Rail timetable changes: May 2018 Contents

2Why did the system fail?

19.The ORR’s September 2018 interim reports sets out at length, and in technical detail, the circumstances that led to the May 2018 timetabling crisis. Evidence to our inquiry broadly corroborates the ORR’s findings and we are therefore confident that the facts have been established. Below we draw on the ORR’s analysis and evidence to our inquiry to summarise, as accessibly as we can, how 20 May went so badly awry, including the part played by each of the key stakeholders, and consider the steps required in the short and longer term to avoid a repeat of the situation and better protect the interests of rail passengers.

Network Rail

20.Network Rail had two key functions in relation to delivering the May timetable: its Infrastructure Projects (IP) teams in the north and the south needed to deliver the physical works; and its separate, central System Operator (SO) function, comprising about 700 people, about 400 of whom work on timetabling, had the unenviable task of putting the national timetable together. This involved managing the inevitable mass of conflicts amongst the enormous number of service changes on multiple, interrelated commercial franchises. The process deploys specialist IT but also requires a high level of manual intervention from very highly skilled people.20

21.To comply with the long-established and well-understood timescales for six-monthly timetable changes, Network Rail SO was required to produce a first version of the national timetable in November 2017. It did so; however, events in late 2017 and early 2018 meant the November 2017 timetables for the north and southeast of England were essentially “invalid” and had to be rewritten.21

22.The reasons for this were different in the north and the south, but the ultimate effect was the same: the timescales for the industry to prepare for an unprecedently large national rail timetable change were condensed into a far shorter period than standard industry practice. The processes are set out in Part D of the “Network Code”, which codifies how private operators’ rights of access to the publicly-owned network translate into the construction of the national rail timetable.22 There was simply not enough time to put everything in place—for example, train diagrams (planning how to have trains in the right locations), driver and crew rosters and route-training required for drivers before they can drive trains on new or updated infrastructure—to ensure a reasonably smooth implementation.23

23.Delays to the physical works were the key contributory factor in the north. A key plank of the Great North Rail Project, the North West Electrification Project (NWEP), which had already been delayed by one year from December 2016 to December 2017—placing an even greater onus on the timetable change planned for May 2018—faced further, unforeseen delays during 2017. The Infrastructure Project (IP) team faced worse than anticipated ground conditions. Several innovative solutions were tried and failed, further compressing the timescale for the project. A final attempt to catch up with construction work was made over the Christmas period 2017, but again encountered problems with unfavourable ground conditions. By January 2018, there were no acceptable options to recover the works in time to complete phase 4 of NWEP, electrification of the “Bolton Corridor” from Bolton to Manchester, before introduction of the May 2018 timetable change.24

24.Jo Kaye, Managing Director, Network Rail SO, succinctly described the situation in January 2018: “The timetable that we had completed [in November 2017] simply could not work without that infrastructure in place.”25 Gary Bogan, the DfT’s Director, Rail North Partnership, explained that:

“The plan was to have an electrification route from Bolton to Manchester, and the trains that were going to do that were electric, and the diesel trains that the company ran were going to go across the network to strengthen services. Instead, there was, effectively, a missing train fleet; we did not have the electrification.”26

Once it was known that NWEP phase 4 would not be completed in time, there were very broadly only two options: postpone the implementation of the May timetable change or rewrite the timetable, in a much-compressed timescale, to match the available infrastructure.

25.David Brown, Managing Director of Arriva Rail North, reported that Northern made a request in January 2018 to “roll over” the existing timetable i.e. to postpone the May 2018 change. Mr Brown told us that Arriva put this request to Network Rail SO in late January, whereupon there was “an industry conversation with other train operating companies”. It was clear from those discussions that “a significant number of players” did not support a postponement. The request was therefore declined.27 Jo Kaye explained that:

“If we had rolled the timetable over, we would have had to roll over the whole national timetable. There are a number of operators operating on the network today. The national timetable is a culmination of all those things pieced together, and they all work together. [ … ] There was not the simple option of just continuing with one plan for one operator, because we had already made changes for other train operators who use the same infrastructure. That is why we had to rewrite the timetable rather than just roll it over. [ … ].”28

