2Government digitisation
9.This Chapter sets out the concept and purpose of digitisation, as well as the success of the Government to date in transforming through technology. Further, this Chapter sets out the Estonian digital Government model and highlights what the UK Government could learn from it.
Transformation through digitisation
10.In the Government Transformation Strategy, published in 2017, the Government set out three goals for how it intended to use technology and digitisation to improve Government:
- To “transform Government through technology”;
- To create a “responsive State that can change at pace and at scale”; and
- To transform “the relationship between citizens and the State - putting more power in the hands of citizens and being more responsive to their needs.”14
11.We took our definition of digitisation from a 2018 report from the Institute for Government (IfG), The hidden obstacles to government digital transformation.15 In its report, the IfG made the distinction between digital transformation and digital programmes, where digital programmes “mainly focus on improving citizen’s website experience”, whilst digital transformation meant “more profound shifts in the way government departments operate and even with reshaping operating models across departmental boundaries when there are benefits for citizens from joining up services.”16 This difference is in the end-to-end digitisation of services, as opposed to front-end optimisation.
12.This view was also shared by technology transformation consultancy company, PUBLIC, who explained that digital was understood by the public sector and the Government as “deep internal departmental change, and a core shift in how public bodies operate”.17 As such, PUBLIC viewed technology as a disruptive method for entering a new era of Government, transforming both policy and delivery of services to create “smarter governments around the world.”18
13.This view was also shared by the Minister for Implementation, Oliver Dowden MP. When asked how he would characterise digital, he explained that digital “is not somebody taking something that is produced digitally, printing it out, processing it and then sending someone an email at the end” but that the challenge is how we ensure “end to end digitisation”.19 This understanding of digital is similar to the IfG definition of digitisation, as going beyond online platforms to using digital to transform the way departments operate.
14.The Government defined a “digital transaction” as “those lodged by a customer through a digital channel. Once received some of these transactions are processed automatically whilst others require manual intervention and subsequently incur greater costs.”20As such, when assessing the evidence of the Performance Dashboard, a tool that records which services are online and their level of take-up, it did not distinguish services which had delivered against the Minister’s ambition of “end-to-end digitisation”, nor did it distinguish services, as per our preferred definition, that were digitised in a way that transformed how these service were delivered.21 It simply recorded services for which an element of the process was digital, which could involve downloading, completing and printing the form to submit, or, in the case of the second most used ‘digital service’ on the list, the Home Office arrangements for passenger arrival at the UK border, simply a publication of the number of people entering the UK.22 Further, much of the data on the dashboard no longer seems to be updated, despite section 10 of the GDS Service Standard, last updated in 2017, which advocated the publication of such data: “publishing performance data means that you’re being transparent about the success of services funded by public money. And people can make comparisons between different government services”.23
15.The open-ended definition of “digital” has meant that it is hard to assess the full scale of any progress that the UK Government has made with its digitisation agenda. We believe that Government digitisation should be defined as transforming how services are delivered so that the relationship between the citizen and the State is enhanced. The Government should adopt this definition and set out metrics of success. Departments and associated Agencies should be required to publicly report against these metrics on an annual basis, starting from the financial year 2020/21, highlighting areas of success and areas for improvement. The Cabinet Office should be responsible for overseeing departments’ action plans in response to this annual publication.
Levers for digitisation
16.What this definition of digitisation means in practice is a matter of debate. Though we did not put the IfG definition of digitisation to our witnesses, the themes in the evidence can be related to this definition. For example, the evidence, including that from Deloitte, the Cabinet Office and Mr David Moss, explained how data could be used to join up Government departments, saving money and time, and producing a better experience for the citizen through the joining up of data sets and creating a more efficient and comprehensive profile for departments to work from.24 We also heard that the efficient use of data was a major feature of the Estonian digital Government model, an issue that we will be explored in greater detail in this Chapter.
17.Much of the evidence also explained how innovative technologies could be used to enable transformation. We heard from the Alan Turing Institute and Deloitte, for example, about how Artificial Intelligence could be used to transform specific services so they were faster and more efficient.25 The Minister for the Cabinet Office also explained ways in which the Government’s GovTech Catalyst programme had used innovative technologies to solve policy delivery issues, such as cutting congestion and tackling rural isolation and loneliness.26 Innovative technologies will be explored in further detail in Chapter 3.
