Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability Contents

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Annex: UK armoured vehicle capabilities and programmes since the Cold War

1)The story of UK armoured vehicle acquisition since the end of the Cold War is deplorable. The Ministry of Defence has squandered significant amounts of money on a series of overly ambitious requirements and technically complex programmes, resulting in these being abandoned and no planned new vehicles being introduced to service over a 20-year period.129 Partly as a result of these failures, the Armed Forces lacked modern, survivable vehicles for stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to avoidable casualties and the need to procure billions of pounds worth of off-the-shelf vehicles to fill the capability gap via the Urgent Operational Requirements process.

The impact of evolving defence strategy

2)For the four decades following the Second World War, the British Army was trained, equipped and funded to face a specific threat: the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. These forces represented arguably the apex of late 20th Century conventional armed forces, made up of large, heavily armoured combined arms groupings designed to penetrate and advance rapidly beyond the frontiers of Western Europe.

3)NATO and UK forces in Europe (primarily the British Army of the Rhine - BAOR) sought to deter and counter this threat through the development and maintenance of similar heavy armoured forces. Western forces could not match the quantity of men and materiel held by their potential adversaries, but sought to balance this through the pursuit of a qualitative advantage, gained via superior training and technology, which arguably came most to fruition in the early 1980s with the introduction of a new generation of main battle tanks such as the US Abrams, the German Leopard II and the British Challenger 1. The advanced optics, fire control systems and weaponry of these vehicles heralded a step-change in NATO armoured capabilities.

4)As the Cold War came to an end, so too did the certainty around the threats that the UK’s Armed Forces, and particularly the British Army would be required to prepare for. The early 1990s saw Western governments eager to realise a ‘peace dividend’ through a series of reductions in the costly standing forces that had been maintained for the preceding 40 years. The UK undertook a number of reviews of defence posture and expenditure, the first being the 1990 ‘Options for Change’. The then Secretary of State for Defence told the House of Commons:

“In the options for change studies, we have sought to devise a structure for our regular forces appropriate to the new security situation and meeting our essential peacetime operational needs […] Our proposals will bring savings and a reduction in the share of GDP taken by defence”.130

5)Options for Change resulted in a significant redrawing of the structure of the UK’s Armed Forces and was seen as the start of a shift from a threats-based to a capability-based force structure.131 With this change came significant reductions in personnel numbers: the Armed Forces as a whole was reduced by 56,000 (18%) by the mid-1990s, with the most significant cuts falling on the Army which was reduced from 160,000 to 120,000.132 The BAOR was reduced from three to two divisions, one based in the UK. The subsequent 1994 Defence Costs Study sought to realise a further peace dividend and reduced the Army’s numbers a further 2,200 by the end of the decade.

6)In 1997, the newly elected Labour government undertook a wide-ranging review of the UK’s defence posture - the Strategic Defence Review. This set out in more explicit form the intent to move away from static, Cold War-type forces to more expeditionary, capability-focused structures. It also set out future technology and equipment requirements to meet this vision, including new aircraft carriers. The organisation of the Army’s armoured forces was modified, with a reduction in the number of armoured regiments and the shift of two reconnaissance regiments to different roles.133 Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the subsequent intervention in Afghanistan, a New Chapter to the SDR was published in 2002, increasing the focus on defending against threats from non-state actors and terrorism. From 2003 and 2006 respectively, the British Army was increasingly focused on maintaining Operations Telic (Iraq) and Herrick (Afghanistan) which consumed most of its resources and effort.

7)In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and amid the need to make large-scale savings within the public sector, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review had significant implications for the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces. Defence was required to make cuts in both personnel and equipment. The Army was to be reduced by 7,000 troops by 2015, and to a size of 82,000 regulars and 30,000 reservists by 2018; all British forces were to withdraw from Germany by 2020; the Challenger 2 main battle tank fleet was cut by around 40% to 227 vehicles and the number of AS-90 self-propelled artillery vehicles was reduced by 35%.134 This review also saw a wholesale restructuring of the Army as set out in the ‘Army 2020’ vision.135

8)These significant changes to the Army’s force structures were revised further as a result of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, which led to the ‘Army 2020 Refine’. This outlined a new set of structures and forces, including:

• The creation of two new ‘Strike’ brigades by converting an Armoured Infantry brigade and an infantry brigade. These were to be equipped with new Ajax tracked reconnaissance vehicles and Mechanised Infantry Vehicles;
• That, by 2025, UK 3rd Division would comprise two armoured infantry brigades, a Strike brigade and a Strike experimentation group. This division would be available to NATO under UK command; and,
• Establishing the Specialised Infantry forces, created through the conversion of five infantry battalions.