26.David Brown described the scale of the task then facing Arriva Rail North and Network Rail SO’s timetabling staff:

“That meant that [Northern and Network Rail SO] had to plan the whole timetable in a period of 16 weeks rather than 40 weeks. We had to look at options for completely rewriting a timetable for the north of England, which is 10% to 11% of the total national rail network, in four months—16 weeks compared with 40 weeks.”29

27.We wanted to know why the Network Rail IP team had not realised before January 2018 that the necessary works would not be completed in time for May. Martin Frobisher, Network Rail’s Route Managing Director, London North Western, told us that, despite the experience of a previous year-long delay and the multitude of problems experienced during 2017:

“We genuinely believed that it was possible to recover the programme with a short line closure through to December, but by January it was absolutely clear that it would have required a five-week line closure and really difficult circumstances for many people who commute from places such as Bolton.”30

28.The ORR found that in continuing efforts, beyond autumn 2017, to complete phase 4 NWEP electrification:

“[ … ] the consequential risks to the introduction of the May 2018 timetable were compounded by an excessively optimistic approach to planning and re-planning mitigating actions to catch up [ … ]”31

Infrastructure programme governance structures

Great North Rail Project

29.While by January 2018 it was “too late” to implement a workable solution, the ORR found that Network Rail SO had been “best placed” to understand and address the escalating risks in autumn 2017 or earlier, when it may have still been possible to advocate workable alternatives.32

30.It was not entirely clear, however, from evidence to our inquiry that SO understood this to be its remitted role. Jo Kaye emphasised to us that the timetabling processes, set out in the Network Code, were industry-wide processes.33 Furthermore, SO told the ORR’s inquiry that:

“[ … ] had it decided in autumn 2017 not to assume that the NWEP infrastructure would be ready, it would have been ‘overruled’ in favour of the advice from the project team because it would have delayed benefits to passengers.”34

31.There were both internal and external pressures on Network Rail to find a solution for NWEP and adhere to the timescale. The ORR found the North of England Programme Board “faced substantial pressure from senior levels of Network Rail” not to further delay the timescale of NWEP.35 Professor Glaister and colleagues were equally clear in oral evidence to our inquiry that the then Chief Executive of Network Rail, Mark Carne, felt under similar pressure from DfT Ministers not to further delay the project.36

32.Other bodies were aware of the escalating risks posed by NWEP to the May timetable, but they told us they were ultimately reliant on Network Rail IP’s assessment of the deliverability of NWEP. Ruth Hannant, DfT Director General for Rail, confirmed that in autumn 2017 Network Rail was “saying that they thought they would be able to complete the works.”37 Gary Bogan, the DfT’s Director, Rail North Partnership, confirmed that he had been present at all relevant board meetings. Before Christmas 2017, he “heard the level of confidence and commitment to be finished by the time we came back in early January, only to find that there had been a setback.”38

33.No single body appears to have been primarily focused on systemic risks. The DfT-chaired North of England Programme Board, which includes Transport for the North, Network Rail, Northern Rail and TPE, is responsible for delivery of rail infrastructure projects in the north of England. It is one of several regional programme boards set up following the recommendations of the 2015 Bowe review, which considered lessons learned from earlier infrastructure project overruns.39 The ORR’s interim report noted that regional programme boards were not explicitly remitted to consider systemic risks, such as to national rail timetable changes, arising from its infrastructure projects. The North of England Programme Board, like the other DfT-chaired regional boards, was focused primarily on project delivery and cost control.40

Thameslink

34.The circumstances in the south were different. The infrastructure was available and not a factor in the May 2018 timetable disruption. A key problem was deciding how to phase in Thameslink services, using new Class 700 rolling stock over the new infrastructure to bring them up to 24 trains per hour (tph) at peak times. The initial plan, agreed by the DfT, Network Rail and GTR was for 20 tph from May 2018 and 24 tph from December 2018.41

35.In recognition of the complexity of the task and the need to bring the range of interested parties together to work collaboratively, the Secretary of State established an extra layer of governance, in addition to the existing DfT-chaired Thameslink Programme Board. In January 2017, he appointed Chris Gibb, a hugely experienced operational railway expert and former Chief Operating Officer of Virgin Trains, to independently Chair a Thameslink 2018 Industry Readiness Board (IRB). Mr Gibb described the IRB as follows:

“[ … ] It is a collection of the companies involved in delivery of the Thameslink project: all the train companies extending from what is now London North Eastern Railway to GTR, Southeastern and Arriva Rail London, all the Network Rail routes, the Network Rail SO, the Department for Transport and the ORR. [ … ]

[ … ]. Everybody comes, very diligently, and everybody has an opinion and a contribution. There is lots of disagreement. There are people with different contractual obligations. There are different opinions, and it is a tough meeting to chair.”

