Research integrity Contents

6Regulating research and researchers

107.The UK has an enviable reputation for high-quality research. In 2013, the UK accounted for almost 16% of the world’s most highly cited research articles, despite having less than 1% of the global population and around 4% of researchers.196 Meanwhile, researchers themselves are one of the most highly-trusted groups in the eyes of the UK public. The 2017 IPSOS Mori Veracity Index suggests that 85% of British adults trust “professors” to tell the truth, higher than judges and the police, and considerably higher than politicians at 17%.197

108.However, as Professor Stephan Lewandowsky and Professor Dorothy Bishop put it, “science […] has to be conducted according to rigorous standards to be effective. Where the integrity of research is compromised by dishonesty, conflict of interest or incompetence, there can be major impacts on public health and safety”. Similarly, Universities UK noted the importance of public confidence in research, and observed that “wherever this confidence is undermined, either through poor practice or misconduct, then public trust in—and support for—research can be shaken”.198

109.High-profile cases of research misconduct in other countries have prompted changes in the way in which research integrity is managed. For instance, in the USA, the Office of Research Integrity was created following research misconduct cases at four major research centres in 1980.199 In general, we were told that many countries follow a similar path: “a problem occurs; there is a question about whether oversight and regulation would be useful; there is significant pushback, with people saying regulations are terrible and they will do bad things and interfere with scientific progress. The regulation occurs; people normalise it and things stabilise a bit. Then another problem occurs so they look at it again”.200

110.UK research has an enviable record of excellence and public trust, but this should not be taken for granted. There is a risk that public trust in science could be eroded in the future through high-profile examples of research misconduct, and a risk that this could lead to demands for knee-jerk and ill-advised changes to the research system in the UK. There is a need for the research community—including funders, publishers, and employers of researchers—to stay ahead of research integrity issues and how they are dealt with in public policy. The UK’s position of international high regard and public trust in researchers is strengthened if the community has the confidence to admit that no area of human endeavour is immune to misconduct and error at some scale.

111.UKRIO’s position statement explains that the UK system is based on the responsibility to investigate misconduct usually resting with the employer:

When issues of research [mis]conduct arise, if a field of research is not governed by statute, it normally devolves to the relevant employer—such as a university, NHS body or private sector organisation—to investigate and, if necessary, take remedial action. […] In turn, research funding bodies, via contractual mechanisms, help ensure that employers fulfil their responsibilities.201

Sir Mark Walport (speaking then as the Director of the Wellcome Trust) told our predecessors in 2011 that research integrity was “an intrinsic responsibility of an employer. It is not something they should be delegating to somebody else”. Similarly, Universities UK argued that:

Universities—as autonomous institutions—are responsible for responding to and investigating allegations of research misconduct, and ultimately have the final decision on whether an allegation of research misconduct is upheld. Universities may also apply sanctions up to and including dismissal, subject to employment law. This is a responsibility that universities take very seriously, and have a significant interest in ensuring policies and processes are fit for purpose and in line with best practice.202

112.However, we also heard that current arrangements of institutions “policing their own conduct” could represent a conflict of interests.203 Retraction Watch observed that “given many cases we have covered in which universities cleared their scientists of misconduct, only to later be forced to acknowledge such misconduct, it is obvious that institutions have a conflict of interest in investigating their own employees”.204 Professor Dorothy Bishop called for an ombudsman to be created in the UK in order to manage this conflict of interest, and argued that this would be a benefit to the community in being able to defend itself against accusations of impropriety:

It would be sensible to have an independent arbiter, who has to be independent from Government and from the universities. They would be more like an ombudsman, but would need expertise in statistics and methods so that they could examine data, and they should have teeth so that they could take steps. Obviously, that would not be non-trivial to set up, but it would benefit the scientists who sometimes come under attack from people with vested interests, the people who are concerned about fraud, and the institutions themselves, who otherwise have to deal with those very messy cases.205

113.In contrast, Professor Sir Ian Diamond (on behalf of UUK) argued that it was already in a university’s interest to investigate misconduct properly:

It is easy to say that there is a conflict of interest, but […] universities have an enormous interest in their own reputation and maintaining it. Universities have a long history of being able to co-regulate in an effective way. […] It is in everybody’s interest to get to the bottom of the problem.206

