Conclusions and recommendations
1.Resolutions of the House of Commons are the expression of the will of the elected representatives of the United Kingdom. Resolutions by themselves may not have legal effect, but they can have political effect. As such, resolutions should be treated seriously by the Government acknowledging that the Government must retain the confidence of the House of Commons to remain in office. It is evident that a shared understanding of the status of resolutions of the House of Commons has been eroded in this Parliament, reflecting the inability of the Government always to defeat Opposition Day motions, or a reluctance to be seen to be opposing them. (Paragraph 31)
2.We note that it is not mandatory for Members to vote in any division. However, the Government’s actions in whipping its Members to abstain from votes on Opposition Day motions have been interpreted as showing a lack of respect for the House of Commons and its chosen methods of debate. In some cases, this has proved counter-productive for the Government. (Paragraph 32)
3.The Government’s decision to abstain from votes because the proposers’ motion is deemed by the Government to be mere “political point scoring” has devalued the status of resolutions of the House of Commons. It is for the House of Commons, not the Government, to determine what is legitimate scrutiny, and the Government is expected to engage in good faith with resolutions of the House of Commons, even if it cannot implement their terms as expressed, or chooses to disagree with it. (Paragraph 33)
4.We accept that the Government may decide on a particular motion not to vote, and that in doing so it may be seeking to save itself from political embarrassment. However, in such instances the Government must still respect the will of the House of Commons as expressed. This does not necessarily mean that the Government should be required to change its policy in the relevant area; and the precise means by which the Government should properly demonstrate it is treating resolutions of the House of Commons seriously may be different from case to case. (Paragraph 34)
5.We welcome the fact that the Leader of the House has recognised the importance of the Government responding to resolutions of the House of Commons, setting a deadline of 12 weeks for departmental responses. It is for the Government to decide what response it wishes to make to resolutions of the House of Commons. However, it is for the House of Commons to decide whether it feels the Government has responded appropriately to its resolution, both in terms of length of time and quality of the response. It is clear to us that many resolutions can and should receive a response within a much shorter timescale than 12 weeks, especially if it is the Government’s intention to act in any way contrary to the views expressed by the House. (Paragraph 35)
6.We invite the Procedure Committee to consider whether any changes to the practice and procedures of the House of Commons are merited in the light of the practice the Government has adopted in responding to resolutions of the House which seek to direct Ministers. (Paragraph 35)
7.The Motion for return using an Humble Address had fallen into disuse, but it draws upon powers still used by the Government itself - in the form of motions for unopposed returns. While these powers are not set out in statute, they are within the House of Commons’ existing and recognised powers and, as such, should be complied with. (Paragraph 65)
8.The Government’s decision not to test the opinion of the House of Commons in a division on the motion calling for the Attorney General’s legal advice added to confusion about the sincerity of the Government’s intentions and undermined the Government’s subsequent refusal to provide the legal advice. (Paragraph 66)
9.The actions of the House of Commons since, including questioning the Attorney General on his advice and subsequently finding that the Government was in contempt of the House of Commons’ previous resolution, have asserted the House of Commons’ right for those resolutions to be taken seriously. The Government’s eventual publication of the Attorney General’s legal advice, although we note that breached the usual convention that such advice remains confidential, has demonstrated the importance of, and need to take seriously, resolutions of the House of Commons. (Paragraph 67)
10.There are limits to the use of motions for return. If the House of Commons were to call for papers outside its existing and recognised powers, for example calling for private papers, this would likely be resisted. The House of Commons should respect this limit and would be expected to withdraw its call for such papers. Nor could motions of return direct a minister to bring forward legislation or how he or she should carry out their statutory functions. (Paragraph 68)
11.An established limit to the motion for return within the House of Commons’ recognised powers is the advice to Government from the Law Officers. The House of Commons would not usually ask for, and the Government would not usually provide, this advice or even confirmation of the fact that such advice has been given, because it would have a chilling effect on the advice being given if there is a risk of it being made public. Nevertheless, as matters stand, it is for the House of Commons to decide what it calls for and if circumstances are not usual, legal advice may be sought regardless of this convention. (Paragraph 69)
12.The motion for return using an Humble Address is a power of the House of Commons has not hitherto been employed as part of the usual to-and-fro of party politics. This is not a device that should be overused or used irresponsibly, particularly if there is a minority. The credibility of the unlimited powers of the House of Commons depends on their responsible exercise. If they cease to be exercised responsibly, they will lose respect and, lacking statutory force, could be ignored. Equally, the effective balance between Government and Parliament is dependent on the Government demonstrating reasonable respect towards the will of the House of Commons as, while it may not be under a statutory obligation to do so, lack of such respect could impel the House of Commons to seek to exercise its powers in new ways. (Paragraph 70)
13.The House of Commons should be both assertive and sensitive in the exercise of its powers. Where the limits on these essentially unlimited powers lie is a matter for negotiation between Parliament and Government and both should be careful about setting any precedent with long-term effects in reaction to short-term political pressures. (Paragraph 71)
14.We invite the Procedure Committee to consider how procedures relating to the motion for return using an Humble Address might be updated. In particular, we invite the Procedure Committee to consider whether a process could be established for the House of Commons to consider if and how contentious or confidential government papers might be made available to the House via motions of return, without compromising the generally accepted principles of what should remain protected from public disclosure. (Paragraph 72)
Published: 7 January 2019