9)It is apparent from the above summary that since the 1990s there have been several Defence reviews with significant implications for the Army’s force structures, equipment requirements and capability goals. The vision of what the Army is required to do and where it may be needed to it has been revised repeatedly, from the Cold War to Iraq and Afghanistan and now the Integrated Review. These shifts in requirements inevitably flowed into planning for future capability and equipment procurement. The next section of this report will address the effects of this.

Shifting requirements and the impact of counter-insurgency operations

10)Since the end of the Cold War, the British Army has made a number of attempts to replace and modernise its Armoured Fighting Vehicle fleet, but to date these have not resulted in a significant refresh of the Army’s capabilities, with the majority of its primary vehicles now in-service having been procured before the 1990s, and some as early as the 1960s. As the National Audit Office (NAO) reported in 2011:

“The [Ministry of Defence] has initiated a number of projects since 1985 to replace its existing vehicles, and from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review … Despite the expenditure of considerable resources over more than a decade, the Department has not met its objective of fielding a more mobile, flexible fleet”.136

As noted previously, during the Cold War the British Army’s major procurement programmes were driven by the need to counter a relatively well-understood threat, which evolved gradually and incrementally (for example, through improvements to the capabilities of Soviet armoured vehicles). This engendered an approach to procurement that prioritised the meeting of exacting technical requirements to ensure the resulting vehicles could overmatch those of the posited threat. Consequently, there was little appetite for compromise or trading-off between performance and time, with delivery of new equipment expected to take one or even two decades.137

11)With the demise of the most likely threat in 1990 and as the likelihood of state-on-state conflict in Europe appeared to recede, NATO militaries began exploring the types of forces that might be required for operations in other theatres and contexts. Experiences in the First Gulf War in 1991 and the 1999 Kosovo intervention highlighted the logistical challenges associated with deploying armoured forces at scale beyond the North American and European continents. This direction was also influenced by the need for future forces to be less costly to procure and sustain than their Cold War predecessors. In the US, these factors led the US Army to begin a process of transformation with the aim of developing ‘medium-weight’ forces which were able to deploy rapidly to an emerging crisis with sufficient combat power to act as a deterrent. In 1999 the then US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, stated:

“Look at the condition of the army and our ability to move quickly to these hot spots. We need to have sufficient capability on the ground to deter and to hold crises where they are, with the intent of then returning to stability. That takes a kind of agility and flexibility and versatility that we need in the force … So as we talk about transformation, we intend to get into the design of our units. It is about looking for a common chassis design. It is about looking for smaller [calibre] ammunition. It is about fuel efficiency. It is about micro-technology. As we reduce the size of our platforms, we also reduce the size of this rather significant logistical footprint, and that gives us the kind of agility that will put us in places that are least expected.”138

This led the US to develop a new range of modular, wheeled armoured vehicles to equip new Brigade Combat Teams which could be deployed at short-notice globally with a reduced logistical footprint.139 These new vehicles were later named ‘Stryker’ and came in a number of variants, seeing operational deployment to Iraq in the mid-2000s where they generally performed well but required upgrades to their armour to protect from insurgent attacks.140 We note that within four years of General Shinseki’s speech Strykers were deployed on combat operations , a striking contrast with the UK’s planned armoured vehicle programmes from the same period.141

12)In parallel to the US, the British Army also sought to develop new types of armoured vehicles. As early as 1985 it began the Future Family of Light Armoured Vehicles (FFLAV) study142 with the aim of developing a series of lighter armoured vehicles to replace the already obsolescent FV430 and CVR(T) (Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked)) vehicle families. This study led to the development of two new programmes: TRACER (Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement) and MRAV (Multi Role Armoured Vehicle).143

13)The TRACER programme aimed to replace the already aging CVR(T) which had been found to be: “inadequate during the Gulf War (in 1991) in the areas of sensors, stealth, survivability, mobility and lethality”.144 In 1992 the Department began a joint programme with the US to develop TRACER, which envisaged the procurement of some 335 vehicles. The NAO noted in 2011 that the delivery of this programme would require the rapid development of some very advanced technologies, some of which are only now at the stage where they can be incorporated on armoured vehicles.145 Subsequently the US abandoned the TRACER programme and in 2001 the UK halted its development, with £131m in sunk costs.

