Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

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About JUSTICE
1. JUSTICE is an all-party law reform and human rights organisation working to strengthen the justice system. It is the UK section of the International Commission of Jurists. Our vision is of fair, accessible and efficient legal processes in which the individual’s rights are protected and which reflect the country’s international reputation for upholding and promoting the rule of law.

Introduction
2. This briefing addresses JUSTICE’s concerns with the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (the Bill).

3. JUSTICE recognises the unique role and status of the UK’s armed forces, and the difficulties faced by service personnel. However, this Bill fails to support current and former service personnel whilst also depriving victims of serious crime to proper access to appropriate remedies. JUSTICE believes that this Bill is deficient in two important respects.

   a. First, the Bill would damage the standing of the armed forces by acting contrary to established legal norms – both domestic and international. It does so by introducing a threshold which would be near-impossible to meet where claims for torture and other serious crimes are made after five years. By affording effective impunity for UK overseas military operations, the Bill signals that, rather than adhering to a strict human rights framework in the rules of engagement, the UK is prepared to relax, or worse, disregard, protection from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. The Bill risks both contravening the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) and other international legal instruments, many of which the UK helped to create.

   b. Second, the Bill would restrict the ability of service people to bring claims for personal injury and death during the course of overseas actions. Rather than protecting and enhancing the rights of service personnel, it would weaken their key avenue for proper compensation. The Bill would serve only to shield the Government.

4. JUSTICE also notes the context in which this Bill arises. The Government’s introduction of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, and its expressed intention to break international law, signals a worrying disregard for the UK’s obligations to uphold international law. This Bill actively conflicts with domestic and international human rights
law, thereby deepening these anxieties, especially at a time of great political and constitutional uncertainty.

5. For these reasons, as expanded below, JUSTICE strongly resists the passage of this Bill and urges parliamentarians to vote against this proposal.

**Purpose of the Bill: the so-called problem of ‘lawfare’**

6. The Bill seeks to address the so-called problem of ‘lawfare’, defined in the Explanatory Notes as the ‘judicialisation of armed conflict’ evidenced by the ‘cycle of reinvestigation’ of historic operations.¹ The Bill intends to give service personnel and veterans ‘greater certainty’ against ‘vexatious claims and prosecution of historical events, that occurred in the uniquely complex environment of armed conflict overseas’.² However, it is far from clear that the Bill is necessary or appropriate.

7. **First**, the Bill would not stop the so-called cycle of investigations: its restrictions apply solely to prosecutions.³ The Bill does not address measures that could be taken to ensure that allegations are properly investigated and resolved within a reasonable period of time. Service personnel would benefit from a focus on prompt and thorough investigations - rather than a limitation on prosecutions – to resolve any concerns with respect to uncertainty and delay for soldiers and victims.

8. **Second**, in any event, the Bill addresses a non-existent issue. As the Centre for Military Justice notes, there have in fact been hardly any criminal prosecutions brought against service personnel, arising from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan;⁴ it is therefore difficult to understand the need to legislate.

**The Presumption Against Prosecution**

1. Part 1 of the Bill contains a presumption against prosecution of personnel engaged in overseas operations once five years has elapsed from the date of the alleged criminal activity. Prosecution after this period would be ‘exceptional, and subject to a so-called ‘triple lock’.

2. This three-part test is as follows:

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¹ Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Explanatory Notes, paragraph 6.
² Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Explanatory Notes, paragraph 1.
³ https://centreformilitaryjustice.org.uk/guide/briefing-on-the-overseas-operations-bill/
⁴ https://centreformilitaryjustice.org.uk/guide/briefing-on-the-overseas-operations-bill/
a. **First**, it must be ‘exceptional’ for a prosecutor to decide to initiate proceedings against a service member (**Clause 2**);

b. **Second**, the prosecutor ‘must give particular weight to’ (a) factors which may dilute the culpability of the potential accused service member, for instance “being exposed to unexpected or continuous threats, being in command of others who were so exposed, or being deployed alongside others who were killed or severely wounded in action)” and (b) where there has been a previous investigation, and no new evidence, a public interest in finality of such proceedings (**Clause 3**); and

c. **Third**, the consent of the Attorney General must be obtained to advance any prosecution (**Clause 5**).

