18.The Government spends around £250 billion a year through commercial relationships, approximately a third of total government spending. The Government contracts for a wide range of goods and services, from relatively generic back-office functions to frontline activities, such as medical assessments for benefits claimants, through to highly specialised markets such as building nuclear weapons. The Government has a unique position in many of these markets owing to its spending power and undoubted ability to pay, although public procurement rules restrict the extent to which it can intervene in the market. The Government also brings a unique perspective to contracts in the political context in which decisions are made and the accountability of Ministers, officials and suppliers for the delivery of public services and use of taxpayers’ money.
In markets with few potential providers there are value for money risks. These require different contracting approaches, such as the development of Single Source Contract Regulations in defence equipment procurement. As at July 2017, 110 contracts have been brought within the Regulations, with a combined value of £23.9 billion. MoD staff have welcomed the opportunities under the new regime to improve contract management, including the ability to require full transparency of costs within suppliers’ prices, which provides greater assurance on value for money. Rail franchising has seen several high-profile failures. The Department for Transport (DfT) has attempted to broaden participation and encourage new entrants by simplifying pre-qualification processes, producing phased competition schedules, and reviewing the number and size of franchises.
19.In more competitive markets, such as construction or facilities management, the Government’s ability to ‘buy in bulk’ should create opportunities for better value through economies of scale. Even in these markets the number of companies that have successfully bid for central Government contracts is a relatively small number of large well-known suppliers that have pursued growth through acquisitions and expansion into new sectors.. This strategy led to a loss of focus on the companies’ core expertise in favour of concentrating on winning contracts to maintain sufficient cashflow to offset balance sheet debt. This trend has been reversed to some extent recently as companies have refreshed their senior management and shed non-core parts of their businesses. The Minister for the Cabinet Office has recognised that “competition for contracts has often favoured large suppliers,” with too much focus on price.
20.Several of these companies have had significant financial problems and had to undertake large-scale debt reduction through public refinancing. John Manzoni, Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office, acknowledged that the facilities management sector was not “in a healthy position” and both Government and the industry had to “build rather carefully back out of that”. The Strategic Supplier risk assessments provided us with an insight into the health of those companies, and their performance against contracts.
21.In our report on Learndirect we considered the Department for Education’s failure to cancel the company’s contract suggested that the Government might have considered the company to be too big to fail. The Carillion board appeared to be under that impression, right up to the point when the company failed. We have recommended to Government that Departments “develop a framework for identifying any risk that a commercial provider becomes so large and essential to the delivery of public services that it cannot be allowed to fail, or requires special treatment if it begins to do so.” The Cabinet Office has undertaken to provide a detailed response by the end of this year.
22.The Government has allowed a culture to develop in which a small number of large companies believe that they are too big to fail pursued new business with little apparent consideration of their ability to deliver the right service at the right price.
23.The Government has committed to encouraging competition in the market. To achieve that goal the Government will need to attract new entrants to the market. The benefits of greater competition, which can also improve innovation and efficiency, need to be balanced with the requirement to have sufficient established potential suppliers to deliver very large or complex projects and to maintain appropriate resilience in the system to ensure continuity of delivery.
24.The British Institute of Facilities Management (BIFM) argue that Government is a key driver of procurement trends that affect not only its direct contracts but the wider procurement market. Despite Mr Manzoni telling us that Government “should not be satisfied” with its relationship with the private sector”. The Cabinet Office appeared somewhat complacent about the health of certain markets. Coleen Andrews, Director of Market and Suppliers at the Cabinet Office, told us that there were “more than enough suppliers in IT”. She was content that for most big contracts there were between two and five final bidders and that suppliers were now more cautious about deciding what to bid on. However, other outsourced sectors beyond IT do not have the same levels of competition, for example prison management or rail franchising.
25.Departments have attempted to increase the size of the market in the past. The NAO found that for its Transforming Rehabilitation programme, the Ministry of Justice intended to bring new suppliers into the market, and put extensive effort into attracting a diverse range of potential bidders. While more than 700 private, public and third-sector organisations registered an interest, only one of its contracts was won by a supplier from outside the private sector. Voluntary sector bidders were put off by the scale, fixed timetable and associated risks, and a lack of detail about the Ministry’s requirements for financial guarantees from bidders.
