Panel. DFID views the response to Internally Displaced Persons as part of a better development response to protracted crises more broadly. This requires better planning, anticipation, flexibility, long-term strategies and support and stronger evidence. Fundamentally, internally displaced persons should not have to wait until a crisis is fully resolved before they can begin to rebuild their lives.
(26)DFID needs to find ways to effectively support local and community-based organisations, including those led by women, who are vital partners in forced displacement crises in Africa. It must also find an effective way of tracking the proportion of humanitarian funding that is directed to national and local responders, in line with the Grand Bargain commitments.
Government position: Partially Agree
DFID recognises the importance of supporting and building the capacity of national and local organisations and communities to manage risk, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. DFID has committed not only to protect women and girls, but also empower them to participate in and lead responses. DFID recognises the specific role of local women’s rights and women-led organisations to deliver more effective and safer responses. We believe that greater engagement of local partners ensures continuity as efforts shift to the medium/longer term.
DFID also continues to support the Grand Bargain commitment to a global “aggregated target of at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible”. We recognise that developing a consistent, accurate, and efficient global approach to measuring this has proven a challenging task for many actors. However, DFID continues to work with the Grand Bargain Workstream to explore practical options for doing so, for example with OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service and the IATI. We are also encouraging all our partners to publish their data to IATI, including information about their downstream partners, which will help provide a clearer picture of support to local and national actors. In addition, the UK is working with the informal Friends of Gender Group to develop specific gender indicators for priority workstreams.
(27)Following last year’s DFID Supplier Review, DFID should provide an update—alongside its response to this Report—on its progress in diversifying its supplier base in humanitarian situations, including forced displacement crises.
Government position: Agree
Legally DFID is bound by the public procurement regulations, and therefore cannot specify or require a given proportion of funding go to local suppliers. However, we have taken a number of actions within the regulatory framework to diversify our supplier base and encourage greater participation by local suppliers. DFID’s new multi-disciplinary framework has a total of 78 lead suppliers and 472 subcontractors. The Humanitarian specific Lot consists of 27 humanitarian suppliers and 86 subcontractors, allowing DFID to quickly mobilise in humanitarian situations as required. This framework supports our existing strategic Humanitarian Emergency Response Operations and Stabilisation contract. We also require prime supply partners to submit an annual declaration which outlines how they will continue to sustain and deliver through local suppliers, the data will be used to inform our Strategic Commissioning Strategies.
(28)DFID should continue to pioneer and support cash-based programming in forced displacement crises, scaling up provision where it is appropriate, and feasible, to do so.
Government position: Agree
The UK is committed to more than double the proportion of our humanitarian funding that is cash. DFID has seen significant growth in the use of cash since the 2016 baseline and this growth is not limited to forced displacement crises but can be seen across all contexts where we support the use of cash. Providing cash to people affected by forced displacement ensures that they are able to make their own choices to meet the varied needs that displacement may generate. DFID promotes the use of single transfers of cash that meet multiple needs and continues to invest through means that improve access and protect recipients.
(29)DFID should push its major partners, such as UNHCR, to provide multi-year funding to smaller organisations on the ground. It should also encourage other major aid donors to provide sustainable, predictable multi-year funding for humanitarian emergencies, including refugee crises. Reform in this area is taking too long and must be addressed as a matter of urgency.
Government position: Agree
Multi-year humanitarian programming is the default option for the UK, in line with our Grand Bargain commitments. As a donor, our core, unearmarked funding is provided on a multiyear basis while an increasing proportion of our bilateral funding is also provided as multiyear commitment. The UK provided 89% of its humanitarian funding in multi-year agreements in 2017 (£1,249 million), and 90% in 2018. We will continue to encourage others to do the same and have an expectation that our UN partners pass such multiyear commitments down to their partners. UNHCR has undertaken work in recent years to support these efforts. It has undertaken a pilot—the ‘multiyear multi partner’ approach—which has sought to scale up the number of operations providing multiyear funding to partners. 22 operations were supported to adopt this approach in 2018. We will continue to work with UNHCR to support them to develop the systems that enable them to plan and fund for the longer-term.
