3Leadership, oversight and culture
Leadership and accountability
Responsibilities for disclosure
71.One of the persistent messages that comes through the evidence we have received, both orally and in writing, is that resolving problems with disclosure will take a shift in culture, driven by clear leadership. This echoes the findings of the Mouncher Investigations Report by Richard Horwell QC which concluded “[d]isclosure errors were not designed to pervert the course of justice; they were the consequence of inexperience, poor decision making and inadequate training, leadership and governance.”90
72.Core responsibilities for disclosure (as outlined in the CPIA 1996) sit with the police, funded, in part, by the Home Office, and the CPS. There are 43 police forces in England and Wales, which are operationally independent of Government and run by Chief Constables. Every force has an elected Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC), except in London and Manchester where the PCC responsibility sits with the mayor, who is responsible for setting the budget and strategic policing priorities, and who holds the Chief Constable to account for performance. There are two national policing bodies who signed the National Disclosure Improvement Plan, and gave evidence (written and oral) to this Committee: the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and the College of Policing.
73.Since disclosure became a national news story, the NPCC, the College of Policing and CPS have worked together to produce the National Disclosure Improvement Plan.91 The National Disclosure Improvement plan is signed by Alison Saunders (the current DPP); Mike Cunningham (CEO of the College of Policing); and Nick Ephgrave (Criminal Justice Lead for the NPCC). The NPCC and CPS told us in their written submission that the “Disclosure Summit convened by the Director for Public Prosecutions provides, for the first time, system-wide leadership for this critical issue.”92
74.The Attorney General superintends the Crown Prosecution Service, which is led by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Attorney General owns the guidelines on disclosure, which outline the high level principles which should be followed when the disclosure regime is applied. The last iteration of the Attorney General’s guidelines was signed in 2013 by the then Attorney General, Dominic Grieve MP, and had not been updated in the five years before this inquiry.93 The Crown Prosecution Service has its own Disclosure Manual for use by its prosecuting and police staff, which was updated in 2018 and signed off by the DPP, Alison Saunders.94
75.We asked the then Attorney General, Jeremy Wright MP, and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Alison Saunders, who was responsible for disclosure failings. Jeremy Wright MP told us, “I absolutely accept the responsibility” and went on to state “that is why we are doing what we are doing now”, referencing the disclosure review.95 We asked Alison Saunders whether she considered herself responsible for disclosure failings and she said “it is difficult to say that it is just on my watch. Disclosure has been a systemic issue for quite some years”. She went on to explain “I am not at all seeking to shirk the fact that improvements need to take place and that this has been an issue for some time across the whole system” and noted “ I feel every single failure. It is not something that we want”.96
76.The Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service (a Home Office Minister) is responsible for Policing. Police forces are operationally independent of Government, but the Minister’s official responsibilities include (but are not limited to) police finance and resourcing; police reform and governance; police workforce; and police integrity and transparency. We asked the Minister, Nick Hurd MP, whether he was responsible and he told us that “[a]s a Home Office Minister, I have a very high sense of responsibility to support where we can, and to hold to account where we must”.97 He also told us that “there is a very high degree of operational autonomy in the police system [ … and] In my mind, the primary leadership role here comes from chiefs”.98
77.We put the question of accountability for disclosure to the NPCC and the College of Policing. Nick Ephgrave, the Criminal Justice Lead for the NPCC,told us that “I can give you my commitment [ … ] we are committed to making a real difference”99 and the CEO of the College of Policing, Mike Cunningham, explained that “I am accountable to my board in relation to what the college delivers”.100
78.We welcome the National Disclosure Improvement Plan, and note that it names the people responsible for ensuring that it follows into real and lasting change. We expect these people to be personally accountable for delivery of the plan.
79.So that signatories to the National Disclosure Improvement Plan can be held to account, they should publish an update on progress quarterly until each action can be closed. This Committee will keep a watching brief on progress.
80.We did welcome the comment from the then Attorney General that, ultimately, it is the holder of his office who is responsible for disclosure, but we do not feel ministerial responsibility for disclosure has been clear enough to date. It is concerning to us that successive Attorney Generals have not acted more quickly and proactively on disclosure issues which have been widely acknowledged for many years, and it is of note that the Attorney General’s guidelines have not been reviewed since 2013 in spite of concerns being raised about disclosure a number of times. We expect that the Attorney General’s review will make it clear that he is responsible for disclosure failings and for ensuring improvement, and we will hold him to account for driving this improvement.