26.In sectors such as IT expanding the market may be more achievable and will frequently mean engaging with SMEs. The NAO has found that this process has not always been successful. The Ministry of Justice adopted a new commercial approach intended to support SMEs for its new generation electronic monitoring programme. However, high process burdens, financial risk and complex requirements made SME involvement more challenging.
27.In our Report on Transforming Rehabilitation, we noted that, despite Government attempts to diversify the providers of public services, we had “repeatedly seen a narrowing of the private contractors bidding for, and running, services over time”. The Minister for the Cabinet Office has announced that departments will be provided with “a ‘playbook’ of guidelines, rules and principles that will encourage new entrants to the market and build mixed markets of suppliers”.
28.There are several reasons that current suppliers are exiting parts of the market or not bidding for particular contracts. Several of Government’s large suppliers operate internationally and less onerous contract conditions and better margins overseas have led to some companies restricting their exposure to the UK public sector.
29.Several of the existing Strategic Suppliers identified the cost and burden of the bidding process, and the level of financial guarantees required by the Government, as disincentives to bid. For new entrants, the concerns of the established suppliers are magnified by their size and lack of experience in the process. Contractors in certain sectors have also emphasised the squeeze on margins and the transfer of risk, including the higher reputational risks associated with operating in the public sector.
30.David Lidington, the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, has set out a number of initiatives to improve contracting and maximize the number of alternative suppliers and encourage new providers to enter the market. The Minister recognised that “competition for contracts has often favoured large suppliers, with too narrow a focus on value for money”, and announced that the Government would set out a number of measures to remove barriers to encourage small business, mutuals, charities, cooperatives and social enterprises to bid for public sector contracts.
31.We welcome the Minister’s announcement that the government will be issuing a ‘playbook’ to encourage new entrants and look forward to seeing the details of the proposal. However, the language used in the announcement suggests that the Cabinet Office does not intend to take the opportunity to equip itself with powers to enforce its ‘playbook’. We recommend that the Cabinet Office upgrade its ‘playbook’ and other guidance to the status of mandatory requirements.
32.In 2010, when Francis Maude began to reform government contracting, he found that he was unable to find a record of what contracts were provided by each of the Government’s suppliers, and he had to go to the companies themselves to find out the level of involvement government had with each company. There has been an improvement in the quality and extent of the data held by Government, but it is still not good enough.
33.The Government appears to have limited understanding of how some of these markets operate, and the role that it plays in sustaining the market. There is a balance to be struck between tough negotiations and maintaining relationships with suppliers in the longer term. Unless the risks are understood and mitigated, there can be implications for competitiveness in certain markets because of suppliers exiting areas of public sector business, or new entrants being deterred.
34.The Government should be more confident and assertive in forming the market. The approach will vary in different sectors but the Government’s aim should be to have smaller and less concentrated risks.
35.The Government has created a merry-go-round procurement culture that encouraged a small number of companies to bid for contracts that they knew they would be unable to deliver for the agreed price.
36.The Government’s procurement process incentivised both Government and companies to focus more on the process of tendering and winning bids than on ensuring the right supplier could provide the right service at the right price.
37.The Government has failed to use its unique position in the market to encourage competition in the market; and appears to have no plan or targets for the development of the markets in which it operates; nor does it have the underlying data necessary to develop such a plan.
38.The Government is a uniquely powerful player in these markets but has failed to understand or manage the market. Public sector contracts cover a wide range of activities and are provided by a wide range of companies. Government has little understanding about how it influences the market and displays little strategic thinking into how it could, or should, be examining or influencing those markets.
39.Recommendation: We recommend that the Cabinet Office develop an approach to examining the market to provide it with better intelligence on the motivations and intentions of companies currently bidding for central government work.
40.Our evidence identified a lack of clear data on the scale of the government’s exposure to strategic suppliers, both in terms of contract value and the companies’ involvement in the whole of the public sector. The NAO’s report into the collapse of Carillion identified lack of basic information as a barrier to the early stages of contingency planning.
