Conclusions and recommendations
Why did the system fail?
1.2018 was a year in which huge investment in infrastructure was intended to unlock much needed additional capacity on the railways and produce very substantial benefits for passengers. The system has so far failed to deliver those benefits fully and in the process has demonstrated an extraordinary complacency with regard to protecting the interests of passengers. Those who suffered in the chaos that ensued have been very badly let down. (Paragraph 62)
2.The May 2018 timetabling crisis was in part a consequence of the astonishing complexity of a disaggregated railway in which the interrelated private train companies operating on publicly-owned and managed infrastructure have competing commercial interests. In a fragmented, over-complicated system, with competing contractual interests, only the Secretary of State had the ultimate authority to judge the inevitable trade-offs and halt the implementation in good time but at no point was he given all the information he needed to make that decision. The case for a genuinely “root and branch” review, in which a broad range of options for reform are considered, is undeniable, but rail passengers cannot wait for the Williams Review to be conducted and for reforms to be implemented from 2020. The immediate priority must be establishing effective governance and decision-making structures to oversee the implementation of the planned timetable change in December 2018 and the two scheduled for 2019. (Paragraph 63)
3.Evidence to our inquiry, and the Office of Rail and Road’s (ORR) September 2018 report, clearly demonstrates that the May 2018 timetable change was a collective, system-wide failure, across the publicly-owned infrastructure owner and manager, Network Rail, privately-owned train operating companies, Arriva Rail North and Govia Thameslink Railway, the Department for Transport and the ORR itself. The governance and decision-making structures were fundamentally flawed. Network Rail System Operator could and should have more clearly identified systemic risks and spoken up with more force earlier in the process. Network Rail’s infrastructure project teams and the train operating companies were guilty of an indefensible optimism bias. We would have expected the then Chief Executive of Network Rail to have been aware of emerging risks and, on that basis, to have taken action to address them. The governance and decision-making structures overseen by the Secretary of State and the Department of Transport were inadequate: lines of accountability failed; were not sufficiently clear; or simply did not exist. The Secretary of State for Transport is responsible for the structure of the system that controls and runs our railways. He is at the apex of this system. Some of the problems caused by timetabling changes arose from the structure of the railways. It is therefore not reasonable for the Secretary of State to absolve himself of all responsibility. We acknowledge that the Secretary of State was not fully informed of serious problems, but he should have been more proactive. The Office of Rail and Road missed chances to sound the alarm; a more confident, independent and effective Regulator may have been able to avert the crisis. (Paragraph 64)
4.We are confident that Professor Glaister and his team have, so far as is possible in the time available, thoroughly and fairly established the facts, shedding light on why the system failed to deliver the May 2018 timetable, and why opportunities to raise the alarm in autumn 2017 or earlier, and prevent the crisis, were missed. We endorse the ORR’s finding that “no one took charge”; this is extraordinary and totally unacceptable. It is incumbent on all parties to accept in full the ORR’s, and our, findings and work together quickly to learn the lessons and restore trust in the industry. They must not continue to pass the buck. (Paragraph 65)
What happens next?
5.Delivering the capacity and passenger benefits of investment in rail infrastructure is crucial but must always take proper account of the risks to operations from the implementation of requisite timetable changes. Given the chaos that followed May 2018, we endorse the more cautious approach—announced by the industry in July—to the changes planned for December 2018. More substantial changes currently planned for 2019 should only go ahead when the industry is confident they can be delivered effectively. The integrity of the system and passengers’ needs for reliable services must ultimately take precedence over any political and commercial interests in delivering additional capacity quickly. The Secretary of State is responsible for putting in place suitable governance and decision-making structures for the rail industry. A key lesson of the timetabling crisis is that an independent system operator needs to take charge. We are content, in the short term, for that person to be the Chief Executive of Network Rail, but if he is to assume responsibility the Secretary of State must make clear the extent of Mr Haines’ decision-making power over whether and when the next timetable change goes ahead. (Paragraph 70)
6.The governance and decision-making structures in place for the May 2018 national rail timetabling change were not fit for purpose. They would not have been used for any major project in any sector anywhere in the world. We offer a cautious welcome to the establishment of a Project Management Office (PMO), located within Network Rail, including train operating company representatives and open to independent expert challenge. It is not yet clear, however, how well equipped the PMO will be to manage systemic risk and balance the competing interests of commercial operators to ensure that network integrity comes before these interests. It remains to be seen whether it can be more effective than Network Rail’s existing System Operator function in this regard. We await the ORR’s final recommendations, but our clear view is that the national rail timetabling process requires genuinely independent oversight, following accepted principles of professional project management, including the appointment of an independent Project Sponsor or Senior Responsible Owner for the whole national timetabling project. We believe this role would need to be located outside of Network Rail, so that it is more effectively insulated from commercial and political pressures. (Paragraph 71)
Contingencies to assist disabled passengers
7.All passengers affected by the 20 May timetabling disruption have been badly let down by the system, but people with sensory, mobility and other impairments were disproportionately affected. This is clearly unacceptable. As a matter of urgency, the industry and the Office of Rail and Road must take steps to ensure such a situation does not arise again. Putting in place adequate contingency plans to assist disabled people if timetable changes do not go plan must now be a central part of train operating companies’ timetable planning processes. We recommend the Office of Rail and Road take a proactive approach to ensuring such plans are in place and, in response to this Report, it should set out how it intends to do so. (Paragraph 82)
