Small claims limit for personal injury Contents

2Reforms to personal injury claim processes

Under the Civil Procedure Rules, the court allocates claims to one of three tracks: the Multitrack, the Fast track or the Small Claims track, taking into account factors such as the value and complexity of the claim. Generally, claims worth no more than £10,000 are allocated to the Small Claims track—but for personal injury claims, the limit is £1,000 (based on the estimated level of compensation for the injury itself, excluding any additional damages for financial loss). The small claims procedure is designed to provide an informal environment for the resolution of straightforward disputes, where strict rules of evidence do not apply and the losing party is not at risk of paying the legal costs of the other side. In contrast, claims worth over £10,000 and up to £25,000 are generally allocated to the Fast track, which involves more formal court procedures and pre-trial directions to set a timetable for the management of claims. Because the successful party can usually expect the court to order the other party to pay their reasonable legal costs, in most Fast track personal injury claims the parties have legal representation.

The Annex to this Report provides more information on the small claims process.

The basis of personal injury claims

9.The law of personal injury (PI) is underpinned by the long-established principles of tort law. A tort is a breach of a civil duty to another person, including any negligent act or omission in breach of a duty of care to the other person that causes that person to suffer a loss—that is, personal injury or loss/damage to their property. Under the law of negligence, losses are shifted from the claimant to a defendant who was at fault; the aim of an award of damages is to put the affected party in the same position as they would have been in if the negligence had not occurred.

10.For PI, damages can be separated into pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. The former is usually relatively straightforward to assess as the damages are simply designed to compensate for any financial loss that can be attributed to the negligence—for example, loss of earnings. Non-pecuniary losses include pain, suffering, and loss of amenity (PSLA). PSLA is not readily quantifiable and thus more difficult to assess; the level of compensation is the subject of guidance published by the Judicial College, updated on a regular basis.4

11.The insurance industry has a central involvement in the majority of personal injury claims. Under Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988, motorists in Britain are legally required to insure their vehicles against the risk of damaging a third party’s property or causing death or bodily injury to others. Motor insurance is provided under a fault-based scheme, whereby the company insuring the party who was at fault for a motor accident compensates the non-fault party for any personal injury, and meets the cost of vehicle repair, as well as legal costs and any other associated costs such as the provision of a replacement vehicle. If an insurance company disputes the liability for an accident, the question may need to be resolved in court.

12.Similarly, in relation to the workplace, the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 requires employers to have insurance cover to meet potential claims by their employees for injuries at work or for any illness or disease resulting from their employment. The insurance policy must cover the employer for at least £5 million and be provided by an authorised insurer. Many businesses and other organisations also opt to protect themselves with public liability insurance, which covers compensation awarded to members of the public as a result of injury, or damage to their property, caused by the organisation’s activities or defects to its premises. Larger organisations such as Government departments and local authorities may be self-insured for risks that they face, meaning that they set aside sufficient money to remedy any unexpected loss.

Impact on clinical negligence claims

13.Claims of clinical negligence (also called medical negligence) differ from PI in that they require the claimant to prove that there were serious errors in the medical treatment they received that a competent doctor would not have made, and that these errors played a part in the injury which is being claimed for. The draft Impact Assessment that accompanied the MoJ’s November 2016 consultation on reforming the soft tissue injury claims process sought further information on the potential impact of the reform proposals on low value clinical negligence claims.5 The final stage Impact Assessment concluded that the impact was not expected to be significant, because of the relatively low volume of such claims (2% of all PI claims) and their complexity, meaning that many would be likely to qualify for Fast track costs provisions.6 As our inquiry did not receive any evidence on the impact of raising the small claims limit on clinical negligence claims, we do not discuss this issue further.