Mr Gibb emphasised that the IRB had “chewed over hundreds of issues” since January 2017 and, despite the difficulties described, resolved many of them.42 The ORR confirmed to us that the IRB had, in many ways, done a good job.43

36.However, coming to an agreed approach to Thameslink phasing and getting a formal DfT decision appears to have been a deeply problematic and slow process. Mr Gibb had already considered Thameslink phasing in his December 2016 report to the Secretary of State on improving Southern rail services, also on GTR’s franchise, after a prolonged period of disruption in 2016 caused in part by the Thameslink infrastructure works. Mr Gibb had then recommended the creation of the IRB to “look at the phasing in detail.” He told us that: “By early 2017, it was clear that everybody on the [IRB] wanted it phased [more gradually]. Nobody believed that it could be done in one go [in 2018].”44

37.The ORR’s report confirmed that both the Thameslink Programme Board and the IRB supported re-phasing May 2018 Thameslink service introduction down from 20 to 18 tph, then ramping up to 20, 22 and 24 tph over the three further six-monthly timetable changes, reaching full implementation in December 2019.45 Mr Gibb told us that GTR first recommended this approach to the DfT in April 2017.46 The decision was not formally approved by the Secretary of State until 31 October 2017.47

38.The consequences for the production of the May timetable were grossly underestimated. As Peter Wilkinson, the DfT’s Managing Director of Passenger Services, put it:

“Nobody estimated that taking two trains out would be terribly high risk. It turned out to be very difficult to achieve, the reason being that the GTR timetable is interwoven with at least three of the major timetables on the east coast and the midland main line. Taking two trains out meant a lot more restructuring of rosters and diagrams that had interdependencies with other lines of route than had been estimated.”48

39.The ORR found that, while the DfT “could not have reasonably foreseen the risk of needing to rewrite the timetable [ … ]”:

“In hindsight, had the final decision by DfT to phase the introduction of services from 18tph been aligned with the schedule for developing the timetable in August 2017, the unpredicted consequences for the Thameslink timetable may have been avoided and the consequential risks of a timetabling failure on the scale experienced would have been greatly reduced.”49

40.We wanted to know why it took so long to reach a formal decision approved by the Secretary of State. Ruth Hannant told us that, in April 2017, DfT officials told GTR to “go away and work up proposals”. It did so and came back with “initial proposals some time towards the end of May”. The Secretary of State’s “decision in principle to proceed” was given after a discussion with Chris Gibb “at the end of July or beginning of August”:

“There was then a contractual process that we had to go through with GTR to turn that decision in principle into something embedded in their contractual terms. They came to us with a final proposition in October, and it was agreed by Ministers in October.”50

41.Ruth Hannant insisted that “At no time during that period did anybody say to us, ‘You need to accelerate the contractual discussions.’” This is a point of contention between the DfT and GTR, which told the ORR’s inquiry that it “verbally advised DfT that it needed a decision by June 2017”. The ORR’s report also noted an email from GTR to the DfT on 25 August had emphasised the “time-critical nature of the decisions”.51

42.The ORR’s inquiry confirmed that the period from April to October involved a “long and complex process in which many errors and service conflicts with other operators needed to be resolved”. Its conclusion was that, within this highly complex set of circumstances, “the only way in which these risks could have been avoided is for the advice on the re-planning of phasing to have been sought earlier.”52