81.The new Attorney General should take his appointment as an opportunity to clarify what is meant by “to superintend” the Crown Prosecution Service, and it should be very clear that he is accountable to Parliament for the performance of the CPS. As a demonstration of his ongoing responsibility for disclosure, he should personally sign off on his guidelines at regular, defined intervals, either stating that they remain sufficient, or noting amendments. We expect that ongoing review will incorporate restatement or amendment of the current guidelines, and we request that it include a commitment to sign off at stated intervals. We expect the next Director of Public Prosecutions to proactively address disclosure throughout their tenure. The culture of ‘it didn’t start on my watch’ is pervasive and undermining of public confidence. It must not continue.
Performance culture of the CPS and data to hold people to account
Data on the number of disclosure errors
82.When material is not disclosed, or is disclosed late, there are a number of possible outcomes, including: the case goes ahead without the undisclosed evidence being considered (this could result in an unsafe conviction or miscarriage of justice); the case is delayed; or the CPS decide that there is no longer a realistic prospect conviction and “drop” the case.
83.The CPS do not publish any routine data on whether they have met their disclosure obligations. The Ministry of Justice publish statistics on cracked and ineffective trails (as noted earlier), and the Crown Prosecution Service’s key performance measures relate predominately to the number of hearings in a case, the proportion of guilty pleas at first hearing, and successful convictions. CPS data is published quarterly.
84.The CPS collect some data on disclosure errors, but we heard evidence that this data underestimates the true scale of the disclosure problem. The Director of Public Prosecutions provided written and oral evidence that explained the CPS data on disclosure.101,102 We heard about the following problems with existing data:
a)The CPS data on disclosure only includes cases that were stopped. It does not include cases which went ahead with unsatisfactory disclosure, or that were delayed while problems with unsatisfactory disclosure were resolved. The CPS data would not include any of the miscarriages of justice that the CCRC say have resulted from disclosure errors;
b)The CPS data only includes stopped cases where the primary reason is the CPS not meeting their duty to disclose. It does not include stopped cases with disclosure errors, but where disclosure was not the primary reason for stopping the case.
85.Data provided to this inquiry by the CPS states that 841 of the cases that were stopped in 2017–18 were stopped due to disclosure errors, but (as explained below) we know this is smaller than the true figure.
Table 1: the number of cases which the CPS identified as having stopped due to disclosure errors between 2013 and 2018
|
2013–14 |
2014–15 |
2015–16 |
2016–17 |
2017–18 |
|
583 |
537 |
732 |
916 |
841 |
Source: NPCC and CPS (DIS0057); Alison Saunders CB, Director of Public Prosecutions (DIS0068)
86.A recent review of sex cases by the CPS highlights that the data they routinely collect significantly underestimates the number of cases stopped due to disclosure errors. The CPS reviewed all rape and serious sexual offence (RASSO) cases that had been stopped between 1 January and 13 February 2018.103 Their report found that “47 cases stopped during the period that had issues with the disclosure of unused material”. Of the 47 cases stopped during the six-week review period, five had been recorded on the CPS system as stopped due to disclosure errors, and 42 had not been recorded in this category. Data provided to this inquiry by the CPS had stated that during the whole of 2017–18 (including the six-week review period) 23 RASSO cases had been stopped due to disclosure errors. As it transpired, this is half the number the CPS identified as having stopped in a six week period during that year, alone.104,105 Further to this, some of the very high profile cases which brought disclosure to the public’s attention would not be captured in this data. The Director of Public Prosecutions wrote to us while this report was being prepared to correct her earlier evidence and confirm that the case against Liam Allan had not been recorded as a disclosure error.106 The Director stated, in her letter, that “[t]his illustrates the limitations of our current system.”107
87.The Director of Public Prosecutions explained to us that “[w]here a case has been stopped—which does not necessarily mean “collapsed” in a negative way, but where they have stopped—we ask prosecutors to choose one of 28 different reasons. The disclosure one is where that is the sole reason”. She noted that “where we have looked at the cases [during the RASSO review]. Disclosure is not necessarily the only reason. It may be that we have some materials that have been given to us late, which undermines a witness’s credibility. That may well go down as a witness credibility issue.”108 The then Attorney General told us that “if disclosure has contributed to the problems with a case but has not, in the view of the prosecutor, been the primary reason for its failure, disclosure does not make an appearance on the form”. He conceded that “the method of recording information needs to be better.”109
88.The then Attorney General told us “we [clearly do not] have a proper method of data collection that enables us to display clearly what is and is not going on in every case”.110 The Director of Public Prosecutions wrote to us after she gave oral evidence and confirmed that the CPS:
… have already begun work on a comprehensive range of performance measures that are both qualitative and quantitative, beginning at the pre-charge stage and continuing throughout the prosecution process up to and including the trial, as well as making changes to the recording of case outcomes. We are involving the Attorney General’s Office and HMCPS Inspectorate in this work and although some of these measures require significant changes to our case management system, and are therefore longer term, we anticipate that case outcome measures which will include disclosure failures will be in place by the Autumn.111
Understanding the performance of the CPS
89.The Director of Public Prosecutions told us in written evidence that “[t]he CPS’s role is not to obtain convictions at all costs; it is to make fair, independent and objective assessments about whether it is appropriate to present charges for the criminal Court to consider. We do look at “unsuccessful” cases to establish what if any lessons can be learnt. However, an acquittal or a successful appeal may not mean a prosecution was wrongly brought or that there was some “failure” by the prosecution.”112 As the General Principles of the CPS state “It is the duty of prosecutors to make sure that the right person is prosecuted for the right offence”.113
90.There was a perception amongst some people who submitted evidence to this inquiry that the CPS prioritised timeliness of cases and conviction rate over getting decisions right. For example, Dr Hannah Quirk stated in her written evidence to us that the “CPS and courts operate in an increasingly ‘target driven’ environment with pressure for hearings to go ahead, whether or not all the disclosure tasks have been performed”. Some defence practitioners stated a view that courts were reluctant to adjourn and reschedule a hearing for a later date, when an application is made - by the prosecution or defence - for time to rectify disclosure errors or delays.114 The Defence Practitioners Working Group stated that, when the prosecution serve the disclosure schedule on the day of trial, “the defence are frequently refused an adjournment and given only a short time at Court to serve their defence statement and obtain secondary disclosure.” They went on to state a view that “[i]t has become part of the culture for prosecutors to fail to comply with requirements under [the Criminal Procedure Rules] with no sanction for failure.”115
91.We asked Alison Saunders, Director of Public Prosecutions, what the consequences were for the individual prosecutors who failed in their disclosure duties, and she told us that “[t]he disciplinary process is there” and that “[i]f it is around performance, we will take steps, [first] an informal action plan, [then] if it becomes intractable, it becomes a formal performance measure and it could lead to dismissal.”116 The Director of Public Prosecutions wrote to us after the hearing and explained that during her period of office “there have been 10 cases where formal disciplinary proceedings were concluded against prosecutors for issues relating to disclosure failings. The majority of these related to the inappropriate disclosure of sensitive material, with 1 case relating to a direct failure to disclose relevant and appropriate material” and that “[t]he CPS operates a robust performance management system that is underpinned by Cabinet Office principles that focus on improving capability and performance.”117
92.Since 2010 all parts of the criminal justice system have had to make efficiency savings (outlined in paragraph 31). Two initiatives in the courts, Better Case Management in the Crown Court and Transforming Summary Justice in the Magistrates’ Courts, have aimed to reduce costs by eliciting earlier guilty pleas, and reducing the number of hearings.118,119 Transforming Summary Justice was rolled out in 2015 and one of the key initiatives was an attempt to “front-load” disclosure by asking CPS and police to do more of the work early, to enable disclosure at the first hearing and prevent delays later. Better Case Management was rolled out in 2016 to introduce a consistent approach to case management in the Crown Court.
93.We heard from Kevin McGinty, the Chief Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service, that these initiatives place “pressures on both the prosecution and defence, and it discourages judges from giving adjournments when they think the matter can be dealt with sooner than was asked for by the defence” but he also went on to say that such pressure was “not necessarily a bad thing”.120 The Magistrates’ Court Observers Panel stated in their written evidence that “Judges and Magistrates” are being less accommodating to CPS requests for adjournments when the problem has been due to poor case preparation. It is their Court and they must set high standards and shout very loudly when cases are not properly prepared.”121
94.We have already referred to the responsibilities of the Attorney General, who “superintends” the CPS, but the day-to-day management of the service and ownership of it performance, including in relation to disclosure, rests clearly with the Director of Public Prosecutions. We do not feel that the Director has sufficiently recognised the extent and seriousness of the failures of disclosure by police and the CPS that have been highlighted by evidence given to us and, as we have noted in paragraph 81, have been recognised over a number of years. It is surprising and concerning that the Director of Public Prosecutions did not know that the case against Liam Allan had not been recorded as a disclosure error at the point that it was stopped. The Director has not acted as quickly and proactively as required and this, it appears to us, has permeated throughout the organisation.