Recent reforms to PI claims processes

14.Successive governments have been concerned to reduce “the high number and cost of low value soft tissue injury claims, and in particular RTA related soft tissue injury claims”;7 the majority of these claims are described as “whiplash”, considered to be the most common form of RTA soft tissue injury. There is no single definition of whiplash. In a 2012 consultation paper, the Ministry of Justice described it as “neck pain which occurs after the soft tissue in the spine has been stretched and strained when the body is thrown in a sudden, forceful jerk”.8 Clause 1(1) of the Civil Liability Bill adopts a wider approach, defining whiplash as injury/ies, in the neck, back or shoulder, of a description specified in regulations.

15.Over the past few years, several measures have been introduced to contain the overall cost of personal injury claims, particularly for whiplash—however defined—and to regulate the PI claims market. These measures, many introduced under Part 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012, are summarised in the Annex to this report.

The prevalence of RTA personal injury claims

16.The Compensation Recovery Unit (CRU) is an important source of data on the volume of RTA PI claims, as all such claims must be registered there. This unit works with insurance companies, solicitors and the Department for Work and Pensions to recover from PI awards any social security benefits paid as a result of an accident, injury or disease, and costs incurred by NHS hospitals and Ambulance Trusts for treatment of injuries. In 2017–18, the number of motor liability claims registered to CRU was 650,019, representing a drop of around 17% from the claims registered in 2016–17 (780,324). Claims registered to CRU in 2015–16 and 2014–15 were 770,791 and 761,878 respectively. In 2011–2012, prior to the implementation of the 2013 reforms to PI claim processes under the LASPO Act 2012, motor liability claims registered to CRU stood at 828,489.9


Employer liability

Motor liability

Public liability

































Source: Compensation Recovery Unit Performance Data.

17.Another source of data on RTA PI claims is the claim notification forms (CNFs) submitted by claimant representatives to the RTA electronic portal.10 According to the portal’s RTA management information, there were 776,185 CNFs created and sent to the compensator in 2016–17. The portal aims to achieve a high rate of settlement of claims and, in 2016–17, a failure to settle led to court proceedings being initiated in 71,884 cases.11 Based on insurance industry and CRU data, the MoJ’s 2018 Impact Assessment12 estimates that 520,000 of the 540,000 RTA cases that received a financial settlement in 2016/17 related to soft tissue injuries (as defined by the Road Traffic Accident Pre-Action Protocol).

18.Submissions to our predecessor Committee’s inquiry offered conflicting evidence on the prevalence of RTA PI claims, in particular claims that could be categorised as “whiplash”—an injury for which, as noted above, there is no agreed definition. Witnesses representing the views of the insurance industry, including the Association of British Insurers, argued that while the number of claims described as whiplash has decreased in recent years, there has been a corresponding increase in soft tissue injury claims for neck and back injuries—indicating a degree of claims displacement;13 and that, as whiplash is an “invisible injury” which cannot be proved or disproved by any medical test, claimants need do no more than describe their symptoms in order to be compensated.14

19.It was suggested by one insurer that the volume and nature of claims is out of proportion to the number of accidents, especially in the light of recent improvements to vehicle safety.15 On the other hand, witnesses representing the claimant sector argued that increased car ownership has led to UK roads having a higher density of motor traffic than the European average; this congestion is linked to lower speed accidents, with fewer serious/fatal injuries but more soft tissue injuries.16 The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers drew attention to OECD data on road traffic accidents: this source indicates that, in 2015, there were 146,203 accidents in the UK involving casualties, compared to 56,603 in France and 97,756 in Spain.17 Witness also maintained that many accidents are not reported to the police or, if reported, they are not necessarily recorded.18 In addition, it was suggested that it was not possible to determine whether the number of RTA PI claims was “too high” without agreeing a benchmark to establish a “reasonable” level of claims.19

20.Whether or not the number of RTA PI claims—in particular for soft tissue injuries—is reasonable falls outside the scope of this inquiry and so we draw no conclusion on this question, save to note the marked divergence between the views of the insurance and claimant sectors and the problems of quantification owing to difficulties in the medical assessment of whiplash. We also note the fall in the overall number of motor liability claims in the past few years.