**Concerns**

3. JUSTICE is deeply concerned by the statutory presumption against prosecution after a limitation period of five years, as well as this ‘triple lock’, for the following reasons:

   a. **Clause 2 - Breach of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR**
      
      i. A statutory presumption against prosecution would breach the procedural obligations under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR to conduct an effective investigation into allegations of unlawful killings or torture.

      ii. *Da Silva v the United Kingdom* concerned the decision not to prosecute the individuals involved in the police shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes.\(^5\) The European Court of Human Rights (the **ECtHR**) held that the Article 2 procedural duty to carry out an effective investigation entails, *inter alia*, identifying and, where appropriate, punishing those responsible.\(^6\) Where a suspicious death has been caused by a State agent, ‘particularly stringent scrutiny must be applied by the relevant domestic authorities to the ensuing investigation’.\(^7\) The **ECtHR** held that ‘national courts should not under any circumstances be prepared to allow life-endangering offences to go unpunished’.\(^8\) In addition, the obligation to investigate deaths caused by state agents was found to apply to the UK’s investigations into deaths in

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\(^5\) *Armani Da Silva v UK* (App No 5878/08) 30 March 2016

\(^6\) *Armani Da Silva v UK* (App No 5878/08) 30 March 2016 [233]

\(^7\) *Armani Da Silva v UK* (App No 5878/08) 30 March 2016 [234]

\(^8\) *Armani Da Silva v UK* (App No 5878/08) 30 March 2016 [239]
Iraq in Al-Skeini v the United Kingdom. The obligations applied to armed conflict ‘despite the prevalence of violent armed clashes [and] the high incidence of fatalities’.

iii. Article 2 requires careful judicial scrutiny, so that the deterrent effect of the judicial system is not undermined. Making prosecution “exceptional” undermines this deterrent effect and careful judicial scrutiny.

b. Clause 2 - Discrimination under Article 14 ECHR

i. As is openly acknowledged by the Ministry of Defence (the MoD), the Bill would afford preferential treatment to service personnel alleged to have committed crimes overseas. The MoD believes that, to the extent that domestically deployed personnel are considered an ‘other’ status under Article 14 ECHR then the unequal treatment to which they are subjected is justified by the ‘uniquely challenging circumstances’ faced by service personnel abroad. This justification is not convincing. Veterans who served in Northern Ireland certainly faced a ‘high degree of hostility’ and ‘threat of violence’ yet they are not covered by the Bill. JUSTICE believes that service personnel should be subject to the highest ethical standards regardless of whether they are stationed at home or overseas.

ii. Further, the Bill would weaken the rights of foreign national victims. While there is no right to prosecution under the ECHR, foreign nationals may suffer indirect discrimination regarding the discharge of the state’s procedural obligations to investigate allegations of crimes which fall under Articles 2 and 3. The five year time-limit would apply regardless of the status of the victim, with foreign national victims facing a disproportionate effect because the Bill only concerns overseas actions.

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9 Al-Skeini v UK (App No 55721/07) 7 July 2011
11 Armani Da Silva v UK (App No 5878/08) 30 March 2016 [239]
12 Written evidence from Professor Merris Amos, submitted to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/11454/html/
c. **Clause 2 - Breach of Other International Legal Instruments**

i. A presumption against prosecution could be contrary to Article 29 of the Rome Statute\(^\text{16}\), which cannot be derogated from. The International Criminal Court has warned that if proposals for a presumption against prosecution were introduced, it “would need to consider its potential impact on the ability of the UK authorities to investigate and/or prosecute crimes allegedly committed by members of the British armed forces in Iraq, against the standards of inactivity and genuineness set out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute”\(^\text{17}\).

