



House of Commons
International Development
Committee

**DFID's Economic
Development Strategy**

Sixth Report of Session 2017–19

*Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report*

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The International Development Committee

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Committee reports are published on the [Committee's website](#) and in print by Order of the House. Evidence relating to this Report is published on the relevant [inquiry page](#) of the Committee's website.

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Summary

We welcome the account taken by DFID and Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) of past scrutiny recommendations on economic development and work with the private sector. Ever since the publication of its Economic Development Strategy, DFID has continued to adapt its approach in response to recommendations by ICAI, for example developing new programmes and diagnostic tools with a greater emphasis on key thematic issues such as inclusion, gender equality and combating climate change.

The Economic Development Strategy cannot be a one-size-fits-all. It needs to avoid becoming either a set of bland aspirations or a straitjacket. This will be achieved by careful calibration to fit with, and meet, the specific demands and priorities of each individual country programme and the characteristics and ambitions of each developing country. We therefore welcome DFID's focus on its country diagnostic tools and CDC's emphasis on constant dialogue with DFID's in-country, and sectoral, teams. We note the Department's aim of standardising its diagnostic tools and look forward to the highest standards of inclusion, consultation and partnership becoming the benchmark.

Overall, we recommend that DFID maintains its focus on what will have the best and most equitable results for the poorest in the world and how trade and investment can best contribute to this; trade with the UK, including opportunities arising from exiting the EU; and trade with middle income countries, including opportunities promoted by the impact of the Prosperity Fund.

Introduction

1. In January 2017, DFID published its Economic Development Strategy: *Prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges*.¹ This document built on the Economic Development Strategic Framework of 2014² which our predecessor Committee scrutinised in its 2015 report, *Jobs and Livelihoods*.³ Although the 2017 initiative is DFID's first official, self-standing, 'economic development strategy', DFID has a tradition of encouraging economic development, including by working with the private sector, starting under the leadership of Rt Hon Clare Short as Secretary of State (1997-2003) with prominent examples such as its support for M-Pesa,⁴ the ever-expanding, smartphone-based, financing and microfinancing service.⁵

2. Predecessor Committees have reported on this subject before: in 2006 with *Private sector development work*⁶ and the *Jobs and Livelihoods* report in 2015.⁷ The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) which reports to us, has also contributed to scrutiny of these issues with reviews in the past few years of:

- *DFID's Private Sector Development Work* (May 2014);⁸
- *Business in Development* (May 2015);⁹ and
- *DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa, A learning review* (June 2017).¹⁰

In February of this year our ICAI Sub-Committee took evidence from the ICAI Commissioners and DFID on the ICAI review of *DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa*.¹¹ ICAI has just published its follow-up work on its recommendations from this review.¹²

3. The Committee and Parliament have also been closely following the work of the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). In 2011 our predecessor Committee looked at the corporation's future.¹³ The National Audit Office carried out scrutiny of CDC in 2016¹⁴ and the Public Accounts Committee reported on it in April 2017.¹⁵ Also, our predecessor Committee examined DFID witnesses in relation to the Commonwealth Development Corporation Bill in 2017 (now enacted) which proposed increasing the maximum limit on its investments from £1.5bn to £6bn (with the potential to increase to

1 DFID [Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges](#), January 2017

2 DFID [Economic development for shared prosperity and poverty reduction: a strategic framework](#), 2014

3 International Development Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2014-15, [Jobs and Livelihoods](#), HC 685

4 [M-Pesa](#) is designed to enable customers safely and securely to send, receive and store money via a basic mobile phone. Now at its 11th anniversary it is the world's leading mobile money service having expanded from Kenya and Tanzania to operation in Afghanistan, South Africa, India, Romania and Albania.

5 [Q1](#)

6 International Development Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2005-06, [Private Sector Development](#), HC 921;

7 International Development Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2014-15, [Jobs and Livelihoods](#), HC 685

8 ICAI, [DFID's Private Sector Development Work](#), May 2014, Report 35

9 ICAI, [Business in Development](#), May 2015, Report 43

10 ICAI, [DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa: a Learning Review](#), June 2017

11 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727

12 [ICAI follow-up of 2016-17 reports – new review](#), June 2018

13 International Development Committee Fifth Report of Session 2010-11 [The Future of CDC](#) HC 607

14 NAO, [Department for International Development: investing through CDC](#), November 2016

15 ["CDC must control costs as it faces new investment challenges"](#) Public Accounts Committee, April 2017

£12bn without further primary legislation).¹⁶ ICAI have recently launched a performance review of how effectively CDC has adapted its strategy and operations to help meet DFID's economic development priorities and drive growth in low-income and fragile states.¹⁷

4. Running parallel to our inquiry, the International Trade Committee has been conducting an inquiry into the UK's future trade relationships with developing countries, particularly those in the Commonwealth.¹⁸ We discuss trade in this report as an integral part of the Economic Development Strategy, but we have tried not to duplicate the work our colleagues are currently carrying out.

5. This report does not seek to summarise or replicate the work that has gone before or to duplicate work in parallel but to build on it, following up on the conclusions and recommendations made in the past. It has been a short inquiry which has involved a call for written evidence and an oral evidence session with CDC and DFID. The aim has been to monitor DFID's responsiveness to previous concerns and whether new concerns have been raised. In this report we look at the specific issues raised in past reports and the written evidence, such as how the strategy includes support for marginalised groups.

