Environment Bill

Supplementary written evidence submitted by Greener UK and Wildlife and Countryside Link (EB17)

Supplementary note to the Environment Bill Committee

We are grateful for the opportunity to appear before the Committee this week. We welcome the bill and want to work with government and parliamentarians to improve it and make sure that this vitally important legislation sets the clear sense of direction needed to deliver government ambition.

This ground breaking bill will set the approach to environmental management in this country for many years to come. The aims and reassurances from this government with respect to the bill are welcome, but we must ensure that safeguards are in place so that future administrations take a similar approach. Good environmental management requires consistency both for the environment itself and those whose livelihoods rely upon it.

Please find below some points which we wanted to clarify following the oral evidence sessions.

1. Priority areas for setting targets

Several witnesses commented on the importance of the marine environment and the need for this to be properly recognised and provided for in the bill. There are a number of possible ways in which this could be achieved, including through the addition of the marine environment as a priority area for the target setting process in Clause 1. We hope that the Committee can consider this suggestion when it scrutinises this part of the bill.

The government has set out a very strong agenda for international ocean protection, especially the Blue Belt Programme and the "30 by 30" Global Ocean Alliance. Including the marine environment as an additional priority area in Clause 1 of the bill would underline those global goals with domestic credibility and provide a clear direction of travel for recovery of our seas.

2. Office for Environmental Protection

There was a suggestion that the Equalities and Human Rights Commission ought to be a comparator when it comes to establishing the independence of the Office for Environmental Protection (OEP).

In its evidence to the 2018 Tailored Review, the Commission argued that direct reporting to Parliament was a model that would give it greater independence and better align with international principles. The Review, which was conducted by a senior civil servant from another government department, concluded that a change in form was not necessary despite the Commission believing it is desirable. This does not suggest to us that the Commission has the independence it believes it needs and is therefore, in our view, not a model that would appear to be the gold standard for independence.

The previous Secretary of State appeared to agree with this when in her oral evidence, she told the EFRA Committee that the model of the Office for Budget Responsibility, in which the appointment of the chair is made with the consent of the Treasury Select Committee, "has much to recommend it".

It is surprising, therefore, that the government is proposing for the OEP to have weaker arrangements on appointments than any other comparable oversight body. For example:

· At the National Audit Office (NAO) the Auditor and Comptroller General (C&AG) is appointed with the consent of the House of Commons on the joint recommendation of the Prime Minister and the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts (which is by convention a member of the Official Opposition). The non-executive members of the NAO are appointed by the Public Accounts Commission;

· At the Electoral Commission the Electoral Commissioners and Commission Chair are appointed at the recommendation of the Speaker of the House of Commons following consultation with the leadership of the major political parties;

· At the Budget Responsibility Council at the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), the Chair and members are appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but must have the consent of the Treasury Select Committee.

These cases all have a statutory basis for their specific appointment processes [1] and the direct involvement of Parliament is a recognition of the fact that an additional degree of independence from government control over the person appointed is appropriate.

Public oversight of the leadership of public bodies spending public money through ministerial responsibility is vitally important. However, this aim can still be achieved in arrangements where ministerial responsibility is shared with parliamentary accountability. The involvement of Parliament in the appointment of people to roles that require greater independence than normal non-departmental public bodies provides a public opportunity for scrutiny and airing of potential conflicts, issues and capabilities. It is also a check on ministerial power over the individuals that will be providing oversight of government activity.

Alternative measures to create distance between ministers and public appointees exist already in the key cases referred to above. It is essential that the OEP, with its explicit enforcement and oversight role over government, is treated in the same category as these bodies, and alternative arrangements for these senior appointments are put in place for the appointment of the OEP Chair and non-executive board members.

3. The scope of biodiversity gain

Excluding Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs) and other large scale infrastructure projects from the provisions on biodiversity gain is a significant missed opportunity.

At the moment, the potential for the Secretary of State to carve out blanket exemptions from biodiversity gain is too wide and could significantly weaken the policy. There are also some uncertainties in the current scope of biodiversity gain. Notably, Development Orders can be used to facilitate large scale developments and should be explicitly included in the policy. We would welcome clarification around the development orders exemption and the sorts of development that the Secretary of State intends to exempt.

On exemptions for brownfield sites, we are concerned this will undermine protections for ecologically important brownfield habitats and species – this must be addressed. This exemption would also exclude a large proportion of land from biodiversity gain (recognising how much redevelopment is on brownfield sites).

NSIPs and large scale infrastructure projects can be some of the most damaging developments for nature but if appropriately located and planned and designed well, they offer significant opportunities for biodiversity gain.

NSIPs and other major infrastructure projects could achieve at least ten per cent biodiversity gain for a tiny additional cost as a proportion of their budgets, but with very great benefits for the natural world.

We understand that Defra has commissioned WSP to assess the viability of achieving biodiversity gain in large-scale infrastructure projects and that this work is nearing completion.

We hope that the government will continue in the spirit of openness with which it has approached the bill so far and publish the results of this study promptly, as well as sharing the study with the Committee to assist in its deliberations.

We recommend that the government amends the bill to bring NSIPs and large scale infrastructure projects within scope of the policy.

4. Resources and waste

Evidence to support extending the scope of single use charges to all materials can be found in Green Alliance’s new report, Fixing the system: why a circular economy for all materials is the only way to solve the plastic problem. While bans on polluting items are necessary, it says, the current piecemeal approach is not only unlikely to deliver significant improvement to plastic pollution, it also risks detracting from the wider need to improve the sustainability of resources used. For example, the UK’s ban on microbeads in wash off cosmetics, introduced in June 2018 and described as world leading, ignores 90 per cent of intentionally added microplastics that pollute the environment.

Similarly, the new ban on plastic straws, stirrers and cotton buds has pushed companies to substitute plastic for other single use materials, which are often equally unnecessary. This will continue to cause environmental problems: the research found that simply removing plastic from the current packaging system, for instance, and replacing it with other materials on a like for like basis could increase carbon emissions by three times. The report sets out recommendations for improving the environmental performance of several common materials, but a simple first step to futureproof UK environmental legislation would be to ensure government can discourage any unnecessary single use items, not only those made from plastic.

Also, especially in light of plans to potentially ban waste exports, a more strategic approach to infrastructure is needed that will not simply result in greater incineration or landfill in this country. This is examined in another Green Alliance report, Building a circular economy: how a new approach to infrastructure can put an end to waste. The approach of leaving resource infrastructure to the market is unlikely to deliver the sorts of infrastructure needed for a transformational circular economy scenario.

So far, the only major government fund in this area, the Waste Infrastructure Development Programme, which will see £3 billion of public and private investment in waste infrastructure through to 2042, is almost exclusively dedicated to energy from waste and landfill installations. Interventions from the Green Investment Bank – including since it became private – have also overwhelmingly focused on energy from waste. Transformation needs to refocus on upstream activities, business models and data and logistic systems targeted at reducing resource consumption rather than just on recycling and energy from waste. The government needs a strategic vision and a greater knowledge of current infrastructure and material flows to support this shift. We recommend an immediate and comprehensive infrastructure stocktake, looking beyond residual waste treatment, and fast tracking the proposed National Materials Datahub.

March 2020


[1] The NAO and OBR under the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011, Schedules 1 & 2; the Electoral Commission under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.

 

Prepared 17th March 2020