ii. The UK was complicit in the United States’ rendition, detention and interrogation following 9/11. The Supreme Court in *Belhaj v Straw* held that the doctrines of state immunity and foreign act of state were not engaged and, even if the doctrine of foreign act of state were engaged, the allegations would fall within a public policy exception for violations of international law or fundamental human rights.\(^\text{18}\) It is distasteful to suggest that the UK can carve out an immunity for torture.

d. **Clauses 2 and 4 - Entrenchment of Flawed Investigatory Practices**

i. Clause 4, paragraph 1 provides that the presumption against prosecution would apply to investigations which have ‘ceased to be active’. This creates a perverse incentive to leave investigations incomplete.\(^\text{19}\)

ii. The UK does not have a good record when it comes to investigating armed forces operations, at home\(^\text{20}\) or abroad.\(^\text{21}\) This context makes the statutory presumption even more concerning.

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\(^{16}\) Article 2 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – “The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations”.


\(^{18}\) *Belhaj and another v Straw and others* [2017] UKSC 3


\(^{21}\) Regarding Iraq, see *Al-Skeini and Others v UK* (App No 55721/07) 7 July 2011. The UN Committee against Torture has also raised concerns over the effectiveness of allegations into torture in Iraq.
e. **Retrospective Application**

i. While the Bill would not apply to investigations which are currently ongoing, the presumption against prosecution could apply retrospectively to new cases arising from overseas operations, for instance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

ii. The presumption against prosecution could, therefore, hamper investigations into alleged criminal behaviour during those operations, thereby retrospectively disapplying the procedural obligations which currently apply (i.e. Articles 2 and 3 ECHR). This would mean that victims who may be presently entitled pursue action face an increased procedural bar, consequently limiting access to justice.

f. **Clause 3 - Current Powers are Sufficient**

i. The Bill would require prosecutors to “have proper regard to the uniquely challenging context” of overseas operations. The law already does this. At present, the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance on mental health grants prosecutors a wide discretion to consider such issues when making a charging decision.22

ii. The justification for an arbitrary five year limitation period acts as a blunt tool. The law is capable of making assessments of the “unique circumstance” on a case by case basis. JUSTICE therefore views Clause 3 as at best unnecessary, and at worst a procedural bar for those with legitimate claims.

g. **Clause 5 - Role of the Attorney General**

i. JUSTICE is concerned by the requirement that any prosecutions after five years would need the consent of the Attorney-General. The Attorney General is supposed to act independently with respect to individual prosecutions - having the public interest as an overriding consideration. She is not supposed to have the interests of a particular group in mind, nor advance a party-political agenda.

ii. The Bill, therefore, could risk creating a conflict between the rights of victims to seek redress and the political circumstances surrounding any proposed prosecution. JUSTICE believes that victims’ rights should not be subject to the uncertainty of future political considerations, and must instead be judged according to their own merits, on a case by case basis.

h. Schedule 1 – Excluded Offences and Carve-out for Torture

i. The Bill, at Schedule 1 (Excluded Offences for the purpose of Section 6), would carve out an exception for sexual offences and certain war crimes and crimes against humanity.

ii. JUSTICE welcomes that such serious allegations would not be subject to a five-year time limit. However, we continue to have strong concerns with the exclusion of a number of offences from Schedule 1 – namely, torture.

iii. It is unacceptable that allegations of torture would be subject to the ‘triple lock’. While the Government insists that the Bill would not ‘decriminalise’ torture committed by service people overseas, it misses the point. By creating such a high bar for allegations to be prosecuted, the Bill in practice makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to envisage a successful prosecution after the five-year limit.

iv. Such a bar would go against established international jurisprudence. For example, the UN Convention against Torture, ratified by the UK, contains an obligation not to apply statutes of limitation to torture, as well as an obligation to investigate which cannot be time-limited.23 The passage of this Bill, would, therefore, lead to a breach of the UK’s international obligations.

