20.While the personal and political relationship between the two governments is an essential part of intergovernmental relationship, it is vital they are supported by effective formal processes that can cope with issues that cannot be resolved informally. At the heart of the UK’s formal system of intergovernmental relation is the Joint Ministerial Committee (‘JMC’) which is comprised of ministers from the UK and devolved administrations. The JMC’s remit is:
21.The JMC (Plenary) is the overarching committee of the JMC which is expected to meet once per year. It is chaired by the Prime Minister, and is attended by the First Ministers of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, as well as the UK Government territorial Secretaries of State. It is intended to be the primary heads of government forum in which the devolved administrations can air their views to the UK Government. There are currently two JMC sub-committees—the JMC (Europe) and JMC (European Negotiations). The former meets roughly four or five times a year to consult on UK Government positions on EU issues which affect devolved matters ahead of European Council meetings. The latter was established in late 2016, with the aim of involving the devolved administrations in the process of withdrawing the UK from the EU.
22.We heard that the effectiveness of the JMC format has varied over time. For example, Lord Wallace, former Deputy First Minister of Scotland (1999–2005), claimed that during his time in government, JMC (Plenary) meetings were not taken seriously, and “Tony Blair spent most of the time looking out the window. Nothing much was achieved at them and no one could understand the point of them”. Professor Gallagher, who was the UK Government official responsible for the JMC in the early 2000s, claimed that less tangible outcomes of JMC meetings were arguably more understandable in the first years of devolution, because the policy agendas of the four UK executives were broadly aligned, and political parties (rather than the JMC) were the conduit through which issues were discussed and resolved. Professor Gallagher said, “in practice, it had nothing to do[…] Frankly, filling an agenda was very difficult because[…] there were very good fences between the devolved and reserved, so there was not much overlap[…] People got on with their own business”. Other witnesses made the same point.
23.We heard that the need for more proactive engagement through the JMC became increasingly apparent post-2007, as the political landscape was no longer dominated by the same political parties. Professor Gallagher explained that, in light of the formation of an SNP government in Edinburgh, the UK Government’s attitude to the JMC was, “The one thing we have to do is make these JMCs work because we now do have a political argument to have”. Our evidence suggests that, as a result, the JMC has been used more proactively and meaningfully since 2007, after “oil was put on and the machine staggered along”.
24.As we argued in the previous chapter, UK intergovernmental relations should be underlined by the principle of parity of esteem. As such, this principle should also be reflected in how the JMC operates. However, throughout our inquiry we have been surprised by the consistency of the evidence we heard which suggests that the conduct, outcome and frequency of JMC meetings is predominantly determined by the UK Government’s interests and priorities, with little open-minded and meaningful engagement.
25.We heard concerns that the JMC is not always used as a meaningful forum for intergovernmental engagement. Some witnesses argued that JMC meetings are often used to simply rehearse entrenched policy positions. For example, Michael Russell MSP, Scottish Government Cabinet Secretary for Government Business and Constitutional Relations, argued that JMC (European Negotiations) meetings have become a place where the UK Government can dictate to the devolved administrations what is going to happen, rather than meaningfully consult on what should happen, and that, “at no point have the views of the Scottish Government[…] been addressed in a way that has led us to think we have been listened to, and would be taken account of”.
26.On the other hand, Rt Hon David Mundell MP, Secretary of State for Scotland, had a different perspective. Mr Mundell told us that the JMC (EN) has allowed the Scottish Government to engage meaningfully with the EU Exit process and has served to “strengthen relationships and information sharing”. When these points were put to Chloe Smith MP, UK Government Minister for the Constitution, she said “they are not talking shops. They are highly practical meetings where business is being conducted”. However, when asked to give an example of how a policy position has changed as a result of JMC meetings, the minister was unable to recall a specific example, saying “I am going to rack my brains for that example while we are talking”.
27.Some witnesses proposed replacing the JMC with an altogether new intergovernmental body. For example, Lords McConnell and Wallace—a former First Minister of Scotland, and former Deputy, respectively—suggested a new “UK Council of Ministers”. The Welsh Government has set out high-level proposals along similar lines, and Michael Russell MSP was cautiously supportive of this approach. However most witnesses felt that it would be more productive to reform the existing JMC model, Akash Paun, Institute for Government—amongst others—suggested that the JMC does not need to be “completely replaced”, but that it could be significantly “strengthened”. Professor McEwen made the point there was limited value in creating an entirely new system as it would like to face similar changes to the current JMC model: “I don’t think it really matters whether you call it a JMC or a Council of Ministers[…] It is what it does and how it does it that is key”.
