Benefit Sanctions Contents

3Vulnerable claimants

Single parents

32.From April 2017, single parents became subject to conditionality when their youngest child turned one year old. Previously, conditionality applied when their youngest child turned two (see table 3).70 When introducing these changes, the Government said:

providing additional support for parents to move into work, and conditionality to require them to engage with it, enables them to take financial responsibility for themselves and their children.71

Furthermore, it said “evidence finds that parents who have conditionality are more likely to move into work”.72

33.In August 2017, DWP data showed that 68% of lone parents were in work—an increase of nearly 11 percentage points since 2010 and “the highest figure on record”.73 Gingerbread, a charity working with single parent families, questioned, however, the extent to which sanctions themselves were responsible for this improvement. It found that for single parents, sanctions were typically due to “one-off errors”, more often the result of structural barriers or a failing of logistics—such as unavailability of part-time work or accessible childcare—rather than a failing of attitude or motivation. It argued, “in these circumstances, sanctions serve little purpose”.74 This was supported by the Welfare Conditionality Project’s research, which found single parents to be “highly motivated to work, but prevented from doing so by a range of structural and/or personal barriers”.75 As a result, conditionality had “little tangible influence” on their motivation to “seek or increase their participation in paid employment”.76

Table 3: Conditionality and sanctions for single parents

Requirement on parent

Under UC, requirement applies when youngest child is aged

Under legacy system, requirement applies when youngest child is aged

Sanction under UC, if applied

Must attend work-focused interviews


Two (JSA)

40% of standard allowance

Must take “active steps” to prepare for work


Three or Four (JSA)

100% of standard allowance

Must look for work

Three or four

Five or older (IS)

100% of standard allowance

Source: Gingerbread, “Unhelpful and unfair? The impact of single parent sanctions”, March 2018

34.Evidence to our inquiry also highlighted the “devastating” impact sanctions could have on single parent families, whose finances were particularly vulnerable in the absence of a second income.77 Gingerbread told us that sanctions could throw single parents’ finances into “disarray, leading to debt and reliance on emergency support”.78 We also heard how debt can quickly lead to rent arrears, which put housing at risk.79 Newcastle Citizens Advice noted that such consequences could make children in the household “vulnerable to poverty and severe hardship”.80 Several written evidence submissions, including from Inclusion London and Citizens Advice, stressed that people facing hardship could not, and did not, prioritise finding employment. Rather they were forced to focus on more basic needs.81

Box 4: Samantha’s story

Samantha is a single parent who gave evidence to our inquiry. She was working full-time and needed childcare before and after school, some weekends and during school holidays. She described how the pressure of working full-time, yet still struggling to meet the costs of childcare, led to “serious stress and low moods as it seemed [she] was not able [to keep] up with it all”. Although she would have liked to continue with her company, “lack of childcare made it just impossible”, and she moved to a part-time job. She explained her circumstances to her work coach and provided confirmation from her doctor about the stress her full-time job was causing. At the time, her work coach seemed understanding but she was sanctioned for voluntarily leaving employment.

Samantha described the immediate impact on her income, which fell from an average of £800 per month to £300. While doing her best to budget, she said that after “paying for food and a small amount of heating, I had quite literally no money.” She fell behind with rent and said she felt lucky to be given food parcels from friends, so she could “spend less on food and more on heating, or paying some of [her] rent arrears”. She described herself in a “cycle of begging for money … food and handouts”, despite working part-time. She was still feeling the consequences of being in debt, two years on. Samantha was visibly upset while telling us about her experience.

Source: Samantha (ANC 0085), Q129

35.Given the limited evidence on sanctions’ effectiveness, but strong evidence on their potentially devastating impact for single parent families, several witnesses including Gingerbread and the Employment Related Services Association (ERSA), argued that sanctions should not apply to this group of claimants.82 Gingerbread recognised the political challenges of implementing this significant change. It noted, however, that the Government already reduced sanction rates for certain groups (withholding 40% or 20% of their benefit, rather than 100%) and recommended that, at the very least, this should apply to single parents.83

36.Children play no part in a failure to comply with conditionality, yet when a sanction is imposed they feel the effects just as acutely. Any positive effect a sanction might have is outweighed by the risk that children’s welfare becomes the collateral damage. This risk is all the more real for children in single parent families. While it is welcome that a record proportion of single parents are in work, we are concerned about the devastating impact sanctions can have on this vulnerable group of claimants and their children. In the absence of more robust evidence that sanctions themselves are driving the positive trend in single parents’ employment outcomes, it is hard to justify the risks they pose.