16 [Oral evidence taken on 10 November 2016](#), HC (2015-16) 686, Qq43-46

17 ICAI Approach Paper, [CDC's investments in low income and fragile states](#), 29 May 2018

18 International Trade Committee: [Trade and the Commonwealth: developing countries](#)

1 The Strategy

6. DFID's bilateral economic development spending for 2017/18 is estimated to be £1.9bn. This has increased from £1.1bn in 2012/13.¹⁹ In 2017/18 this was 31% of total DFID bilateral programming spend.²⁰

7. Economic development expenditure is, however, not identified separately by, for instance, Development Tracker (Devtracker)²¹ - DFID's expenditure transparency tool. Devtracker lists the top ten themes for DFID spending as follows:

Top 10 Things We Do



Project budgets for each sector [FY18/19]

8. A Development Initiatives report on the enabling environment for private sector development found the UK to be the second largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for such purposes after the USA. In 2015, the UK invested \$1.34 billion compared to the United States' \$1.65 billion and Germany's \$1.26 billion.²²

9. The Economic Development Strategy (see Box 1 for its key messages) asserts that:

These priorities will support economic development overseas whilst benefitting the UK at home. Our priorities will help build Britain's trading partners of the future, and advance Britain's national security and foreign policy interests. We will assist poor countries to finance their own development, harness their rapidly growing young populations and overcome the need for aid.²³

19 Figures supplied by DFID:

- Includes CDC, bilateral programme spend (country office and centrally managed programmes)
- Does not include multilaterals (except for Private Infrastructure Development Group)

20 Plus core PIDG multilateral funding in 2017/18.

21 [Development Tracker](#)

22 Development Initiatives, [The enabling environment for private sector development](#), March 2018

23 DFID [Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges](#), January 2017

Lord Bates, DFID's Minister-of-State with responsibility for the strategy, told us:

You have to create wealth and find ways of creating wealth in order to eradicate extreme poverty. As I said right at the beginning, that simply cannot be done with \$140 billion of aid flows when there is a need for \$3.5 trillion.²⁴

Melinda Bohannon, Head of Growth and Resilience at DFID, said “The whole point of the Economic Development Strategy is to give us that momentum and that clarity of vision, to which we then want country teams to respond.”²⁵

10. *We look to DFID to ensure that the responses of individual country teams maintain a focus on wealth creation that includes marginalised groups, takes account of sustainable development and generates revenue for national governments to spend in appropriate ways.*

Box 1: DFID's Economic Development Strategy key messages:

DFID's Economic Development Strategy will deliver by:

- Focusing on trade as an engine for poverty reduction
- Stimulating investment to spur economic growth in developing countries
- Supporting countries to mobilise their own domestic resources, improve their enabling environment for business and reduce reliance on aid
- Focusing on sectors that can unlock growth
- Making it easier for companies – including from the UK – to enter and invest in markets of the future
- Supporting our partner countries to harness new technologies for growth and look to emerging and innovating economic sectors
- Working with, and challenging, the City of London to become the ‘development finance hub of choice’
- Using country presence, knowledge and expertise to bring economic opportunity to some of the world's most fragile states
- Building a sharper focus on nutrition, human development and skills for work into economic development programmes
- Focusing on the poorest and most marginalised people, the majority of whom work in the informal sector
- Establishing new links both in the UK and internationally with civil society organisations and other innovative partners.

Source: DFID [Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges](#), January 2017

24 Q29

25 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q24

11. The recent ICAI review of DFID's work on inclusive growth in Africa noted a 'broad consensus amongst external stakeholders, including academic experts and development NGOs, that [an economic transformation focus] was the right direction-of-travel'. The review also welcomed the Economic Development Strategy which, it said, represented a 'much clearer articulation of DFID's objectives and overall approach'.²⁶ Much of our evidence was similar in tone to ICAI's view, with submissions broadly supporting the strategy (with the Overseas Development Institute questioning why it had taken so long for DFID to develop one.)²⁷ The typical thrust of submissions to us comprised a welcome for the overall approach, with additional suggestions of themes that merit further emphasis within the strategy; for example, gender,²⁸ climate change²⁹ and decent work.³⁰

Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)

12. The CDC is a vital component of DFID's Economic Development Strategy. CDC is the UK's development finance institution (DFI), a company owned by DFID. Graham Wrigley, Chair of CDC told us: "Our strategy is all about driving patient capital to the poorest parts of the world."³¹ He described the relationship with DFID and the Economic Development Strategy as follows: "DFID has a general development strategy and economic development is one subset of that overall strategy. CDC, with its provision of patient capital, is one subset of the Economic Development Strategy. It is very complementary."³²

13. CDC invests in private enterprise projects in developing countries, primarily by buying shares in companies which would otherwise find it difficult to attract investment. In line with World Bank objectives for its lending activity, CDC aims to demonstrate the commercial viability of such investments and hence catalyse further financing for commercial sources.

14. CDC has recently undergone a period of change:

- i) its investment strategy now allows it to make direct investments as well as investing through intermediaries³³; and
- ii) its list of eligible countries for new investments now consists exclusively of African and South Asian countries.

15. In 2017 CDC published a new 5-year strategy³⁴ with changes aimed at significantly increasing CDC's effectiveness in terms of contributing to meeting DFID's objectives and priorities (see Box 2). Its mission statement is: "to support the building of businesses throughout Africa and South Asia, to create jobs and make a lasting difference to people's lives in some of the world's poorest places."³⁵

26 [DFID Response to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact recommendations on: DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa, June 2017, August 2017](#)

27 Overseas Development Institute ([EDS0026](#)), para 3

28 CARE International UK ([EDS0009](#)), ActionAid UK ([EDS0027](#)), Gender and Development Network ([EDS0021](#))

29 WWF ([EDS0011](#)), CAFOD ([EDS0008](#)), Bond ([EDS0015](#))

30 Bond ([EDS0015](#)), CAFOD ([EDS0008](#)), Fairtrade Foundation ([EDS0020](#))

31 Q3

32 Q3

33 Changes introduced in 2012 enabled CDC to invest directly into companies, such that by 2016 around 60% of the portfolio was invested in funds and 40% directly through equity or debt instruments

34 CDC, [Investing to transform lives, Strategic framework 2017–2021, CDC: the UK's development finance institution, 2017](#)

35 CDC, [Investing to transform lives, Strategic framework 2017–2021, CDC: the UK's development finance institution, 2017](#)

Box 2: CDC's 5-year strategic priorities**Developmental**

- Invest only in Africa and South Asia, where the world's poorest people live.
- Prioritise investing in poorer and more fragile countries, and the sectors that create the most jobs.
- Develop a world-class framework to maximise our impact. We will integrate this with our investment process and deepen our development expertise.
- Mobilise private capital alongside our investments, and find new ways to partner with investors to increase our own impact.
- Achieve a broad range of impacts in addition to our main aim of creating jobs.
- Support the UN Global Goals, including women's economic empowerment and climate change.
- Undertake more evaluations to enhance our understanding of the best ways to support long-term positive change in our markets.