41.This Committee has previously recommended that the Government publish more information about contracts. In our report on Contracted out health and disability assessments, we noted that while information was collected to manage contracts there was a lack of information made available to claimants and the wider public. We recommended that the Department “publish quarterly national and regional data on contractor performance”.
43.Transparency is key but still too many contracts are secretive or opaque. Quite frankly the taxpayer deserves better. A standard set of contract information should be made publicly available after a contract has been agreed. That information must include the contract value, length and KPIs, together with a list of other public sector contracts won by the successful company. The Government should consider more “open book” methods of running contracts.
44.Strategic Suppliers are, by definition, those suppliers with the largest value of contracts. It is unsurprising therefore that these companies are generally large entities, particularly if they operate in sectors, such as facilities management or construction, that have seen several years of aggressive acquisitions and growth. The process of tendering for Government work has also favoured companies with a track record of securing public sector contracts. Mr Manzoni acknowledged that “We are not doing as well as we would like on small and medium-sized enterprises elsewhere in Government procurement … It is better than it was, but it is still not where we want it to be.”
45.The Federation of Small Businesses argue that SMEs offer greater innovation, flexibility and responsiveness and better value. The Government has an aspiration for greater SME involvement in public sector contracts and has announced further measures to improve access to government contracts. Our evidence suggests simpler and more transparent routes into public sector procurement, disaggregation of large contracts and more collaborative models, such as joint or consortia bidding, would enable SMEs to compete.
46.SME involvement in public sector work is not restricted to bidding for individual contracts. Many Strategic Suppliers have extensive supply chains that involve SMEs. However, the FSB argue that “if simply operating as aggregators, strategic suppliers gain huge power in the marketplace with their suppliers, but it is the strategic suppliers—rather than Government—who will gain from this market power.”
47.There may be benefits of SMEs contracting directly with Government. However, there are risks for government if they are acting as the aggregator for multiple suppliers. An SME contractor may also be less able to respond to change and variation in the contract conditions or terms, and Government unable to flex appropriately to compensate for the restraints faced by smaller businesses. For example, SMEs supplying the Ministry of Justice’s new electronic monitoring programme were asked to attend up to 40 meetings per week and give up their intellectual property for nothing—a wholly unrealistic expectation. The National Audit Office found that the Department had failed to adapt its approach enough to take into account limited staffing and financial resources at SMEs with which it had contracted on the programme.
48.While there may be a balance in the costs and benefits of Government contracting directly with SMEs there is no doubt that the Government plays a role in ensuring businesses throughout the supply chain are fairly treated. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s recently announced initiatives include a requirement for “departments to follow for the first time a ‘playbook’ of guidelines, rules and principles that will encourage new entrants to the market and build mixed markets of suppliers”. The Specialist Engineering Contractors’ (SEC) Group advocated several specific changes, such as the use of Project Bank Accounts, enforcement of the Public Contract Regulations on prompt payment and end or protect retention payments.
49.The Government has committed to greater use of SMEs as direct contractors and announced measures to improve treatment of SMEs in the supply chain. We have, however, seen little evidence of action. We recommend that when the Government publishes details of its proposals to support SMEs it includes an assessment of the wider benefits of increasing the pool of potential suppliers to Government.
50.Recommendation: There is no excuse for small and medium supplier businesses not being paid on time. We recommend that the Government considers a project bank account approach and reviews the impact on small business. We expect the Government’s proposals for supporting SMEs to include measures to address:
51.Outsourcing has been pursued by successive Government to try to secure better value for money, reduce costs and improve quality of service. For Government, outsourcing may also provide access to greater innovation and transfer risk from the taxpayer to private companies. We have not considered the arguments for or against the principle of outsourcing public services as this falls outside of the Committee’s remit. We are, however, concerned about the factors that drive the decision to outsource and the structure of subsequent tenders and contracts.