37.The evaluation we have recommended must include an assessment of the role played by conditionality and sanctions in improving employment outcomes for lone parents. If a robust causal relationship is not found, there would be a strong case for the Department to end conditionality and sanctions for this group. In the meantime, the Government should amend regulations to ensure that a sanction rate of 20% applies to any claimant who is the responsible carer for a child under the age of five, or a child with demonstrable additional needs and care costs.

Care leavers

38.From all known research, we are aware that the life chances of young people who have been in care are far less favourable than their peers who have not been.84 The Children’s Society, a charity supporting vulnerable children and young people, told us that most care leavers have to submit a benefit claim around their 18th birthday because they have no other financial support or savings; just one of the many challenges they faced when reaching adulthood.85 It described benefits as a “lifeline” but highlighted that care leavers were disproportionately affected by sanctions.86

39.It told us care leavers were “far more likely to be sanctioned than other young people aged 18 to 24, who in turn are already more likely to be sanctioned than older claimants”. Its analysis showed that overall, care leavers were five times more likely to be sanctioned than other claimants. It stressed that given their “financially precarious situation”, stopping their benefits could lead to “devastating consequences”.87 Often with no family support to lean on, care leavers could be left without money for weeks, “making it impossible for them to pay their bills and make ends meet” and risked moving them further away from work or study “and closer to extreme financial hardship”.88

Improving support

40.We heard that care leavers were often not aware of the rules and “felt confused when sanctioned”.89 This was despite having two relationships that should help them understand and navigate the system: their local authority personal adviser and work coach. But evidence identified a lack of information sharing between these two roles as a significant failing of the current system. We were told that, while the personal adviser often held crucial information about the care leaver’s circumstances, work coaches could not contact them without seeking explicit consent from the young person on every occasion.90

41.Written evidence from the Children’s Society argued that “better support from professionals, including local authority and jobcentre plus staff working more closely with each other, could help care leavers avoid being sanctioned”.91 It highlighted examples of such practice, like Doncaster, where no care leaver had been sanctioned since the jobcentre and care leaving team at Doncaster Children’s Services Trust signed a joint protocol. The Children’s Society suggested wider implementation of such joint protocols and identified two specific changes that would improve support for care leavers:

Reducing the severity of sanctions

42.Conditionality and sanctions apply to care leavers in the same way they do any other claimant. Iain Porter, Policy Officer for Poverty and Inequality at the Children’s Society, told us that many care leavers the charity worked with agreed with the principle of conditionality.93 But the organisation’s written evidence argued that care leavers’ vulnerable circumstances should be recognised through applying less severe sanctions.

43.The Universal Credit Regulations 2013 make provision for a reduced rate sanction—40%, instead of 100%, of the UC standard allowance—to apply to people in certain circumstances, including those aged 16 and 17 years old.94 In written evidence, the Children’s Society argued that this should be extended to care leavers.95


44.The Children’s Society told us that identifying and monitoring care leavers through the benefits system was crucial to tailoring support and reducing sanctions. It noted, however, that care leaver status could not be recorded under UC and it was concerned that, as a result, the full scale of sanctions on care leavers was unknown. It therefore recommended that a marker for care leavers be included in UC. In response to this suggestion, the Minister pointed to a new function to “’pin’ key profile notes” within the system.96 This would be like an electronic post-it note, making information “instantly visible to all staff helping a claimant”. It was trialled in August 2018 across 13 jobcentres and the Department were “looking to introduce it more widely in the autumn”.97

45.Care leavers acknowledge their responsibilities associated with receiving benefits. In return, the Government should acknowledge care leavers’ challenging circumstances and consequent vulnerability. But care leavers are currently being let down by the system, with often devastating consequences. What is worse, the inability to identify care leavers under Universal Credit risks the Department losing sight of them altogether. ‘Pinning’ information—which is like sticking an electronic post-it note on someone’s file—sounds like a good way for work coaches to communicate better the circumstances surrounding someone’s claim. But it is not the same as having to identify routinely, through a simple tick box, whether someone is a care leaver. The Government has a duty to monitor the impact of its policies on all benefit claimants, but as a corporate parent, it has a unique and particular duty to promote the wellbeing of care leavers.