Responsible

- Set high environmental, social and business integrity standards and provide practical assistance to businesses and investment fund managers.
- Always ensure our capital or expertise supplements what private investors will provide
- Increase our transparency and strengthen our approach to tax practice amongst development finance institutions (DFIs).

Innovative

- Invest to transform whole sectors.
- Invest in new business models and nascent or failed markets.
- Take calculated risks to unlock impact we could not otherwise achieve.

Enduring

- Build our team of outstanding professionals, who are dedicated to achieving development impact through their commercial judgement.
- Expand our local presence by opening country offices
- Manage and mitigate risks, recognising they are inherent in our mission, through continuous improvement of our risk policies and procedures.

Source: [Investing to transform lives, Strategic framework 2017–2021, CDC: the UK's development finance institution, 2017](#)

16. Our CDC witnesses were candid about the implications of an increased focus on riskier ventures in less stable business environments. Nick O'Donohoe, CDC's Chief Executive Officer, told us:

The shift into fragile, more challenging states began in 2012. If you look at CDC today, more than 50% of our new investment goes into fragile and conflict states, under DFID's definition. To put that into perspective, it is more than twice as the percentage in the other major development finance institutions. Principally, we have used the strategy that was developed in 2012, long before I came. We should feel proud of the fact that of all the

development finance institutions, CDC is the one that is evidentially the most focused on fragile and conflict states. That is one of the things that we are measured on in terms of where our money is invested.³⁶

The corollary of this was that, as Graham Wrigley, CDC Chair, conceded: “We put on record that the new strategy we have been moving towards is taking on more risk, and we think returns will go down in CDC over the next five years compared to what they have been in the last five years.”³⁷

2 Past criticisms and responses

17. ICAI's reviews of DFID's economic development work in 2014 and 2015, both resulted in Amber/Red ratings.³⁸ The criticisms were very similar in successive reviews: ICAI found:

- failure to translate high ambitions into a workable reality;
- poor knowledge of the private sector and where DFID might add value; and
- poor oversight, co-ordination and learning.

18. In June 2017, ICAI reviewed DFID's work on 'Inclusive Growth in Africa' and, despite giving DFID a Green/Amber rating³⁹, it repeated warnings over DFID's ambitions being welcome but spread too thinly; and identified that there were many challenges ahead. We consider these criticisms and how they have been followed up by DFID.

Ambitions vs reality

19. ICAI criticised DFID in its 2014 report for not turning ambitions into clear guidance to develop a realistic, well-balanced and joined-up portfolio of country-level programmes—Amber/Red.⁴⁰ Again in 2015, ICAI praised DFID for their high-level ambitions but concluded that they had to do far more to translate these into detailed operational plans and concrete targets—Amber/Red.⁴¹

20. In response to ICAI's criticism that there was a gap between project monitoring and the overall impact, DFID told our ICAI Sub-Committee earlier this year that it was putting its efforts into really understanding the overall impact of economic transformation on each economy.⁴² Development and improvement of DFID's country-level diagnostic tools, as well as looking at the contributions from centrally-managed programmes, should fill gaps that had been present in past operations.⁴³

21. Fairtrade Foundation recommended that DFID develop a clear 'theory of change' to accompany the strategy to demonstrate: the logic behind their investments more clearly; how DFID was working in different ways with different economic actors; and how DFID was aiming to bring about change for people living in poverty.⁴⁴ The need to incorporate theories of change into programming to ensure the primacy of poverty reduction as an objective is something we also recommended in our recent report on *Definition and Administration of ODA*.⁴⁵ Fairtrade Foundation highlighted that benefits of economic

38 ICAI reviews use a simple 'traffic light' scoring system. The four assessment ratings are: green, green-amber, amber-red and red. Amber/Red means unsatisfactory achievement in most areas, with some positive elements. An area where improvements are required for UK aid to make a positive contribution. [ICAI's Approach to Effectiveness and Value for Money](#)

39 Green/Amber score means satisfactory achievement in most areas, but partial achievement in others. An area where UK aid is making a positive contribution, but could do more

40 ICAI, [DFID's Private Sector Development Work](#), May 2014, Report 35

41 ICAI, [Business in Development](#), May 2015, Report 43

42 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q23

43 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q33

44 Fairtrade Foundation ([EDS0020](#)), para 9

45 International Development Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2017-19, [Definition and administration of ODA](#), HC 547, para 113

growth programming can be captured by established elites, particularly men, and that inequality could increase.⁴⁶ ICAI also recognised this point, Marcus Cox, ICAI Team Leader, told us:

economic transformation as a process tends to create winners and losers, and I think there is an obligation on DFID to be aware of that, to track who is benefiting and who is potentially losing out, and to build in mitigations to make sure that they are not disadvantaging people.⁴⁷

This is something that is recognised by DFID and Rachel Turner, Director of Economic Development told us that they were working to understand how people in all income groups are affected particularly from rural-urban transitions by investing in longitudinal research. She explained:

We have found that one of the most useful ways to deepen our understanding is really to understand and follow people on those journeys from rural to urban.⁴⁸

Strategic oversight

22. ICAI found in its 2015 report *Business in Development* that there was a lack of strategic oversight, with economic development work spread across too many different areas with insufficient strategic oversight. ICAI found weak interaction and information sharing between central and country office programmes as well as a lack of cross-departmental oversight which resulted in diminished learning.⁴⁹ This was repeated in the 2017 report which stated that country offices were not focusing on where DFID had a comparative advantage and was spreading its economic development work too thinly.⁵⁰

