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Windrush generation and the Home Office

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to the report*

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The Committee of Public Accounts

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Contents

Summary	3
Introduction	4
Conclusions and recommendations	5
1 Systemic problems within the Department	8
Failing to protect the legal rights of the Windrush generation	9
Poor quality systems and data	10
Failing to monitor the impact of compliant environment measures	11
2 The Department's response	13
Limited support programmes	13
Narrow review of cases	13
Insufficient promotion of the Windrush scheme	14
Formal Minutes	16
Witnesses	17
Published written evidence	18
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliaments	19

Summary

The Windrush scandal demonstrates a combination of a lack of concern about the real-world impact of the Home Office's (the Department) immigration policies compounded by a systemic failure to keep accurate records, meaning many people who are British Citizens or have leave to remain in the UK do not have the paperwork to prove it. The Home Office was aware of this through case enquiries from citizens and their MPs. Yet, the department failed in its duty to protect the rights of people to live, work and access services and benefits in the UK when designing and implementing its immigration policies. This failure was compounded by the Department's lack of action when there were clear warnings that members of the Windrush generation, many of whom were elderly and vulnerable, were being denied their rights. The Department has a duty of care to identify and support everyone affected by the Windrush scandal, but in practice its actions do not live up to its own promise to do everything it can to put things right. It has set up a task force, but while this belated flurry of activity may help some of those who have identified themselves, it does nothing to tackle the systemic issues that led to the problems in the first place. Rather than taking full responsibility to resolve the problems it has caused, it is being complacent, neglecting to identify those affected and denying people support to rebuild their lives. We do not believe that the Department is doing enough to address the appalling defects in its systems, processes and data quality, which contributed to the scandal. Given the human cost of wrong decisions in the immigration system, the Department must invest significant effort so that its staff make the right decisions and correctly record people's immigration history and status. This has major implications for the future as the UK prepares to leave the EU: the Home Office must ensure that EU citizens are easily able to regularise their status and stay in the UK as the Government has promised, rather than being caught up in a similar scandal.

Introduction

The Home Office (The Department) and its agencies (UK Visas and Immigration, Immigration Enforcement and Border Force) manage the UK immigration system: setting immigration policy; deciding who has the right to stay; and encouraging and enforcing the removal of illegal migrants. Between 1948 and 1973, nearly 600,000 Commonwealth citizens came to live and work in the UK with the right to remain indefinitely. But many were not given any documentation to confirm their immigration status, and the Home Office kept no records. In the last ten years, successive governments have introduced the “compliant environment” where the right to live, work and access services including benefits and bank accounts in the UK is only available to people who can demonstrate their eligibility to do so. Towards the end of 2017 the media began to report stories of members of the Windrush generation being denied access to public services, being detained in the UK or at the border, or being removed from, or refused re-entry to, the UK. This has been referred to as the Windrush scandal.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. **For many years, the Home Office has failed to protect people's legal rights to live, work and access services and benefits in the UK.** The Department's operating policy over the last 20 years has been to receive and process applications for visas and other types of immigration status under a rules-based system. The Department has shown a lack of care by producing weak impact assessments and evaluations of its compliant environment policies which failed to identify the potential negative effects on people who were in the UK lawfully but had poor documentation; ignoring key warning signs including a 2014 report that flagged the potential adverse impact of compliant environment policy on certain groups; and not acting when Caribbean ministers raised the plight of Windrush generation members in April 2016. We are deeply concerned by Department's lack of action and understanding of the needs of applicants. As the UK prepares to exit the EU there is a risk that EU citizens will also be caught out if they do not have the required documents. It is vital that the Department acts on the lessons of Windrush.

Recommendation: *The Department must protect and prioritise people's rights to residency or citizenship when designing, delivering and monitoring its immigration policies and systems. It should report back to us in 6 months on how it is putting impact assessments and external consultations at the core of its policy making to identify how new immigration policies could affect people and how to mitigate against the risk of unintended consequences. It should also report back to us on how it is addressing the findings of Wendy Williams's lessons learned review.*

Recommendation: *It should redesign and test its application processes and systems with applicants and staff to ensure they are accessible and easy to use. It should report back to the Committee in 12 months on the progress it has made, including a description of the testing it has done and how it is identifying and managing risks.*