The response to insurance fraud

21.Motor insurance fraud can be opportunistic, such as making an exaggerated claim or understating a history of previous claims in an application for insurance; it can also be premeditated, as in “crash for cash” scams operated by criminal gangs, where an accident is deliberately staged in the hope of profiting from a claim.

22.The insurance industry has adopted various measures to deal with fraud. In 2006, it set up the Insurance Fraud Bureau, a not-for-profit company, to lead the industry’s collective efforts to reduce fraud. It describes itself as “a central hub for sharing insurance fraud data and intelligence, using our unique position at the heart of the industry and unrivalled access to data to detect and disrupt organised fraud networks.”20 The Bureau operates a “Cheatline” to allow members of the public to report suspected fraud.

23.Another initiative is the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED), a specialist unit within the City of London Police funded by the insurance industry, which is dedicated to tackling insurance fraud in England and Wales.21 In addition, the insurance industry has set up various data sets to help identify and tackle fraud, including the Insurance Fraud Register, which records details of known insurance fraudsters; and the CUE database of reported incidents designed to prevent multiple claims fraud and the misrepresentation of claims histories.22 In January 2015, the Government set up an Insurance Fraud Taskforce, with membership drawn from the insurance sector and consumer organisations, which reported a year later. The report remarked that “fraudsters have placed much focus on personal injury claims”,23 but accepted that measuring the scale of insurance fraud is not simple, as much of it goes undetected and not all fraud is clear cut. Appendix C to the report explains how the Association of British Insurers (ABI) collates its annual fraud statistics: the ABI has determined a list of scenarios where it is believed that fraud is likely or is suspected to have taken place—for example, because of a tip-off or system-generated “high risk” referral—and asks its members to submit the numbers of cases falling within these categories. Suspected fraud includes situations where an applicant for insurance or would-be claimant is required to provide more information, and subsequently fails to co-operate; withdraws their application without explanation; allows communication with the insurer to lapse in spite of the insurer’s efforts; or accepts without credible explanation either a substantially reduced claim settlement or a substantially increased premium (in respect of an application for insurance). On this basis, for 2014 the ABI estimated a value of £2.1 billion for undetected insurance fraud; for detected fraud, the value was calculated at £1.32 billion (it should be noted that both these figures relate to all insurance fraud, not just to RTA PI claims).

24.The Taskforce made a range of recommendations aimed at government, the insurance industry, regulators and others.24 It called for improved data sharing within the insurance industry; a more robust approach to defending claims, including by discouraging the inappropriate use of pre-medical offers of settlement; further consideration of possible legal changes to reduce exaggerated and fraudulent claims; and improving communication both within the insurance sector, and between the sector and regulators. The Taskforce also recommended a stronger regulatory regime for claims management companies (CMCs), which are currently regulated by a unit within the Ministry of Justice; and taking steps to prevent nuisance callers that encourage fraudulent claims.

25.The report of the Insurance Fraud Taskforce was followed, in March 2016, by the final report of Carol Brady’s Independent Review of claims management, commissioned by HM Treasury and the Ministry of Justice.25 Echoing the recommendations of the Taskforce, the review called for strengthened regulation of CMCs, including by re-authorising all regulated bodies under a robust new process, with a “fit and proper persons test” for those wishing to perform controlled functions. Under the Financial Guidance and Claims Act, responsibility for regulating CMCs will be transferred to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).26 The FCA is expected to confirm that, in keeping with the recommendations of the Brady review, it will pro-actively re-authorise every CMC and impose a “fit and proper persons” test.27