43.Furthermore, the ORR was critical of the structure of the board established by the Secretary of State to provide that advice. Its report, for example, noted that the IRB, and its associated risk assessment body, the Independent Assurance Panel (IAP), had no powers to commission third parties to gather evidence to test the assurances it was being given by GTR about readiness for May 2018.53 Dan Brown, the ORR’s Director, Strategy and Policy, elaborated in oral evidence, telling us that the IAP had “a relatively informal style of working”, in which they were “kicking the tyres on GTR’s plans”, which they took “largely at face value”. He believed the IAP was “largely misnamed” as “there was not a great deal of independent assurance of the sort of detail that might reasonably have been expected [ … ]”.54

44.When we first questioned the Secretary of State about the timetabling crisis in July, he emphasised that he and his Department delegated responsibility for the operation of the railway to industry experts. He told us he: did not “run the railways”; was “not responsible for rail timetabling”; and that the Department “had rail professionals to do that”. He also pointed out that the IRB had not, at any stage, indicated to him that there was a risk of serious timetable failure in May 2018:

“[ … ] I did not make a decision on the introduction of the new timetable in May. I received an indication from those who are in place to plan the new timetable introduction. We had an independent assurance panel and we had an Industry Readiness Board, both of which recommended that the timetable change should go ahead.”55

45.In October, when we had the opportunity to question Mr Grayling with the benefit of the ORR’s findings, we put it to him that the governance structures, which he had established, were inadequate and that he and his Department ought to accept a level of responsibility. He reiterated:

“At no point did anybody in that board come to me and say, ‘We are not able to get the job done.’ At no point did anybody raise with me concerns about the workings of the board. I saw Chris Gibb from time to time, and he assured me that progress was being made towards the May timetable and towards implementing the Thameslink decision. Nothing ever crossed my desk that gave me reason to think that that body was not capable of doing its job.”56

46.Mr Grayling did accept that the length of time taken to come to a decision on Thameslink phasing had been a material factor in the timetabling crisis.57 More broadly, he emphatically agreed that he was responsible for establishing effective governance structures in the rail industry. He emphasised his recent appointment of Keith Williams to lead the independent Rail Review, telling us:

“[ … ] If I am guilty of anything, it is of not moving fast enough to deliver change. I have said to this Committee over the last couple of years that I believe we need a more integrated railway. [ … ]

What this summer has convinced me is that we need to move much faster. There was a process of evolution that I judged to be the right one to avoid putting the industry through excessive change. I now think that it needs significant change, and that is what the process I have established since the timetable issues arose is designed to achieve.”58

Culpability of the train companies

47.Arriva Rail North and GTR told us about the extreme difficulties they faced in preparing to implement new timetables within unprecedentedly compressed timescales. Northern Rail faced an additional infrastructure-related setback as late as March 2018, when NWEP phase 3, from Blackpool to Preston, was delayed by three weeks. This meant the electrified infrastructure did not enter service until 11 May, creating a very late, additional driver training requirement on the route, for example.59 David Brown of Arriva Rail North reported that Northern was still “piecing together the rosters and the diagrams only days and evenings before” implementation on 20 May.60 Charles Horton, the then Chief Executive of GTR who resigned in June in the wake of the timetabling crisis, said:

“All the detailed, complicated resource-planning tasks that we would normally spread over at least a 12-week period we had to complete in a three-week period. That caused us multiple problems in terms of the deployment of our drivers to that new timetable, with, ultimately, a gap between the drivers we had available to us and the skills they held and the work that we were requiring them to do, with the resulting cancellations and delays […]”61

Northern

48.The ORR acknowledged the severe difficulties faced by the train companies. Its inquiry found that Northern had “engaged properly with Network Rail’s timetabling process, and the factors that caused the timetable to be replanned at a late stage were outside of its control.” In the circumstances, Northern could not, for example, have “reasonably accelerated the train crew diagramming process”.62

49.However, the ORR found that Northern did not demonstrate that it “understood the full ramifications of the events leading up to the timetable change”. Despite the escalating difficulties, particularly in relation to driver training, as late as 9 May it expected “to be in a position to run a full service from the implementation of the new timetable on 20 May”.63 On 17 May, it briefed the DfT about the “high risk of poor operational performance and identified potential hotspots for capacity and service decrements”. In an email to stakeholders on 18 May it warned of “some localised service disruption at potentially very short-notice.”64 David Brown’s admission to us that “the full impact only became apparent when the timetable went live” was cited by the ORR as clear evidence of Northern’s failure to comprehend the magnitude of the situation.65