23. CDC conceded that, in the past, it was fair to say that CDC and DFID did not always understand what each other were doing. Nick O'Donohoe, Chief Executive Officer since March 2017, said: "When I joined CDC, I spent quite a bit of time travelling around the countries we were investing in, and it was clear that we had not had the close relationships that we needed to have in country with DFID or broadly across Government."⁵¹ We were concerned as to whether CDC and DFID yet worked in as closely an aligned way as possible for maximum impact. In response the Chair of CDC referred to his organisation as a 'subset' of the Economic Development Strategy and 'complementary'.⁵² Graham Wrigley said that both CDC and the Economic Development Strategy had the same goal of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals⁵³— "I describe DFID as a shareholder with clear goals."⁵⁴ In terms of day-to-day practice, Nick O'Donohoe told us: "We are in a constant dialogue with DFID. We are in a constant dialogue at a country level, with not just DFID but the other parts of the UK Government represented on the ground. There is a constant dialogue going on at a country level. ... There is a dialogue at the sector level."⁵⁵

46 Fairtrade Foundation (EDS0020), para 13

47 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q11

48 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q19

49 ICAI, [Business in Development](#), May 2015, Report 43

50 ICAI, [DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa: a Learning Review](#), June 2017

51 Q8

52 Q3

53 Q5

54 Q6

55 Q6

One size fits all

24. We were concerned with the twin risks that the Economic Development Strategy might prove either blandly aspirational or something of a straitjacket for innovative, context-sensitive, country programming. We questioned whether the strategy was a one size fits all approach in light of the ICAI Inclusive Growth report's finding that:

Both the Zambia and Tanzania portfolios illustrate the difficulty of programming for economic transformation when diagnostic work reveals multiple constraints and a political economy that has not always delivered the degree of policy consistency needed to support increased investment. As a result, both country offices continue to invest most of their resources in agriculture, with a range of interventions aimed at different socio-economic strata, including those who are 'hanging in'. This is consistent with their diagnostic work, but notably more realistic than the Economic Development Strategy about the prospects for economic transformation and job creation over the short-to-medium term.⁵⁶

25. However, DFID has asserted that, due to its country diagnostic tools to support country planning, programming was indeed context-specific.⁵⁷ These country diagnostic tools are now being updated and piloted to go "one notch ... further" toward understanding "the underpinnings of economic transformation alongside state capability, resilience, human capital, governance, and conflict, so that country offices can make choices about their economic development priorities."⁵⁸ However, striking an appropriate balance between strategic direction from the centre, and the tactical wisdom in-country, is not straightforward. ICAI's follow-up to its review of DFID's support for inclusive growth in Africa noted that a focus on economic transformation and job creation should not come at the expense of supporting the development of livelihoods for the poorest. ICAI had recommended that DFID should provide more guidance for country programmes on portfolios that balance long-term structural change and job creation with effort to increase incomes for the poor in existing livelihood areas. DFID had partially accepted this recommendation but ICAI noted that the Department had not committed to developing any new guidance in this area, preferring to let country offices make their own decisions on sequencing and balance.⁵⁹

Monitoring and measurement of results

26. The Economic Development Strategy says it will monitor results in different ways (See Box 3):

56 ICAI, [DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa: a Learning Review](#), June 2017, para 4.43

57 DFID, [DFID Response to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact recommendations on: DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa](#), 2 August 2017

58 Q38

59 [ICAI follow-up of 2016-17 reports – new review](#), June 2018

Box 3: Economic Development Strategy sample indicators

Sector	Sample indicators
Jobs and incomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of women and men supported to have better jobs or higher incomes
Infrastructure, energy and urban development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Megawatts of energy and clean energy capacity installed Number of women, men or firms with new and/or improved access to energy and clean energy Number of cities with new and/or improved urban economic development strategies Proportion of the target population that has new and/or improved access to public transport
Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of women and men farmers with new and/or improved access to agriculture and livestock markets Value and volume of production (per labour unit as appropriate) Prevalence of food insecurity and/or dietary diversity
Manufacturing, trade and services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trade logistics performance index Foreign Direct Investment inflows
Natural resource wealth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Actions/activities supported for countries to become/maintain Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative-compliant status Resource Governance Index score
Insurance and finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amount of disaster finance delivered through insurance-based systems Number of women with access to financial services Domestic credit to the private sector
Female economic empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of women supported to improve their rights to land and property Number of DFID countries with improved performance in the Women, Business and Law data

Source: DFID [Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges](#), January 2017

27. ICAI recommended improved DFID monitoring to help the Department to understand the impact of individual programmes on the overall transformation of the economy.⁶⁰ Rachel Turner, Director of Economic Development at DFID, said that DFID was working on “what is happening on the overall transformation piece” and the “series of complex issues” in the overall economy.⁶¹ Melinda Bohannon, Head of Growth and Resilience said that DFID was keen to take the monitoring and evaluation “out of its box” to make it more systematic to a country’s approach.⁶² ***We expect to hear how this approach is evolving, and its impact, when the Department replies to this report and/or in subsequent ICAI follow-up work.***

Staff expertise

28. The 2014⁶³ and 2015⁶⁴ ICAI reports as well as our predecessor Committee’s *Jobs and Livelihoods* report⁶⁵ questioned the knowledge of DFID on economic development and the private sector. DFID now has its first dedicated directorate for economic development and is strengthening staff capacity. Rachel Turner told us that they had spent the last year scaling up their teams, making a specific effort to bring skills in from the financial sector and increasing the size of the team with trade policy skills.⁶⁶ DFID also now has a

60 ICAI, [DFID’s approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa: a Learning Review](#), June 2017

61 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q23

62 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q24

63 ICAI, [DFID’s Private Sector Development Work](#), May 2014, Report 35

64 ICAI, [Business in Development](#), May 2015, Report 43

65 International Development Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2014-15, [Jobs and Livelihoods](#), HC 685, para 80

66 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q21

seconded from the Office for National Statistics to help them with the job creation figures and analysis of the labour market.⁶⁷ The 2017 ICAI review recognised that DFID had come a long way in building up its expertise.⁶⁸

Additionality & mobilisation

29. The issue of additionality⁶⁹ has featured in past concerns of donors working with the private sector. CDC's main purposes are to act as a pathfinder or trailblazer for the commercial sector as well as bridging gaps and supplementing where the private market will not yet provide finance and take on risk. CDC's approach to additionality was agreed in 2014 following an external review. CDC told us it is approaching this difficult topic with "clarity, honesty and objectivity – ensuring additionality in every investment and independent verification of this taking place."⁷⁰ Nick O'Donohoe told us that:

Last year [mobilisation] ... was about \$800 million. That includes other DFIs as well as private capital. One of the key strategic goals of the new strategy is to increase our mobilisation efforts. Yesterday, for example, we hosted an event in the City of London drawing together mainstream investors to talk about how we could get more of their capital into the countries in which we invest, so it is a critically important part. On additionality, I could give you a very long answer. The short answer is that we aspire for all our investments to be additional. That can mean financial additionality, meaning that we are investing somewhere that no one else would invest, but equally it can also mean value additionality. It can mean that we have an effect on the way this company is managed and run that we believe is different from other sources of capital. We look at both.⁷¹

Decent work

30. Our predecessor committee's *Jobs and Livelihoods* report highlighted that it should not just be any job that is created and supported by DFID programmes but good jobs.⁷² ICAI's 2017 report highlighted that DFID's log frames⁷³ did not pay attention to the quality of jobs created.⁷⁴

31. This concern is evident still in the submissions received for this inquiry. The Gender & Development Network observed that DFID stops short of using the language of 'decent work' in the Economic Development Strategy which is not in line with the UK Government's commitments under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8. CARE International recommended that DFID needed to improve the current 'weak focus' on decent work in the strategy. It said that DFID needed indicators to track the quality of jobs

67 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q35

68 ICAI, [DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa: a Learning Review](#), June 2017

69 Investments should only be undertaken where they are additional to what the local market would already offer i.e. providing funding for investments that would not have otherwise have received it.

70 CDC Group ([EDS0023](#))

71 Q24

72 International Development Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2014-15, [Jobs and Livelihoods](#), HC 685

73 A Logical Framework Approach is a project design methodology that provides a systematic structure for identifying, planning and managing projects. It was developed in the United States for USAID and has been adopted and adapted for use by other major donors including DFID and the EC.

74 ICAI, [DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa: a Learning Review](#), June 2017

created.⁷⁵ There was also a call for the UK Government to support the new ILO Convention on ending violence and harassment in the world of work.⁷⁶ Bond's joint submission by its Private Sector Working Group, Decent Work Group, and Sustainable Development Goals Group called for the promotion of the ILO's decent work standards. It also recommended that CDC must develop a set of minimum standards on decent work to be used by CDC as a whole, as well as investees, to guide investment decisions and called for DFID to support worker 'representation, voice and agency'.⁷⁷

Climate change and the environment

32. A common theme through the submissions was a recommendation that DFID's Economic Development Strategy should promote sustainable use of natural resources and climate protection. Bond warned that there was a significant risk that economic development could, if not designed appropriately, cause environmental degradation, which in turn increases rather than decreases poverty and adversely affects DFID's broader work around sustainable development.⁷⁸ WWF asked for a clearer recognition by DFID in its Economic Development Strategy that development trajectories should be environmentally sustainable. It also highlighted that negative environmental outcomes from inappropriate economic development were damaging to future economic prospects.⁷⁹

33. WWF recommended that DFID should cease investing in fossil fuels.⁸⁰ CDC told us that it has a policy on coal fired power generation which means it no longer invests in coal-fired power plants and it will be issuing new guidance on heavy fuel oil. Instead, CDC is actively investing in low carbon sectors.⁸¹

34. In response to climate change and environment concerns, DFID is currently working on a set of updated country development diagnostics which consider climate change throughout.⁸² Climate change is also now one of CDC's four key commitment areas in its new strategy. Since 2014, CDC has had a Climate Change Policy to proactively assess climate change risks.⁸³

Marginalised groups

35. ICAI's 2017 report on DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa recommended that:

Building on broader learning on inclusion, DFID should ensure that opportunities for reaching women, young people and marginalised groups are identified and built into programme designs and results frameworks and that distributional impacts are routinely monitored and assessed.⁸⁴

75 CARE International UK ([EDS0009](#))

76 CARE International UK ([EDS0009](#))

77 Bond ([EDS0015](#)), Summary

78 Bond ([EDS0015](#))

79 WWF ([EDS0011](#))

80 WWF ([EDS0011](#))

81 CDC Group ([EDS0023](#)) supplementary

82 CDC Group ([EDS0023](#)) supplementary

83 CDC Group ([EDS0023](#)) supplementary

84 ICAI, [DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa: a Learning Review](#), June 2017

DFID's management response agreed that there was more to do and said:

We will develop analytical tools to track a range of economic development programme level results so that we better understand the impact of our economic development programmes on gender, young people and marginalised groups. ... We will also conduct more in-depth analysis on the barriers to women's economic empowerment in DFID's focus countries.⁸⁵

Gender

36. DFID's Economic Development Strategy said it has ensured that girls and women were at the centre of its economic development work and that it addressed gender inequality, for example, it's collaboration with the World Bank has meant that for the first time the particular challenges faced by women are reflected in the flagship 'Doing Business Index'.⁸⁶

37. The evidence we received suggested that DFID could go further in its work on women's economic development. The Gender and Development Network recommended that DFID take into consideration the structural barriers to women's economic empowerment such as unpaid care work and violence against women and girls.⁸⁷ CARE recognised an opportunity for DFID in conflict and displacement settings to sustain positive changes to gender roles where women's participation in economic activities had already increased.⁸⁸

Disability

38. Sightsavers argued that disability should be a clear priority in the implementation of DFID's Economic Development Strategy. It highlighted the upcoming Global Disability Summit as an opportunity to build an Economic Development Strategy which focused on how to reach people with disabilities. Although Sightsavers recognised that the strategy sets out a positive broad vision, the detail of the implementation regarding disability would be crucial to its success.⁸⁹

Youth

39. Our predecessor Committee report on *Jobs and Livelihoods* focused on the youth factor - with a billion more young people entering the job market, mainly in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa over the next decade.⁹⁰ We questioned the Director of Economic Development at DFID, Rachel Turner, as to why there were not more specific programmes on youth employment. She told us:

We have reached a point in Africa where talking about young people as if they are a small niche and the programmes are targeted on everyone else is just not the reality of the shape of the population. Absolutely, young people are part and parcel of our ambition to the Economic Development Strategy. We do have some interesting programmes that we are developing in east Africa, particularly, that are focusing on young people. There are new

85 DFID, [DFID Response to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact recommendations on: DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa](#), 2 August 2017

86 [DFID Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges](#), January 2017

87 Gender and Development Network ([EDS0021](#)), para 2.2

88 CARE International UK ([EDS0009](#))

89 Sightsavers ([EDS0013](#))

90 [DFID Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges](#), January 2017, Foreword from the Secretary of State

programmes in both Tanzania and Kenya. There is a growing portfolio that is responding to the youth employment challenge. However, the wider piece as well speaks to the need to create jobs for young people.⁹¹

Overall

40. ICAI's follow-up review of its report from 2016-17⁹² (published in June 2018 after we had taken evidence from DFID on its Economic Development Strategy) included a further review of DFID's progress against ICAI's recommendations on inclusive growth (in large measure, a review of DFID's approach to economic development). The Department had accepted 3 out of 4 of ICAI's recommendations and partially accepted one.

41. Of the accepted recommendations, ICAI concluded that new diagnostic development demonstrated good engagement by DFID with the challenges of investment prioritisation (not spreading efforts too thinly) and tackling weaknesses in its analysis of the contribution of the state to economic transformation (being politically smart). In addition, DFID had made practical efforts to lay the foundations for the effective monitoring and understanding of distributional impacts of programmes (who benefits and who remains excluded). **We were disappointed to see that there had been little progress on taking account of DFID's "comparative advantage relative to other development actors" in prioritising interventions.**⁹³

42. We refer to the partially accepted recommendation above. DFID seemed to accept the importance of striking an appropriate balance between job creation via economic transformation and the development of livelihoods for the poor. However, ICAI had called for central guidance and DFID argued that country offices were best-placed to make their own decisions about the proportions and sequencing of interventions in these areas.⁹⁴ *We tend to agree with the Department but DFID should test its confidence in country teams with a programme of review and best practice-sharing.*

43. In responding to the ICAI Sub-Committee on this matter, DFID appeared to be conceding the challenge. Melinda Bohannon, Head of Growth and Resilience cast the issue in terms of agriculture, she told us:

we see it as central to the Economic Development Strategy ambition, for the reason [...] that smallholders working in agriculture make up a significant part of the transformation challenge, and our agriculture policy framework, which was launched before the Economic Development Strategy, sets out quite a strong ambition for how we are going to work in the agriculture space. That speaks to the challenges of working with smallholders to hang in, those that are going to realistically be involved in smallholder farming indefinitely stepping up, so increasing the productivity of those smallholders to increase their incomes, and then stepping out, which is more of the diversification, rural-urban transition piece.⁹⁵

This debate continues as the range of evidence submitted to this inquiry suggests.⁹⁶

91 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q30

92 [ICAI follow-up of 2016-17 reports – new review](#), June 2018

93 [ICAI follow-up of 2016-17 reports – new review](#), June 2018

94 [ICAI follow-up of 2016-17 reports – new review](#), June 2018, pg 29/30

95 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q15

96 ACTIONAID ([EDS0012](#)), Ethical Events Ltd ([EDS0010](#)), AgDevCo ([EDS0004](#)), APPG on Agriculture and Food for Development ([EDS0003](#)), George Gwyer ([EDS0006](#))

3 Going Forward

A different model to Asian success in Africa

44. ICAI wrote in its report on DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa:

There are concerns among some stakeholders and in the literature about the extent to which the Asian model of mass job creation through industrialisation can be replicated in Africa. DFID will need to be realistic about the pace of change and open to the idea that job creation in Africa may take different forms, including a higher level of informality.⁹⁷

DFID were very candid in their acknowledgement of this. Melinda Bohannon, Head of Growth and Resilience recognised that the impact of automation on low skilled labour was an unknown but economic trends were suggesting it could be very high. This meant that DFID's current economic transformation plans were potentially at risk. DFID was watching these trends very carefully and at the same time considering the opportunities of the e-economy which could allow for 'leapfrogging' into new technologies.⁹⁸

Trade opportunity as well as poverty alleviation

45. The Economic Development Strategy puts a new emphasis on the importance of trade for DFID's work. In the foreword to the strategy the previous Secretary of State Rt Hon Priti Patel MP stated:

DFID's ambition will be at the heart of the Government's emerging agenda on international trade and investment, led by the Department for International Trade. We will work across Government to agree trade and investment deals that bring the benefits of trade to every corner of the world. And we will use our voice in the World Trade Organization to promote free trade as one of the bedrocks of global prosperity and stability.⁹⁹

46. The Trade White Paper contains a chapter on *Supporting development countries to reduce poverty*. It states that the Government will help "developing countries break down the barriers to trade" and "This will help them to continue to benefit from trade by growing their economies, increasing incomes and reducing poverty."¹⁰⁰

47. Under World Trade Organisation rules, developed countries can grant non-reciprocal trade preferences to developing countries, imposing lower tariffs on imports from developing countries without obtaining trade preferences in return. The UK already grants trade preferences to least developed countries for 'Everything but Arms' as a member of the EU (under the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences), and has indicated that it will follow a similar approach post-Brexit. The Government has also committed to negotiated arrangements that provide advantages similar to existing free trade agreements for other developing countries. However, there is an option to go further– for example by

97 ICAI, [DFID's approach to supporting inclusive growth in Africa: a Learning Review](#), June 2017

98 Q58

99 DFID [Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges](#), January 2017, Foreword from the Secretary of State

100 [Preparing for our future UK trade policy](#), Cm 9470, October 2017, Chapter 4

granting non-reciprocal trade preferences to all developing countries - after leaving the European Union Customs Union and Single Market. This is currently being examined by our colleagues on the International Trade Committee.¹⁰¹

48. Earlier this year, the Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP, made five pledges for the future of UK aid, the first of which was to:

[...] develop alongside the Department for International Trade a bold new Brexit-ready proposition to boost trade and investment with developing countries and promote sustainable economic development and job creation. Development policy will not exist in a vacuum. It will be part of a joined-up response to the challenges and opportunities we face as a country. This new offer will provide a clear 'win-win' for Britain and the world's poorest.¹⁰²

In a recent speech at Chatham House setting out her vision for DFID she said:

With trade we are developing a new Brexit-ready offer created by both departments and this will connect all we have to offer with the opportunities to invest abroad.