26.Evidence to our predecessor Committee and to our own inquiry expressed unanimous condemnation of insurance fraud, which was recognised as a crime. But the extent of the problem, and the most effective responses to it, were contested issues. Some witnesses from the claimant sector considered that the extent of fraud was exaggerated and thought it was wrong to conflate whiplash injury with fraud;28 and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers and the Personal Injury Bar Association emphasised the importance of distinguishing genuine, but modest claims from those that are fraudulent.29 There was criticism of the ABI’s wide definition of fraud that includes suspected fraudulent activity, on the basis that it could allow genuine claims to be categorised as fraudulent.30 We were told that claims might be dropped for a wide range of reasons—for example, a lack of corroborative evidence, or a claimant failing to notify their solicitor of a change of address.31 According to Access to Justice, a campaign group, insurers currently pay out on 99% of claims32 and witnesses pointed out that insurers had the power to refuse to settle a claim and/or defend it at trial, and could report any suspicions of fraud to the police.33

27.Our predecessor Committee asked James Dalton from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) whether he could identify a pattern as to when fraudulent claims occurred within the [three-year] limitation period for making a personal injury claims. In response, he said:

…about 90% of cases are notified to the insurer within the first 12 months. For me, the question goes back to [ … ] why it takes some people so long to file a claim from the date of the accident. Most people will know, albeit not the extent of the injury, that they have in fact been injured [ … ] [W]hen you have not filed a claim, you are the target of an industry that is going to try to make you make a claim [ … ]34

Mr Dalton also recognised that the recent introduction of court powers to dismiss personal injury claims where the claimant has been “fundamentally dishonest” has provided a useful tool for insurers to tackle claims that are fraudulent or exaggerated.35 However, in defending claims, some insurance companies considered that they needed greater support from members of the judiciary, whom they thought were often disinclined to challenge the claimant’s evidence in court.36

28.In oral evidence to us, the Minister, the Rt Hon Lord Keen of Elie QC, asserted that many RTA soft tissue injury claims were fraudulent.37 When we asked him to state how many claims were fraudulent, he responded: “We do not know exactly.” Pressed on this point, he said that the Government had an indication from data: “You have to make qualitative assessments in this context.”38 He referred to “clear evidence”: data relating to improvements in vehicle safety, the fall in reported road traffic accidents and the continuing high level of whiplash claims, he told us, were all indicative of a claims culture, part of this culture being fraudulent, exaggerated and set-up claims.39 In addition, the Association of British Insurers had data that he considered to be reliable.40

29.Subsequently, Lord Keen wrote to us, confirming that the Government did not collate data on fraudulent claims; moreover, the nature of fraud made it difficult accurately to identify “the number of unmeritorious claims taken forward”. His letter continued by quoting insurance industry data indicating that there were around 69,000 detected cases of motor insurance fraud in 2016, worth £780 million [this information appears to relate to motor insurance in general, rather than RTA PI in particular], and told us that the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department has secured over 350 convictions since its inception in 2012.41

30.We endorse the steps taken by the Government and the insurance industry to tackle insurance fraud. Nonetheless we are troubled by the absence of reliable data on fraudulent claims and we find surprising the wide definition of suspected fraud that is used to collate the ABI’s statistics. In particular, the failure by the ABI to break down their figures by the nature and type of claim, and to isolate RTA PI claims broken down by type of road user, is a significant and regrettable omission that weakens their evidence base. We recommend that, in the interests of accuracy, the Government work with the ABI to develop a more nuanced approach to avoid conflating innocent—if unexpected—consumer behaviour with fraudulent activity.

The most recent proposals for reform

31.On 17 November 2016, the MoJ published a consultation paper setting out a package of further reforms to the claims process for PI, in particular for RTA-related soft tissue injuries. The package of measures was designed “to crack down on minor, exaggerated and fraudulent soft tissue injury (‘whiplash’) claims stemming from road traffic accidents (RTAs).”42 A central proposal was either to remove altogether the right to compensation for pain, suffering and loss of amenity (PSLA) in RTA whiplash claims, or to introduce a fixed tariff, replacing the more generous compensation levels currently set by the Judicial College Guidelines for the assessment of general damages in personal injury claims. The MoJ also proposed that the Civil Procedure Rules be amended (by secondary legislation under existing statutory powers) to raise the small claims limit for PI claims.