50.Ultimately this meant that Northern Rail passengers who faced severe disruption to services were not provided with information or advice “that would have allowed them to manage the impact”.66 Northern also failed to provide additional information or support tailored to the needs of disabled passengers (we discuss this further in chapter 3).67

GTR

51.GTR finally received a fully reworked timetable on 9 April 2018, leaving just six weeks, rather than the 12 set out in the Network Code, to “optimise and roster staff”.68 Driver rosters were not finalised and posted up until 18 May, just two days prior to the timetable change, rather than the usual six weeks.69 GTR agreed a “rolling deployment” approach with the DfT, in which it would work up to full deployment of the 20 May timetable over a three-week period. The intention was to initially remove 80–100 services per day.70

52.Charles Horton told us that “It was only in that final week, on the Thursday before the timetable came in, that we realised the problem was more serious than we expected’’.71 This is another point of contention with the Department; the DfT’s view is that GTR “‘plainly were just not ready’ and would not have been ready even if all the issues around the timetabling and rostering had been taken away.”72

53.The ORR found that “GTR had a much greater ability to prepare and test their plans than Northern”.73 GTR managers reported to the inquiry that the company had “a history [ … ] of running with far less drivers than [ … ] we needed’’. The ORR noted that GTR had a known driver shortfall at the outset of its franchise agreement in 2014.74 Our predecessor Committee highlighted this issue in a Report published in October 2016.75 GTR had realised as early as 2016 that it would not have a sufficient number of fully trained drivers for May 2018 and planned mitigations, including borrowing drivers from the Southeastern franchise, using “pilot” drivers on the new infrastructure through central London and relying on its drivers to work on rest days.76

54.When a greater than expected driver shortfall became apparent on the drawing up of diagrams in April 2018, it planned further mitigations, including: cancelling late night services; transferring driver trainers to driver roles; transferring Southern and Great Northern drivers to Thameslink; and seeking drivers with relevant training from freight operators. The ORR noted that these mitigations were either “extremely limited” (GTR found only four additional drivers from freight train operators, for example) or created knock-on problems (moving driver trainers to driving roles meant they could not contribute to alleviating the backlog in new driver training).77

55.The ORR found that GTR “did not adequately recognise the exceptional scale of change and the probable risks arising from the May timetable.” Its plans “were not adequately stress tested [ … ] even as the time available to prepare driver diagrams was reduced”. It made insufficient contingency to cope with problems as they emerged as a consequence of the timetable re-write.78

56.The culpability of GTR in relation to its staffing levels should be considered in the context of a £13.4 million settlement it reached with the DfT in July 2017. This was predominantly to buy out part of its future contractual performance liabilities for the period to September 2018, on the understanding that the sum would be spent on “various measures aimed at improving services for passengers, including extra train crew.”79 We discuss this further in chapter 4.

The ORR

57.The ORR’s “prior role review”, conducted separately from the broader May timetable inquiry by Ian Prosser, HM Chief Inspector of Railways, sets out five areas of regulatory responsibility that could have played in part in assuring the timetabling change or more clearly raising the alarm that a very serious problem was emerging. It suggests weaknesses in four of these.80

58.Its 2013 “periodic review” (PR13) of Network Rail’s plans for rail control period 5 (CP5), 2014–19, included efficiency assumptions, with which Network Rail disagreed, in relation to Network Rail’s resources for timetable planning. The prior role review notes that the ORR “did not undertake any impact assessment of its proposals”.81 It should be noted that the ORR’s recently published final determination for CP6, which will start in April 2019, includes:

“[ … ] a significant funding and resource boost for its timetabling and planning functions, with the System Operator’s forecast spend almost doubling from around £145m in CP5 to over £270m in CP6 enabling this part of Network Rail to employ around 100 new staff from the current total of around 700.”82