2. **The Department is making life-changing decisions on people's rights, based on incorrect data from systems that are not fit for purpose.** This Committee, our predecessor and other commentators have raised concerns about the quality of the Department's data numerous times. We are extremely concerned that the Department is not taking this seriously. In 2014, the Department accepted the recommendation of the previous Committee that it immediately take steps to improve the quality and clarity of the data it collects and holds, but we have seen little evidence of improvements. Indeed, in 2016 the Department rejected the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration's recommendation that it cleanse its database of 'disqualified persons' from holding bank accounts and driving licenses of any one wrongly identified. We find it deeply worrying that, in the session, the Department told us that it did not know whether issues with data and incorrect sanctions on the Windrush generation could apply to other aspects of its immigration application cases. Despite this, the Department promises that Atlas, its new case management system, will resolve existing problems with its legacy Casework Information Database. However, it could not confirm how it will deal with the stock and flow of cases being transferred to Atlas, nor give a definitive timetable for the full roll-out of the system.

Recommendation: *In its design and roll-out of Atlas, the Department should prioritise improving the quality of its data. Alongside its Treasury Minute response, the Department should write to us setting out specific plans for data cleansing, migration of the existing case files and controls around the input of new data.*

Recommendation: *In 6 months' time, the Department should write to us with an update on how its system for EU citizens to confirm their status is working, to ensure they do not face the same issues as the Windrush generation.*

3. **It was a dereliction of duty for the Department not to monitor the impact of its compliant environment policy on vulnerable members of our society.** The Department has essentially devolved the enforcement of its compliant environment policies on housing and employment to landlords and employers. Despite the risk of potential inconsistency and discrimination, the Department has not evaluated the impact of its compliant environment measures and acknowledges that it will struggle to do so. Its 2015 evaluation of a pilot of its Right to Rent scheme, which the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants claimed had led to discrimination, was inadequate and the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration concluded in 2018 that the Department's evaluation had simply dismissed concerns about negative impacts such as discrimination.

Recommendation: *In its Treasury Minute response to this report the Department should explain its monitoring and evaluation regime for compliant environment measures. It must set out how it intends to incorporate information collected from people affected by the system, not just from those administering it.*

4. **Members of the Windrush Generation have lost jobs, benefits, homes and access to health care. The Department is shirking its responsibility to put right the wrongs suffered by individuals because of its mistakes.** The Department is not taking ownership for resolving individual cases but is instead interpreting its role narrowly and using other departments' remits as a poor excuse for inaction. For example, it has done little to secure urgent housing for members of the Windrush Generation, many of whom are homeless or having to rely on family members, and is content to simply leave this to local authorities which are under significant pressure. It demonstrates a disconnect with the reality facing many local authorities to simply devolve responsibility and assume that the problem is resolved. The Department also lacks any sense of urgency: it has taken 8 months to set up an 'urgent' hardship fund; and its compensation scheme is still not operating, over a year since the Windrush scandal first broke. The Department could not tell us when the scheme would be launched. Many of those in need of help are elderly and vulnerable and cannot afford to wait any longer. Homelessness is an acute issue for those affected requiring urgent action.

Recommendation: *The Department should take immediate responsibility for meeting the urgent needs of individuals. In the case of housing, it needs to have a better solution and explain how it will secure housing quickly for those in dire need.*

5. **The Department has not done enough to identify people, from its own data, that might have been affected. We do not accept that reviewing cases from the wider Commonwealth would be disproportionate.** Despite clearly acknowledging to us

that a wider group of people could be affected, the Department has limited both its reviews, of removals and detentions and of compliant environment sanctions, to people from 12 Caribbean countries. This level of inaction is both deeply frustrating and the Department's argument that a further review would be disproportionate is a yet another example of it doing as little, rather than as much, as possible to find and help people affected by its actions. The Department could not justify its position adequately given it has not undertaken a sample review of wider Commonwealth cases and has not yet produced the results of its review of compliant environment sanctions. It is also contrary to the Department's admission that it was reasonable to expect that non-Caribbean nationals may have also been affected, and that people from other nationalities, including India, Australia and Nigeria, have approached it for help. The Windrush scandal concerns the entire Commonwealth, not only Caribbean nationals, and while the Department has reviewed 11,800 Caribbean cases, around 160,000 non-Caribbean Commonwealth cases remain unreviewed. We believe these people cannot be simply ignored.

