3The progress of the UC programme
12.The Department set out its plans for UC in a November 2010 white paper.29 That document envisaged completing rollout to around eight million households by October 2017. Beginning his foreword, the then Secretary of State, Iain Duncan Smith, wrote:
Successive governments have ignored the need for fundamental welfare reform, not because they didn’t think that reform was needed but because they thought it too difficult to achieve.30
The Department began design and build work in January 2011.31
A chaotic start
13.The early years of the UC programme were beset by an implementation approach at odds with the ambition of the biggest welfare reform in 50 years.32 The November 2011 PAR noted that while ministers and senior staff understood the transformational nature of UC, the programme team was “very focussed on IT”.33 This created a risk it would “deliver a transactional processing system but will not achieve the policy intent”.34 This concern was echoed in the March 2012 PAR, which stressed that, to achieve transformational aims, the programme would need a new culture, distinct from that which existed in DWP and HMRC.35
14.The DWP failed to act adequately on the findings of these early assurance reviews.36 The January 2013 PAR concluded that, despite some improvements, the programme team’s approach remained incremental and did not recognise what was required to achieve transformation on the scale envisaged.37 There was “no bridge between the high-level vision and the prolific detail in the programme”.38 UC leadership had failed to produce or articulate the “blueprint” necessary to “turn vision into practical reality”.39 It was not clear what was to be achieved, how it was to be achieved, or, in the absence of a plan for the full programme, when particular elements would need to be achieved for it to be on track.40 Lacking strategic direction, the “community of partners constituting the UC enterprise” focused on impending local deadlines, without an adequate sense of where they fitted in the wider picture.41 The MPA warned of the implications of this lack of coherence for the entire programme:
many of the parts of the programme have been built in isolation based on different and sometimes conflicting assumptions with no clear understanding of how the parts will be ultimately assembled. The potential for significant levels of unknown risk is high.42
15.The ramifications of the “extraordinarily poor” early management of UC were most evident in the Department’s now well-documented mishandling of its IT suppliers, which included Accenture, IBM, Hewlett Packard and British Telecom.43 In its November 2013 report, the PAC found the programme had “a shocking absence of control” over its suppliers and had failed to “implement basic procedure for monitoring and authorising expenditure”.44 The prevalence of exclusivity clauses, the absence of performance monitoring and active contract management, and a paucity of the requisite skills and experience in the Department meant it was at a severe disadvantage in seeking to address shortcomings on the part of suppliers.45 Those suppliers were rewarded handsomely for ultimately pointless design and development work conducted without clear sets of requirements or an overarching objective.46 Many millions of pounds of public money were wasted.47 The MPA found that in continuing to accept instructions from DWP in the absence of a blueprint for UC, the suppliers had exhibited unacceptable behaviour and had failed in their professional duty of care to their client.48
Reset
16.Concluding its January 2013 PAR, the MPA said that the programme required a “complete rethink of the entire delivery approach” to have “realistic prospects for delivery”.49 Considering those findings, the MPRG decided in February 2013 to pause the UC programme immediately, for three months.50 It appointed David Pitchford, then Executive Director of the MPA, as interim Chief Executive Officer of UC for that period, to “reset” the programme. His brief included developing a blueprint and transition plan.51 The June 2013 PAR said the reset had been “acknowledged by all as having provided a necessary pause and opportunity to rethink”.52 While finding the blueprint “valuable”, that PAR said that much detailed planning for achieving the blueprint remained to be done.53 This work was taken on by Howard Shiplee, the new SRO, who used his first 100 days to take forward recommendations of the reset and then argued that a further three months’ review and revision of the programme was required before further decisions could be taken on the future of UC.54 The programme also awaited formal approval to proceed from a ministerial oversight group.55 2013 was a hiatus in the implementation of UC.56
A twin-track programme and slower timetable