59.For several years, the ORR had been aware of the rail industry’s difficulties in producing reliable timetables within the agreed timescale of 12 weeks in advance.83 Following an investigation launched in February 2018, it found Network Rail to be in formal breach of its relevant obligations under the Network Code.84 Its preceding investigation, however, “did not identify the impending operational timetable problems in advance of 20 May.”85 We asked Professor Glaister if this indicated that the ORR had failed to do its job properly. He said:

“Yes, I agree that we should have looked to ways of being sharper on enforcing those licence conditions, and in future we will. That is part of the recommendations we will be looking for, both for ourselves and in our advice to the Secretary of State about what should be done. I am not saying that one can never miss a deadline, but if one is going to miss a deadline, one has to do it in a very considered and controlled way, with good reasons and good mitigation.”86

60.In its ongoing monitoring of Network Rail’s infrastructure projects, the prior role review found the ORR had identified risks but there was “a lack of clarity over whether these risks were communicated effectively and to whom.”87 More broadly, the ORR had not sufficiently considered May 2018 in the context of its responsibility to protect the performance of the whole railway network. The ORR board, for example, had “never held a substantive discussion on Thameslink and the largest timetable change in many years.”88 We found this extraordinary and put it to Professor Glaister that it indicated the ORR was unfit for purpose. He accepted that:

“I think there are many ways in which we could improve what we do. It will be part of our own second stage to think about what we can do differently; it will also of course be part of the Department’s own longer-term view, with Mr Williams, to see whether that is the case.

In longer-term changes, which will involve legislation, the logic will be that the Government of the day will need to decide what they want to do about changing the structure. Then they will have to think about what regulatory structure is appropriate for that, which may be different from what we have today.”89

61.2018 was a year in which huge investment in infrastructure was intended to unlock much needed additional capacity on the railways and produce very substantial benefits for passengers. The system has so far failed to deliver those benefits fully and in the process has demonstrated an extraordinary complacency with regard to protecting the interests of passengers. Those who suffered in the chaos that ensued have been very badly let down.

62.The May 2018 timetabling crisis was in part a consequence of the astonishing complexity of a disaggregated railway in which the interrelated private train companies operating on publicly-owned and managed infrastructure have competing commercial interests. In a fragmented, over-complicated system, with competing contractual interests, only the Secretary of State had the ultimate authority to judge the inevitable trade-offs and halt the implementation in good time but at no point was he given all the information he needed to make that decision. The case for a genuinely “root and branch” review, in which a broad range of options for reform are considered, is undeniable, but rail passengers cannot wait for the Williams Review to be conducted and for reforms to be implemented from 2020. The immediate priority must be establishing effective governance and decision-making structures to oversee the implementation of the planned timetable change in December 2018 and the two scheduled for 2019.

63.Evidence to our inquiry, and the Office of Rail and Road’s (ORR) September 2018 report, clearly demonstrates that the May 2018 timetable change was a collective, system-wide failure, across the publicly-owned infrastructure owner and manager, Network Rail, privately-owned train operating companies, Arriva Rail North and Govia Thameslink Railway, the Department for Transport and the ORR itself. The governance and decision-making structures were fundamentally flawed. Network Rail System Operator could and should have more clearly identified systemic risks and spoken up with more force earlier in the process. Network Rail’s infrastructure project teams and the train operating companies were guilty of an indefensible optimism bias. We would have expected the then Chief Executive of Network Rail to have been aware of emerging risks and, on that basis, to have taken action to address them. The governance and decision-making structures overseen by the Secretary of State and the Department of Transport were inadequate: lines of accountability failed; were not sufficiently clear; or simply did not exist. The Secretary of State for Transport is responsible for the structure of the system that controls and runs our railways. He is at the apex of this system. Some of the problems caused by timetabling changes arose from the structure of the railways. It is therefore not reasonable for the Secretary of State to absolve himself of all responsibility. We acknowledge that the Secretary of State was not fully informed of serious problems, but he should have been more proactive. The Office of Rail and Road missed chances to sound the alarm; a more confident, independent and effective Regulator may have been able to avert the crisis.

64.We are confident that Professor Glaister and his team have, so far as is possible in the time available, thoroughly and fairly established the facts, shedding light on why the system failed to deliver the May 2018 timetable, and why opportunities to raise the alarm in autumn 2017 or earlier, and prevent the crisis, were missed. We endorse the ORR’s finding that “no one took charge”; this is extraordinary and totally unacceptable. It is incumbent on all parties to accept in full the ORR’s, and our, findings and work together quickly to learn the lessons and restore trust in the industry. They must not continue to pass the buck.