Progress
18.As set out at paragraph 1, the beginning of the digital transformation period was characterised by the creation of the Government Digital Service in 2011, on the back of the Martha Lane Fox review. The first blogpost once GDS had launched set out its priorities and explained that GDS would become the new centre for digital Government in the UK, championing a culture of digital throughout Government that put the user first and delivered cheaper, more efficient services.27
19.A former Deputy Director of GDS, Tom Loosemore, told us that the aims of digitisation during the establishment of GDS were improving service delivery, and improving communications between citizens and the Government.28 This was demonstrated by the creation of the “Government as a Platform” concept in 2013. This can be illustrated by the creation of a host of technology products that departments could use, which would ease interactions between departments and the citizen, and standardise delivery across Government. These shared platforms included GOV.UK Pay, GOV.UK Notify, GOV.UK Platform as a Service, GOV.UK Registers, GOV.UK Verify.29
20.The Cabinet Office explained that these platforms had been successful: “adoption of these platforms has increased substantially over the past year, and it is expected to accelerate further over the coming years”.30 The Institute for Government (IfG) also pointed to the growth in use of GOV Pay and GOV Notify, and praised the successes of GOV.UK as a central Government website, becoming an international exemplar across the world.31 However, the IfG was critical of GOV.UK Registers and GOV.UK Verify as there had been a lack of incentives for departments and citizens alike to use Verify, and that Registers had lacked strategic focus on getting the basic data infrastructure right.32 Further, the Public Accounts Committee concluded in 2019 that Verify had been unsuccessfully implemented, was badly designed, and had technical difficulties that lacked the necessary departmental and leadership buy-in.33 GlobalData and Mr David Durant, both explained that Government as a Platform had failed to reach its full potential due to an absence of leadership and political will.34 We explore further challenges of leadership in Chapter 4.
21.In addition to Government as a Platform, GDS published the Government Digital Strategy in 2012, which set out the Government’s plans to improve digital capabilities throughout Government, increase the number of citizens using online services and make sure Government services were consistent and coherent, using common standards and platforms across departments. The aim of this was to create a more consistent experience of Government for the citizen. A 2017 NAO report, Digital transformation in Government, emphasised the success of GDS in doing this, particularly in its creation GOV.UK as a centralised Government website, as well as its spreading of common standards and guidance across departments.35
The Government-citizen relationship
22.According to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), digitising Government not only improves service delivery and public sector efficiency, but it can also give rise to new forms of public engagement and collaborative relationships, moving from “citizen-centric” approaches to “citizen-driven” approaches.36 The OECD explained in 2014 in Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies, that if digital technologies were harnessed they could strengthen the relationship between the citizen and the State; they advocated that governments could and should use technology to strengthen citizen trust, and create more agile, resilient and forward-looking public institutions that performed better and more responsively for the citizen.37 Evidence from Professor Helen Kennedy referenced the importance of citizen trust in ensuring that digital Government was utilised to its full potential, due to the need for efficient and transparent use of citizen data for better services.38
23.Estonia’s approach to data and citizen identification was an area that we recognised as a useful case study for our inquiry. Estonia operates a “consent” model in its utilisation of citizen data, where citizens are fully informed about how their data is being used by the Government. Every citizen in Estonia has a profile of basic personal data that allows them to interact with the Government quickly without incurring the inconvenience and cost of contacting multiple Government departments. Citizens can access all the data the Government holds on them through a State portal using an identity card and they can make updates and corrections. The Personal Data Protection Act in Estonia created a framework that allowed people control over their data, such as restricting who could view it. It fostered a consent model.39 This meant that certain sensitive personal information, such as ethnicity, State of residence and sexuality, could only be viewed by a government department if the citizen had given consent. This consent could also be conditional on circumstance. For example, a citizen could change whether a department could view their data or information at any time. Sam Smith, representing medConfidential, said that it was wrong to call the Estonian model a “consent” model, and in fact it should be regarded as a transparency model.40 He explained that this was because being able to access Government services did not equate to true consent because it was a conditional on sharing one’s data. However, the Minister for Digital and the Creative Industries, Margot James MP, told us that both the Estonian model and GDPR did equate to consent models, as they were “opt-in” systems, and such consent was given.41
24.Under the Estonian model, the Government has implemented a comprehensive electronic ID system, covering 94% of the population. It was recognised by the World Bank as one of the most advanced digital States in the world according to a Digital Dividends Report from 2015.42 Peter Herlihy, who worked on Digital Strategy at GDS in 2013, called Estonia “the most joined up digital government in the world”.43 Estonia’s use of single unique identifiers, in the form of electronic ID Cards has allowed citizens to interact efficiently and directly with the Government. Citizens could verify their identity securely in a matter of seconds to access a range of Government services, including e-Banking, libraries, medical records, tax history, e-Prescriptions, i-Voting and digital signatures.44 Dr Helen Margetts, representing the Alan Turing Institute, told us that “the key problem the UK has” is the lack of unique digital identifiers, and that one of the good things about Estonia’s system was its use of these unique identifiers and secure data interchanges between registries.45 Peter Wells from the Open Data Institute encouraged caution at the prospect of single unique identifiers, explaining that he did not believe it was necessary for some departments to be able to access all his data, including that which was irrelevant to the department’s purpose.46 Discussion on single digital identifiers will be explored in more detail at paragraph 29.