46.We recommend that the Department review any guidance or restrictions on working practices, including information sharing, between personal advisers and work coaches for care leavers. It should follow successful examples of joint protocols already in place and, in particular, should consider:

a)requiring work coaches never to apply a sanction until they have made contact with the claimant’s personal adviser and taken into consideration the information they receive; and

b)enabling care leavers to give consent for their work coach to discuss any matter regarding their benefit claim with their personal adviser for a specified period of time.

47.We further recommend that:

Claimants with a disability or chronic health condition

48.Claimants with a disability or chronic health condition (hereafter ‘disability’), can be subject to conditionality and sanctions in the circumstances outlined in Table 4.

Table 4: Circumstances in which conditionality applies to a disabled claimant

Benefit being claimed

Status of claim

Applicable conditionality regime

Level of sanction imposed for non-compliance (see Table 2)

Amount of benefit deducted if a sanction is imposed

ESA or equivalent under UC

Assessed by the Work Capability Assessment (WCA) to have limited capability for work (in Work-Related Activity Group or equivalent under UC)

Work preparation

Lower level

100% of UC standard allowance or JSA

JSA or equivalent under UC

Assessed by the WCA to be capable of work

Full conditionality

Higher, medium or lower, depending on the nature of non-compliance

100% of UC standard allowance or JSA


Awaiting a WCA

Full conditionality

Higher, medium or lower, depending on the nature of non-compliance

100% of UC standard allowance

Claimants assessed by a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) as having limited capability for work and work-related activities do not have to take any steps towards employment and cannot be sanctioned.

Disabled claimants’ disproportionate propensity to be sanctioned

49.At its peak in August 2014, 125,000 ESA sanction referrals were being made each year.98 And while Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger, an expert academic in this field, found sanctioning of ESA claimants to be “rare”, he wrote it was “clearly happening at a non-negligible scale with over 400,000 confirmed sanctions being applied to disability claimants since conditionality was introduced in 2008”.99 We heard further concerns that disabled claimants were more likely to be sanctioned than non-disabled claimants. For example, Dr David Webster found that ESA claimants were more likely to be sanctioned repeatedly than those on JSA100 and research by Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger showed JSA claimants with a disability were 26 to 53% more likely to be sanctioned than non-disabled claimants between 2010 and 2014.101 He acknowledged the limitations of self-declared disability data, but said the finding validated anecdotal evidence that “disabled people are being sanctioned unfairly”.102

50.Both Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger and Dr David Webster were concerned that the full effect of sanctions on disabled people could not be fully understood because of omissions in data collected and published by the DWP. Dr David Webster explained that published data did not currently include the number of people claiming UC on the grounds of sickness or disability (the equivalent of ESA). This meant the number of disabled claimants subject to a sanction could “no longer be stated with certainty”.103 In addition, those with a self-declared disability claiming out-of-work UC could not be identified, unlike under JSA. Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger said this meant it was “almost impossible to scrutinise the operation of sanctioning as it applies to disabled people in UC”.104 He, as well as others such as Anna Bird, Executive Director of Policy and Research at Scope, the disability equality charity, called for these omissions to be resolved.105 In response to this suggestion, the Minister again referred to work coaches’ newly introduced ability to ‘pin’ key information to a claim.106

51.As with care leavers, the Department risks losing sight of disabled people if it does not introduce a specific marker under Universal Credit. It cannot rely on work coaches ‘pinning’ information.

52.We recommend that the Department introduce a marker for disability under Universal Credit.

The effectiveness of conditionality and sanctions at moving disabled claimants into employment

53.The extension of conditionality and sanctions to claimants on disability benefits is not unique to the UK and has been supported by organisations such as the OECD.107 As the policy aims to encourage people to engage with support that moves them closer to employment, it has a role in the Government’s ambition for 1 million more disabled people to be in work by 2027.108 DWP research found that over 60% of ESA claimants surveyed said the threat of a sanction made them more likely to comply with conditionality.109 We were also told by Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger that programmes combining sanctioning and support—such as the Support for the Very Long-Term Unemployed Trailblazer in the UK and Personal Roads to Individual Development and Employment in the USA—”can sometimes increase employment outcomes for disabled people”.110

54.The overwhelming majority of evidence we received on this issue argued, however, that conditionality and sanctions for people with a disability is at best ineffective, and worse, inappropriate and counterproductive.111 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger concluded:

The limited but robust existing evidence focusing on disabled people suggests that sanctioning may have zero or even negative impacts on work-related outcomes.112