Recommendation: *The Department should extend its historical reviews beyond Caribbean Commonwealth nationals to include other Commonwealth nationals who may have been wrongfully detained, removed or sanctioned under the compliant environment.*

6. **The Department is not doing enough to raise awareness of the help available from the Windrush Scheme to the people who so desperately need it.** The Department set up the Windrush Scheme in April 2018 to help individuals resolve their immigration status but has been woefully complacent in its promotion of the scheme, particularly internationally. In failing to promote the Windrush scheme to all Commonwealth citizens who may be affected, the Department is denying victims their right to support. While the Windrush branding has been effective in raising awareness amongst Caribbean nationals, it has been less so in alerting people from other Commonwealth nations. The Department says it has promoted the Windrush scheme internationally but accepts it could do more.

Recommendation: *The Department should immediately promote the Windrush scheme more proactively, particularly outside of the UK and the Caribbean. It should also clearly communicate the need for people to formalise their immigration status more generally so undocumented residents do not get caught out again. The Department should write to us by the end of March outlining the immediate action it has taken and include an update on the number of people who have engaged with the scheme.*

1 Systemic problems within the Department

1. Based on a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office (the Department).¹ We also took evidence from the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association, Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, and from Vernon Vanriel and his representative Jon Feld (Mr Vanriel is a member of the Windrush generation who was denied re-entry to the UK after a visit to Jamaica). The Home Office and its agencies (UK Visas and Immigration, Immigration Enforcement and Border Force) manage the UK immigration system, setting immigration policy, deciding who has the right to stay and encouraging and enforcing the removal of illegal migrants.²

2. Between 1948 and 1973, many Commonwealth citizens came to live and work in the UK and had the right to remain in the UK indefinitely. Some of these individuals, particularly those from Caribbean nations, have become known as the Windrush generation, named after the hundreds of people who travelled from the Caribbean to England on HMT Empire Windrush in 1948. From 1973, changes to immigration legislation meant that people arriving from Commonwealth countries could no longer stay in the UK indefinitely and were granted temporary residence instead. Many Commonwealth citizens who had arrived before 1973 were not issued with any documentation, and the Home Office kept no records to confirm these individuals' immigration status.³

3. The 'compliant environment', known pre-2010 as the 'hostile environment', is a cross-government policy designed to reduce the impact of migration on public services, emphasising the need for individuals to prove their immigration status. The 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts introduced stricter controls around migrants' access to services including housing, welfare benefits, driving licences and bank accounts.⁴ For example, the 2014 Immigration Act introduced Right to Rent, requiring private landlords to check the immigration status of prospective tenants, and giving them powers to evict existing tenants who are in the UK illegally with the risk of financial penalties or criminal sanctions if they are found to be renting to illegal migrants.⁵

4. From late 2017, media reports began to grow about members of the Windrush generation being denied access to public services, detained in the UK or at the border, or removed from, or refused re-entry to, the UK.⁶ In April 2018, the government acknowledged that the Windrush generation had been treated unfairly. The Department has set up a taskforce to help resolve the Windrush generation's immigration status. It is also in the process of setting up a compensation scheme. It has reviewed 11,800 cases of Caribbean Commonwealth people who were born before 1 January 1973 and were detained and/or removed from the UK since 2002. From this it found 164 people who may have been in the UK before 1973, and of those, 18 people it is most likely to have treated wrongly.⁷ The Department has reported that it is trying to contact these 164 people via its taskforce,

1 C&AG's Report, [Handling of the Windrush situation](#), Session 2017–19, HC 1622, 5 December 2018

2 [C&AG's report](#), paras 3, 1.8

3 [C&AG's report](#), para 1

4 [C&AG's report](#), paras 2, 1.7

5 [C&AG's report](#), paras 1.1, 1.9, Figure 1

6 Q 89; [C&AG's report](#), para 5

7 [C&AG's report](#), paras 5, 18, 2.4

and as of December 2018 had traced 124.⁸ It is also carrying out a separate review of around 2,000 cases to find people who may have had a compliant environment sanction wrongfully applied. It has committed to sharing its findings in the first quarter of 2019.⁹

Failing to protect the legal rights of the Windrush generation

5. The Immigration Law Practitioners' Association (ILPA) noted that public administration in the UK is based on a culture of rights rather than permissions, and the notion that people do not have to prove their identity at various points. This meant that people from the Windrush generation, who had statutory leave to remain under the 1971 Immigration Act, did not have formal permission or documentation to remain in the UK from the Home Office, but still had the right to do so. It told us that the compliant environment policy, however, had brought about a requirement for documentation without having a documentary system in place, and that this, combined with a net migration target and the removal of legal aid from immigration cases and first-tier tribunal appeal rights had created a system that manufactured 'precarious lives' and led to people being excluded.¹⁰ In its December 2018 report, the National Audit Office concluded that the Department had not adequately considered its duty of care and ensured that people's rights and entitlements were recognised when it introduced its immigration policies.¹¹