52.The Treasury’s Green Book includes guidance to departments on evaluating projects and sets out the process for approving a project to ensure that it delivers value for money. The Green Book advises that risks should be “borne by the organisation that is best placed to manage and monitor” them. Several of the Strategic Suppliers expressed concern about the scale of risk transfer encompassed in government contracts. Serco’s CEO, Rupert Soames, told us his main concern was the transfer to unmanageable risk to suppliers “in direct contravention of what is in the Treasury Green Book and the Cabinet Office guidance”. For example, Government may require Suppliers to sign contracts that transfer the risk of any changes in the law or increases in taxes, even though Government has control over what those changes could be. Rupert Soames further cited council tax rises as a risk transferred to suppliers, even though they are not best placed to manage it.
53.Mr Manzoni also accepted that there was some merit in the Strategic Suppliers’ concerns. He told us that:
When outsourcing first began in industry, the presumption was that if you lobbed it over the fence they would sort the problem out. That rarely works. The private sector cannot sort your problem out. You have to be clear what your problem is and then contract in an intelligent way for it. I think we still have a bit of that going on occasionally—not across the board, but occasionally.
54.The NAO has reported on projects where the Government has had to step in when the risks are too great for the private sector. In 2002, the NAO reported, for example, that the Ministry of Defence considered that it had transferred the risk of cost overruns associated with its nuclear submarine facilities at Devonport to the private sector. However, the Department ultimately funded the cost overruns as it had nowhere else to go and needed to ensure the supplier remained viable. Mr Manzoni accepted that “there are certain risks that only the Government can take, and we need to be better at recognising what they are and not trying to outsource them.”
55.Public sector contracts will often have a political context that does not exist in the private sector. Although Ministers may have little direct involvement in the contracting process they can put pressure on civil servants to make early commitments about what a project will achieve and to deliver results quickly.
56.The NAO’s Survival guide to challenging costs in major projects noted that Ministers may get involved in executive decision making, which can confuse accountability, and lead to decisions not being sufficiently tested. For example, our report on Hinkley Point C found that the financing structure of the deal had been determined as a matter of policy and that better value for money alternatives had therefore not been explored.
58.Public bodies can consider outsourcing to be an opportunity to transfer problems to a private company. Transferring risk is illusory in most cases as the government retains the ultimate risk of failure to deliver certain services.
59.The NAO has published several guides to best practice in contracting and makes dozens of recommendations each year to support public bodies improving their approach to contracting. A consistent message from our witnesses and from the NAO is the need for greater engagement and clarity at early stages of a project. Several Strategic Suppliers called for earlier dialogue with Government and opportunities for a more collaborative approach to finding solutions.
60.As previous PAC Reports have said, there can be no certainty about what a project is likely to cost if its scope is uncertain and that once a project enters the planning phase costs may increase and departments may find themselves focussing on “trying to make a project appear successful rather than on delivering a successful project”. In every case the contracting department needs to be very clear on what it wishes to achieve, particularly in fast moving areas such as I.T.
61.The NAO has warned departments of being too quick to arrive at a preferred solution and the political pressure to make early commitments about project cost, innovation or timing. The Public Accounts Committee has seen the results of all these. Ground-breaking projects are “inherently more risky and much more difficult to cost”. John Manzoni told us that the complex contracts “tend to be first-of-a-kind” and that fewer should be going wrong in the future as “We need to pilot them and we need to run them in dual-mode and so on.”
62.Baroness Macgregor Smith and John Collington both told us that the Government had been guilty of poor specification at the start of a contract. John Collington added that Government had been over reliant on third-party consultants to develop a specification and recommended having more civil servants with relevant commercial experience to develop specifications. Those drafting contracts should also consult and take into account the views of those who will manage contracts in order to minimise the risk of writing a contract that is difficult to manage.
63.This Committee is accustomed to seeing poor contract specifications leading to wasted public funds. The Government’s contracts for Community Rehabilitation Companies required major changes following gross misestimation of the scale and nature of the work, with lower-than-expected volumes and higher overheads for the suppliers running the Companies. The changed contracts will cost the Ministry of Justice an additional £342 million from 2017 to 2022, and the Community Rehabilitation Companies themselves forecast losses of £443 million over the same period.
