House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts

Governance and departmental oversight of the Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership

Twenty-Sixth Report of Session 2017–19

Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 7 March 2018
The Committee of Public Accounts

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Summary

In 2016 the Committee of Public Accounts reported on the governance of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and made clear recommendations for improvement which were accepted by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (the Department). Despite this, the Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership (GCGP LEP) provides the latest example of the Department devolving powers and funding to LEPs in a manner characterised by both complexity and confusion. The Department needs to get its act together and assure taxpayers that it is monitoring how LEPs spend taxpayers’ money and how it evaluates results.

The Department assures us that there was no misuse of public funds in this instance; however, this is due more to luck than effective oversight given that there appear to have been no effective mechanisms in place for identifying conflicts of interest in GCGP LEP. We are not at all convinced that the issues uncovered in GCGP LEP might not be found elsewhere in other LEPs.

We also put on record our displeasure at the conduct of the former Chair of GCGP LEP when giving evidence. He failed to appreciate the importance of good governance, showed a lack of remorse about the outcome for GCGP LEP, and was evasive when questioned about his potential conflict of interest. Such an attitude only serves to underline the need for the Department to get a grip of its oversight of LEPs. It needs to implement quickly the recommendations of Mary Ney’s review of Local Enterprise Partnership governance and transparency, ensure that all LEPs and their boards are aware of the Nolan Principles for the standards of conduct expected in public life and ensure that they live up to these principles in practice.
Introduction

Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) are partnerships between local authorities and local businesses to support local economic growth, established in 2010. They have a key role to play in assisting in the delivery of many important government policies to support local economic growth. There are 38 LEPs in England, each intended to cover a functional economic area. Through the Local Growth Fund, the government has committed £12 billion to local areas between 2015 and 2021; £9.1 billion of this is through Growth Deals with LEPs. The Department relies on their National Assurance Framework for LEPs to ensure that money is spent appropriately. The government also sees LEPs as key to its new industrial strategy.

Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership (GCGP LEP) consists of 15 separate local authorities, and covers all of Cambridgeshire along with districts in Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire, plus the unitary authorities of Rutland and Peterborough. Concerns about the governance of GCGP LEP were raised locally in January 2017, and in March 2017 Mr Stephen Barclay MP raised these again in correspondence with the Comptroller and Auditor General. Foremost among Mr Barclay’s concerns was that the Chair of GCGP LEP might have benefited from investment of public funds in GCGP LEP’s area of operation. After receiving Mr Barclay’s concerns, the Department conducted a review of GCGP LEP. While this did not find evidence of misuse of public funds, the review did find that GCGP LEP’s assurance framework did not comply with national standards and that GCGP LEP was unable to respond effectively to Mr Barclay’s concerns. In March 2017, the Department withheld the release of money to GCGP LEP and then, in December 2017, GCGP LEP went into voluntary liquidation, following the Chair’s resignation the previous month.
Conclusions and recommendations

1. **Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership (GCGP LEP) did not comply with expected standards in public life, particularly in terms of accountability and transparency.** The governance arrangements at GCCP LEP were clearly not up to standard. GCGP LEP did not have a comprehensive conflicts of interest policy nor an up to date register of interests for board members. In addition, GCGP LEP was not acting transparently, as was illustrated by its failure to publish board papers and produce minutes in a timely or accessible manner. When appearing before this Committee, the former Chair refused to answer questions about his own potential conflict of interest, did not take responsibility for failings at GCGP LEP and seemed not to appreciate the importance of the Nolan principles for the holders of public office: principles which include accountability, openness, and leadership. GCGP LEP and its former Chair must accept responsibility for its failings. However, it is also the case, well illustrated by Mary Ney’s review, that roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities for all LEPs and their accountable bodies need to be much clearer. Without such clarity, we are extremely concerned that in other LEPs there could be a similar lack of openness to the public about the way they make decisions.