32.In its response to the consultation, the MoJ stated that it had received 625 responses, including 349 (56%) from claimant lawyers, 30 (5%) from insurers and 12 (2%) from defendant lawyers. Half of the responses, mainly from the claimant sector, disagreed with the introduction of a tariff and most respondents, predominantly claimant solicitors, opposed the raising of the small claims limit other than by an amount for inflation. However, the MoJ announced that it would proceed with the tariff and would raise the small claims limit from £1,000 to £5,000 for the PSLA element of RTA-related PI claims, and from £1,000 to £2,000 for other personal injury claims “in line with inflation”.43 The measures requiring primary legislation appeared as Part 5 of the Prisons and Courts Bill, which was introduced in the House of Commons in February 2017.

33.As noted above, this Bill fell because of the General Election, but the Queen’s Speech on 21 June 2017 promised similar measures in a new Civil Liability Bill. The Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on 20 March 2018. Part 1 of the Bill, containing measures to reform the whiplash claims process that are very similar to those in Part 5 of the Prisons and Courts Bill, can be summarised as follows (it should be noted that, other than for Clause 7 which sets out a list of regulators and regulated persons, all regulations would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure):

Clause 1: defines a “whiplash injury” as a soft tissue injury (or set of injuries) of the neck, back or shoulder, of a description specified in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor. Relevant injuries are those caused by a driver’s negligence to another driver or to a passenger of a motor vehicle other than a motor cycle. Related minor psychological injuries are also included.

Clause 2: further regulations can introduce a tariff to set out the amount that a court may award for pain, suffering and loss of amenity for RTA whiplash injuries of up to two years’ duration. The tariff sum may be reduced for contributory negligence by the injured person.

Clause 3: allows regulations to provide that in exceptional circumstances the court may exercise discretion to increase the prescribed tariff sum up to a maximum percentage. The Lord Chancellor must consult with the Lord Chief Justice before making such regulations.

Clause 4: bans regulated persons—including solicitors, barristers and insurance companies—from making/accepting a payment in settlement of an RTA-related whiplash claim, or offering or inviting a settlement, without having appropriate medical evidence. The Lord Chancellor may specify in regulations what medical evidence is appropriate and who can provide it.

Clauses 5, 6 and 7: set out a list of the regulators and the requirements on them to monitor and enforce compliance with the ban under Clause 4.

34.Evidence to our predecessor’s inquiry indicated widespread support for a ban on pre-medical offers of settlement, which was also endorsed by a majority of respondents to the MoJ’s consultation. However, the evidence to that inquiry indicated a divergence of views on the proposal for a tariff to limit damages for PSLA in whiplash claims. In broad terms, the insurance sector and its representatives were supportive, considering that a tariff would deliver certainty and simplicity, that it would avoid under-settlement to the disadvantage of claimants and that it would deter fraudsters.44 However, some witnesses from this sector expressed doubts about the idea of an uplift for exceptional cases, taking the view that this would undermine certainty, and lead to confusion—unless supported by clear guidance—and could generate satellite litigation and claims displacement.45

35.In contrast, witnesses from the claimant sector were strongly opposed to the idea of a tariff, arguing that whiplash injuries affected people differently, something recognised in the approach taken by the Judicial College guidelines;46 a single tariff rate based on injury duration could not take into account the intensity of pain, the extent of treatment required or the claimant’s ability to function, for example.47

36.Comparing tariff figures suggested in the MoJ’s consultation paper with the rates set in the Judicial College guidelines, many in the claimant sector thought that victims of whiplash injury would be significantly under-compensated under the new proposals.48 The Personal Injury Bar Association commented that whether the number of claims had increased or decreased “is not a good reason for the imposition of a tariff that fundamentally changes the law of England and Wales established in the nineteenth century that a claimant is entitled to full compensation.”49

The impact of RTA PI claims on insurance premiums

37.Potential savings to consumers by way of reduced insurance premiums were presented by the MoJ as one of the main justifications for its proposed package of reforms. The Impact Assessment that accompanied the November 2016 consultation paper estimated that the proposed measures would lead to reductions in motor insurance premiums equivalent to approximately £40 per customer per year; however, we received evidence that the reduction in premiums arising from the reforms is likely to be significantly lower than that forecast by the Government in the Impact Assessment.50 As noted below, the average motor premium at the end of the third quarter of 2017 was £485.51

38.In oral evidence to our predecessor Committee, James Dalton from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) argued forcefully that whiplash claims had a significant impact on motor insurance premiums.