Professor Peter Dwyer, Director of Research for the Welfare Conditionality Project, summarised the project’s findings that “conditionality does not move disabled people … into sustainable work”.113 This echoed the NAO’s conclusion that sanctions “reduced [ESA] claimants’ time in employment” and that

most of the reduction [of time in employment] meant people spent more time claiming, suggesting sanctions may have discouraged some claimants from working.114

The DWP cautioned against the NAO’s analysis as the results were preliminary and not extensively peer reviewed.115 But Dr David Webster told us that, if it “was not for the embarrassment”, the Government would have suspended conditionality and sanctions for ESA claimants in immediate response to this finding.116

The impact of conditionality and sanctions on disabled claimants’ well-being

55.Witnesses stressed the disproportionate impact of both the threat, and application, of sanctions on disabled claimants’ well-being. For example, Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger told us that the “stress of conditionality itself” can negatively affect the health of disabled people.117 Others, such as Citizens Advice, described how conditionality made disabled claimants “fearful” of engaging with the jobcentre and:

People who are fearful of engaging with the Jobcentre are unlikely to take up support that is accessed there, or engage constructively with a Work Coach.118

Among others, the British Psychological Society highlighted the particularly damaging effect the threat of sanctions can have on claimants with mental ill health. It stated, “the threat of sanctions can trigger or exacerbate mental health conditions”,119 which was reflected in a YouGov survey of over 2,000 people in contact with secondary mental health services. It found that 29% of those who had considered taking their own life mentioned the fear of losing welfare benefits.120 Mind, the mental health charity, described the “significant amount of anxiety” experienced by people with mental health problems “as they attempt to navigate the system in good faith”.121

56.Furthermore, much evidence stressed that the negative impact of a sanction, once imposed, “may be even more acute” for disabled people, for example, due to: the extra day-to-day costs resulting from their condition, the challenges faced in the labour market and their limited ability to increase income quickly.122 The Welfare Conditionality Project stated that such effects make sanctions counterproductive as they “are likely to move disabled people further away from the paid labour market”.123 Witnesses highlighted that those with learning disabilities or mental ill health may be particularly disadvantaged as it could be harder for them to get back on track after a sanction.124 Mencap, the charity which supports people with learning disabilities, described benefits as a “lifeline for many people with a learning disability”, but said sanctions could “trap [them] in a cycle of poverty”.125 Citizens Advice Rossendale and Hyndburn described a similar “spiral of increasing problems” for claimants with mental health conditions following a sanction.126

Conditionality while waiting for a WCA

57.Under the legacy system, claimants with disabilities only had to take steps towards work once the Work Capability Assessment (WCA) concluded that they had limited capability for work, but that they could undertake ‘work-related activities’. Under UC, anyone waiting for a WCA must comply with full conditionality. This means they could be required to look for work for up to 35 hours a week before any assessment of whether they are even capable of doing so. The Minister confirmed that “work coaches have discretion to reduce commitments where they deem it necessary for the claimant”.127 But written evidence from CPAG stated that these claimants “rarely have their claimant commitment suitably tailored”.128 For example, one woman suffering from anxiety and agoraphobia—a fear of being in situations where escape might be difficult—was subject to full conditionality for nine months while waiting for a WCA. She told Mind that she felt “treated like a work-shy nobody until I had my [WCA] and they realised I am actually struggling with my health at the moment”.129

What is the alternative to conditionality and sanctions for disabled claimants?

58.Matthew Oakley, an economist and policy analyst who published an independent review of the operation of JSA sanctions in 2014,130 described finding an alternative to conditionality and sanctions for disabled claimants as “a really challenging question”. He said any substitute must balance the risks to disabled claimants’ wellbeing against the desired outcomes of encouraging people towards employment and ensuring there are some “checks and balances”.131 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger also acknowledged the public expectation that claimants “make efforts to gain work in return for claiming benefits”.132 But his research found that the existing regime for disabled claimants “goes far beyond most members of the public’s sense of fairness”.133 He also noted that, from an international perspective, the UK is unusual in terms of the number of sanctions imposed on disabled claimants. While many countries require some sick or disabled benefits claimants to participate in work-related activities, few actually sanction “more than negligible numbers of claimants”.134 In comparison, 1.2 million sanctions were applied to disabled claimants in the UK since 2008.135