6. The Department has accepted that it should have understood the potential adverse effect of its policies on the Windrush generation, and that this information should have featured in its impact assessments. The Department told us that the impact assessments were not done to the standard required, and rather than being at the heart of the policy making process, were most likely to have been completed as a tick box exercise towards the end of it. The Permanent Secretary stated to us: "It will have been a failing, to be honest, of understanding the context, of not understanding enough about the populations that were affected..." The Department observed that the approach taken meant the assessments did not identify all the issues, and that it was awaiting the findings of the Wendy Williams Independent Lessons Learned review, due to report in Spring 2019, for a definitive account of what happened and when, and who knew what.¹² The Department said its experience of what had gone wrong with Windrush had influenced its approach to leaving the European Union and related immigration policy. It claimed that following the publication of its immigration White paper it would be engaging in a significant process of assessments and testing submissions for the risks of inadvertent consequences and other factors before it set new rules for the immigration system.¹³

7. The Department also agreed that it should have 'properly considered' concerns raised by third sector and other parties about the adverse effect of its policies on people. It accepted it did not gather relevant evidence to ensure it had a good understanding of the issues, and did not properly consider representations made to it.¹⁴ In written evidence, the previous Permanent Secretary of the Department, who was in the role from 2013 to 2017, told us that two documents were not brought to his attention: the 2014 Chasing

8 [Update to HASC on Windrush: 17 December 2018](#), page 10

9 Qq 98, 164–167; [C&AG's report](#), para 9

10 Q 22

11 [C&AG's report](#), para 20

12 [Qq 78, 81–85](#), 88–89; [C&AG's report](#) para 4.9

13 Qq 154–155

14 Q 78

Status report by the Legal Action Group, which raised concerns about the adverse impact of compliant environment policy on certain groups, including Jamaican migrants who arrived in the UK before 1973, and a 2016 diplomatic telegram sent by the Foreign Office to the Home Office that referred to warnings from Caribbean Commonwealth Ministers about Windrush cases.¹⁵ The Department took no action following the 2014 report or 2016 diplomatic telegram.¹⁶ The Committee will be taking evidence from the former Permanent Secretary later this year.

Poor quality systems and data

8. This Committee, our predecessor, and other commentators have raised concerns about the quality of the Department's systems and data. In 2014, the Department committed to implementing by Spring 2015, the previous Committee of Public Accounts' recommendation to immediately take steps to improve the quality and clarity of the data it collects and holds.¹⁷ In 2016, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found the Department had wrongly identified some people as being 'disqualified' from having a driving license or a bank account, but the Department rejected the recommendation to cleanse its disqualified persons list of people who should not be on it.¹⁸ The historical review on compliant sanctions is ongoing: the Department accepted that it was likely to find a small number of people from the Windrush generation whose data was wrongly shared and could, therefore, have been given incorrect compliant environment sanctions. It added that it was reasonable to expect this could be scaled to a larger number of people from other Commonwealth nationalities.¹⁹

9. The Department told us that it has reduced or paused active data sharing since the Windrush scandal broke, to reduce the risk of unreliable data being used and is manually checking and putting safeguards around the data it holds. It told us that it was more confident that it was not taking unfair action against people due to these changes.²⁰ The Department did not know whether issues with its data and incorrect sanctions on the Windrush generation could apply to other aspects of its immigration application cases.²¹

10. The Department told us that its policy under successive governments has been to receive and process applications according to a set of rules, rather than trying to help people navigate the system. The Department has been aware for some time that people struggle to use its systems and following the Windrush scandal it is now trying to change this approach.²² It admitted that it had not tested its Windrush 'urgent and exceptional need' support programme with staff or members of the public before going live to see

15 Written evidence from Sir Mark Sedwill (WIN0002), page 1

16 Q 79; C&AG's report, para 3.22; [Immigration: Written question - 136368](#)

17 HC Committee of Public Accounts, Reforming the UK border and immigration system, Twentieth report of Session 2014–15, HC 584, October 2014; [Treasury Minutes, Government responses on the Ninth; the Sixteenth and Seventeenth; and the Nineteenth to the Twentieth reports from the Committee of Public Accounts: Session 2014–15; and progress on Government Cash Management, Cm 8988, December 2014, page 21](#)