14)The MRAV programme was intended to replace the obsolete FV430 and Saxon series of vehicles, and in the mid-1990s the UK joined a multinational programme with Germany and France to develop a new eight-wheeled armoured vehicle which could be fitted with interchangeable mission modules. Deliveries of the vehicle were scheduled to begin in 2006.146 The first operational use of Boxer was by Germany in 2011. However, in July 2003, the Ministry of Defence decided to withdraw from the MRAV programme, primarily on the grounds that it was too heavy to be transported on a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft (Boxer weighs up to 36 tonnes).147 At the point of cancellation the Department had sunk £57m into the programme. Sixteen years later, the Ministry of Defence signed a £2.8 billion contract to procure over 500 of these vehicles (now known as Boxer) to meet the Army’s Mechanised Infantry Vehicle requirement.

15)While both TRACER and MRAV had been cancelled by 2003, the Army’s requirements to replace its increasingly obsolete armoured vehicle fleets, and to meet the need for a medium-weight, rapidly deployable force remained pressing. The Ministry of Defence’s next solution for this requirement was to be the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES). The programme had been in Concept phase since 2001, and moved into Assessment in 2004, with an initial In-Service Date of 2009.148149 This was a highly ambitious programme aimed at replacing the Saxon, FV430 and CVR(T) fleets with over 3,000 vehicles in Heavy, Utility and Reconnaissance families that would meet 16 different battlefield roles.150 A key issue for FRES was balancing deployability with protection. By 2006 the Department had increased the weight limit from 17 tonnes to between 25–30 tonnes and accepted that its new medium-weight vehicles would not be transportable by C-130 aircraft but should be light enough to be lifted by the new A400M transporter.151 Our predecessor Committees raised concerns with the FRES programme on a number of occasions.; in 2007 a Committee report on the FRES programme concluded that “nine years after the 1997 Strategic Defence Review, the Army’s requirement for a medium-weight vehicles remains unmet”152 and,

“This is a sorry story of indecision, constantly changing requirements and delay. We are concerned that the FRES requirement may simply be unachievable without a major technical breakthrough. The tension between the survivability and deployability is particularly acute: satisfying both requirements may prove impossible. It is high time the MoD decided where its priorities lay”.153

16)The FRES programme struggled to resolve the weight versus protection conundrum, and faced a range of commercial, funding and technical issues. The In-Service Date for the first variant (FRES Utility Vehicle) slipped repeatedly from 2008 to 2012 and finally to 2015. The combination of difficulties faced by the programme increased the overall risk level to unacceptable levels, and the FRES programme was cancelled in 2008, with £133 million having been spent.154 In 2009 our predecessor Committee concluded that:

“The FRES programme has been a fiasco. In February 2007 we concluded that the MoD’s attempts to meet its medium-weight vehicle requirement had been a sorry story of indecision, changing requirements and delay. Two years later the story is, incredibly, even worse. Whilst we recognise that the MoD’s equipment requirements need to reflect changing threats, that is no excuse for the MoD’s behaviour in this programme; they have wasted their and industry’s time and money. The FRES Utility Vehicle programme was, from the outset, poorly conceived and managed. The MoD must work out what its requirements are for medium-weight armoured vehicles and identify lessons from the saga of the FRES Utility Vehicle programme”.155

Aspects of the FRES programme (for example development of the 40mm main weapon system) would subsequently be pulled into the current Ajax reconnaissance vehicle programme (which was formerly known as FRES Scout).

17)While the FRES programme stalled and ultimately unravelled, the British Army had become fully engaged in the campaigns in Iraq (from 2003) and Afghanistan (from 2006 in Helmand province). In the main war fighting phase of the Iraq campaign (in Spring 2003) the UK’s armoured forces employed their heaviest vehicles (Challenger 2, Warrior, and others), where they performed well. However, in the subsequent occupation phase, and operations in Helmand province in Afghanistan, these heavily armoured vehicles were not appropriate for stabilisation operations. In lieu of having a medium-weight class of vehicles, British forces had to fall back on the use of much lighter vehicles such as lightly armoured Landrovers (for example the Snatch vehicles, which had previously been used in a public order role in Northern Ireland).