95.Data collected by the Crown Prosecution Service did not enable the DPP or the then Attorney General to know if their prosecutors were getting decisions right or wrong. We believe that this might have allowed disclosure errors to prevail and that miscarriages might have resulted. The DPP has said to us, in writing, that it is not the role of the CPS to pursue convictions at all costs, but it is of note that the CPS use conviction rate and number of hearings to measure their performance. The Code for Crown Prosecutors is clear “Prosecutors must be fair, independent and objective… Prosecutors must always act in the interests of justice and not solely for the purpose of obtaining a conviction”.122 The fact that performance metrics do not fully reflect the purpose of the CPS is compounded by a significant underestimation of the number of cases that stopped due to disclosure errors in the CPS’ internal data. The RASSO review indicates that data the CPS did collect on cases that failed due to disclosure might have underestimated the number with disclosure errors by around 90%. Data the CPS did collect did not include cases which proceeded with disclosure errors. We welcomed the commitment by the Director of Public Prosecutions and the then Attorney General to improving their performance measures so that they can be held to account in future, and we expect that the incoming Attorney General will uphold this commitment. It remains disappointing, however, that this poor data collection regime was allowed to continue for so long in spite of reports suggesting that disclosure errors were widespread.
96.The new Attorney General should make it clear, in the review, that the duty to ensure “the right person is prosecuted for the right offence” is paramount, even if this is at the expense of timeliness or conviction rate. The Director of Public Prosecutions should set measures that enable her (and her successor) to report against this objective. We expect this to include improving data on cases that fail to ensure that the CPS are capturing and reporting on a true number of cases where errors have played a part. Although we welcome the National Disclosure Improvement Plan, we also think a more thorough review of the data, that goes beyond just rape and sexual assault cases, is required. The CPS should also consider what data they can capture on cases which proceed with disclosure errors but are not stopped. We expect Crown Prosecution Service performance measures to be updated before the end of the 2018–19 financial year so they can be outlined in the 2018–19 Annual Report and Accounts and reported against in the Annual Report and Accounts from 2019–20 (the first year that full data will be available).
Police culture
Reasonable lines of inquiry
97.When conducting an investigation the police have a statutory duty, defined in the CPIA 1996, to follow all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether they point towards or away from the suspect. A number of witnesses stated a perception (orally and in writing) that there is a culture within policing that encourages the pursuit of a conviction against a suspect, and does not give enough weight to the investigation of alternatives.
98.The Criminal Law Solicitors’ Association stated, in their written evidence, that “[o]ften police consider lines of enquiry that are likely to generate evidence that will assist the suspect as being for the suspect or their lawyers to obtain”.123 This was a view echoed by the Law Society in their written submission, defence practitioners in oral evidence and by some of the individuals who wrote to us sharing their personal stories.124125126
99.This perception was acknowledged by police witnesses but they assured us that is was not the reality. When we put this question to Nick Ephgrave, criminal justice lead for the NPCC, he stated “[t]he culture you describe is not one I recognise now”.127 Mike Cunningham, CEO of the College of Policing, stated that “we in the college can issue codes, and we have issued two. The most significant was the code of ethics. The code of ethics has been in place for a few years now in policing. It has completely set a context that sets clarity on expectation” and he went on to explain that “[t]here is the requirement [in the code] to behave with honesty and integrity. People are tested on that when they apply to be a police officer. It is reinforced during their training and it is tested during promotion processes”.128
100.In 2014, HM Inspector of Constabulary had reported that the “unwillingness of some officers to believe victims [ … ] leads to the under-recording of crime. If forces do not take crime recording sufficiently seriously, victims are unlikely to have confidence that they will be taken seriously by the police and the criminal justice system. HMIC is clear that the presumption that the victim should always be believed should be institutionalised”.129 However, in October 2016, the Henrique investigation into the Met’s handling of historic sex abuse recommended that the “instruction to believe a victim’s account” should cease. Instead, the report recommended that “in future, the public should be told that “if you make a complaint we will treat it very seriously and investigate it thoroughly without fear or favour”.130 Richard Henrique was referring to reports that, in 2002, the Met had instructed its officers to “accept allegations made by the victim in the first instance as being truthful” following accusations that police forces had not responded well enough to allegations of sexual offences (including historic offences).131
101.The Criminal Law Solicitors’ Association stated, in evidence to this inquiry, that the police “have come to believe they are fighting for the complainant rather than investigating the facts. This affects what enquiries they make and hence what unused [material] is generated, and also how they consider what is disclosable.”132 Daniel Bonich of the Criminal Law Solicitors’ Association told the Committee that “[i]t is a cultural problem. We have the use of the term “victim” very early in proceedings, which arguably is the incorrect term. It feeds into how the police and the CPS often view complainants in cases, and it can lead to confirmation bias because they are looking for particular things.”