18 [Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, An Inspection of the "hostile environment" measures relating to driving licences and bank accounts, October 2016, C&AG's report, para 3.21](#)

19 Qq 145, 146, 148

20 Qq 93, 149

21 Qq 93, 150–151

22 Q 140–144

whether it was user-friendly and understandable.²³ The Department's quality assurance systems are also process focused, looking at speed and volumes and not the complexity or impact of its decisions.²⁴

11. The Department told us that its Casework Information Database (CID), dates back to 1998 and acknowledged that there are defects both in the system and the data within it. It says that 'Atlas', its new case management system, will resolve existing problems by providing a customer focussed view and allowing more automated updating, reducing the amount of manual entry by staff.²⁵ The Department also said it has begun to process some new applications on Atlas. The project is due to be complete by 2021. It did not have specific dates for when all applications involving immigration processes will be using the system and for when movement of all stock will be complete.²⁶ It says work is ongoing to ensure it adopts the optimum approach to data migration, including finalising its approach to assuring data quality using management information, business activity monitoring and data comparison.²⁷

12. The Department told us that it is taking steps to ensure EU citizens do not face the same issues as the Windrush generation when the UK leaves the EU in March 2019. The Department says it is making the system EU citizens will use to confirm their status as easy and simple to use as possible. At the time of our evidence session the Department told us that the system was still in its 'private beta' stage and being tested with some EU citizens, and would be open to all EU citizens in 2019.²⁸ It has since confirmed the scheme will be fully open by 30 March 2019.²⁹

Failing to monitor the impact of compliant environment measures

13. During the evidence session we raised the risk that lawfully British citizens, mostly ethnic minorities, have been discriminated against in their access to important services including housing and employment.³⁰ ILPA told us that compliant environment measures regarding private renting and employment checks had effectively forced employers and private landlords to become local immigration enforcement officers. ILPA also stated that the risk of penalties for non-compliance – £3,000 for a landlord and up to £20,000 for an employer - mean landlords and employers are less likely to go through the process of awaiting confirmation of identity, increasing the risk of discrimination against certain groups. It noted that ethnic minorities in particular, including those who are British citizens, are being filtered out of housing and employment processes because it is easier to do this than perform a series of checks.³¹

14. The Department has accepted that its pre-Windrush monitoring of the compliant environment was limited, and that it should have been doing more to evaluate whether its policies were leading to discrimination in the housing and employer market. It told us it had conducted some analysis regarding Right to Rent in 2015 to see whether the

23 Q 172–178

24 [C&AG's report](#), para 13, 3.9

25 Qq 125, 126

26 Qq 130–133

27 [Letter from Home Office to PAC](#) dated 8 January 2019

28 Qq 199–201, 212–213

29 <https://www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-citizens-families>

30 Q 94

31 Qq 26–28

policy was leading to discrimination, but did not have specifics on the information it had received back from partners in advance of the Windrush scandal.³² The National Audit Office's report noted that the Department had decided from its 2015 pilot of Right to Rent that the scheme was having a positive effect, but the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants claimed it had led to discrimination. The Chief Inspector later concluded the Department's evaluation of the Right to Rent scheme had dismissed concerns about negative effects including discrimination.³³

32 Q 90–96

33 C&AG's report, para 3.23

2 The Department's response

Limited support programmes

15. Vernon Vanriel, a member of the Windrush generation, told us that after being denied entry to the UK in 2007, he remained in Jamaica until the Department funded his return to the UK in September 2018.³⁴ He told us he is still waiting for council housing, having lost his home when he was not allowed to return to the UK, and is having to rely on family.³⁵ The Department has apologised for its treatment of the Windrush Generation, and says it has a vulnerable persons team helping those affected. Lack of housing is the one of the most prominent and debilitating issue for many victims, however the Department told us responsibility for this lies with local authorities. The Department explained that their vulnerable persons team can help people with their applications for benefits and registering with a GP, but cannot direct local authorities or housing associations to provide people with accommodation.³⁶ The Department referred to the cross-Government taskforce but said that nobody on the taskforce would be personally responsible for housing Windrush generation members because this role lies with local authorities.³⁷ The Department acknowledged that it had not thought about alternatives, such as actions taken following the Grenfell Tower disaster.³⁸