Around 60 of my team are embedded with the Department for Trade to form a joint team responsible for shaping the UK's future trade arrangements with developing countries. We have had a joint executive board with the DIT.¹⁰³

49. Fairtrade Foundation highlighted apprehension amongst African governments and civil society about the Economic Partnership Agreements¹⁰⁴ (EPAs) and the potential for EPAs to require liberalisation that runs counter to domestic industrial strategies. It recommended that the Government:

ensure that any independent post-Brexit trade policy supports rather than undermines the development objectives of partner countries.¹⁰⁵

50. The Gender and Development Network expressed concern that the impacts of trade are "deeply gendered" and that previous aid for trade programmes have been criticised for the lack of data on how they impact on poverty. The Network also argued that poorly designed trade policy can undermine women's rights and deepen existing identity based inequalities. It recommended that DFID's Economic Development Strategy should go further by explicitly committing to a gender responsive approach to trade and investment.¹⁰⁶

51. The APPG on Agriculture and Food for Development warned that DFID's strategic emphasis - broadening to economic growth from poverty reduction - should not lose sight of the core mission of eradicating poverty. To prevent this the APPG says that appropriate measurement processes were needed to allow DFID to track impact on the poorest.¹⁰⁷

101 International Trade Committee: [Trade and the Commonwealth: developing countries](#)

102 "Penny Mordaunt's five pledges for the future of UK aid" DFID, 15 January 2018

103 [The Great Partnership: Delivering Global Britain](#), International Development Secretary Penny Mordaunt's speech at the Chatham House London Conference 2018, 21 June

104 [Economic Partnership Agreements](#) (EPAs) are trade and development agreements negotiated between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partners engaged in regional economic integration processes.

105 Fairtrade Foundation ([EDS0020](#)), para 23

106 Gender and Development Network ([EDS0021](#)), para 6.1/6.2

107 APPG on Agriculture and Food for Development ([EDS0003](#))

52. Dr Stephen Buzdugan, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy at Manchester Metropolitan University, suggested that the insights of the UK's own Industrial Strategy White Paper may increase the effectiveness of DFID's support to inward investment and trade by assisting partner countries increase productivity and integration with global supply chains.¹⁰⁸ Justin Moore of Development Monitor highlighted the trend that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by UK companies in Least Developed Countries (LDC) was less than 1% of total UK outward FDI in 2015 and that the level of UK FDI in LDCs fell nearly 30% from 2014-15.¹⁰⁹ It will be interesting to see if this trend has been reversed under the economic development framework and the Economic Development Strategy as new figures become available. Equally it will be important to assess these figures as the UK exits the European Union. We will also be considering the potential effects of the UK exiting the European Union on DFID and developing countries over the next few months.¹¹⁰

Emphasis on the UK gains

53. In her June speech at Chatham House the Secretary of State Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP said:

We will go much further, working strategically with big business, and building networks of entrepreneurs, civil society, and community groups, to connect them with people and opportunities.

So, as well as seeing us in places like Singapore and Dubai in the future you will also see DFID in Belfast and Glasgow and Newcastle and in fact every region of the UK, talking to local businesses who are keen to bring their expertise and skills to help the world's poorest. As part of a cross-government commercial approach, my teams have already been to Birmingham, Leeds and Cardiff to discuss how businesses there can apply for DFID funding.¹¹¹

54. Bond told us that the Economic Development Strategy's emphasis on UK business and prosperity, and the likely resulting programmes, may present a serious risk to sustainable development and poverty impact outcomes.¹¹² CARE International recommended that DFID's focus should not be on whether the global supplier is British but on whether the value chains fulfil the most development objectives such as incorporating the most women.¹¹³

55. We considered this in our recent inquiry on *Definition and Administration of ODA*.¹¹⁴ In keeping with the UK Aid Strategy, we recommended that poverty reduction should be the central pillar of UK ODA spending. As part of that inquiry we heard extensive evidence about the development of "dual purpose" aid, whereby a development objective forms

108 Manchester Metropolitan University ([EDS0007](#))

109 These figures are based on the latest data from the Office for National Statistics (following a request from Development Monitor), Mr Justin Moore ([EDS0024](#))

110 [International Development Committee announcements](#)

111 [The Great Partnership: Delivering Global Britain](#), International Development Secretary Penny Mordaunt's speech at the Chatham House London Conference 2018, 21 June

112 Bond ([EDS0015](#))

113 CARE International UK ([EDS0009](#))

114 International Development Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2017-19, [Definition and administration of ODA](#), HC 547

the primary objective of an ODA-eligible activity accompanied by a secondary national interest objective, such as increasing trade. Of particular concern to us was the Prosperity Fund which cites its primary objective as poverty reduction and development in partner countries with a secondary benefit of the creation of opportunities for business, including UK business. We recommended that “ODA must be directed primarily at reducing poverty, helping the very poorest and most vulnerable rather than being used as a slush fund to pay for developing the UK’s diplomatic, trade or national security interests.”¹¹⁵

56. In the oral evidence for this inquiry, we noted Rachel Turner’s ‘knock-on’ argument in support of the Prosperity Fund, its focus on middle-income countries, and the creation of opportunities for trade *other* than with the UK. She said that:

If the Prosperity Fund programmes succeed in tackling some of the improvements to the ways these [better regulated, more open, better run, less corrupt and more stable] ... economies are run and the removal of regulatory barriers in many of these better-off countries, that will also help the poorer countries trade with those parts of the world. It will help poorer countries receive better-quality investment from them. It will also drive out some of the systemic causes of corruption, and the Prosperity Fund has quite a strong focus on driving out corruption. Although this is a separate fund, and is stewarded by the overall Aid Strategy, as the Minister said, we feel that, if it works and if the programmes deliver, it will have knock-on benefits for the poorer countries that are our focus.¹¹⁶