102.Nick Ephgrave, Criminal Justice Lead for the NPCC, assured us that, a performance culture of chasing convictions is one of the past, stating that it was not a culture he recognised now. He went on to say that “[p]erhaps if you go back 10 or 15 years, or perhaps a bit further, we had a very significant performance culture in the police service, and I was part of that. [As a Chief Constable, I used to drive … ] performance religiously; I was a zealot at getting detections, and I make no bones about it. But things have changed quite a lot in the way police approach performance.”133 He also noted, however, that “victims have told us [ … ] that the offender will often say, “Do not bother going to the police. They will never believe you.” It is exactly that type of belief that we are trying to challenge [ … ] I absolutely take your point: our job is to be impartial and search for the truth wherever it takes us. But we need to get the balance right and we do not want to reverse the very significant advances we have made in terms of people’s confidence in coming forward.”134
Disclosure as an administrative add on
103.Throughout the inquiry we encountered a perception that police see disclosure as an administrative task, rather than as central to the criminal justice process. In 2017, the report on disclosure in the Crown Court by the Criminal Justice Joint Inspectorate,135 found that “[o]fficers did not tend to consider the importance of disclosure as part of the investigation. Instead, disclosure was seen as more of an administrative exercise rather than integral to the investigation process, and that issue continued throughout the life of a case”. This view was repeated in evidence to this inquiry, including by Daniel Bonich of the Criminal Law Solicitors’ Association, who told us that “police, in particular, view [disclosure] as an unnecessary administrative hurdle that they have to go through”;136 and the Criminal Justice Alliance who noted the “need for a ‘cultural shift’ across all agencies in the way that disclosure is understood–not as an administrative function but as a fundamental aspect of the criminal justice process.”137
104.This perception was acknowledged by the senior accountable people we spoke to, including by Mike Cunningham, the CEO of the College of Policing, who stated that “[t]he different cultural challenge is that disclosure is seen as a bureaucratic add-on to the investigation. That is not about, “We must get our man and convict them”; that is about, “[t]his is a blinking tortuous bit of work” and not seen as integral to the investigation. That is what we need to change”.138 Nick Ephgrave, Criminal Justice Lead for the NPCC, also acknowledged that disclosure might be seen as an administrative task, stating that “[a]t the end of an investigation, if you are the officer in the case, it might be 3 o’clock in the morning and you might have been on duty for 14 hours and now have to fill in a very complicated schedule. The temptation is, not through misdeeds, just not to put enough detail in there because you have just about had enough. These are very human issues. We need to find solutions to some of those, and technology may help with some of that.”139
105.Evidence from the Crown Prosecution Service and the NPCC states that “[t]here has been an absence of senior police leaders actively championing the disclosure cause and this has contributed to what might be described as a shift in mindset concerning disclosure, particularly in less complex and high volume crime, from it being considered an investigative cornerstone to simply one of a number of administrative requirements to be completed at the end of an investigation.”140
106.We consider that, on balance, most police forces and their officers recognise their duty as a search for the truth but that this has not been, and is still not, universal. We were encouraged by the commitment of the NPCC, outlined in their written evidence and in oral evidence from Chief Constable Nick Ephgrave, to work to ensure that officers understand their duties properly. It is fundamentally important that all police officers recognise both that they are searching for the truth; and that they have core disclosure duties which are central to the criminal justice process and are not merely an administrative add-on. Nevertheless, we believe that there is more work to do to ensure that this mindset is embedded across all police forces, and public confidence is improved. It is vital that disclosure is embedded at every stage in the process and not delegated to the most junior person as has all too often been the case in the past.