(30)DFID should ensure that, where it is responding to displacement crises, its humanitarian and development work is joined up. It should also ensure that is the case amongst their partners. DFID has a good reputation amongst donors and aid agencies and its country offices can play a key convening role, bringing together organisations working in countries where a joined-up development and humanitarian response to displacement is essential.
Government position: Agree
The UK strives to respond to forced displacement through coherent humanitarian, development and peacebuilding programmes and collaborative approaches, in respect of humanitarian principles. The UK launched for instance a new £84 million, 5-year programme in Kenya to support self-reliance among refugees and host communities. This programme will also support a challenge fund to promote market-led solutions to challenges that refugees face such as access to water and energy. In Lebanon, DFID and other donors funded formal public education for just over 213,000 non-Lebanese boys and girls in the 2017/18 school year. In Somalia the UK is working to ensure IDPs have sustainable access to housing, land and property. In Burundi, the UK is working through the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to support the livelihoods of up to 12,000 households affected by the current political and economic crisis, including IDPs.
The UK constantly reviews how it can strengthen coherent approaches to forced displacement and resilience across our entire portfolio and we will continue to do so including ahead of the next round of departmental business planning. To support coherent humanitarian, development and peacebuilding approaches to crises and forced displacement among aid providers and partners, the UK co-drafted with Germany and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility, the DAC Recommendation on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, adopted by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in February 2019.
(31)Programmes funded by UK aid should be driven by the primary objective of protecting people on the move, including the most vulnerable refugees, and not by the desire to control migration to Europe. This must be reflected in all the UK’s work in this area, including through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, where the UK should use its position to push for progressive programmes, which prioritise protecting and supporting the most vulnerable.
Government position: Partially Agree
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) aims to address the drivers of irregular migration and forced displacement and contribute to better migration management in three key African regions (Sahel and Lake Chad, North Africa and the Horn of Africa), with a particular focus on the main migratory routes toward Europe. It focuses its efforts in four key areas: (i) contributing to better migration management; (ii) improving governance and preventing conflicts; (iii) providing economic and employment opportunities; and (iv) enhancing resilience, addressing the needs of refugees and the most vulnerable.
The EUTF is a key element of joint efforts by European and African partners to respond to the situation along the African routes, including the dangers faced by migrants and refugees in transit. The EUTF is closely aligned to the UK’s own efforts and strategic objectives on migration ‘upstream’ and we welcome its efforts to develop a coherent and strategic set of programmes on a ‘whole-of-route’ basis. The EUTF rightly includes a strong focus on work to protect and support the most vulnerable, and the UK has used its engagement with the European Commission and other partners to press for further work in this area (e.g. through support for the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in the Horn of Africa). But we judge that such work, in and of itself, would be insufficient to address the challenges of better managing migration, preventing harmful outcomes, and meeting the needs of migrants and refugees themselves. Those challenges are best addressed by the broader work undertaken by the EUTF across its four areas of work.
(32)DFID should continue to invest in creating a body of evidence to underpin its work on addressing the root causes of forced displacement. This should be separate, but linked to, work establishing the root causes of economic migration as there will be commonalities, but also key differences. Programmes in this area must be based on solid, context-specific evidence to avoid unintended consequences.
Government position: Agree
DFID is on track to double its spend on humanitarian research and innovation to £22m per annum by 2020/21. This includes significant investments to understand and respond to forced displacement; protection of people affected by conflict; and how to deliver essential services during crises. Conflict is the main cause of forced displacement, and DFID research includes a recent £29 million investment in understanding the causes of cross-border conflict, and £6 million on securing peace deals. DFID also committed £70 million to climate research last year through the International Climate Finance initiative, contributing to early warning to mitigate natural disasters and displacement. In addition, research on root causes of economic migration is included in a range of economic, governance, and urban research programmes, all of which include strong contextual analysis. DFID research is used across HMG, and by the international system, particularly by UN organisations working on conflict, humanitarian response, and forced migration to inform policy and programmes.