Self-regulation in the UK

114.UKRIO’s November 2016 position statement on statutory regulation of research integrity notes that “ultimately, all countries and jurisdictions rely on self-regulation by researchers”, but that “what varies are the structures set up to support and oversee this self-regulation and to ensure that action is taken when needed”.207 It explains that:

There is currently no overall statutory regulation of research or of researchers in the UK. While there are regulators for certain types of research, such as human clinical trials or research involving animal subjects, and for certain types of researchers, such as (medical) doctors, these are exceptions rather than the rule.208

115.Our predecessor committee concluded in 2011 that the general oversight of research integrity in the UK was “unsatisfactory”, and recommended that an external regulator for research integrity should be established.209 The Government declined to act on this recommendation, stating:

the Government does not agree that there is a case for setting up an external regulator to oversee the employers [of researchers]. There are already a number of regulatory and licensing bodies in key areas of research, and therefore any new regulatory body would increase regulatory burden on employers, and risks causing unnecessary overlap and uncertainty. Through the Research Integrity Concordat the Government will expect employers of researchers to deal with research integrity in an open and transparent manner.210

116.The written evidence we received suggests that there is still strong resistance within the university sector to the idea of a regulator. The Russell Group argued that “the creation of a UK regulatory body to oversee compliance would run the risk of undoing the progress made in strengthening the rigor and culture of UK research, by discouraging transparency and undermining the credibility of positive messages”.211 The Group also suggested that “a culture which places an emphasis on compliance with rules can be counterproductive, as it may encourage people to do the minimum, just enough to comply, as opposed to incentivising people to strive to improve research behaviours and practices”.212 Similarly, Universities UK argued that “policing researchers via a compliance-led policy focus risks distancing researchers from the importance of pursuing best practice, and instilling undesirable attitudes towards the promotion of research integrity […] It is unclear how further regulation can address poor research culture or promote good practice”.213

117.The Government’s position is that the “primary responsibility” for research integrity lies with the researchers themselves, with an “overarching responsibility” at the institutional level. The Government argued that formal regulation would be “overly bureaucratic, difficult to implement” and would risk “hampering the research endeavour”.214

International examples

118.We were directed to a range of international examples of research integrity systems, including those in Australia (see Box 3), Canada (Box 4), Denmark (Box 5) and the USA. Our attention was drawn specifically to systems that provide a means of assuring that employers have conducted misconduct investigations in an appropriate way, while retaining the onus on the employer to conduct the investigation. Dr Elizabeth Wager explained that:

One model that has a lot of merit is the Australian system, where the first response lies with the university. That is the prime responsibility to investigate, and it is an important principle. We do not have some big expensive body trying to do the investigations. However, in the last four or five years, they have set up an independent but national committee on research integrity that acts like a court of appeal. If the university has not done a good job, if people are unhappy or it is too slow, or to collate best practice and give advice, they have that extra layer. That is something we really lack in the UK.

[…] We do not have anything that universities, individuals or whistleblowers can turn to if a university does not do a good job. Often they investigate well, but there are cases when they do not investigate well, and that is when the system really falls down, because we just say, “Well, they are autonomous and secretive,” and there the matter ends.215

119.We asked the Australian Research Council to provide some further information on the work of the Australian Research Integrity Committee (ARIC—see Box 3). We also sought reflections from Australian academics, who told us that there was still a lack of transparency within the Australian system in terms of the total numbers of investigations—ARIC reviews only a very small number of contentious cases each year and most information on misconduct processes is not public. Neither does ARIC play a role in promoting responsible research or providing advice on training, which, we were told, means that its impact will only be on one part of the system (poorly handled misconduct cases). We were pointed towards Canada as an example of a system which includes this wider role alongside reviewing whether investigations have been conducted appropriately (see Box 4).