28.Several reforms to the JMC were suggested to us, which were intended to redress the UK Government’s perceived dominance of the forum and ensure parity of esteem between all parties involved. These focused on introducing a more routinised and structured approach to the JMC. For example, many witnesses suggested that JMC meetings should be held more regularly, and to a set schedule. The UK Government is responsible for arranging meetings of the JMC. According to the MoU, meetings of the JMC (Plenary) should be held at least once a year. However, the JMC (Plenary) failed to meet at all between 2003 and 2008, and again between late 2014 and late 2016. Meetings of the JMC (European Negotiations) have also not taken place on a regular basis. For example the forum did not meet at all between February and October 2017, despite this being the period in which the Article 50 notification letter was sent.
29.Akash Paun, Institute for Government, argued that the infrequency of meeting had damaged intergovernmental relations but acknowledged that “things seem to have improved in recent months”. Mr Paun also argued that the JMC (Plenary) serves an important “symbolic purpose” and therefore:
It is quite important that that body does meet, and that it meets more regularly and is taken seriously, because it sends out the signal that this is a Union of four nations, with usually four Governments, who can come together and have that summit-level meeting.
The Centre on Constitutional Change has argued that holding more regular meetings “can ease scheduling challenges and contribute to building trust and empathy among ministerial representatives, as well as the officials who support them”. For the same reason, many witnesses recommended that the location and Chair of JMC meetings should rotate between each of the four administrations.
30.Another frequent concern was that agendas for JMC meetings are often not circulated until the last minute. Professor Nicola McEwen told us, “sharing papers and agendas[…] in advance is the sort of organisational issue that can become a political issue”. Many witnesses recommended that circulating agendas further in advance of meetings would enable more meaningful engagement and more productive outcomes. However, the UK Minister for the Constitution, argued that this was “perhaps a mischaracterisation” and that information was shared.
31.We believe that, as the UK’s highest-level intergovernmental forum, the JMC should be a productive forum which is robust enough to cope with different governments with divergent policy objectives. The existing set up and organisation of the JMC has resulted in it being predominantly controlled by the UK Government. This has limited its effectiveness as a forum for meaningful engagement between the UK’s four governments. The JMC therefore urgently requires reform.
32.The effectiveness of the JMC will hinge on how it works in practice, rather than what it is called. We were not persuaded by the any of the alternatives to the current JMC format. Although proponents of more fundamental reform tended to coalesce around the idea of a UK Council of Ministers, we are not convinced that this proposal offers benefits which cannot be delivered through the reforms to the JMC.
33.Instead there are several reforms we think that the Government could make to the JMC to ensure it embodies the principle of parity of esteem and becomes a forum where all four governments can engage as equals. We recommend that:
a)JMC meetings should be hosted and chaired by each of the UK’s administrations on a rotating basis.
b)JMC meetings should be held frequently, and to a set schedule.
c)JMC agendas should be agreed in advance between all parties.
In the rest of the chapter we discuss other ways the JMC could be improved and how those reforms could be embedded in the UK’s constitutional framework.
34.Previous parliamentary inquiries have raised concerns about the lack of accountability and transparency in the current JMC set up. The Centre on Constitutional Change told us that the UK’s intergovernmental system has a particular problem with a lack of accountability and transparency, arguing that, although transparency of intergovernmental relations is a frequent issue in other countries, “nowhere is the problem more pronounced than in the UK”. The Centre argued that these transparency issues are a product of the “absence of more routine and formalised intergovernmental machinery”.
35.The most common complaints were that JMC agendas are not published in advance of meetings, and the communiques published after the meetings lack detail. Speaking about the detail provided after JMC meetings, Michael Clancy, Law Society of Scotland, told us that, “it is a misnomer to call the communiques that are issued by the JMCs communiques, because effectively they just tell who was there and that somebody spoke and someone replied”. This lack of information and transparency about the JMC and its outcomes then poses problems for the accountability of the JMC as it is difficult for the respective parliaments to hold the governments to account for this performance or conduct at these meetings. We heard that if the JMC was made more transparent, the quality of all governments’ engagement in the process would also likely improve, as their performance at meetings would come under greater public and parliamentary scrutiny.