v. Likewise, the limited range of offences set out in Schedule 1 undermines the enforcement of international humanitarian law, which foresees no time limit on the obligation to prosecute those suspected of grave breaches of the Four Geneva Conventions 1949 and Additional Protocol 1.24

23 Wallace, Stubbins Bates, Quénivet, ‘Legal Protections for Armed Forces Personnel and Veterans serving in operations outside the United Kingdom Response to Public Consultation Questionnaire’, p.13
4. JUSTICE believes that no serious criminal offence should be subject to a limitation period. On the contrary, there is a positive obligation to investigate such allegations, enshrined in international law and present throughout the UK’s own domestic jurisprudence. While some have argued that the Bill does not ‘decriminalise’ torture since the Bill does not affect cases brought before the five year limitation period, JUSTICE maintains that it creates a substantive procedural barrier to justice for serious crimes, and may result in victims being deprived of an effective remedy.

**Personal Injury and Human Rights ‘Longstops’**

5. Part 2 of the Bill would amend s.33 of the Limitation Act 1980, thereby curtailing the court’s discretionary power to disapply time limits for former and current members of the armed forces to bring claims concerning personal injury and death during overseas actions. Currently, there is a three-year limit on bringing personal injury claims and a one-year limit for human rights claims. Both limits can, however, be extended through judicial discretion. When exercising this discretion, judges have regard to a list of factors.

6. While the present three and one year primary limits will remain, the Bill would introduce a new six-year absolute bar on bringing a claim. For claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 (the HRA) there is an alternative of a one-year limit from the date of knowledge, whichever is later. The court would be required to take into account factors such the cogency of evidence under the new limitations (even though these are factors which are already considered by the court under the current rules).

7. The MoD relies on the case of *Stubbings v United Kingdom* to assert that the new limitation periods would not constitute a violation of Article 6 ECHR. Borrowing words from the judgment, the Government argue that the right of access to a court is not fettered because the ‘essence’ of the right is not impaired. The MoD’s analysis of the case, however, is inapposite. The ECtHR found that a six-year absolute limitation on intentional injury claims (in this case for a historic sexual abuse claim) was not a violation of the right to access a

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25 Limitations Act 1980, s 11. There is also a special limit of 15 years for latent damage under s 14A which could be relevant for issues of armed forces personnel and cases of PTSD.

26 Human Rights Act 1998, s 7(5)(a).

27 Limitations Act 1980, s 33. As noted in Ministry of Defence, ‘Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill, European Convention on Human Rights Memorandum’, (March 2020), paragraph 26: ‘Although no equivalent provisions exist in the HRA, the case law indicates that courts do already have regard to the factors set out in section 33(3) when considering whether to exercise discretion to extend the primary limitation period (see *Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust* [2012] UKSC 2).’

28 For example, under cl 11(2) of the Bill.


court under Article 6(1). A crucial part of the court's reasoning, instead, was that the claimant had the alternative route of criminal prosecution open to them:31

*In the instant case, the English law of limitation allowed the applicants six years from their eighteenth birthdays in which to initiate civil proceedings. In addition, subject to the need for sufficient evidence, a criminal prosecution could be brought *at any time* and, if successful, a compensation order could be made (see paragraphs 38-42 above). Thus, the very essence of the applicant's right of access to a court was not impaired.*

8. It is clear from this excerpt that the availability of criminal sanctions which were not time-limited was an important factor for the ECtHR in finding that the 6-year absolute bar was a proportionate measure. Further, the rule in *Stubbings* applied to anyone seeking to bring an intentional injury claim. The current Bill would apply a six-year limit only for overseas armed forces proceedings.