**Recommendation:** *The Department should implement the Mary Ney review recommendations in full with all possible speed. It should reiterate the obligations of LEP board members under the Nolan principles; set out ways by which LEPs can enhance their openness and be clear on the training in corporate governance that Chairs and Chief Executives of LEPs should receive.*

2. **The Department’s oversight system failed to identify GCGP LEP as one which should have raised concerns.** The Department has repeatedly given assurances to us that it has resolved issues in LEPs, but the case of GCGP LEP suggests that these assurances are without substance. There were failings at each stage of the Department’s system of assurance over GCGP LEP; notably, the Section 151 officer of Cambridgeshire County Council signed off on GCGP LEP’s assurance framework without checking all of its supporting documentation. Moreover, the Department did not flag GCGP as a LEP about which it had particular concerns, and its system of “annual conversations” with LEPs is not convincingly robust. It was only the correspondence from Mr Barclay which triggered the Department’s internal review, which then led to the withholding of funds from GCGP LEP. The Department informed us that it is now checking on LEPs’ compliance with their assurance frameworks.

**Recommendation:** *The Department should write to us setting out the results of its compliance checks and annual conversations and it should also publish these results.*

3. **Mary Ney’s review of LEP governance and transparency provides a sound basis for improvement; however, the Department has a long way to go before it can be sure that all LEPs have implemented the review properly.** Mary Ney’s review was comprehensive, making 17 recommendations to improve LEP governance and transparency, which the Department assures us that it is currently working to implement. However, as Mary Ney herself highlights, making people properly
accountable is more about culture and actual implementation than it is just about guidance. Mary Ney also acknowledge that it was not possible during the course of the review for her to look in detail at all 38 LEPs in England. To check on the full compliance with the national framework and the implementation of Mary Ney’s review’s recommendations, the Department is conducting “deep dives” into around 12 LEPs across England per year.

**Recommendation:** The Department should write to us by 1 June 2018 with an update on the implementation of the Mary Ney review recommendations, and the results of its “deep dives.” It should set out how this will ensure that concerns unearthed in GCGP LEP are not present in other LEPs, and detail the guidance given to LEPs on corporate governance and transparency.

4. The government has not been clear about the current role, function, and purpose of LEPs in the context of the creation of directly elected mayors and combined authorities. As the case of GCGP LEP illustrates, LEPs are complex entities, often operating across numerous local government boundaries. Their value as a means of driving local economic growth is unclear, as is their fit with other organisations in the increasingly complex governance structure in England, such as elected mayors and combined authorities. The Department is presently undertaking a full policy review of LEPs, with a particular focus on their contribution to the government’s industrial strategy.

**Recommendation:** The Department’s policy review needs to make the role of LEPs absolutely clear, assess whether LEP boundaries are in the right place, evaluate their role in promoting economic growth and set out their place alongside new mayors and combined authorities.

5. The Department has not developed a full range of interventions for LEPs and only uses the extreme, blunt option of withholding funds. The Department has a wide range of interventions at its disposal for intervening in local authorities. However, LEPs are non-statutory organisations and are often private companies; this limits how the government can intervene in their operations. In the case of GCGP LEP, the Department moved straight way to the “nuclear” option of withholding funds, which meant the area missed out on over £12 million pounds of investment in 2017.

**Recommendation:** The Department needs to be alive to the ongoing risk of failure in LEPs and develop a proportionate range of interventions for LEPs, akin to those it has for local authorities.
1 Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership

Local Enterprise Partnerships

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (the Department).\(^1\) We also took evidence from the Chief Executive of Cambridgeshire County Council and the former Chair of Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership (GCGP LEP).

2. Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) are business-led partnerships between the private sector and local authorities. Each operates across more than one local authority and is designed to cover a functional economic area. Following the abolition of Regional Development Agencies in 2010, LEPs were established in England as strategic bodies responsible for steering economic growth in local communities. LEPs have subsequently taken on increased responsibility for significant amounts of central government funding. Through its Local Growth Fund, since 2015 the government has awarded LEPs £9.1 billion of public money to invest in the development of local economies.