16. The Department acknowledged it is dealing with a vulnerable set of people with a wide range of needs.³⁹ In December 2018, 8 months after the Windrush scandal began in earnest, the Department announced its financial support programme for Windrush generation members with an 'urgent and exceptional need', otherwise known as its 'hardship fund'.⁴⁰ The Department accepted that it took too long to set this up, and admitted it had not tested the scheme to see how user-friendly and understandable it is.⁴¹ The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants expressed concern that the hardship fund was inadequate and had set a very high and difficult bar for people to reach in order to secure support.⁴² The hardship fund is separate from the Department's compensation scheme. The Department intends to start making payments from its compensation scheme in Spring 2019.⁴³ The Department said it cannot and will not announce the scheme until it is able to fund it.⁴⁴

Narrow review of cases

17. The Department acknowledged that it has always known that there are a large number of citizens living in the UK lawfully who do not have the documentation to prove their

34 Qq 1, 35

35 Qq 10–15

36 Qq 59, 61–63

37 Qq 65–66

38 Qq 68, 71–73

39 Q 71

40 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/windrush-scheme-support-in-urgent-and-exceptional-circumstances>

41 Qq 172–178

42 Q 56

43 [C&AG's report](#), paras 18, 4.5

44 Qq 189–190

status.⁴⁵ In 2014 it estimated there may be up to 500,000 such people in the UK.⁴⁶ The Department admitted that it lost sight of this group of people when it was developing and implementing its policies.⁴⁷ The Department said it focused its review of historical cases of detentions, removals, and compliant environment sanctions on Caribbean nationals because its own evidence suggests that these are the people most likely to have suffered in relation to unfair removals or detentions, but accepts that a wider group of people could be affected by its compliant environment sanctions.⁴⁸ It has also released data showing that people from other nationalities, including India, Australia and Nigeria, have approached it for help.⁴⁹ The Department argues that reviewing the cases of around 160,000 non-commonwealth nationals, would be operationally ‘disproportionate’ because it could take up to 200 staff over a year to do.⁵⁰ This is despite also telling us that the operational impact of moving 175 staff into its Windrush reform programme from a wider pool of over 7,000 staff, had been minimal.⁵¹

18. The Department set up its Windrush Scheme in April 2018 to help people resolve their immigration status. While the Department is actively looking for Caribbean nationals it has identified through its historical review, it expects people from other Commonwealth nations to seek help themselves through contacting the taskforce.⁵² During the evidence session we were told that contacting the Department can be especially problematic, with applicants historically facing a ‘wall of silence’ and a lack of engagement.⁵³ We have also received written evidence on the difficulties of applying from Nigeria, with the Department being accused of assuming that those in need of help have easy and regular access to a mobile phone, the internet, or email.⁵⁴ The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association explained that not every person in need of help will be aware of this until they run into difficulty. It described those affected by the scandal as a ‘self-selecting population’, meaning they were only likely to be ‘captured’ if they were excluded from the United Kingdom for instance, or ran into problems when applying for a pension or a benefit that requires they prove their right to be in the country. It was only then that they would be likely to seek help.⁵⁵

Insufficient promotion of the Windrush scheme

19. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants told us that while use of the word ‘Windrush’ has been helpful in terms of campaigning, it has been less so in making people aware of whether or not they might be entitled to support from the Windrush scheme. It said it knew of cases where people had assumed they could not be part of the Windrush generation because they were the ‘wrong nationality’, or because they did not arrive in the UK on the HMT Windrush itself. It stressed that the Department should not only investigate non-Caribbean cases, but also needed to do more to promote the message that

45 Q 75

46 Q 24; [C&AG’s report](#), paras 11, 2.14

47 Qq 75–77

48 Qq 98, 148, 159.

49 [C&AG’s report](#), para 2.10; [Update to HASC on Windrush: 17 December 2018](#), page 3–4

50 Qq 99, 148; [C&AG’s report](#), paras 10, 2.11

51 Qq 157–163

52 Qq 101–102; [Update to HASC on Windrush: 17 December 2018](#), page 10

53 Q 3

54 Qq 101–102; Written evidence from Gertrude Chinegwundoh ([WIN0001](#))

55 Q 39

the scandal did not only affect Caribbean nationals.⁵⁶ Written evidence we have received pointed to the need for greater promotion of the Windrush scheme by the Department, and expressed concern that the scandal is being portrayed as only affecting Caribbean Commonwealth citizens, when it is affecting people from the entire Commonwealth.