25.Whether the UK can learn lessons from Estonia is arguably called into question by the most recent UN e-Government ranking, which measured the use of ICT to deliver public services. In this, the UK came fourth behind Denmark, Australia and the Republic of Korea, whilst Estonia came sixteenth.47 However, in an academic paper published by witness Helen Margetts from the Alan Turing Institute, she explained that e-Government rankings may not necessarily give a true indication of the most advanced and exemplary digital States:
E-government rankings are well known for their methodological weaknesses and inconsistencies and Estonia’s place in international rankings has not reflected the country’s reputation […] these rankings include many other elements outside eGovernment (such as business and innovation environment) and when public services or infrastructure are singled out, Estonia has consistently done well in indicators like the ‘social impact of ICTs in public services’, as in the World Economic Forum network readiness index.48
26.Further, there are questions surrounding the feasibility of the UK in producing a similar system of data-sharing to that of Estonia. A number of witnesses, including SAS and Deloitte, pointed out that the UK faced a barrier of societal distrust of the Government’s use of data.49 The written submission from SAS (Statistical Analysis System), a software suite for advanced analytics, suggested that part of the reason that UK citizens had minimal trust in the Government was due to “nervousness” from citizens about the way governments were using their personal data.50 Similarly, Deloitte explained:
The UK has a history of societal aversion to “big state” government. According to Deloitte’s Global Mobile Consumer Survey, 80% of respondents are concerned or fairly concerned about sharing their data. This limits the UK’s ability to move quickly on cross-cutting digital transformation, such as across the health and social care sector.51
27.The recent results from the Edelman Trust Barometer mirror the concerns of Deloitte and SAS. The Edelman Trust Barometer measures levels of citizens trust across different countries annually. In its 2019 study, the Barometer highlighted a flatline trend on the trust of citizens in the UK, with 44% of the public identifying the Government as the “most broken institution”.52 The Barometer further highlighted that the UK had some of the lowest scoring levels of trust internationally at 43%, behind Germany (44%), France (44%), US (49%), Italy (46%), Australia (48%), and many others with similar political systems.53 In addition to this, a 2017 study by the UK Information Commissioner’s Office revealed that less than half (49%) of Britons trusted the Government with storing their personal data.54
28.However, many witnesses, such as Helen Kennedy from the University of Sheffield and Sam Smith from medConfidential pointed out that rather than a lack of trust being seen as a barrier to the UK implementing data intensive transformation as Estonia had, a push for transformative digitisation could be seen as a means to improve the Government-citizen relationship and levels of trust. Helen Kennedy, viewed the transparent use of a data as a means for the Government’s ability to improve relations.55 Further, Sam Smith argued that the UK could learn valuable lessons from Estonia in enhancing trust between the citizen and the Government, as when Estonia built its digital State in the 1990s, the populace had a “fear of the State”, and the solution was for the Government to say “the State will be able to do a number of things, but you will be able to see anything that the State does with access to your data.”56 UKCloud also pointed to the benefits that further data transparency would provide.57
Single unique identifiers
29.As previously explained at paragraph 24, one particular way in which Estonia transformed the relationship between the citizen and State was through the use of a single unique identifier. In practice, this meant that citizens could access Government services quickly and securely, through an ID card that gave individuals and departments access to all their citizens’ personal information. Some of the written submissions we received such as those from GlobalData, Helen Margetts from the Alan Turing Institute and 360Giving were supportive of the suggestion of having a single unique identifier in the UK.58 GlobalData, a global data analytics company, explained that “whilst ID cards were a political hot-potato, a single digital identity for each citizen could have provided the foundations for better data-sharing and faster transformation”.59 Further, 360Giving advocated that the Government should adopt single unique identifiers for organisations and processes across key datasets to produce more efficient, cost-effective use of data.60 Dr Helen Margetts also spoke in favour of digital identifiers as a means of improving public services and making datasets more accessible, stating that “less is more in the case of digital identifiers, and reviving the idea of data registries and a digital identifier is something to think about.”61