64.Poor contract specification leads to uncertainty, which can cause cost increases, delay and failures to deliver. Imprecise scoping and poor information at the tendering phase can also lead to an adversarial environment that makes it more difficult to reach resolution. The Government needs to ensure that contracting bodies balance front line understanding of a service, project management skills and commercial and financial considerations when designing contracts. The Cabinet Office has a role in ensuring that this balance is achieved.
65.The NAO recommend departments calculate robust baselines against which to measure a project’s performance. Rupert Soames agreed that data received from Government was often inaccurate and that instructions by the Cabinet Office to Departments to collect accurate data were often ignored. For example, our inquiry into the Nuclear Decommission Authority’s contract for decommissioning 12 Magnox nuclear sites concluded that Government dramatically under-estimated the condition of the sites and had not independently assured its information. Government lack of due diligence on basic data led to the contract cost increasing from £3.8 billion to £6.0 billion, and ultimately being terminated 9 years early.
66.The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee concluded that Government’s due diligence processes were in urgent need of improvement, and that there were serious flaws with how Government carried out due diligence on Carillion. Those flaws might not be limited to just one company. We asked witnesses what due diligence Government did on them and vice versa. Some could not fully recall what due diligence work had been done. Sodexo told us that due diligence on a prison was still “a point of contention” and that they had inherited a facility that was in a “poorer condition than we anticipated”. We are surprised that any contractor would not assure itself fully asset conditions during the contracting process.
68.Recommendation: We recommend that Government set out how it will improve the reciprocal due diligence between the Government and its suppliers. Government has a right to assure itself that a company is competent and capable of delivering the contracted service. The company also has a right to expect the Government to specify accurately what service it is contracting.
69.In response to concerns about variations in contract terms the Government has announced the introduction of a standard contract to improve consistency and reduce disputes about interpretation.
70.The introduction of a standard contract is welcome and appropriate for the majority of typical procurements. When the Government procurements are more complex, a more flexible and intelligent approach to contracting is required.
71.Recommendation: Standard contracts, which are beginning to be used by Government, should be used widely. Standard contracts should be designed to make it easier for SMEs to bid and make it clearer where variance occurs.
73.Recommendation: Government should look at the lifetime cost and value of a contract, not just the bottom line at the point the contract is commissioned. Government needs to get better at managing contracts through their life. To do this it needs to facilitate significant uplift in skills
74.In construction, partnering is a relationship of co-dependence between parties on a contract. It is often used on high-risk contracts to ensure coordinated planning and cooperation. Partnering contracts are done on a target cost basis that shares incentives and penalties between partners.
75.Recommendation: Government should consider using a partnering model, as used in construction to create co-dependent relationships, for major, risky contracts to incentivise suppliers to deliver effectively alongside Government, and to ensure Government has proper oversight and skin in the game on vital public services
76.The Government has been accused of being reluctant to negotiate changes to contracts in response to information that was not clear at the start of the contract. Baroness McGregor-Smith told us that in the private sector variations that are identified after the start of a contract would be subject to negotiation and a solution found whereas with government contracts there is insufficient flexibility to make changes. This was also the view of Philip Chalmers, who told us that Government contracts leave little room for negotiation and that in recent times the Government has adopted a “take it or leave it approach” to contracting. This approach denies suppliers the option of genuine contractual renegotiation.
77.The greater the size, and length, of contracts the greater the probability of variations being necessary. In certain sectors social or legislative change may lead to contracts containing perverse incentives or illogical performance measures. The speed of technological change means that IT contracts are susceptible to changes in the external environment.
78.Recommendation: There is an attitude that money can be made from contract variance–so that when data is wrong at the outset this can be a way to boost income on a low margin contract. In the middle of this game, the user of the service too often loses out.
79.In certain sectors technical, social or legislative change may lead to contracts containing perverse incentives or illogical performance measures. The speed of technological change means that IT contracts are susceptible to changes in the external environment.