17.The Department originally intended to begin national rollout in October 2013, though it was unable to explain how it had arrived at this date.57 In the light of the reset, it abandoned that intention.58 This was in line with the PAC’s November 2013 conclusion that “meeting any specific timetable from now on is less important than delivering the programme successfully”.59 The Department also adopted a twin-track approach to deliver UC through two parallel services:
a)live service, which would introduce UC for limited claimant types using some IT developed before the reset; and
b)digital service, an enhanced online system for all claimant types, to be developed in-house while the live service was being tested.60
The Department argued that, through a “test and learn” approach, the live service would inform the development of the digital service.61 This method tests UC as it is gradually rolled out, to enable problems to surface. This means it is vital the Department responds rapidly to detrimental effects on claimants. The live service would also provide a contingency option should the digital service be delayed or fail.62
18.The Department was slow to produce long term plans for UC implementation. The February 2014 PAR found no “single coherent integrated plan for UC”.63 This contributed to delays before the Treasury approved a revised strategic outline business case (SOBC) for the programme in September 2014.64 However, the MPA also identified a “fundamental” change in the way UC was being approached: “a transformation programme and not an IT programme” which was better integrated with the wider DWP and other stakeholders.65 The September 2014 AAP recommended that the SOBC be approved and that the live service be rolled out nationally for single, unemployed claimants without children.66 The new business case extended the timetable for the transfer of claimants from existing benefits to 2019.67 Rather than move one million tax credit claimants to UC in April 2016, the Department planned to introduce the digital service for new cases between May 2016 and December 2017.68
Praise for programme amid further delays
19.The September 2014 AAP identified the creation of a viable and scalable digital service by May 2016 as a “critical dependency” in the DWP’s revised implementation plans.69 The April 2015 HC concluded that a functioning digital service could be ready by May 2016. It cautioned, however, that the subsequent planned rollout schedule was too fast. In MPA-speak, “scaling volumes over-aggressively from May 2016 onwards”.70 The programme team had inadequate management information and the schedule lacked “firebreaks”, or pauses, to enable progress to be assessed and improvements to be made. This risked compromising the labour market and efficiency benefits of UC.71 The programme was also reliant on retaining highly-skilled technical staff who were working as contractors.72
20.The October 2015 PAR gave a bullish assessment of progress in the UC programme. It was “a centre of best practice in government” in aspects of digital service development and “best of breed for government” in its approach to technology security.73 The MPA found that many of the criticisms noted in previous reports had been addressed: there was a single agreed plan for the duration of the programme; policy, IT and operations teams were well integrated; and the programme had strong leadership. Neil Couling, in his sole comment as SRO on the report, felt that, five years in, the UC programme had perhaps reached the end of the beginning:
“There must be a beginning of any great matter, but the continuing until [sic] the end until it be thoroughly finished yields the true glory.” Letter from Sir Francis Drake to Sir Francis Walsingham (1587).74
21.The PAR cautioned, however, that while the programme plan was achievable it was “not without significant challenge or risk”.75 Rolling out the digital service would need the programme to develop further from being a technology-driven programme to one delivering transformational change.76 The degree of some potential problems would only become apparent when the digital service was operating on a substantial scale.77 These risks were amplified because the digital service was the Department’s only means of fully delivering UC nationwide: the live service would be unaffordable on a national scale for all claimant types. There was, by then, “no Plan B”.78 This meant contingency questions were framed “not around whether a digital service will be rolled out, but at what pace and scale”.79
Rolling out the digital service