8.We welcome the Office of Rail and Road’s renewed focus on the adequacy of train operating companies Disabled Persons’ Protection Policies (DPPPs) and support its intention to consult and then strengthen the regime. Northern Rail’s failure to put in place additional assistance, despite being fully aware ahead of 20 May of the very high risks of severe disruption, clearly demonstrates the weakness of the current approach. Our judgement is that the ORR can no longer rely solely on the publication of data, and the reputational effects on train operating companies’ behaviour, to ensure compliance and the provision of assistance that disabled rail users need and deserve. The Regulator must prove its effectiveness in this policy area, including by acting swiftly to implement the outcome of its DPPP consultation and stepping up its enforcement activity, including using its powers to levy fines on train operating companies. (Paragraph 83)
2019 Fares
9.We understand and sympathise with calls for, at the very least, a freeze of regulated fares in 2019 for Thameslink, Great Northern, Northern and TransPennine Express passengers. They do not deserve to see their fares increase in line with July’s Retail Price Index measure of inflation of 3.2%. Ultimately the level of fares increase up to this cap will be a matter of commercial and political will, but we accept the practical difficulties of applying a fares freeze within the current annual, inflation-linked system. However, around a fifth of rail passengers have suffered appalling services and been very badly let down by the whole system; a fares increase in these circumstances would confirm that the current fares system is broken. Establishing a clear link between passengers’ daily experiences of using the railway and the fares they pay must be a first order priority for the Williams Rail Review. We urge the industry and Government to consider all options to keep any regulated fares increase in 2019 to a minimum, particularly on parts of the network worst affected by the timetabling crisis. We further recommended that 2018 Northern, TransPennine Express, Thameslink and Great Northern season ticket holders receive a discount, equivalent to any increase announced in December 2018, on renewed season tickets in 2019. (Paragraph 89)
Fairer compensation schemes
10.We acknowledge that the Government acted reasonably quickly to ensure train operating companies put in place additional compensation schemes over and above existing Delay Repay arrangements. We do not, however, accept the Secretary of State’s assertion that the additional schemes have ensured passengers were compensated straightforwardly and quickly. The schemes have complicated eligibility rules and place the onus on passengers to make a claim through relatively complex processes. Non-season ticket holders were not able to apply to Thameslink’s and Great Northern’s schemes until 30 November, more than six months after 20 May. (Paragraph 108)
11.While it may be the case that it would be theoretically possible for the worst-affected passengers to claim around 10% of the cost of their annual season ticket, this would require them to navigate the additional compensation scheme and make individual claims for each delayed service throughout the year. In the chaos of this summer, when at points it was not clear that significant portions of the railway were operating to any timetable at all, this would have been virtually impossible. Even if passengers were able to make the claims, in many cases the level of reimbursement would be insufficient to compensate for additional costs incurred, such as for taxis and additional childcare, and unmonetised costs to working and family lives. (Paragraph 109)
12.The events of this year demonstrate an overwhelming case for automated, or automatic, compensation schemes. We therefore welcome the Government’s announcement of stronger obligations on future train operating companies within the franchising system, including the provision of simple, one-click automated schemes enabled via smart card registration or smart phone apps. The key to this is successful roll out of smart ticketing technology across the network, which the Government has committed to achieve by the end of 2018. The Government must now set a measurable target for implementation of “one click” automated compensation schemes on commuter rail routes. These schemes must be written into contracts as they are re-let. Those who suffered most in the timetabling crisis should also benefit from automated compensation schemes as soon as possible. We recommend the Government ensure, through franchise renegotiations if necessary, that smart automated compensation schemes are piloted are on Govia Thameslink Railway, Northern and TransPennine Express commuter routes by the end of 2019. (Paragraph 110)
Meaningful consultation and proper impact assessment
13.A key lesson from the May 2018 timetable change is that a significant proportion of rail users do not feel the industry is listening to them and taking proper account of their needs. If trust in the railway is to be restored the rail industry must substantially improve its engagement with passengers, including through ongoing and meaningful consultation on proposed service changes. Good practice, such as Govia Thameslink Railway’s active engagement with Rail User Groups on the design of some its services, exists but the broader approach to passenger consultation is patchy at best and perfunctory at worse. The Department for Transport’s rail franchising teams must more actively ensure that all passenger rail franchisees adopt best practice and innovative approaches and adhere to their contractual obligations to consult on all significant service changes. (Paragraph 128)
14.Where there are major timetable changes on a complex interrelated network some highly-valued services may have to change, and some passengers may lose out. It is vital in these circumstances that passengers’ voices are heard, and effective mitigations fully explored. This does not appear to have been the case in relation to service alterations affecting East Midlands Trains, Thameslink and Great Northern passengers. Consultations on the May timetable were completed before these changes were planned. This was in part because of knock on effects of work to upgrade the Midland Mainline. Many passengers were consulted on significant service improvements; what they got were substantial reductions. In these circumstances we cannot agree with the Department for Transport that the industry’s consultations on the May 2018 timetable were “very comprehensive”. Future national rail timetable changes must adhere to agreed timescales and allow sufficient time for meaningful consultation with passengers. (Paragraph 129)
15.As set out earlier in this Report, the industry and Network Rail have now adopted a more cautious approach to national rail timetable change in December 2018, and possibly beyond. We recommend the Department for Transport use this period of relative stability to re-assess the effects of the May 2018 timetable change, identifying stations that have lost a significant number of services, particularly at peak times. The Department and Network Rail should work with the operators and engage with passengers to design mitigations that better meet the needs of people travelling to and from the worst-affected stations. Evidence to our inquiry suggests these will include Sheffield, Hitchin, Harpenden, Luton Airport Parkway, Leagrave, Harlington and Flitwick. (Paragraph 130)
Published: 4 December 2018