What happens next?

A more cautious approach and putting “someone in charge”

65.On 9 July, Network Rail and the RDG announced, with the agreement of the DfT, that the timetable change planned for December 2018 would be substantially scaled back. Several operators, including all of GTR’s services,90 Northern and TPE, will continue to introduce and implement their May 2018 timetables.

Table 1: December 2018 timetable change

Source: RDG, 9 July 2018

According to Network Rail and RDG, the anticipated effect is that the total size of the national rail timetable change in December would be “of a similar scale to the smaller changes of recent years.”91 The Secretary of State told us:

“The December timetable change is smaller than the routine ones that normally happen every six months, to make sure that we do not have the same issues in December. Next May, there is a plan to step up the Thameslink programme. We will need to make absolutely certain that the industry is ready for that.”92

66.On 13 October, The Times reported that Andrew Haines, who took over from Mark Carne as Chief Executive of Network Rail from August this year, was “very keen not to commit” to further timetable changes until he could be sure they will work. The suggestion in the article was that the already scaled down changes scheduled for this December may be delayed until the end of 2019.93

67.We were obviously keen to know what governance changes had been made to the national timetabling process ahead of December 2018 and who would have the ultimate say over whether and when they go ahead. Mr Grayling said:

“I am very clear that in the short term it will sit on Andrew Haines’s desk. Indeed, I met Andrew earlier today to talk about December. Andrew is the person I trust to take a lead on this. He is a new appointment, and I think he is very good. I trust his judgment.”94

68.In relation to structural governance changes, Peter Wilkinson told us:

“This time around, we have put in place what is called a programme management office—a PMO—charged with looking at the total system risk. It looks at the interactions between different timetables, the bids for different timetables from different operators and the way they work together. As you will certainly understand, in a very tightly wound railway system, which is what we have today, with very many more trains on it and running much closer together at higher speeds and carrying many more people, the margin for absorbing any programme error is very much reduced. You have to focus on where the interactions and interdependencies are.”95

Mr Wilkinson and Ruth Hannant confirmed that the new PMO was located within Network Rail but included “people from the [train] operators” and would be “bolstered by independent challenge”. Ms Hannant insisted it was “not just the industry marking its own homework”.96

69.Delivering the capacity and passenger benefits of investment in rail infrastructure is crucial but must always take proper account of the risks to operations from the implementation of requisite timetable changes. Given the chaos that followed May 2018, we endorse the more cautious approach—announced by the industry in July—to the changes planned for December 2018. More substantial changes currently planned for 2019 should only go ahead when the industry is confident they can be delivered effectively. The integrity of the system and passengers’ needs for reliable services must ultimately take precedence over any political and commercial interests in delivering additional capacity quickly. The Secretary of State is responsible for putting in place suitable governance and decision-making structures for the rail industry. A key lesson of the timetabling crisis is that an independent system operator needs to take charge. We are content, in the short term, for that person to be the Chief Executive of Network Rail, but if he is to assume responsibility the Secretary of State must make clear the extent of Mr Haines’ decision-making power over whether and when the next timetable change goes ahead.

70.The governance and decision-making structures in place for the May 2018 national rail timetabling change were not fit for purpose. They would not have been used for any major project in any sector anywhere in the world. We offer a cautious welcome to the establishment of a Project Management Office (PMO), located within Network Rail, including train operating company representatives and open to independent expert challenge. It is not yet clear, however, how well equipped the PMO will be to manage systemic risk and balance the competing interests of commercial operators to ensure that network integrity comes before these interests. It remains to be seen whether it can be more effective than Network Rail’s existing System Operator function in this regard. We await the ORR’s final recommendations, but our clear view is that the national rail timetabling process requires genuinely independent oversight, following accepted principles of professional project management, including the appointment of an independent Project Sponsor or Senior Responsible Owner for the whole national timetabling project. We believe this role would need to be located outside of Network Rail, so that it is more effectively insulated from commercial and political pressures.