(33)We remain deeply concerned about the UK Government’s engagement in Libya and Sudan. In its response, we ask that the Government supplies us with the full details of its migration and displacement-related spending in both Libya and Sudan, including all Official Development Assistance (ODA) spend. The Government must also outline precisely what it is doing to safeguard against breaches of the ‘do no harm’ principle in both countries, uphold human rights and protect migrants and refugees at risk.
Government position: Partially Agree
Sudan Response: DFID provides £7.6 million to protect migrants, victims of trafficking and refugees, with three objectives: build the evidence base of challenges faced by migrants in Sudan, provide direct assistance to victims of trafficking, migrants and refugees, support durable solutions, integration and voluntary return.
DFID funds 3 migration programmes in Sudan:
i)Routes Based Migration Response Programme: (£5.6m). Builds evidence using the 4Mi methodology, provides direct assistance, supports durable solutions.
ii)Children on the Move: (£1.6m). Strengthens systems for child victims of trafficking.
iii)Kassala Safe House Project (£400k): Provides assistance and protection for asylum seekers.
DFID provides £18.8 million to protect and support refugees in Sudan, including; £16 million immediate protection, £2.5 million for cash payments, £2.8 million for Education. DFID is providing £45 million to provide food assistance to IDPs in Darfur, through cash and vouchers.
There are four migration programmes via the £1 million Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF): support to regional migration policy, reporting and analysis on migration, monitoring anti-trafficking, studies on illicit finance linked to human trafficking. ODA spend to the EUTF Khartoum Process is via UK’s 15% member contribution to EUTF budget (€550 million) and a smaller bilateral contribution (€3 million).
DFID and FCO recognise the risks to vulnerable migrants and refugees including risks of safeguarding and human rights abuses. These risks are managed through detailed cataloguing of reported incidents in a register that was presented to Ministers via Info Notes in Oct 2018 and Dec 2018.
Libya Response: We agree that it is important for the committee to have full information on our engagement on migration and displacement in Libya, and refer them to recent exchanges of letters between Minister Burt and Thangam Debbonaire MP, and between Lord Bates and Lord Boswell, in which this information is comprehensively set out—including details of how we safeguard against breaches of the “do no harm” principle.
(34) The UK Government should create a national strategy on migration and forced displacement to:
- bring much-needed clarity and transparency to its approach to migration and forced displacement;
- consolidate the work that DFID is doing in this area with the work of other government departments and identify areas of conflict or potential collaboration;
- facilitate greater cross-government working on migration and forced displacement, including the continuation of regular working group meetings with high-level officials from relevant departments; and
- create a coherent narrative that reflects the UK’s position as a progressive voice in the debate on displacement and migration, and its responsibilities towards some of the world’s most vulnerable people.
Government position: Disagree
The Government already takes an integrated approach to migration and forced displacement. On migration, the UK’s coordinated approach is set out in the Illegal Migration Strategy, which aims to improve asylum and returns processes and combat organised immigration crime and modern slavery, as well as to promote safe and regular migration in line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. This strategy is overseen at both senior official and ministerial level. The Government’s strategy on forced displacement is to address the drivers of conflict, instability and lack of economic opportunities in key source countries, as set out in the Building Stability Framework and elsewhere. Regular cross-government meetings ensure coherence and facilitate cross-departmental working, including the NSSIG (National Security Secretariat Implementation Group) on migration, which also has scope to consider forced displacement.
At the global level, DFID is also leading UK Government efforts to secure more coordinated global management of migration and displacement through the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. Taken together these Compacts offer an internationally agreed, cohesive and forward-leaning framework to address large-scale movement of people. We do not need an additional national strategy.
Published: 27 June 2019