3. The Department relies on their National Assurance Framework for LEPs to ensure that money is spent appropriately. Each LEP in turn has its own assurance framework, and a local authority which is accountable for its expenditure and activities. It is the responsibility of the accountable body’s Section 151 officer to sign off on this assurance framework.\(^2\)

4. The government also sees LEPs as key to the implementation of its industrial strategy, which was published in 2017. According to this strategy, LEPs will perform a role, often in partnership with mayoral combined authorities, in areas including improving workforce skills and the development of local industrial strategies.\(^3\)

Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership

5. GCGP LEP consists of 15 separate local authorities, and covers all of Cambridgeshire along with districts in Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire, plus the unitary authorities of Rutland and Peterborough. Concerns about the governance of the LEP were raised locally in January 2017. In March 2017, Mr Stephen Barclay MP wrote to both the Comptroller and Auditor General and to the Department, raising concerns about GCGP LEP. Mr Barclay’s concerns were around matters including GCGP’s management

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\(^1\) Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, *Investigation into the governance of Greater Cambridge, Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership*, Session 2017–19, HC 410, 29 November 2017

\(^2\) A Section 151 Officer is an officer appointed under Section 151 of the Local Government Act 1972, which requires every local authority to appoint a suitably qualified officer responsible for the proper administration of its affairs

of conflicts of interest, a perceived lack of transparency in GCGP LEP, and a perceived lack of clarity about the relationship between GCGP LEP and certain lobbyists. The National Audit Office began an investigation in March 2017.⁴

6. In parallel with the National Audit Office (NAO), the Department conducted its own investigation into GCGP LEP. In March 2017 it withheld most of its funding to the LEP, leaving only limited funding for its continued operations. In order to have GCGP LEP’s funding released back to it, the Department required the LEP to improve its transparency by publishing board papers, minutes, and decisions in a timely way, and to develop a comprehensive conflict of interest policy. The Department also required the LEP to demonstrate compliance with the national assurance framework by ensuring that board members and the GCGP LEP executive understood their obligations fully. In addition, the Department required the Chair to respond formally to allegations of a personal conflict of interest.⁵

7. GCGP LEP recognised that it needed to improve its processes, and published a revised local assurance framework which included amendments to ensure that papers were published in a timely fashion. In September 2017 the Department drew initial conclusions from its review and found that there was no evidence of the misuse of public funds by the LEP. However, the Department continued to have concerns about the LEP’s executive leadership capacity. In December 2017, GCGP LEP decided to go into voluntary liquidation.⁶

8. We discussed the allegations raised by Mr Barclay with Cambridgeshire County Council, the local authority responsible for GCGP LEP, and with Mr Reeve, the former Chair of GCGP LEP. Gillian Beasley, the Chief Executive of Cambridgeshire County Council and Peterborough City Council, told us that she had been concerned because the conflicts of interest policy “needed to be more detailed.” In her written evidence, she stated that the conflicts of interest policy “did not include other interests such as land, property and investment interests of board members.” Ms Beasley also provided us with a memorandum from the Leader of Cambridgeshire County Council, Councillor Count, to Mark Reeve about issues he identified in the governance of GCGP LEP in early 2017. The concerns raised by Councillor Count were wide-ranging, and included “some decisions being made by the LEP are done so without adequate supporting documentation”, “no forward plan for future agenda items”, “board papers and minutes not properly placed on the website”, “no verbal or written report from the Chief Executive on the National Assurance Framework” and a “rushed” approach to agreeing the local assurance framework.⁸

9. The former Chair of GCGP LEP, Mark Reeve, pointed out to us that he and other board members only performed their role alongside other positions, and were therefore unable to devote a significant amount of time and consideration to it. Mr Reeve stated that “the LEP chair and the LEP private sector board members were doing this on a part-time basis” and therefore “relied heavily not only on the accountable body but the executive of the enterprise partnership to ensure that governance was in order.”⁹ When pressed to

⁴ C&AG’s Report, paras 1–4
⁵ C&AG’s Report, para 3.17
⁶ C&AG’s Report, paras 3.19–3.20
⁷ Q 9
⁸ Gillian Beasley (CCP0001)
⁹ Q 2
describe exactly what he thought his role as Chair should have been in relation to ensuring that there was good governance and transparency around decision-making, Mr Reeve replied "Our view was that we had an accountable body, which took that responsibility.