115 International Development Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2017-19, [Definition and administration of ODA](#), HC 547, para 112

116 [ICAI follow-up of 2016-17 reports – new review](#), June 2018

4 Conclusion

57. Minister Bates said:

The more economic growth there is, the fewer people there will be in extreme poverty. That has been the story of the past 20 years.¹¹⁷

Melinda Bohannon, Head of Growth and Resilience explained:

The strategy is about driving inclusive growth, spreading the benefits across society and delivering the SDGs.¹¹⁸

58. We welcome these ideals. We also welcome the listening that DFID has done to Parliament and NGOs in both constructing this strategy and in modifying and improving it since its publication. We particularly welcome the changes that are being made to the country diagnostic tools currently being piloted to help inform the individual country plans for example including a greater emphasis on climate change. One area that we would like to continue to monitor is how DFID uses the different levers it has to improve economic development - CDC, bilateral country programmes and centrally managed programmes - to work together for optimum impact. We are yet to be convinced of a seamless joint approach. Our concerns about the Economic Development Strategy are similar to concerns we raised in our recent report, *Definition and administration of ODA*, about the Prosperity Fund - namely, an insufficient focus on poverty reduction and on helping the very poorest and most vulnerable. Although the Secretary of State refers to the "boost" in trade and investment with developing countries as "a clear 'win-win' for Britain and the world's poorest"¹¹⁹ ICAI have highlighted that economic growth produces winners and losers.¹²⁰ It is acceptable for UK companies and the UK government to have 'wins' in trade and investment with least developed countries as long as it can be guaranteed that the most marginalised in developing countries do not become the resulting 'losers'.

117 Q31

118 Q34

119 "Penny Mordaunt's five pledges for the future of UK aid" DFID, 15 January 2018

120 Oral evidence taken on [7 February 2018](#), HC (2017-19) 727, Q1

Conclusions and recommendations

The Strategy

1. *We look to DFID to ensure that the responses of individual country teams maintain a focus on wealth creation that includes marginalised groups, takes account of sustainable development and generates revenue for national governments to spend in appropriate ways. (Paragraph 10)*

Past criticisms and responses

2. *We expect to hear how this approach is evolving, and its impact, when the Department replies to this report and/or in subsequent ICAI follow-up work. (Paragraph 27)*
3. *We were disappointed to see that there had been little progress on taking account of DFID's "comparative advantage relative to other development actors" in prioritising interventions. (Paragraph 41)*
4. *We tend to agree with the Department but DFID should test its confidence in country teams with a programme of review and best practice-sharing. (Paragraph 42)*

Formal minutes

Tuesday 10 July 2018

Members present:

Stephen Twigg, in the Chair

Chris Law Mr Ivan Lewis

Draft Report (*DFID's Economic Development Strategy*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 58 read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

[Adjourned till Wednesday 11 July at 2.10 pm.]

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Tuesday 12 June 2018

Graham Wrigley, Chairman, CDC Group PLC; and **Nick O'Donohoe**, Chief Executive Officer, CDC Group PLC

[Q1–28](#)

Lord Bates, Minister of State for International Development; **Rachel Turner**, Director of Economic Development, Department for International Development; and **Melinda Bohannon**, Head of Growth and Resilience Department, Department for International Development.

[Q29–73](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

EDS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 ACTIONAID ([EDS0012](#))
- 2 ActionAid UK ([EDS0027](#))
- 3 AgDevCo ([EDS0004](#))
- 4 APPG on Agriculture and Food for Development ([EDS0003](#))
- 5 Aviva ([EDS0017](#))
- 6 Bond ([EDS0015](#))
- 7 British Council ([EDS0018](#))
- 8 CAFOD ([EDS0008](#))
- 9 CARE International UK ([EDS0009](#))
- 10 CDC Group ([EDS0023](#))
- 11 CDC Group Annex A ([EDS0031](#))
- 12 Christian Aid ([EDS0029](#))
- 13 Concern Worldwide, Action Against Hunger and RESULTS ([EDS0030](#))
- 14 Department for International Development ([EDS0028](#))
- 15 Dr Konstantinos Baltas ([EDS0005](#))
- 16 Ethical Events Ltd ([EDS0010](#))
- 17 Fairtrade Foundation ([EDS0020](#))
- 18 FSD Africa ([EDS0022](#))
- 19 Gender and Development Network ([EDS0021](#))
- 20 George Gwyer ([EDS0006](#))
- 21 International Growth Centre ([EDS0014](#))
- 22 International Rescue Committee ([EDS0019](#))
- 23 Manchester Metropolitan University ([EDS0007](#))
- 24 Mr Clive Richardson ([EDS0001](#))
- 25 Mr Justin Moore ([EDS0024](#))
- 26 Overseas Development Institute ([EDS0026](#))
- 27 Private Infrastructure Development Group ([EDS0016](#))
- 28 Sightsavers ([EDS0013](#))
- 29 WWF ([EDS0011](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website. The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2017–19

First Report	DFID's work on education: Leaving no one behind?	HC 367
Second Report	Bangladesh and Burma: the Rohingya crisis	HC 504
Third Report	Bangladesh and Burma: the Rohingya crisis - monsoon preparedness in Cox's Bazar	HC 904
Fourth Report	Bangladesh, Burma and the Rohingya crisis	HC 1054
Fifth Reprt	Definition and administration of ODA	HC 547
First Special Report	DFID's use of private sector contractors: Government Response	HC 322
Second Special Report	UK aid: allocation of resources: Government Response	HC 323
Third Special Report	DFID's work on education: Leaving no on behind?: Government response	HC 914
Fourth Special Report	Bangladesh and Burma: the Rohingya crisis: Government response	HC 919
Fifth Special Report	Bangladesh and Burma: the Rohingya crisis - monsoon preparedness in Cox's Bazar: Government response to the Committee's Third Report	HC 1055