36.Dr Coree Brown Swan, University of Edinburgh, told us that intergovernmental forums can increase transparency by publicising meetings and publishing details of the forums function, structure, meeting details, and intergovernmental agreements. The Centre on Constitutional Change suggested we look to Belgium and Spain for examples of how to improve transparency. In Belgium, meetings of the Concertation Committee—the country’s JMC equivalent—take place on a regular monthly basis, and a report is subsequently filed with each parliament. In Spain, agendas for intergovernmental forums are published in advance, and a comprehensive communique is published afterwards.
37.Mr Clancy suggested that the UK Government could mirror the approach taken in Scotland, where the Scottish Government has committed to giving advanced notice (at least one month) of JMC meetings and their agendas, as well as a written summary of its participation. The Scottish Government also agreed to maintain a record of all formal agreements and prepare an annual report on intergovernmental relations. Professor Nicola McEwen, Dr Coree Brown Swan, and the Law Society of Scotland also suggested this model might work well at Westminster. Lord Wallace agreed and suggested a Minister be required to make an oral statement in Parliament after a JMC meeting similar to the statements currently made by the Prime Minister after a meeting of the European Council.
38.The level of transparency in the UK’s intergovernmental relations is poor. This lack of transparency has made it less likely that governments will engage cooperatively, because it is difficult for the public and the respective parliaments to hold their governments to account for the quality of their engagement without clear information about meetings and their outcomes.
39.We recommend that the UK Government provides the UK Parliament with advance notice of meetings and agendas for JMC meetings and maintains a formal and publicly accessible record of JMC discussions and outcomes. We also recommend that after every meeting of the JMC (Plenary), an oral statement be made in Parliament by the responsible minister, to allow for proper parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relations.
40.As well as being a forum for discussion and consultation, the JMC is part of the formal dispute resolution process which is used when official-level negotiations have failed, and “an impasse” has presented itself. The Protocol for Avoidance and Resolution of Disputes also makes that clear that, since the JMC is not a decision-making body, the dispute resolution process is designed only to facilitate agreement between parties in a dispute, rather than “impose” any solution. The Protocol also recognises the limitations of this arrangement:
There may be circumstances, particularly those arising from differences in political outlook, where the UK Government and one or more of the devolved administrations are unlikely to be able to agree. In these cases the parties to this agreement recognise that the JMC machinery is unlikely to offer any prospect of resolution.
41.The Protocol outlines a multi-step process for escalating disputes. The steps are:
i)Informal discussion at official-level;
ii)Issue brought to attention of JMC officials;
iii)Informal discussions amongst ministers;
iv)Further talks convened at ministerial and/or official level;
v)Formal referral to JMC as ‘disagreement’;
vi)JMC disputes meeting chaired by UK minister without direct departmental interest.
Ultimately, if a dispute reaches the final stage, it is the UK Government which has the final say on the outcome.
42.Lord McConnell, former First Minister of Scotland, suggested that the underlying political nature of the UK’s devolution settlement has meant that there is an inherent incentive for the UK Government to address disagreements through the JMC before they become disputes:
I think a UK Minister has to always be aware of all the negatives that would be involved in overruling a decision by one of the devolved Governments. In practice, people […] understood how bad it would be for that settlement if there was ever any question of one level overruling the other level […] What happened in the first decade, I would say that there was an understanding of a political pressure on the UK Ministers to not overstate their role.
Sir Peter Housden, former Permanent Secretary to the Scottish Government (2010–2015), shared this view, arguing that the UK Government’s exercise of power in relation to dispute resolution has been “very wisely constrained” because the UK Government “do not want to be saying no”. We also heard that the JMC dispute resolution has been successful in some instances. For example, Sir Peter recalled the resolution of a dispute regarding 2012 Olympic Games consequential funding as an example of a relatively successfully outcome of the existing process. The dispute had been ongoing since 2007 and was resolved in June 2011 in a meeting of the JMC (P).
43.On the other hand, most witnesses highlighted concerns with the existing dispute resolution protocol—particularly the final stage of the process. Professor McEwen told us “the UK Government are essentially the accused and the judge and jury and that has been problematic. It has certainly given rise to a feeling of dissatisfaction[…] on the part of all of the devolved administrations”. In written evidence Jack Sheldon, University of Cambridge, told us that “it has become clear that the devolved governments do not have confidence in the process […] It seems likely that this mistrust has contributed to the devolved governments being reluctant to make use of the Protocol where disagreements occur”.