59.On balance, Matthew Oakley told us that conditionality and sanctions should not apply to disabled claimants and those with chronic health conditions. He described the policy as “probably too dangerous”, noting that “when it goes wrong” the impact on disabled claimants is much greater.136 He said this presented a “huge risk”.137 A significant proportion of the evidence we received echoed this view and recommended that disabled claimants should be exempt from conditionality and sanctions.138 Several submissions recommended that this exemption should also apply to UC claimants waiting for a WCA.139 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger and Mind stressed that work coaches did not have the expertise to determine what work-related activities someone with a disability could do and therefore how their conditionality should be adapted while they wait for the WCA.140 CPAG explained that this left people “at high risk of being sanctioned when in reality they are not able to meet the conditions placed on them”.141

60.Organisations such as CPAG and Mind recommended that conditionality and sanctions should be replaced by voluntary employment support. Disability Rights UK said such a model would “make a reality of the Government’s pledge to halve the disability employment gap”.142 Ayaz Manji, Policy and Campaigns Officer at Mind, told us there was “good evidence that specialist voluntary support works”. Scope already offers employment support programmes to working-aged disabled people to help them “find jobs, work experience and volunteering opportunities that will develop their careers”.143 Scope supported over 1,000 disabled people across its employment programmes in from 2017 to 2018; 30% of people leaving these programmes secured jobs, 73% of whom were still in work after 13 weeks.144 Anna Bird, the charity’s Executive Director of Policy and Research, told us the key to this success was personalised, tailored and voluntary support.145

The Government’s position

61.When giving evidence, the Minister said he would consider exempting disabled claimants from conditionality and sanctions, including UC claimants waiting for a WCA. But in a later letter, he said that imposing such a “blanket policy” would do this group a “great disservice” because the take-up of voluntary employment support “is extremely low and has had limited success”. He explained:

For example, the ESA Support Group has no mandatory conditionality and less than 1% move off the benefit and into work every month.146

The Minister’s argument suggested that conditionality and sanctions played an important role in motivating claimants to move into employment. But the Minister’s example to support this argument was wholly inappropriate: claimants in the ESA Support Group necessarily have limited capability for work and work-related activities. It is therefore unsurprising that so few moved off the benefit and into work every month. More importantly, others have argued that the idea that disabled people were out of work because of a lack of motivation ignored “the real barriers” they faced.147 The recent Welfare Conditionality Project’s research showed:

Personal impairments, long-term physical and mental health conditions and wider discriminatory attitudes and practices, rather than individual attitudinal barriers, often posed significant obstacles to finding and sustaining paid work.148

It argued that conditionality “which regards people’s individual behaviour as being central to both the cause and solution for their inactivity in the paid labour market, achieved little in addressing such barriers”.149 Turning to what did work, Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger’s research found that those with some capability to work required “considerable support” to move towards employment; the relationship with their work coach and the ability to experiment was vital to their successful transition to employment.150

62.The Government should be commended for its commitment to improving employment outcomes for disabled people and those with health conditions. But it presented no evidence that conditionality and sanctions are helping achieve this. We are not convinced by the Government’s argument that exempting disabled claimants from conditionality would be doing them a “great disservice”. Conditionality and sanctions neither work for disabled claimants, nor further the Government’s objectives. We are convinced of the urgent need for change.

63.We recommend that the Department immediately exempt the following groups from conditionality and sanctions:

We further recommend that the Government bring together experts and third sector representatives to consider how voluntary employment support could best be provided to these groups of claimants.

73 “Lone parent employment rate highest on record”, Department for Work and Pensions press release, 30 August 2017

74 Gingerbread (ANC 0080)

75 Sarah Johnsen and Janice Blenkinsop, Welfare Conditionality Project final findings: Lone parents, May 2018

76 Sarah Johnsen and Janice Blenkinsop, Welfare Conditionality Project final findings: Lone parents, May 2018

77 Gingerbread (ANC 0080)

78 Gingerbread (ANC 0080)

79 Gingerbread (ANC 0080)

80 Citizen’s Advice Newcastle (ANC 0051)

81 Inclusion London (ANC 0026), Citizens Advice (ANC 0067)

82 Gingerbread (ANC 0080), Employment Related Services Association (ANC 0066), Professor Michael Adler (ANC 0025)

83 Gingerbread (ANC 0080)

84 See for example: National Audit Office, Care leavers’ transition to adulthood”, July 2015, Howard League for Penal Reform, “Criminal care: children’s homes are criminalising children”, March 2016 and Department for Education, “Children looked after in England (including adoption and care leavers), Eavan Brady and Robbie Gilligan, “The life course perspective: An integrative research paradigm for examining the educational experiences of adult care leavers?”, Elsevier vol 87, pp69–77, April 2018