10. The Chief Executive of Cambridgeshire County, Gillian Beasley, did not agree with Mr Reeve’s assertion that it was necessary for GCGP LEP to rely upon its accountable body, Cambridgeshire County Council. Ms Beasley told us that in her view and that of her officers, in the context of the conflicts of interest policy, it was “for the LEP to determine adequacy, because there was no standard set by the national assurance framework as to how those documents complied”. The Department endorsed the council’s position, stating that “it is the role of the chair to lead the culture and conversation around things like conflicts.” Mary Ney, a non-executive member of the board of the Department commissioned by them to conduct a review of LEP governance and transparency, expressed the view that “the culture around good governance and transparency is led by the Chair and Chief Executive of that organisation.” The Department did, however, acknowledge that in the matter of responsibility for effective governance of GCGP LEP there were “different views on different sides of the argument” locally going back at least to the summer.

11. We asked the former GCGP LEP Chair repeatedly about his own potential conflict of interest, concerning his construction company having the contract to build on a site, while the LEP was advising on what infrastructure should be on that site. Mr Reeve refused to discuss the matter. He referred us to legal advice provided to the Department and to the LEP, but which had not been provided to us at the time of our evidence session, and which he declined even to summarise. He said that “advice has been taken by CLG and the enterprise partnership and both found the same: there was no conflict of interest.” We pressed Mr Reeve specifically on when his construction company had signed the contract and when he became aware of the potential conflict of interest. We found it hard to understand how there could not be a conflict of interest if his construction company was building a site on which the LEP, of which he was Chair at the time, was putting in funds to the infrastructure, which was presumably increasing the value of the site. Mr Reeve would not provide us with any dates. We pointed out that Mr Reeve’s attitude to openness was not in keeping with the Nolan principles for holders of public office and that people in the local area are entitled to know the answer to when his company signed the contract. Mr Reeve commented “It is a private matter, it is not relevant and there was no conflict of interest.” We do not agree that it is a private matter.

12. The Chief Executive of Cambridgeshire County Council told us that she was not aware of the specific date when the contract was signed. She also told us that “I don’t think there was a disclosable pecuniary interest” at the stage when the LEP discussed the interest. However, she also suggested that GCGP LEP’s board had not handled the matter with the level of transparency that she would expect councillors to take. With a councillor, if a contract had been entered into in which there was no financial benefit, under the
Nolan principles in public life it would have needed to have been declared as a disclosable but not a pecuniary interest. Ms Beasley also took the view that this item of discussion at the LEP board “was not well minuted.”

Oversight of Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough LEP

13. The Department has previously informed this Committee that it did not consider there to be problems with its system of LEP governance and transparency. In 2016, during its inquiry on Cities and local growth, the Committee asked the Department about its oversight of LEPs and of conflicts of interest in particular. At that point, the Department confirmed that LEPs had to have a conflicts of interest policy. The Department wrote to the Committee in May 2016 and said that it “did not have any concerns to report about any individual LEP at that stage.” The Department told us that these statements were consistent with “the best of our knowledge at that time” and that “subsequent checks the following year drilled deeper and asked more of LEPs in a number of areas.”

14. The Department relies in part upon local authorities working with LEPs on their assurance frameworks. In the case of GCGP LEP the Cambridgeshire County Council Section 151 officer signed off the framework in February 2017. The Department told us that it began its investigations when it discovered that “the section 151 officer assurance was not based on the sort of oversight of the documentation that we would have expected.” The Chief Executive of Cambridgeshire County Council told us that the Section 151 officer “took the view that his role was to check that the assurance framework had been agreed by the LEP and that the components within the national assurance framework were found in the local assurance framework. It was very clear to him at that time that he was not to look at the adequacy of those documents, because there was no standard against which he should judge that.” Mary Ney, a non-executive director at the Department charged with reviewing the governance of LEPs, told us that on this occasion “some of that the Department’s expectations of the Section 151 officer was not understood” locally.