44.Michael Russell MSP, told us on behalf of the Scottish Government that the current process is “absolutely not” fit for purpose. Mr Russell went on to reference the most recent JMC dispute, in which the Welsh and Scottish Governments sought to initiate formal dispute resolution proceedings in relation to the Northern Irish public spending commitments in the Conservative-DUP confidence and supply deal. There has been no public response from the UK Government on this matter to date. Mr Russell said the UK Government’s approach has been:
‘Nothing to see here. Move along. There is no reason to consider this as a complaint’. It is farcical and that is why it is not used—because there is no point in using it.
Lords Wallace and McConnell, Michael Clancy, Professor McEwen, and the Royal Society of Edinburgh all expressed support for reforming the existing dispute resolution provisions. The Centre on Constitutional Change argued that “having a robust [dispute resolution] system in place can help to ensure that disputes do not lead to polarisation, stalemate or disengagement from, and mistrust in, the IGR system”, and would be likely to deliver broader benefits for IGR beyond simply increasing confidence in the dispute resolution process itself. When the Committee put these criticisms to the UK minister, she told us that the UK Government is looking at dispute resolution as part of the Cabinet Office’s review of intergovernmental relations and acknowledged “it is very important that we get that right in this review”.
45.During this inquiry we looked at how dispute resolution works in other countries, and whether these provide models for reform of the UK’s processes. We heard that it is common, in similar multi–level systems, for dispute resolution processes to provide for mediation or arbitration by an independent third-party body. For example, Mr Jan Bayart, Deputy Head of Mission of the Embassy of Belgium in the UK, explained that competence disputes in Belgium are settled through judicial arbitration. This is an ad hoc tribunal chaired by a professional judge which can be established to hear and settle the dispute. Jack Sheldon, University of Cambridge, noted that:
These procedures are rarely used in practice but serve a useful purpose in reassuring signatories to agreements that recourse to independent dispute resolution is available if needed, while incentivising governments to resolve differences before ceding authority to a third party.
46.The Centre on Constitutional Change has argued that mediation, rather than arbitration, would be more appropriate in the UK’s context, because “it preserves the dispute parties’ autonomy in deciding whether or not to accept any proposed resolution”. Professor Gallagher similarly noted that it would be difficult to square an authoritative dispute resolution process with the fact that each of the parties have their own democratic mandate. Jack Sheldon outlined how independent third party involvement in the JMC dispute resolution process could work:
The role of mediator could potentially be performed by a government not party to the dispute, or another independent and suitably qualified person appointed on a case–by–case basis. The mediator would be empowered to facilitate meetings between the disputing parties and to present compromise proposals for the parties to consider. The disputing parties would each have to consent to the identity of the mediator as this would be essential to ensuring that each party had confidence in the process.
47.The current dispute resolution process does not command the confidence of the Scottish Government and is not fit for purpose. We believe that adoption of our earlier recommendations regarding early engagement, trust–building, and cooperation would help mitigate the need to seek recourse to dispute resolution processes in the first instance. However, some disputes are inevitable. We therefore believe there is a clear need to reform the JMC dispute resolution process to ensure that it is trusted by all parties, and that it is robust enough to deal with the calibre of disagreements which have arisen in recent years.
48.We do not believe the UK Government should have the unilateral right to prevent the devolved administrations from invoking dispute resolution proceedings, as it has done recently. If a reformed dispute resolution process is to be fair and trusted, it must be unconditionally accessible to both parties to a disagreement. We therefore recommend that the UK Government seeks to amend the dispute resolution protocol to ensure all governments have the right to unilaterally initiate dispute resolution proceedings.
49.We were interested to hear of how independent third parties are involved in efforts to resolve intergovernmental disputes in other countries. We recommend that the UK Government explores with the devolved governments how a form of independent mediation might be introduced in the UK. One approach it may wish to consider is referral of a dispute to a third party for mediation—at the penultimate stage of the dispute resolution process. We believe it would be beneficial if, at the end of the mediation process, the mediator could be required to publish some non–binding recommendations outlining possible ways forward. This would help both parties progress towards a resolution, whilst maintaining the UK Government’s final say over the dispute.