22.The September 2016 HC found that the programme was functioning well but successfully rolling out the digital service on a large scale would require a “step change” in approach. This was described by the IPA as “a shift to an industrialised culture”.80 Moving from costly support methods such as telephone lines towards an automated online service was proving a challenge, partly because claimants were finding using UC online more difficult than expected.81 The IPA set a series of four success factors it recommended should be used to determine whether the Department should increase the pace of the rollout in July 2017, covering automation, IT performance, management information and verification.82 The March 2017 AAP found problems with all four of those criteria. It concluded that progress had not, at that stage, been sufficient to give full confidence that UC was ready for the scale of change proposed.83 Operational targets were not being met: the programme was underperforming on several measures that indicated how quickly claims were being processed. There was also considerable variation between the 58 Jobcentres operating the full service at that stage. For example, “just 52%” of new claimants’ evidence was verified within 20 days, a proportion that varied from 10–84% in individual Jobcentres.84 In at least one Jobcentre, not a single decision on a claim had been made within 25 days.85
23.Nonetheless, the “scaling event” in July 2017 proceeded. The September 2017 HC considered the readiness of the UC digital service to be rolled out to around 150 Jobcentres in October-December 2017. It concluded that UC was ready for that step, but that there was less certainty about the continuation of plans into the 2018/19 financial year.86 While scaling entailed risks, it would reveal further evidence of how UC operated in practice which would help the Department resolve problems.87 The IPA recommended the scheduled “firebreak” in January 2018 be used to consider whether the rollout plan remained appropriate.88
Traffic light assessments
24.As part of its reviews, the IPA often provides a Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA). These give a summary of the IPA’s overall confidence in the programme’s ability to achieve its objectives within the timescale, budget and quality requirements (including financial and non-financial benefits) set out in its most recent formal mandating document (such as a business case). DCAs use a five-tier system:
- Green: successful delivery of the project/programme to time, cost and quality appears highly likely and there are no major outstanding issues that at this stage appear to threaten delivery.
- Amber/green: successful delivery appears probable. However, constant attention will be needed to ensure risks do not materialise into major issues threatening delivery.
- Amber: successful delivery appears feasible but significant issues already exist requiring management attention. These appear resolvable at this stage and, if addressed promptly, should not present a cost/schedule overrun.
- Amber/red: successful delivery of the project/programme is in doubt with major risks or issues apparent in a number of key areas. Urgent action is needed to ensure these are addressed, and establish whether resolution is feasible.
- Red: successful delivery of the project/programme appears to be unachievable. There are major issues which, at this stage, do not appear to be manageable or resolvable. The programme/project may need re-base lining and/or overall viability re-assessed.89
25.The DCAs unsurprisingly mirror the narrative history of the programme set out above. The red rating in the January 2013 was followed by the decision to reset the programme. Since then, the ratings have gradually improved.
Table 2: Delivery confidence assessments for UC from MPA/IPA reviews
|
Date |
DCA |
Report |
Notes |
|
Nov 2011 |
Amber Red |
PAR |
Published under FOI. |
|
Mar 2012 |
Amber Red |
PAR |
|
|
Jan 2013 |
Red |
PAR |
|
|
Jun 2013 |
Red |
PAR |
Unable to update as so soon after reset. |
|
Feb 2014 |
Amber Red |
PAR |
|
|
Sep 2014 |
Amber Red |
AAP |
Long term. Live service ‘singles’ rollout rated Amber. |
|
Apr 2015 |
Amber |
HC |
May 2016 ‘Make Scalable’ deadline only. |
|
Oct 2015 |
Amber |
PAR |
Considered a higher rating. |
|
Sep 2016 |
Amber |
HC |
|
|
Mar 2017 |
AAP |
No DCA rating given. |
|
|
Sep 2017 |
HC |
No DCA rating given. |
The March 2017 AAP and September 2017 HC were not given DCAs. This was an agreement between the IPA and the DWP, given the narrow scopes of those reviews.90
26.By 2013, the UC programme was on the brink of complete failure. It is to the Department’s credit that it has brought it back from that brink. The programme is now run more professionally and efficiently with a collective sense of purpose. Rolling out the live service nationally and developing a digital service in-house are substantial achievements. UC continues, however, to face major challenges.
29 DWP, Universal Credit: welfare that works, Cm 7957, November 2010, p37
30 DWP, Universal Credit: welfare that works, Cm 7957, November 2010, p37
31 NAO, Universal Credit: early progress, HC (2013–14) 621, September 2013, fig 9
32 The November 2011 Project Assessment Review, p11 notes that many interviewees described the policy as such.
33 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, November 2011, p4. Throughout this report, the date given to IPA reviews refers to the month in which the review started. In some cases, the reviews continued into, or were signed off in, another month.