Over 750,000 claims for whiplash are made in this country every year. The cost of that to car insurance premium payers is very significant. The question that the Ministry of Justice and the Government are asking is whether consumers [ … ] want to continue paying for whiplash claims in the way they currently do [ … ] or whether they want a society in which people are paid either nothing or less for whiplash claims and therefore get lower car insurance premiums.52

In a subsequent letter to the Chair, Mr Dalton explained that motor insurance premiums are directly influenced by the frequency and cost of claims, which represent around 81% of costs that insurers take into account when calculating premiums (the three lesser factors being expenses incurred by the insurer; solvency capital provisions; and the insurer’s targeted profit margin). His letter sets out the components of motor claims costs in 2015: the most significant of these was bodily injury, accounting for 46% of costs to insurers; accidental damage to the insured’s own vehicle and damage to another person’s car or property each accounted for 22%; and the cost of replacement vehicles represented 5% of claims costs.53

39.We note that the ABI’s state of the market report covering motor insurance claims in 201654 indicates that bodily injury claims fell to 41% of claims costs, whereas accidental damage to the insured’s own vehicle increased to 25%, and damage to another person’s car/other property increased to 23% of claims costs. The same report states that, towards the end of 2017, the average motor premium reached £485—a record high, and £57 more than the average premium at the beginning of 2016. This is attributed in the report partly to rising repair costs: repairing cars with increasingly sophisticated technology is more costly, often requiring expensive spare parts—which, when imported, have been made more costly by the weakening of the pound in the currency market. In addition, the report states that premiums have been affected by successive increases in Insurance Premium Tax, and by the insurance industry anticipating changes in the Personal Injury Discount Rate.55 The Discount rate was the subject of a Justice Committee report published in November 2017.56

40.The MoJ’s 2018 Impact Assessment (IA) estimated that defendant insurers would derive benefits of around £1.3 billion per annum from the package of reforms.57 The IA acknowledged that “many factors feed into motor premiums” and that the effect of the whiplash reforms could not be considered in isolation; there was no robust evidence to indicate their likely “pass through rate”—that is, the proportion of insurers’ savings that would be passed on to consumers by way of reduced premiums. After consideration of the evidence received, the IA conducted sensitivity analysis58 for pass through rates arising from these reforms of 50% and 70%.59

41.As obtaining insurance involves a commercial transaction with a private sector body, it could be argued there is little that the Government can do to enforce lower premium rates without significant change to present policies. We asked Lord Keen whether the ABI had given the Government assurances that premiums would be reduced as a result of the reforms, and he responded:

Two of the major motor insurers, Aviva and LV=, have said publicly that they will reflect any savings in reductions in insurance premiums. The motor insurance industry in the UK is highly competitive, and, if such leading players in the market reflect those reductions in their premiums, we anticipate that others will follow, simply to maintain competitiveness in that market.60

When we pressed Lord Keen on what would happen if insurers did not reduce premiums, he said: “We would have to look at that, but we have received public statements from major insurers [ … ] and we are prepared to accept those public assurances.”61 On 20 March 2018, the day of the Civil Liability Bill’s first reading in the House of Lords, the Association of British Insurers published a letter to the Lord Chancellor, David Gauke MP, signed by leaders of 26 insurance companies setting out their commitment to pass cost benefits on to customers.62

42.Potential savings to motor insurance customers are central to the policy justification for these reforms, but we conclude that the Government’s estimate of the pass-through rate may be over-optimistic, given the lack of robust evidence and the unenforceable nature of insurers’ promises to reduce premiums. We recommend that, if the reforms are implemented, the Government work with the ABI and either the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Financial Conduct Authority to monitor the extent to which any premium reductions can be attributed to these measures and report back to us after 12 months.