50.As we saw earlier, there are currently some commitments about how the JMC should operate which, despite being agreed by all four governments, are not happening in practice. During our inquiry we heard two main suggestions about how the JMC could be more formalised so that these commitments, and any reforms to the JMC, were delivered: creating an independent secretariat and placing elements of the JMC set-up on a statutory basis.
51.The Memorandum of Understanding explains that the “lead role” in the existing Secretariat to the JMC “will fall upon the UK Cabinet Office”. Although the MoU stipulates that it may be possible for civil servants from the devolved administrations to be seconded to the JMC Secretariat, there is no requirement for this to be the case. In its report on inter-governmental relations the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee called for this set up to be replaced with an independent secretariat to “schedule and organise intergovernmental meetings” and “provide an independent conduit for discussions among administrations at official and ministerial level in between formal inter–governmental meetings”.
52.The overwhelming consensus amongst our witnesses was that intergovernmental relations would benefit from a more formalised and fully independent secretariat. The Centre on Constitutional Change said that creating an independent secretariat would address concerns raised about the current secretariat’s lack of capacity to prepare all parties for JMC meetings—for example, by handling the organisational burden, sharing agendas, and producing and publishing communiques. The Royal Society of Edinburgh, amongst others, suggested that an independent secretariat would also help address the JMC’s lack of transparency, as did the former senior Scottish Government civil servants we spoke to.
53.Looking at international examples, Dr Sandra León, York University, said that, “[intergovernmental] bodies that are supported by a secretariat or technical bodies tend to work better”. We heard from George Anderson, former Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs in the Privy Council Office of the Canadian Government, that intergovernmental meetings in Canada are supported by the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat (CICS). The remit of CICS is to “relieve client departments of the numerous technical and administrative tasks associated with the planning and conducting of multilateral conferences, thereby enabling participants to concentrate on substantive intergovernmental policy issues”. Mr Anderson noted that CICS “has no policy role whatsoever”, but that it provides a “very useful” service by organising meetings. The consensus we heard was that a similar system in the UK would help improve the effectiveness of the JMC.
54.We agree with our witnesses and the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee that the JMC would benefit from being supported by an independent secretariat with staff drawn from all four administrations of the UK. This would help ensure meetings are regularly arranged, agendas are agreed and shared in advance, and that the outcomes are communicated in a timely and transparent manner. This would reflect the principle of parity of esteem by ending the situation whereby one government has complete control over the resources that support the JMC.
55.The JMC is currently underpinned by the Memorandum of Understanding. The Memorandum is not a “binding agreement”, but a “statement of intent” between the UK’s four governments. The MoU sets out how frequently the JMC should meet, in which formats, its dispute resolution process, and how it should be supported. However, since it is non-binding, there is a degree of flexibility around these arrangements. Professor McEwen argued that this is one of the reasons why “intergovernmental relations in the UK are very ad hoc. They are used when there is the perceived need to use them”.
56.The most oft–cited consequence of the non-binding nature of the JMC’s arrangements, is that various commitments about how it should function—most notably, the frequency of meetings—are not met. Some witnesses told us that part of the problem is that those commitments about meeting frequency are not binding. Putting some of the JMC’s arrangements on a statutory footing would make them legal requirements, rather than non-binding commitments. Michael Clancy, Professor McEwen, Akash Paun, Professor Gallagher, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the Law Society of Scotland, and Michael Russell MSP all endorsed proposals for a statutory footing, arguing that it would help ensure commitments to maintaining effective intergovernmental relations are met. This recommendation has also been supported by the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and the Lords Constitution Committee.
57.When asked by the Committee whether the UK Government would support proposals for a statutory footing, Chloe Smith MP, Minister for the Constitution, said:
I am not personally convinced of the argument for statutory footing because I think it would reduce flexibility. Self–evidently, if you put something on the face of legislation it takes longer to amend it or update it if you wanted to do so in the future.