15. Stephen Barclay MP raised his concerns in January 2017 and this happened concurrently with a member of the LEP board writing an open letter raising their concerns about governance within the LEP. In March 2017, the Department carried out spot checks of LEP local assurance frameworks: GCGP LEP was one of 13 LEPs that were identified as having minor outstanding issues. Five LEPs were contacted to ensure their frameworks complied with the national framework and two had serious or red risks (GCGP was not one of these two LEPs). Mr Barclay’s concerns were the main trigger for the Department conducting an internal review of the GCGP LEP’s local assurance framework.” The Department told us that whilst the issues in GCGP LEP were “already on our radar”, Stephen Barclay’s letter “sharpened everyone’s mind.”

17 Qq 49, 50
18 Oral evidence, 25 April 2016, HC 913 (Session 2016–17), Q 136
19 Q 87
20 Q 87
21 Q 59
22 Q 9
23 Q 63
24 C&AG’s Report, para 3.9
25 C&AG’s Report, para 8
26 Q 80
2 The governance of Local Enterprise Partnerships

Reforms to the Governance of Local Enterprise Partnerships

16. In 2017, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (the Department) asked Mary Ney, a non-executive director of the Department, to review the governance of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). She consulted with a number of LEPs, accountancy bodies and the National Audit Office (NAO) and her review has been widely praised publicly.27 However, in her review she was not able to examine all 38 LEPs in detail.28 She has made 17 recommendations for improvement. The Department told us that it had accepted the recommendations and was in the process of implementing them.29 Mary Ney though reiterated that the responsibility for good governance rests with the Chair and Chief Executive of the LEP. In her view, her recommendations “are not just about written documents and policies and looking at websites to see if they are there. They are about ensuring good governance and transparency is a live, everyday issue.”30

17. In November 2016, the Department responded to the previous Committee’s 2016 report about Local Enterprise Partnerships, and accepted the recommendations to improve the governance of LEPs. It assured the Committee that “the Government will enforce existing standards of transparency, governance and scrutiny” through the process of annual conversations and the scrutiny of the Section 151 officer in Local Authorities.31 The Department told us that it thought “perhaps we should have done some of this sooner” and said that “with hindsight we should have been clearer about precisely what those framework requirements meant in practice.”32 The Department argued that its delay in coming forward with these suggestions was because the “role of LEPs has changed”, now that they “oversee decision making on large amounts of public funding.”33 We did not agree, pointing out that from the very early days LEPs were spending money and making big decisions about growth funding.34

18. Mary Ney told us “it is quite important not to see this her review as a finished product.” She told us that “issues of governance always need to be reviewed.”35 The Department told us that it would be conducting twelve deep dives which would constitute “a very systematic assessment of compliance with the framework”. The Department undertook to write to us at the conclusion of that process. It also said that this would be an annual exercise which it would “keep tightening.”36 It told us that it would have completed the initial deep dives by the middle of March 2018.37

27 Qq 60, 62
28 Q 62
29 Qq 59, 61
30 Q 63
31 Treasury Minute: Government responses to the Committee of Public Accounts on the thirty-seventh and thirty-ninth reports from Session 2015–16 and the first to thirteenth reports from Session 2016–17, p. 41
32 Q 59
33 Q 99
34 Q 101
35 Q 61
36 Q 68
37 Q 69
The role and purpose of LEPs

19. The Department sees LEPs as playing an “important role in taking forward our industrial strategy”. Consequently their role is at present evolving. The Department has recently launched a policy review of LEPs and their role in stimulating economic growth. We were interested in discussing with the Department the lessons it had learnt from the experience of LEPs since 2010, which should shape the ongoing review. However, the Department told us that it had “not done an evaluation of LEPs” against Regional Development Authorities in terms of their economic impact, their public visibility, or their visibility to local businesses.