80.Recommendation: Departments should provide the Cabinet Office with a request to enable extensions for contracts. That request should set out the reasons for requiring the extension, the analysis of the benefits of extending rather than rebidding, and an analysis of the performance over the course of the contract and record of performance across all of the company’s public-sector contracts.
81.The Government’s approach over several years has led to the market concentrating in a small number of large suppliers that are effectively the only businesses able to compete for large, aggregated, public sector contracts. A focus on price has reduced margins for prime contractors, which have cascaded down the supply chain, placing some subcontractors on the edge of sustainability. The combination of risk transfer, poor data and specification with low margins has meant that some government contracts are not only financially unsustainable but may also be effectively undeliverable, even at a loss. When those conditions prevail, it is inevitable that quality is squeezed to such an extent that those reliant on the service will be negatively affected.
82.The Government has a responsibility to deliver value for money for the taxpayer and cannot ignore price. Similarly, the Government should not ignore quality. Gareth Rhys Williams, Government Chief Commercial Officer, explained that:
What we need to make sure is that the bid that we get is sustainable for the life of the contract. Now, it could well be that a vendor will bid at a marginal cost in order to take market share from one of their competitors. Well, as long as we believe that that’s sustainable, that actually generates good value for the taxpayer, as long as the vendor delivers the service. So it is not as simple as, “Are they absolutely profitable at a certain level?”
83.The current procurement environment encourages Government and suppliers to place too much emphasis on price at the expense of quality. Tendering exercises must have an appropriate quality threshold and contracting bodies need to have sufficient understanding of the market to identify bids that are too low to enable the supplier to sustainably deliver to the required standard.
85.We have real concerns about a race to the bottom in pricing. A number of suppliers are now going through corporate cleansing and refusing to bid for contracts where the profit margins are low. Such cleansing has not stopped them doing this in the past. Too often suppliers will also pass cost-cutting down the supplier chain without due regard for long-term implications. Government has to be an intelligent customer and be clearer about the impact of pricing models on the long-term delivery of a project. A saving today can simply shunt costs into the future.
86.Section 3 of the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 requires that a public-sector authority must consider how a procurement might improve the economic, social and environmental well-being of the relevant area. Baroness McGregor-Smith told us that, as shared value models became more prominent, it was necessary “to start thinking about the impact the private sector has upon the communities where it works” and, whether through apprenticeships, working with “individuals who had been disadvantaged in some way” or improving diversity, additional social value was at the heart of a private sector’s work on public contracts.
87.Strategic Suppliers were keen to tell the Committee about their commitment to social value as part of their company ethic and Corporate Social Responsibility Work. They expressed concern about the consistency with which its requirements were applied. The Government has indicated that greater use of the Act will be included in the measures the Cabinet Office will be implementing to improve Government contracting.
88.Cabinet Office is obliged to consider wider social benefits of procurements under Section 3 of the Public Services (Social Value) Act. The underuse of the Act could be taken as further evidence that cost overrides any other consideration Government makes in awarding contracts. The enthusiasm of suppliers to see the Act better used gives Government an open goal to achieve more social value.
89.Recommendation: We recommend that there be an expectation of including a social value evaluation in Government procurements and that contracting bodies provide the Cabinet Office with an explanation if they wish to remove the provisions.
92.Recommendation: We recommend the Government include terms in their standard contracts that provide assurance that the company has appropriate corporate governance and corporate social responsibility policies in place.
12 , HC (2017–19) 770, Q4
13 See Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-Seventh Report of Session 2015–16, HC 643. The cancelled e-borders scheme was developed against the backdrop of the July 2005 London bombings and the award of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.
14 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2016–17, HC 914, 27 January 2017; Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-Eighth Report Session 2017–19, , HC 724; Lockheed Martin UK ()
15 Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-Eighth Report Session 2017–19, , HC 724
16 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2015–16, HC 604, 24 November 2015
17 Qq 396, 583, 667; The Collapse of Carillion, Briefing Paper , House of Commons Library, March 2018, p. 18
18 Q 396; , HC (2017–19) 770, Q 7; See Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, Second Joint report of Session 2017–19, being the Tenth Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee of Session 2017–19 and Twelfth Report of the Work and Pensions Committee of Session 2017–19, , HC 679, p. 13; J. Ford Financial Times, 18 June 2018.