30.However, some evidence, including from medConfidential, was cautious about the use of single unique identifiers, which, in effect, was akin to the implementation of ID cards.62 medConfidential, for example, was concerned about the prospect of identity cards for citizens, calling it one of the “worst traditions” of the Government, during 2001 to 2010.63 Though ID cards and single unique identifiers are not identical, it is important to note how the centralisation of data and worries over access to it have concerned the public in the past. In May 2018, a YouGov survey revealed that 57% of the British public would support the reintroduction of ID cards.64 However, when the original Identity Card Act 2006 was repealed, it showed that support for the Bill from the public had decreased as time had gone by. A poll by the ICM indicated that between 2003 and 2006, public support for ID cards had dropped from 61% to 46%.65
31.The 2006 Identity Card Act was repealed in 2010. In 2005, the then Joint Committee on Human Rights questioned the compatibility of the Bill with the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically with regard to Article 8 (the right to respect for private life) and Article 14 (the right to non-discrimination).66 In 2004, Richard Thomas from the Information Commissioner’s Office explained that ID cards could result in the UK’s “sleepwalk[ing] into a surveillance society”.67 The then Home Affairs Committee in 2008 expressed concern that ID cards could be subject to “function creep”, and that citizens would not have a say over how their data was being shared and with whom, if further functions were to develop incrementally.68
32.Former GDS employee, Mr David Durant, recognised the political controversy surrounding ID Cards, but recommended an approach to single unique identifiers where citizen data would be treated in a similar way to the Estonian system.69 This would mean that key data fields would not be centrally stored, but just duplicated across departments to reduce the security risks and ethical concerns surrounding centralisation. Further, the Estonian system enshrined transparency, whereby citizens had a legal right to see who had accessed their data and for what reasons.70 In the meeting between our Chair and Estonian officials in March 2019, the Estonian representatives disputed the view that a single unique identifier raised ethical concerns (see annex two). Instead, they argued that citizens’ data being used across Government departments, with little transparency over who had accessed it and why, and without the citizen being aware of the use of their data, such as in the UK system, was a bigger civil liberties issue due to the lack of transparency and accountability. The Estonian citizen has a unique identifier but that means they can see exactly what the Government is doing with their data. The Estonian representatives explained that the civil liberties argument was more nuanced than some might claim.
Despite concern among some groups of witnesses, a shift in approach in the UK Government’s position seems on the horizon. The Minister for Digital and the Creative industries, for example, implied support for a universal digital ID in a recent interview with The Daily Telegraph in 2019:
I think there are advantages of a universally acclaimed digital ID system which nowhere in the world has yet. There is a great prize to be won once the technology and the public’s confidence are reconciled.71
33.On 11 June 2019, DCMS and the Cabinet Office announced their intentions to launch a consultation on digital identify verification in the coming weeks. The following actions were set out:
- “A consultation to be issued in the coming weeks on how to deliver the effective organisation of the digital identity market.”
- “The creation of a new Digital Identity Unit, which is a collaboration between DCMS and Cabinet Office. The Unit will help bring the public and private sector together, ensure the adoption of interoperable standards, specification and schemes, and deliver on the outcome of the consultation.”
- The start of engagement on the commercial framework for using digital identities from the private sector for the period from April 2020 to ensure the continued delivery of public services.”72
34.Single unique identifiers for citizens can transform the efficiency and transparency of Government services. We welcome the Government’s announcement in June 2019 that it will consult shortly on digital identity. While we recognise that in the UK there are concerns about some of the features of a single unique identifier, as demonstrated by the public reaction to the 2006 Identity Card Act, we believe that the Government should recognise the value of consistent identity verification. The Government should facilitate a national debate on single unique identifiers for citizens to use for accessing public services along with the right of the citizen to know exactly what the Government is doing with their data.