20. The Department explained that it was promoting the Windrush scheme through ‘communication assets’ such as wallet cards and posters. It also told us that it relied on non-government organisations, MPs, local authorities and its own volunteer cohort to publicise the scheme, as it believed its own communications such as press notices were less likely to be effective due to public mistrust of the Department following the scandal.⁵⁷ The Department has also told us that there has been international and diaspora media coverage of the taskforce to support anyone affected.⁵⁸ This contrasts with written evidence we have received stating otherwise. Gertrude Chinegwundoh told us that she travelled to Nigeria in the summer to meet with Windrush individuals and, for the six weeks she was there, “did not hear anything in the media about Windrush and how those affected can apply from Nigeria.”⁵⁹ The Department told us there had been high levels of coverage in the Caribbean specifically of the scheme, but it was planning further targeted media to non-Caribbean Commonwealth countries including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.⁶⁰

56 Q 37

57 Qq 104–106

58 [Letter from Home Office to PAC](#) dated 8 January 2019

59 Written evidence from Gertrude Chinegwundoh ([WIN0001](#))

60 [Letter from Home Office to PAC](#) dated 8 January 2019

Formal Minutes

Wednesday 27 February 2019

Members present:

Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown	Stephen Morgan
Douglas Chapman	Bridget Phillipson
Caroline Flint	Gareth Snell
Shabana Mahmood	Anne-Marie Trevelyan
Nigel Mills	

Draft Report (*Windrush generation and the Home Office*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 20 read and agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Eighty-second of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Monday 4 March at 3:30pm]

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Monday 17 December 2018

Adrian Berry, Chair of Trustees, Immigration Law Practitioner's Association, and Barrister, Garden Court Chambers, **Chai Patel**, Legal and Policy Director, Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, **Vernon Vanriel** and **Jon Feld**

[Q1-57](#)

Sir Philip Rutnam, Permanent Secretary, Home Office, **Shona Dunn**, Second Permanent Secretary, Home Office, and **Diana Luchford**, Director, Windrush Reform Programme, Home Office

[Q58-217](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

WIN numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Cabinet Office, HM Government ([WIN0002](#))
- 2 Chinegwundoh, Miss Gertrude ([WIN0001](#))
- 3 Vernon OBE, Dr Patrick ([WIN0003](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliaments

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website. The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2017–19

First Report	Tackling online VAT fraud and error	HC 312 (Cm 9549)
Second Report	Brexit and the future of Customs	HC 401 (Cm 9565)
Third Report	Hinkley Point C	HC 393 (Cm 9565)
Fourth Report	Clinical correspondence handling at NHS Shared Business Services	HC 396 (Cm 9575)
Fifth Report	Managing the costs of clinical negligence in hospital trusts	HC 397 (Cm 9575)
Sixth Report	The growing threat of online fraud	HC 399 (Cm 9575)
Seventh Report	Brexit and the UK border	HC 558 (Cm 9575)
Eighth Report	Mental health in prisons	HC 400 (Cm 9575) (Cm 9596)
Ninth Report	Sheffield to Rotherham tram-trains	HC 453 (Cm 9575)
Tenth Report	High Speed 2 Annual Report and Accounts	HC 454 (Cm 9575)
Eleventh Report	Homeless households	HC 462 (Cm 9575) (Cm 9618)
Twelfth Report	HMRC's Performance in 2016–17	HC 456 (Cm 9596)
Thirteenth Report	NHS continuing healthcare funding	HC 455 (Cm 9596)
Fourteenth Report	Delivering Carrier Strike	HC 394 (Cm 9596)
Fifteenth Report	Offender-monitoring tags	HC 458 (Cm 9596)
Sixteenth Report	Government borrowing and the Whole of Government Accounts	HC 463 (Cm 9596)
Seventeenth Report	Retaining and developing the teaching workforce	HC 460 (Cm 9596)