107.We welcome the code of ethics from the College of Policing and recommend that the College consider a revision to ensure it is clear that police have a duty to follow all lines of inquiry, even when they point away from the suspect. We would like the head of the College to write to us to outline if and by when he considers this practicably possible.
Strategic policing requirement
108.As outlined earlier in this report, police forces are operationally independent of Government and of Ministers. The Home Office and Ministers set out the strategic policing requirement, which “focuses on those areas where government has a responsibility for ensuring that sufficient capabilities are in place to respond”.141 The Strategic Policing Requirement states the capabilities that each force should have to tackle “threats to national security, public safety, public order, and public confidence that are of such gravity as to be of national importance”.142 Currently, the Strategic Policing Requirement does not set any expectations of the ability of police forces to play their role in criminal proceedings.
109.We put this point to the Minster, Nick Hurd MP, who stated that “we are reviewing the strategic policing requirement, and it will certainly be one of our considerations in that work”.143 He referred to the principles Sir Robert Peel set to define an ethical police force, stating that “I am very conscious, going back to the Peelian principles, that we police by consent and that trust in the police is absolutely fundamental”144 and that “[c]ontinued failure in this space takes great risk with public confidence in the criminal justice system. Therefore, for me, the Home Office and, I believe, for police leadership, it is seen as a priority”.145
110.We consider that problems with disclosure have impacted on confidence in the justice system to such an extent that it is now an issue of national importance for the police. The recorded failures of police to disclose evidence in their possession to the defence, and the miscarriages of justice that might have resulted, could undermine confidence in policing.
111.The Minister for Policing told us that the Home Office were reviewing the Strategic Policing requirement, and we recommend that the Minister and the Home Office should consider whether capability to execute core criminal justice duties, including disclosure, should be included.
90 Richard Horwell QC, Mouncher Investigation Report, July 2017
91 CPS, National Police Chief’s Council, College of Policing, the National Disclosure Improvement Plan, January 2018
93 Attorney General, the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure, December 2013
94 CPS, legal guidance, disclosure manual, accessed on 4 July 2018
103 Crown Prosecution Service, Rape and Serious Sexual Offence Prosecutions, Assessment of disclosure of unused material ahead of trial, June 2018
104 Crown Prosecution Service, Rape and serious sexual offence prosecutions. Assessment of disclosure of unused material ahead of trial. June 2018
106 In June 2018 the Director of Public Prosecutions wrote to us stating that “The outcome of the Liam Allan case is recorded as code E44, a failure to comply with disclosure obligations being the primary reason for the case being stopped”. (DIS0083)
In July 2018 the Director of Public Prosecutions wrote stating: “To be clear, the outcome of the Liam Allan case was initially recorded by the prosecutor as a conflict of prosecution evidence, rather than as a disclosure failing […] I have since concluded it should more appropriately have been recorded as a failure to comply with disclosure obligations, as this was the primary reason for the stopping of the case. As such, I asked that the correct primary reason for the unsuccessful outcome for the Liam Allan case be recorded as code E44 on our Case Management System” (DIS0089)
113 Crown Prosecution Service, General Principles, accessed on 4 July 2018
114 For example: Exchange Chambers Liverpool (DIS0056); Defence Practitioners’ Working Group (DIS0047)
118 The Criminal Justice Joint Inspectorate, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Services, and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, Making it fair a Joint Inspection of Disclosure of Unused Material in Volume Crown Court Cases, July 2017
122 2.4 Code for Crown Prosecutors (January 2013)
124 For example: An individual 4 (DIS0019); An individual 6 (DIS0027); An individual 2 (DIS0052); An individual 1 (DIS0020); An Individual 10 (DIS0021); Des Thomas (DIS0081)
127 316
129 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, State of Policing, the Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales, 2013/2014
130 Sir Richard Henriques, Independent Review of Metropolitan Police Service’s handling of non-recent sexual offence investigations, October 2016
131 https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016–12-13/debates/D279D23F-67F4-415C-98A0-FC37CFC640D0/OperationMidlandHenriquesReport
135 The Criminal Justice Joint Inspectorate, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Services, and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, Making it fair a Joint Inspection of Disclosure of Unused Material in Volume Crown Court Cases, July 2017
141 Home Office, The Strategic Policing Requirement, March 2015
142 Home Office, The Strategic Policing Requirement, March 2015
Published: 20 July 2018