35 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, March 2012, para 5.27
36 NAO, Universal Credit: early progress, HC (2013–14) 621, September 2013, para 20. See also Fig 18 on p41, which document’s the Department’s failure to respond to early recommendations relating to areas of criticism in the MPA’s January 2013 PAR.
37 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p3
38 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p3
39 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p10
40 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p10
41 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p3
42 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p10–11
43 PAC, Thirtieth Report of Session 2013–14, Universal Credit: early progress, HC 619, November 2013, p5 and p11
44 PAC, Thirtieth Report of Session 2013–14, Universal Credit: early progress, HC 619, November 2013, p6
45 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p15
46 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p16
47 In its February 2015 report the PAC noted that the Department would use £34 million of the systems developed in this stage, from total expenditure of £344 million, in its full digital service.
48 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p16
49 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, January 2013, p19
50 NAO, Universal Credit: early progress, HC (2013–14) 621, September 2013, para 2.3. The Pathfinder pilot scheme was allowed to proceed in a single site in April 2013.
51 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, June 2013, p10
52 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, June 2013, p3
53 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, June 2013, p3
54 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, June 2013, p8
55 The DWP Ministerial Oversight Group, which comprised ministers and senior officials from the DWP, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office considered the future of UC on 20 November 2013. Its decisions were set out in a Ministerial Statement on 5 December 2013.
56 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, February 2014, p3
57 NAO, Universal Credit: early progress, HC (2013–14) 621, September 2013, paras 16 and 3.7
58 NAO, Universal Credit: early progress, HC (2013–14) 621, September 2013, para 2.12
59 PAC, Thirtieth Report of Session 2013–14, Universal Credit: early progress, HC 619, November 2013, p3
60 The DWP now calls the digital service the “full service”. We use the former throughout this report.
61 NAO, Universal Credit: progress update, HC (2014–15) 786, November 2014, p5–7
62 NAO, Universal Credit: progress update, HC (2014–15) 786, November 2014, para 1.6
63 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, February 2014, p3
64 NAO, Universal Credit: progress update, HC (2014–15) 786, November 2014, para 7
65 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, February 2014, p3
66 IPA, UC Assurance of Action Plan, September 2014, p2 and 7
67 NAO, Universal Credit: progress update, HC (2014–15) 786, November 2014, para 8. No plans were given for a minority of tax credit claimants or for people claiming Employment and Support Allowance at the end of 2019.
68 NAO, Universal Credit: progress update, HC (2014–15) 786, November 2014, para 1.13
69 IPA, UC Assurance of Action Plan, September 2014, p6
70 IPA, UC Health Check, Apr 2015, p3
71 IPA, UC Health Check, Apr 2015, p3
72 IPA, UC Health Check, Apr 2015, p7
73 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, October 2015, p14
74 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, October 2015, p3
75 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, October 2015, p6
76 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, October 2015, p8
77 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, October 2015, p11
78 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, October 2015, p11
79 IPA, UC Project Assessment Review, October 2015, p11
80 IPA, UC Health Check, September 2016, p3
81 IPA, UC Health Check, September 2016, p3, para 5.1.2 and para 5.4.2
82 IPA, UC Health Check, September 2016, p3
83 IPA, UC Assurance of Action Plan, March 2017, p2–3
84 IPA, UC Assurance of Action Plan, March 2017, para 2.7
85 IPA, UC Assurance of Action Plan, March 2017, para 2.7. The IPA noted that the range of performance in making decisions on cases within 25 days ranged from 0% to 75% between Jobcentres, with the average being 51%.
86 IPA, UC Health Check, September 2017, p2
87 IPA, UC Health Check, September 2017, p7
88 IPA, UC Health Check, September 2017, p7
90 Information from the IPA
29 January 2018