Eighteenth Report	Exiting the European Union	HC 467 (Cm 9596)
Nineteenth Report	Excess Votes 2016–17	HC 806 (Cm 9596)
Twentieth Report	Update on the Thameslink Programme	HC 466 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-First Report	The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's Magnox	HC 461 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Second Report	The monitoring, inspection and funding of Learndirect Ltd.	HC 875 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Third Report	Alternative Higher Education Providers	HC 736 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Fourth Report	Care Quality Commission: regulating health and social care	HC 468 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Fifth Report	The sale of the Green Investment Bank	HC 468 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Sixth Report	Governance and departmental oversight of the Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership	HC 896 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Seventh Report	Government contracts for Community Rehabilitation Companies	HC 897 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Eighth Report	Ministry of Defence: Acquisition and support of defence equipment	HC 724 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Ninth Report	Sustainability and transformation in the NHS	HC 793 (Cm 9618)
Thirtieth Report	Academy schools' finances	HC 760 (Cm 9618)
Thirty-First Report	The future of the National Lottery	HC 898 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Second Report	Cyber-attack on the NHS	HC 787 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Third Report	Research and Development funding across government	HC 668 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Fourth Report	Exiting the European Union: The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy	HC 687 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Fifth Report	Rail franchising in the UK	HC 689 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Sixth Report	Reducing modern slavery	HC 886 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Seventh Report	Exiting the European Union: The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and the Department for International Trade	HC 699 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Eighth Report	The adult social care workforce in England	HC 690 (Cm 9667)
Thirty-Ninth Report	The Defence Equipment Plan 2017–2027	HC 880 (Cm 9667)

Fortieth Report	Renewable Heat Incentive in Great Britain	HC 696 (Cm 9667)
Forty-First Report	Government risk assessments relating to Carillion	HC 1045 (Cm 9667)
Forty-Second Report	Modernising the Disclosure and Barring Service	HC 695 (Cm 9667)
Forty-Third Report	Clinical correspondence handling in the NHS	HC 929
Forty-Fourth Report	Reducing emergency admissions	HC 795
Forty-Fifth Report	The higher education market	HC 693
Forty-Sixth Report	Private Finance Initiatives	HC 894
Forty-Seventh Report	Delivering STEM skills for the economy	HC 691
Forty-Eighth Report	Exiting the EU: The financial settlement	HC 973
Forty-Ninth Report	Progress in tackling online VAT fraud	HC 1304
Fiftieth Report	Financial sustainability of local authorities	HC 970
Fifty-First Report	BBC commercial activities	HC 670
Fifty-Second Report	Converting schools to academies	HC 697
Fifty-Third Report	Ministry of Defence's contract with Annington Property Limited	HC 974
Fifty-Fourth Report	Visit to Washington DC	HC 1404
Fifty-Fifth Report	Employment and Support Allowance	HC 975
Fifty-Sixth Report	Transforming courts and tribunals	HC 976
Fifty-Seventh Report	Supporting Primary Care Services: NHS England's contract with Capita	HC 698
Fifty-Eighth Report	Strategic Suppliers	HC 1031
Fifty-Ninth Report	Skill shortages in the Armed Forces	HC 1027
Sixtieth Report	Ofsted's inspection of schools	HC1029
Sixty-First Report	Ministry of Defence nuclear programme	HC 1028
Sixty-Second Report	Price increases for generic medications	HC 1184

Sixty-Third Report	Interface between health and social care	HC 1376
Sixty-Fourth Report	Universal Credit	HC 1375
Sixty-Fifth Report	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority	HC 1375
Sixty-Sixth Report	HMRC's performance in 2017–18	HC 1526
Sixty-Seventh Report	Financial Sustainability of police forces in England and Wales	HC 1513
Sixty-Eighth Report	Defra's progress towards Brexit	HC 1514
Sixty-Ninth Report	Sale of student loans	HC 1527
Seventieth Report	Department for Transport's implementation of Brexit	HC 1657
Seventy-First Report	Department for Health and Social Care accounts	HC 1515
Seventy-Second Report	Mental health services for children and young people	HC 1593
Seventy-Third Report	Academy accounts and performance	HC 1597
Seventy-Fourth Report	Whole of Government accounts	HC 464
Seventy-Fifth Report	Pre-appointment hearing: preferred candidate for Comptroller and Auditor General	HC 1883
Seventy-Sixth Report	Local Government Spending	HC 1775
Seventy-Seventh Report	Defence Equipment Plan 2018–28	HC 1519
Seventy-Eighth Report	Improving Government planning and spending	HC 1596
Seventy-Ninth Report	Rail franchising	HC 1793
Eightieth Report	Capita's contacts with the Ministry of Defence	HC 1736
Eighty-First Report	Rail management and timetabling	HC 1793
First Special Report	Chair of the Public Accounts Committee's Second Annual Report	HC 347
Second Special Report	Third Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts	HC 1399