120.Professor C. K. Gunsalus, an American academic, provided some information on the equivalent part of the research integrity system in the USA, which goes slightly further than in other countries:

The institution is obliged to report when it initiates an inquiry and to submit its investigation report. The two federal agencies, the Office of Research Integrity for the Department of Health and Human Services and the Office of Inspector General for the National Science Foundation, review those reports and have the ability to query them and send them back to the institution and say, “You’ve missed the mark. Do it over again,” which they do with some regularity, before they accept the institutional findings.216

121.We asked Dr Ivan Oransky, from Retraction Watch, whether there were research integrity systems in other countries that the UK could seek to emulate. He highlighted transparency as a key issue:

For me, the best system would be to pick the best from each and avoid the worst in each. […] In Japan, there is a legal obligation that, when there is a finding of misconduct, the university must issue at least an executive summary. They often issue a fairly substantial investigation report. We think that is good for transparency. Personally, I would like to see them release details when there is not such a finding. Of course, I understand that one is innocent until proven guilty, and all those considerations.217

Box 3: Research Integrity in Australia

The Australian Research Integrity Committee (ARIC) was jointly established by the Australian Research Council and the National Health and Medical Research Council in 2011. It is jointly administered by these two bodies, with the secretariat provided by the relevant funding agency in each case.

ARIC does not replace institutional investigation of research misconduct. Research institutions maintain their autonomy and are responsible for investigating allegations of research misconduct in the first instance.

ARIC provides a review system of institutional processes to respond to allegations of research misconduct. This system is intended to ensure that institutions investigate such allegations and observe proper process in doing so.

Specifically, the ARC and the NHMRC jointly administer the ARIC to:

Review the process by which a nominated institution has managed an allegation of research misconduct;
Provide findings and, where relevant, recommendations to the CEO of the ARC and/or the CEO of the NHMRC; and
Publish de-identified information on its activities at least annually.

The ARIC considers whether the institution’s response to the allegation of research misconduct was consistent with the framework outlined in the Code and with the institution’s policies and procedures for investigating allegations of research misconduct.

Source: “Australian Research Integrity Committee”, Australian Government (accessed 20 June 2018)

Box 4: Research Integrity in Canada

In Canada, the Panel on Responsible Conduct of Research (PRCR, established in 2011) reviews institutional investigations, but also has a wider function of promoting research integrity.

A framework agreed by the three federal research agencies sets out policies and requirements related to applying for and managing Agency funds, performing research, disseminating results, and the processes that institutions and agencies follow in the event of an allegation of a breach of the policy.

The PRCR:

reviews institutional investigation reports;
recommends recourse in cases of confirmed breaches, if appropriate, consistent with the Framework;
provides advice to the Agencies on matters related to the responsible conduct of research; and
provides advice to the Agencies on future revisions to the Framework.

The PRCR helps to foster a research environment that supports and promotes the responsible conduct of research by undertaking “educational outreach to the research community”. It has a role to “enhance public trust in research activities undertaken under the auspices of Canadian institutions and organizations receiving funding from the Agencies.”

The PRCR also publishes anonymised summary information on every confirmed breach of the Framework, in three-year instalments. Each summary contains a distillation of the facts as established through the institutional inquiry or investigation, as well as a description of the recourse exercised by the institution and the relevant Agency. Such recourse is not within the authority of or required by the Agencies, but was implemented by the institutions within their absolute discretion to impose employment-related recourse measures such as suspensions or termination of employment. The summaries are anonymized, in keeping with provincial and federal privacy legislation.

Source: Government of Canada, ‘Panel on Responsible Conduct of Research’, accessed 20 June 2018

Box 5: Research Integrity in Denmark

The Danish Committee on Research Misconduct was established in 1992, initially on a trial basis and made permanent in 1999. In 2017 a system of sub-committees was replaced by a single research misconduct committee with a High Court judge as chairman and 8–10 recognized researchers as members representing different scientific areas. The DCRM is an independent body under the Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science where the DCRM secretariat is situated.

A recent Act of Parliament in Denmark separates research integrity into three parts:

Responsible conduct of research is developed in the research community based on common guidelines and practices laid down in non-legal settings such as the Danish Code of Conduct for Research Integrity;

Questionable Research Practices are handled by the individual institutions who are legally obliged to deal with such issues and publish guidelines for their processes in this regard;

All research misconduct cases—defined in the law as fabrication, falsification and plagiarism—will be handled by the DCRM.

All allegations of suspected breaches of research integrity matters must be brought to the relevant institution for an initial assessment. If it is a case of research misconduct and the following conditions are met, the institution must forward the case to the DCRM with a report on the facts of the case:

The allegation must relate to a scientific product, for example a scientific paper, a Ph.D. thesis or similar.

The allegation must relate to a researcher having contributed to the scientific product in question.

The allegations put forward must concern research misconduct. Questions about scientific disagreements, the quality of research and questionable research practice is outside the mandate of the DCRM.