19 Qq 130, 334, 337, 396, 583, 668
20 Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018
21 Qq 223, 232, 236, 401, 583, 667
22 Q 680
23 Public Accounts Committee, Twenty-Second Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 646, p. 3
24 See Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, Second Joint report of Session 2017–19, being the Tenth Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee of Session 2017–19 and Twelfth Report of the Work and Pensions Committee of Session 2017–19, , HC 679
25 Public Accounts Committee, Twenty-Second Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 646
26 HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes: Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Twentieth to the Thirtieth reports from Session 2017–19, , May 2018, p 21
27 Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018
28 Q 306
29 British Institute of Facilities Management ()
30 Q 680
31 Q 761
32 Q 762
33 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2015–16, HC 951 28 April 2016
34 Q 680
35 Public Accounts Committee, Fifteenth Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 458
36 Committee of Public Accounts, Seventeenth Report of Session 2016–17, , HC 484.
37 Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018
38 British Institute of Facilities Management ()
39 Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018
40 Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018
41 Q 679; see National Audit Office, , Session 2013–14, HC 810, 12 November 2013
42 See Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2015–16, HC 604, 24 November 2015; Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018; Q 680
43 National Audit Office, , Session 2013–14, HC 811, 12 November 2013
44 , HC (2017–19) 770, Q26
45 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Session 2015–16, HC 91-I, p. 7; Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2014–15, HC 268, p. 42; Qq 61, 68ff.
46 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General Session 2017–19, HC 1002, 7 June 2018
47 Public Accounts Committee, Thirty-Third Report of Session 2015–16, , HC 727, p. 5
48 Q 680
49 Federation of Small Businesses ()
50 Q 631
51 Federation of Small Businesses ()
52 Committee of Public Accounts, Fifteenth Report of Session 2017–19, HC 458, para 15
53 Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2017–19, HC 242, Para 3.37
54 See Government Commercial Function, , September 2017, p6.
55 Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018
56 Specialist Engineering Contractors’ Group (
57 See Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 748; Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018; HC Deb, 27 June 2018, col 882
58 UK Parliament, , accessed 12 July 2018
59 HM Treasury, March 2018, p 30
60 Q 560
61 Q 355
62 Q 374
63 Q 690
64 Q 690
65 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2002–03, HC 90: 6 December 2002; see Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Survival guide to challenging costs in major projects
66 Q 690
67 National Audit Office, , June 2018; Qq 740–741; see Committee of Public Accounts, Third Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 393
68 Committee of Public Accounts, Third Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 393
69 See Sodexo ();Interserve (); Capita ()
70 CGI (); Interserve (); Q 220.
71 Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-Seventh Report of Session 2015–16, , HC 643; Committee of Public Accounts, Fifty-Fourth Report of Session 2013–14, , HC 1000; National Audit Office, , 21 June 2018
72 National Audit Office, , 21 June 2018
73 Committee of Public Accounts, Fifty-Fourth Report of Session 2013–14, , HC 1000; Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-Seventh Report of Session 2015–16, , HC 643; Committee of Public Accounts, Fifty-First Report of Session 2016–17, HMRC’s contract with Concentrix, HC 998; Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-First Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 461
74 National Audit Office, , 21 June 2018
75 Q 735
76 Qq 21, 104
77 Q 21
78 Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Session 2017–19, HC 676, 15 December 2017. Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-Seventh Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 897
79 National Audit Office, , 21 June 2018
80 Qq 356–7
81 Committee of Public Accounts, , Twenty-First Report of Session 2017–19, HC 461, 21 Februrary 2018
82 See Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 748, para 20
83 Qq 488–9
84 Q 713
85 See Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2017–19, HC 632; Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2017–19, HC 408; Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, , Session 2016–17, HC 915
86 Q 102
87 Q 421
88 Q 769
89 Q 127
90 Q 539–40, Q 611
91 BIFM (), para 20
92 Cabinet Office, , 25 June 2018, accessed 12 July 2018
Published: 24 July 2018