Social inclusion
35.In this Chapter so far, we have mainly focused on the positives of digitisation for the Government-citizen relationship. However, we did receive concerns that a move to “digital” could result in a two-tier set of public services that might, for example, worsen the citizen-State relationship for some, specifically those who were not able to use digital channels as easily, such as some disabled or elderly people. For example, Policy Connect argued that Government services should still be accessible for those who have a disability who might be less able to access these services digitally. They explained that as “the ONS found that while 90% of all adults in the UK have used the internet recently, 20% of disabled adults had never used the internet”.73 In comparison, 8.4% of all adults had never used the internet in 2018.74 Tom Loosemore, a former Deputy Director of GDS, expressed a concern that some senior Government staff, specifically at the Department for Work and Pensions, might have “wilfully” misunderstood what was meant by digital by default, including hiding other means of contacting the department, such as phone numbers, from its websites:
Digital by default did not mean online only. It did not mean hiding other channels and making them rubbish, so that people were forced to use the online channel. Personally, I think that that is lamentable.75
We put these allegations to Simon McKinnon, the interim Chief Digital Officer at DWP, when he appeared before us. He refuted the allegation that DWP would try and hide phone numbers, stating that citizens were only requested to use online services for “economic reasons”, and that the department would always provide alternative means of contact.76 This point was reinforced in a joint letter to the Chair of the Committee, from the Minister for Digital and the Creative Industries and the Minister for Implementation, which explained that the Government intended to keep the relationship between citizen and Government as accessible to those who were not able to access the internet as it was to those who could use the internet. Libraries was one of the means suggested to do this.77
36.While we believe it is important for the Government to make its services end-to-end digital, it must do this in such a way that it includes access to public services for those who are not digitally connected. The Government must ensure that public spaces with digital access, such as libraries, are maintained. The Government should also ensure that those who are not digitally connected have alternative ways of accessing services, for example, by using the phone or having assistance to use digital services, and those alternatives are properly promoted.
14 The Cabinet Office, “Government Transformation Strategy”, (February 2017), p 21
15 Institute for Government, “The hidden obstacles to government digital transformation” (October 2018)
16 Institute for Government, “The hidden obstacles to government digital transformation” (October 2018), p 5
20 GOV.UK, “Land registry: searches of whole register”, accessed 3 July 2019
21 GOV.UK, “Performance”, accessed 3 July 2019
22 GOV.UK, “Passenger arrivals at the UK border”, accessed 3 July 2019
23 GOV.UK, “Service Standard”, accessed 3 July 2019
27 GDS, “Introducing the Government Digital Service”, March 2011
29 A secure way to pay for Government services online; a way for service teams across Government to keep people updated by sending text messages, emails or letters; hosting for services on a Government cloud platform so departments aren’t duplicating digital infrastructure; helping Government design and build services on consistent data infrastructure; a secure way for citizens to prove their identity to Government online.
31 Institute for Government, Digital, “Whitehall Monitor 2019” (2019)
32 Institute for Government, Digital, “Whitehall Monitor 2019” (2019)
33 Public Accounts Committee, Ninety-Fifth Report of Session 2017–19, Accessing public services through the Government’s Verify digital system, HC 1748, paras 1–6
35 National Audit Office, “Digital transformation in Government”, (March 2017), para 15
36 OECD, “ Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies” (July 2014), para 2
37 OECD, “ Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies” (July 2014), para 7
39 Personal Data Protection Act 2007, RT I 2007, 24, 127
42 e.Estonia.com, “e-Estonia: the epic story of the e-State”, (2018), p 14
43 Peter Herlihy, “’Government as a data model’: what I learned in Estonia”, Government Digital Service, (October 2013)
44 e.Estonia.com, “e-Estonia: the epic story of the e-State”, p.18
47 United Nations, “e-Government Survey 2018”, July 2018
48 Helen Margetts and Andre Naumann, “Government as a Platform: What can Estonia show the world?”, Oxford Institute, (2017), p 7
52 Edelman, “EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER 2019 – A DISUNITED KINGDOM” (2019), p 2
53 Edelman, “The 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer: Global Report”, (2019), p 6
54 ICO “ICO survey shows most UK citizens don’t trust organisations with their data” (November 2017)
64 Matthew Smith, “Majority of Brits support introducing ID cards”, YouGov, (2012)
65 ICM, “ID Card Survey”, (2006)
66 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Eight Report of the Session 2004–2005, Scrutiny: Fourth Progress Report, HC 388, p 3
67 BBC, “Britain is ‘surveillance society’” (November 2006),
68 Home Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of the Session 2003–2004, Identity Cards, HC130-I, para 152–159
70 Peter Herlihy, “’Government as a data model’: what I learned in Estonia”, Government Digital Service, (October 2013)
71 “UK should ‘get over’ privacy fears and embrace tech-based ID, says digital minister”, The Telegraph, 9 December 2018
72 “Minister confirms government ambition on digital identity”, Cabinet Office press release 2019, 11 June 2019
74 Office for National Statistics, “Internet users, UK: 2018, 31 May 2018
Published: 10 July 2019