18)As insurgent activity in both Iraq and Afghanistan intensified and these actors increasingly made use of roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to target UK and Coalition military forces, it became apparent that the lightly armoured vehicles being used by UK forces offered inadequate levels of protection against the evolving threat.156 At least 36 UK personnel were ultimately killed in attacks while being transported in these light vehicles.157 In 2009 the Defence Committee concluded:

“We are concerned at the increasingly sophisticated nature of the threat and the consequent vulnerability of UK Forces travelling in Snatch Land Rovers … In the long-term, FRES may offer a solution to the difficulties associated with the Snatch, but its introduction is too far off to offer an answer to current operational needs in Iraq. The MoD should consider an “off the shelf” purchase as an immediate and interim replacement for Snatch, even if it does not fulfil the long-term capability requirement. It is unsatisfactory that the lack of capability was not addressed with greater urgency much earlier”.158

In his evidence to this inquiry, Nicholas Drummond noted the consequences of not having suitable vehicles as a result of decisions not to see programmes through to completion: “If you do not have that vehicle, that means you have to send troops into combat without protected mobility and that will put their lives at risk. That is the situation we got into with the Snatch Land Rover in Iraq in 2006”.159

19)In response to the increased IED threat and faced with the inadequacy of its light armoured vehicles, the Ministry of Defence embarked on a large-scale process to procure a range of vehicles (Protected Patrol Vehicles) that could protect personnel while enabling mobility in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2011, the NAO reported that the Department had spent or intended to spend £2.8 billion on the urgent operational procurement of these vehicles.160 As of September 2020, the Army had 2,101 of these vehicles in its holdings.161 The NAO noted that if the FRES programme had delivered some of the vehicles planned, this additional cost might have been reduced but would not have been completely avoided. Following the draw-down of UK forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army retained these vehicles and subsequently they have been used to equip some armoured cavalry regiments and armoured infantry battalions.162

Lessons from recent experience

20)The above summary of the past two decades of UK armoured vehicle procurement leads us to highlight a number of significant lessons for the future, many of which have been identified previously. These include requirements setting, programme funding and programme management.

21)The Ministry of Defence and the Army embarked on a series of overly-ambitious procurement programmes which were too reliant on the development of nascent technologies in order to deliver viable capabilities; within these programmes; and, there was a reluctance to trade-off capability requirements (such as vehicle weight) leading to programme cancellations and vacillation around decision-making. This was compounded by the desire to adapt requirements to concurrent operational experience. Too often the Ministry of Defence has aimed to deliver the 100 per cent solution tomorrow, rather than the 80 per cent solution today. This conclusion is supported by Francis Tusa in his evidence to us:

“We have to stop specifications creep … We have to accept the 80% solution. That has been known about for probably 50 years … To give an example of that, back in 2006 or 2007 … the then Defence Procurement Minister … ordered the trials of truth down at Bovington. He said to all the main armoured vehicle manufacturers, “Bring your vehicles to Bovington. Stop PowerPoint engineering. We are going to run trials and we will base our decisions on that”. The problem is that the Piranha version was selected and the Army then started changing it and going, “I want to add this, this and this”. It was a pretty disastrous outturn”.163

The NAO highlighted the consequences of this in 2011:

“Complex requirements have been set which rely on technological advances to achieve a qualitative advantage over the most demanding potential adversaries… [t]here has not been an effective means to assess the costs, risks and amount of equipment needed to meet these requirements in the early stages. These demanding requirements often reduce the scope to maximise competition which in turn can lead to cost increases, delays to the introduction of equipment into service and reductions to the numbers of vehicles bought to stay within budgets”.164

22)A lack of coherence in programme funding repeatedly destabilised projects; between 2005 and 2011, the Department removed £5.6 billion in savings measures from its armoured vehicle programmes, resulting in delays to new vehicles being introduced.165 Procurement practices and skills were frequently found wanting; in 2011 the NAO concluded that the failure to introduce any new vehicles since 1997 indicated that, “the Department’s standard acquisition processes for armoured vehicles was not working”.166 Subsequently the Committee of Public Accounts concluded that “there [was] poor accountability for long-term equipment projects”.167 Frequent changes in personnel within project teams and a lack of ingrained technical knowledge and understanding of armoured vehicle development have also been cited as contributing factors to the failure to deliver new vehicles to the Army.168

23)In evidence to this inquiry, Lockheed Martin UK noted that that where the Ministry of Defence acts as a systems integrator or provides assets or resources to the contractor (known as Government Furnished assets or resources - GFX) that “it is important for it to have the necessary resources, capacity, and focus to perform that role, including continuity in technical staff”.169