4 The 14th Edition of the Judicial College Guidelines was published in September 2017, just over two years after the previous edition.

5 Reforming the Soft Tissue Injury (‘whiplash’) Claims Process, Impact Assessment MoJ 015/2016. November 2016; question 3.3, page 77. The 2016 consultation paper is discussed in more detail below.

10 This is a secure portal available only to insurance companies and claimant representatives which must be used for the transfer between parties of documents relating to RTA PI claims. It was extended to employer liability/public liability claims in 2013. See also paragraph 5 of the Annex to this report.

13 Association of British Insurers, letter to the Chair, 8 March 2018; Ageas Insurance [WHP0058]; Direct Line Group [WHP0056]; DWF LLP [WHP0047]; esure [WHP0052]; RSA [WHP0025]

14 Allianz Insurance [WHP0013]; Forum of Insurance Lawyers [WHP0076]

15 Ageas Insurance [WHP0058]

16 Including Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, Further written evidence (published 15 March 2018); DGM Solicitors [WHP0069]; Nicola Dickinson [WHP0041]; Cilex [WHP0060]; Scott Rees & Co [WHP0078]; Thorneycroft Solicitors [WHP0040]; Motorplus Ltd [WHP0043].

18 Including Access to Justice [WHP0063]; Horwich Cohen Coughlan Solicitors [WHP0020]; Motor Accident Solicitors’ Society [WHP0031]; New Law Solicitors [WHP004]; Keith Teare, solicitor [WHP0014]; Auxilis [WHP003].

19 DGM Solicitors [WHP0069].

22 The CUE database home page can be seen here.

26 The Financial Guidance and Claims Act received Royal Assent on 10 May 2018.

28 Including Motor Insurance Solicitors’ Society [WHP0031], Horwich Cohen Coughlan Solicitors [WHP0020], Dowse & Co Solicitors [WHP0011]

30 DGM Solicitors [WHP0069]; True Solicitors [WHP0021]

31 Canter, Levin & Berg Ltd [WHP0064]

33 Thompsons Solicitors [WHP0070]; Thorneycroft Solicitors [WHP0040]

34 Q79, oral evidence to Justice Committee, 7 February 2017

35 ABI, oral evidence to Justice Committee, 7 February 2017, Q84 and Q85

36 Esure [WHP0052]; Ageas [WHP0058];

44 For example, Ageas [WHP0068]; Direct Line [WHP0056]; LV= [WHP0045]; Weightmans [WHP0042]; DWF LLP [WHP0047]

45 For example, Forum of Insurance Lawyers [WHP0076]; Kennedys Law LLP [WHP0068]; Axa UK [WHP0065]; Association of British Insurers [WHP0077]; RSA [WHP0025]

46 For example, Bates, Wells and Braithwaite [WHP0044]; David Calvert [WHP001]; Dowes & Co Solicitors [WHP0011]; New Law Solicitors [WHP004]

48 For example, Hodge Jones & Allen, Solicitors [WHP0059]; McHale & Co Solicitors [WHP0024]; Irwin Mitchell [WHP0067]; Robin Torr [WHP0012].

50 True Solicitors [CLM0036]; Irwin Mitchell [CLM0030]

52 Q9

55 The personal injury discount rate is a percentage applied by the court when assessing lump sum damages for severely injured people, which discounts from their award for future losses an amount that they can expect to earn by investing their damages. The current rate is minus 0.75%.

57 Paragraph 5.115

58 Sensitivity analysis is a tool used in financial modelling to analyse how the different values of an independent variable affect a specific dependent variable under certain specific conditions.

59 Paragraphs 5.63 and 5.64

Published: 17 May 2018