9. There are two reasons why this measure would likely be inconsistent with the UK's human rights obligations:

a. unlike in *Stubbings*, the presumption against prosecution would mean that the criminal prosecution option becomes more restricted, making the procedural obligations under Article 2 less likely to be fulfilled; and

b. even if a legitimate aim exists, the measure would be discriminatory in its focus on claims relating to overseas operations. Potential victims of this discrimination could include non-military organisations acting overseas (for example, the Red Cross), foreign nationals, armed personnel who served overseas with claims against the MoD and the families of those personnel who have claims against the MoD. For families, this is particularly concerning in light of the fact that the Government has announced that it will not proceed with plans to introduce a new combat compensation scheme for armed forces personnel and veterans pursuant to the

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31 (1996) 23 EHRR 213 at [52].
‘Better Combat Compensation’ consultation. Consequently, the scales are tipped in favour of the Government prioritising shielding itself from liability over ensuring adequate redress mechanisms for allegations of human rights violations or breaches of its duty of care towards armed services personnel.

10. As the Law Society argued in its consultation response, the longstops would amount to the Government ‘[legislating] to put themselves above the law that applies to everyone else’. Far from being protected, armed forces personnel who served abroad would be placed in a worse position under this Bill as they will be barred from bringing claims for negligence against the MoD where their domestic counterparts are not. The same would apply to families of those personnel who died while serving abroad on account of negligence by the MoD. The measure would also have a disproportionate effect on foreign nationals seeking to bring civil claims against the MoD.

**Duty to Consider Derogation**

11. Part 2 of the Bill would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to consider derogating from the ECHR via section 14 of the HRA. This would be a highly concerning mechanism. It would place an obligation upon successive Secretaries of State to actively consider derogation for overseas operations. Derogation from treaties is an extremely rare and carefully considered process, tailored to specific facts. This duty would signal a blanket indication that Parliament generally supports the principle of derogation from human rights protection in our overseas operations, as opposed to taking a case by case approach.

**Concerns**

12. There are difficulties with derogating in advance of an entire military operation. Legal theorists argue that it is only possible to derogate from Article 2 ECHR regarding ‘lawful acts of war’, which would require an investigation into the conduct of the war after the fact. The investigatory obligations continue to apply ‘in difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict’. For anything less than acts of war overseas, the procedural obligations under Article 2 would still apply. Further, no derogation is permissible from

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34 Al-Skeini and Others v UK (App No 55721/07) 7 July 2011 at [164], as reiterated in Jaloud v the Netherlands (App No 47708/08) 20 November 2014 at [186].
Article 3. Even if partial derogation is possible, other international obligations such as those under the Geneva Convention and the UN Convention Against Torture will subsist.  

13. The only possible reason for the derogation would be to enable the UK to actively seek to violate the prohibitions on torture and degrading treatment, which would be wholly unacceptable in terms of the rules of engagement, protection of British troops and the protection of overseas civilians.

14. Far from ‘protecting our troops’, there is a danger that if the UK regularly expresses an intention to derogate before engaging in overseas operations, this will put troops at greater risk of human rights abuses. It is difficult for the UK to demand compliance with international laws against torture from others when it does not follow them itself.

15. Derogation from the ECHR for any future overseas operation would set a damaging precedent for an international treaty which relies on the cooperation and consent of its signatory states. The Bill would threaten our international standing and signal a significant weakening in the UK’s resolve to insist a no tolerance policy with respect to torture and other serious crimes committed in the theatre of war.

Conclusion

16. There are serious problems with this Bill. Its measures would act contrary to the Government’s expressed intention to enhance the rights of service personnel by creating a legal shield behind which the Government can hide. Moreover, they would also dilute the UK’s commitment and adherence to international human rights laws and norms.

17. For the reasons set out in this briefing, JUSTICE strongly urges parliamentarians to vote against this Bill, in its entirety, in the interests of service personnel, victims and the UK’s reputation as a country governed by the rule of law.

JUSTICE
5 October 2020

35 Wallace, Stubbins Bates, Quénivet, ‘Legal Protections for Armed Forces Personnel and Veterans serving in operations outside the United Kingdom Response to Public Consultation Questionnaire’, p 6.