85 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

86 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

87 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

88 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

89 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

90 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

91 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

92 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

93 Q148

94 Universal Credit Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/376)

95 The Children’s Society (ANC 0053)

98 Dr David Webster, Benefit sanctions statistics briefing February 2016, accessed 23 October 2018

99 Ben Baumberg Geiger, “Benefits conditionality for disabled people: stylised facts from a review of international evidence and practice”, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, vol 25(2), June 2017, pp 107–128

100 Dr David Webster, Benefit sanctions statistics briefing February 2016, accessed 23 October 2018

101 Ben Baumberg Geiger, “Benefits conditionality for disabled people: stylised facts from a review of international evidence and practice”, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, vol 25(2), June 2017, pp 107–128

102 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

103 Dr David Webster, Benefit sanctions statistics briefing February 2016, accessed 23 October 2018

104 Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

105 Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063), Q185 [Anna Bird], Q36 [Dr David Webster]

107 OECD, “Fit mind, fit job: From evidence to practice in mental health and work”, 2015 and OECD, “Sickness, disability and work: Breaking the barriers”, 2010

108 Department for Work and Pensions and Department of Health, “Improving lives: The future or work, health and disability”, Cm 9526, November 2017

109 Department for Work and Pensions, “The Jobcentre Plus Offer: Final evaluation report”, November 2013

110 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

111 Shaw Trust (ANC 0086), Welfare Conditionality Project (ANC 0079), Citizens Advice (ANC 0067), Feeding Britain (ANC 0072), Mind (ANC 0064), Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063), Child Poverty Action Group (ANC 0056), Disability Rights UK (ANC 0054), Royal Mencap Society (ANC 0046), Inclusion London (ANC 0026), Q19 [Dr David Webster], Q27 [Matthew Oakley], Q27 [Tony Wilson], Q147 [Ayaz Manji]

112 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

113 Q166

114 National Audit Office, “Benefit sanctions”, November 2016

115 National Audit Office, “Benefit sanctions: detailed methodology”, November 2016

116 Q30

117 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

118 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

119 British Psychological Society (ANC 0061)

120 Mind, “One in two people with mental health problems have felt suicidal because of money, housing or benefits issues”, accessed on 23 October 2018

122 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063), see also: Child Poverty Action Group (ANC 0056) and Citizens Advice (ANC 0067)

123 Peter Dwyer, Katy Jones, Jenny McNeill, Lisa Scullion and Alasdair B R Stewart, Welfare Conditionality Project final findings: Disabled people, May 2018

124 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063), Scottish Association for Mental Health (ANC 0069)

125 Royal Mencap Society (ANC 0046)

126 Citizens Advice Rossendale and Hyndburn (ANC 0058)

128 Child Poverty Action Group (ANC 0056)

131 Q27

132 Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

133 Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

134 Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

135 Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063)

136 Q27

137 Q30

138 Shaw Trust (ANC 0086), Welfare Conditionality Project (ANC 0079), Citizens Advice (ANC 0067), Employment Related Services Association (ANC 0066), Mind (ANC 0064), Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063), Child Poverty Action Group (ANC 0056), Disability Rights UK (ANC 0054), Royal Mencap Society (ANC 0046), NHS Health Scotland (ANC 0045), Inclusion London (ANC 0026), Dr David Webster (ANC 0019), Q24 [Dr David Webster], Q27 [Matthew Oakley and Tony Wilson]

139 See for example Mind (ANC 0064) and Child Poverty Action Group (ANC 0056)

140 Dr Ben Baumberg Geiger (ANC 0063), Mind (ANC 0064)

141 Child Poverty Action Group (ANC 0056)

142 Disability Rights UK (ANC 0054)

143 Scope, “Employment”, accessed on 23 October 2018

144 Scope (ANC 0096)

145 Q176

147 Ben Baumberg Geiger, “Benefits conditionality for disabled people: stylised facts from a review of international evidence and practice”, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, vol 25(2), June 2017, pp 107–128

148 Peter Dwyer, Katy Jones, Jenny McNeill, Lisa Scullion and Alasdair B R Stewart, “Welfare Conditionality Project final findings: Disabled People”, May 2018

149 Peter Dwyer, Katy Jones, Jenny McNeill, Lisa Scullion and Alasdair B R Stewart, “Welfare Conditionality Project final findings: Disabled People”, May 2018

150 Ben Baumberg Geiger, “Benefits conditionality for disabled people: stylised facts from a review of international evidence and practice”, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, vol 25(2), June 2017, pp 107–128

Published: 06 November 2018