The allegations put forward are reasoned by the complainant.

Meanwhile, the Danish Code of Conduct for Research Integrity provides the research community with a framework to promote commonly agreed principles and standards. The Code of Conduct aims to support a common understanding and common culture of research integrity in Denmark.

The DCRM is required to publish an annual report on questionable research practice in Denmark based on annual reporting from the institutions to the Committee. In this respect the Committee works toward strengthening the credibility of Danish research, prevent research misconduct and support the effort on research integrity as expressed in the Danish Code of Conduct for Research Integrity.

Sources: ENRIO, ‘Denmark’, accessed 20 June 2018; Mathias Willumsen (RES0043)

122.We see a gap in the UK system for a body that can provide a means of independently verifying whether a research institution has followed appropriate processes to investigate misconduct, as in Australia and Canada. We recommend that the Government ask UKRI to establish a new national committee which could undertake this role. Employers should still have the first responsibility for investigating and taking action in response to allegations of research misconduct, but there should be a means of checking that processes have been followed appropriately. The new committee should be able to recommend to UKRI that funding be restricted or reclaimed if an employer has not followed appropriate processes in responding to research misconduct. While established under the auspices of UKRI, the new committee should have its own secretariat and sufficient independence from it so that it can act in cases where the research is not funded by UKRI. Without a body along the lines we suggest there is a risk that demands for statutory regulation will grow in the future. We recognise that there is a strong consensus within the community about the disadvantages that overbearing regulation could bring. We argue, however, that the onus is now on the community to support steps to avoid this.

123.We recommend that the national committee should also have formal responsibility for promoting research integrity, as the equivalent body does in Canada. Working with Universities UK, the new committee should take responsibility for driving the implementation of an updated and strengthened Concordat, and following up on other recommendations to the sector in this report. Meanwhile, UKRIO should continue its work in providing advice on research integrity and sharing best practice. It should now advise UKRI on the creation of the new body, including its work methods, drawing on the best international examples.

Monitoring trends

124.We noted in Chapter 1 that the available data on research integrity problems is limited. As Dr Elizabeth Wager argued, “without clear [annual narrative] statements about misconduct investigations it is impossible to estimate the extent of problems in the UK or to ensure that institutions are handling them appropriately”.218 She noted that an annual report on the overall state of research integrity across the UK has never been produced,219 and UUK agreed that “more consistent and comprehensive reporting of data on the number and scope of investigations may be valuable”.220

125.To our surprise, the Royal Society disagreed, telling us that “it is not helpful to seek to quantify the ‘research integrity problem’”, since “in an environment where the answer is not always clear cut, a lot of time can be spent discussing how to quantify the problem rather than looking for ways to solve it”.221 Professor Leyser expanded on this point by arguing that “getting meaningful and robust information about the size of the research integrity problem is very difficult and potentially very expensive […] It seems much more productive to work to change the culture so that those problems are less prevalent”.222

126.An RCUK requirement since April 2017 is that the institutions that it funds should report instances of potential misconduct to the research council at the screening phase—considerably earlier than previous requirements.223 This should in principle provide further data on the overall rates of misconduct, at least in the bodies that RCUK funds. UKRIO told us that it will shortly begin a programme of research into research integrity in the UK, including assessing “the extent and scope of challenges to and breaches of research integrity in the UK”.224 This aligns closely with the themes in our report, and we hope that the sector will pay close attention to UKRIO’s findings.

127.Several international systems for monitoring and responding to problems with research integrity include regular reporting or collection of information at the national level (see Boxes 3 to 5). We also note that annual statements from universities are also an opportunity for an institution to report on the proactive steps that it has taken to improve research integrity, including training undertaken and policies reviewed. As well as a means of providing transparency, it is an opportunity for employers of researchers to demonstrate that they are taking research integrity seriously.

128.Transparency is a key feature of a healthy research integrity system. The new national research integrity committee we recommend should publish an annual report on the state of research integrity in the UK, looking across the whole of research, and collecting information on: retractions; misconduct investigations and their outcomes; Concordat compliance; and training undertaken. The data for this will come from university narrative statements and the aggregated data on screening-phase investigations that UKRI is now being provided with. The proposed national committee should also consider how best to engage industry with the issue of research integrity, and should incorporate meaningful information on this aspect in its annual report.