These concerns regarding flexibility were also raised by other witnesses. Akash Paun said that putting the MoU in its entirety on a statutory footing “would be going too far”. Professor McEwen cautioned that “what I would be careful of is putting too much in the statute because then you lose the strength of the flexibility to respond to needs as they arise”. Professor McEwen explained that a balance can be struck whereby what is put on a statutory footing is merely a minimum requirement- for example, requiring that the JMC (P) should meet at least once per year. This would still allow for additional meetings to be held as circumstances dictate, whilst also ensuring a minimum requirement is met. Akash Paun, Institute for Government, told us:
I am convinced that there would be benefits in a limited statutory underpinning, but without a huge amount of detail about the particular forums and membership and regularity of meetings. Something along the lines of specifying that, “There shall be a body called the Joint Ministerial Committee, with the Prime Minister and First Ministers, which should be expected to meet at least annually,” or something like that would be fine and would be helpful.
Dr Bettina Petersohn, Swansea University, made the same point; “it can work and still allow for flexibility […] I would say that there is an argument to be made for a certain formalisation, regularity, continuity, giving certain administrative support to organise these things, and leaving the rest within the definition of each of those intergovernmental bodies”.
58.However, we also heard a note of caution that, although a statutory footing for intergovernmental relations is common in other countries, for example, in Spain and Belgium, it does not necessarily always guarantee more effective intergovernmental relations. Professor César Colino argued that although the frequency of intergovernmental meetings in Spain have been formalised, this has not necessarily improved the quality of engagement.
59.We believe that setting out the basic requirements of the JMC in statute would ensure that it operates in the way envisaged by the Memorandum of Understanding. We therefore recommend that the JMC format, the frequency of JMC meetings, and the right to seek recourse through the dispute resolution process, are set out in statute. This would ensure that a minimum number of JMC meetings are held each year and that the right to invoke dispute resolution proceedings is inalienable. We are not convinced by the UK Government’s argument that placing these requirements on statutory footing would reduce flexibility, as there would be nothing to stop the Government going beyond those minimum requirements, and this would not place any obligation on the UK Government which it has not already signed up to in existing intergovernmental agreements.
52 , October 2013, p. 12
53 Sixth Report from the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee of Session 2016–17, , HC 839, 8 December 2016
54 Institute for Government, , February 2018
55 JMC Joint Secretariat, , March 2018
57 Centre on Constitutional Change, , October 2018, p. 16
62 Royal Society of Edinburgh (); Centre on Constitutional Change (); ;
65 Michael Russell MSP, , March 2019
66 Secretary of State for Scotland ()
70 Welsh Government, , June 2017
75 Royal Society of Edinburgh (); Dr Coree Brown Swan, Centre on Constitutional Change, University of Edinburgh (); ; ; ; ; Centre on Constitutional Change (); Professor Colin Reid ()
76 , October 2013, p. 12
80 Centre on Constitutional Change, , October 2018
81 Royal Society of Edinburgh (); Centre on Constitutional Change ()
83 ; ; ; Centre on Constitutional Change ()
85 Scottish Parliament Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, , October 2014; Sixth Report from the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee of Session 2016–17, , HC 839, 8 December 2016, p. 40
86 Centre on Constitutional Change ()
87 Centre on Constitutional Change
90 Centre on Constitutional Change ()
91 Centre on Constitutional Change ()
93 , March 2016; Dr Coree Brown Swan, Centre on Constitutional Change, University of Edinburgh ()
94 ; Dr Coree Brown Swan, Centre on Constitutional Change, University of Edinburgh (); The Law Society of Scotland ()
96 , October 2013, p. 13; Centre on Constitutional Change, , October 2018
97 Cabinet Office, , June 2011
98 Cabinet Office, , June 2011
99 Cabinet Office, , June 2011, p. 3
100 ; Jack Sheldon, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge ()
103 UK Government, , December 2011
105 Jack Sheldon, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge ()
107 Institute for Government, , February 2018
109 ; ; ; ; Royal Society of Edinburgh ()
110 Centre on Constitutional Change, , October 2018, p. 28
113 Jack Sheldon, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge ()
114 Jack Sheldon, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge ()
115 Centre on Constitutional Change, , October 2018, p. 33
117 Jack Sheldon, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge ()
118 , October 2013, p. 15
119 House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee,, 31 July 2018
120 ; ; ;
121 ; ; ;
126 Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat,
128 , October 2013
129 House of Commons Library, , July 2018
131 Royal Society of Edinburgh ();
133 ; ; ; Royal Society of Edinburgh (); The Law Society of Scotland (); ; Michael Russell MSP, , March 2019
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140 Centre on Constitutional Change, , October 2018, p. 17
Published: 7 June 2019