20. LEPs are part of a diverse array of bodies in local government, in which relations and responsibilities can at times be complex and lacking in clarity. LEPs sit alongside various other local bodies whose constitution and powers have also changed since LEPs were created. The former Chair of GCGP LEP told us that his LEP cut across the boundaries of several local authorities: he described being accountable to “14 or 15 local authority leaders, who formed a leaders committee.” The Chief Executive of Cambridgeshire County Council denied that arrangements for accountability between these local authorities were unclear, but did not deny they were complex. The Department told us that it was aware of the issue and that this was “one of the questions that we are looking at in our policy review right now”. The Department said that a certain amount of this difficulty was inevitable due to the “complexity of working with a two-tier local government structure.” We also asked the Department how the LEPs fitted into the evolving role of local government in particular with reference to combined authorities and newly elected mayors. The Department acknowledged that LEPs have moved to oversee large amounts of public funding and decision-making, which is why they have put an assurance system around them, but did not provide a clear answer to how LEPs will fit into the new landscape of devolved public bodies in England. The Department is conducting a policy review of issues related to LEPs, such as how they fit with other local government bodies, and said that it would be in a position to write to the Committee with the results of this after Easter 2018.

Failure Regimes for LEPs

21. The Department does not have the range of options to respond to failure in LEPs that it has to respond to failure in local authorities. In local authorities, the Department can use its improvement regime, direct a council to undertake certain actions, or impose a commissioner to manage or take over responsibility for services. As LEPs are non-statutory bodies, the Department’s powers do not extend to them and its ability to respond is therefore “limited.”

22. In this case, the Department responded to the problems in GCGP LEP by withholding funding: the “nuclear” option. We also heard suggestions that the Department accompanied the withholding of funding with unofficial means of exerting influence over GCGP LEP.
The former Chair of the LEP, Mr Reeve, informed the Committee that it was made clear to him that he needed to resign to enable GCGP LEP to make a transition to partnership with the local combined authority.\textsuperscript{45}

23. The ultimate sanction, of withholding funding, did not bring about the improvements in GCGP LEP that the Department wanted to see; instead, it appears to have led to the LEP going out of business. We were concerned about the “distortions that this is causing locally and the difficulties that it is causing for Cambridgeshire people.”\textsuperscript{46} Mary Ney told us that the Department should put the emphasis on the relationship between them and the LEP “so that pressure can be put and discussions can be had.” She mentioned the successful use of interventions in other parts of the public sector, such as in Rotherham, where she suggested that an intervention had helped the local authority to get back on track.\textsuperscript{47} The Department accepted our concerns about forms of sanction it had available, but emphasized that it had funded the LEP’s running costs to ensure that its staff did not lose their jobs, whilst withdrawing other funding. It recognised that these events had been painful for GCGP LEP and said that its concern all along had been to ensure it was not delaying growth and job creation in the area.\textsuperscript{48}
Formal minutes

Wednesday 7 March 2018

Members present:

Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Bim Afolami  Gillian Keegan
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown  Shabana Mahmood
Chris Evans  Layla Moran
Caroline Flint  Anne Marie Morris Bridget
Luke Graham  Philipson

Draft Report (Governance and departmental oversight of the Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 23 read and agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Twenty-sixth of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Monday 12 March 2018 at 3.30pm]
Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Monday 22 January 2018

Gillian Beasley, Chief Executive, Cambridgeshire County Council, and Mark Reeve, former Chief Executive, Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership

Melanie Dawes, Permanent Secretary, Simon Ridley, Director General, Decentralisation and Growth, and Mary Ney, Non-Executive Director, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

Melanie Dawes, Permanent Secretary, and Simon Ridley, Director General, Decentralisation and Growth, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

CCP numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 Gillian Beasley (CCP0001)
2 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Communities & Government (CCP0002)

Published correspondence

The following correspondence was also published as part of this inquiry:

1 Correspondence from the Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government relating to housing
List of Reports from the Committee during the current session

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee’s website. The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

**Session 2017–19**

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