In Search of Strategy—The 2020 Integrated Review: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report of Session 2019–21

Third Special Report

On 13 August 2020, the Defence Committee published its First Report of Session 2019–21, In Search of Strategy—The 2020 Integrated Review [HC 165]. The Government’s response was received on 13 October 2020. The response is appended to this report.

Appendix: Government Response


The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence Committee’s inquiry “In Search of Strategy—The 2020 Integrated Review” and the findings set out in the Committee’s report (HC 165), published on 13 August 2020.

Our formal response to its recommendations and conclusions is set out below. The Committee’s headings and findings are highlighted in bold, with the Government’s response set out in plain text. For ease of reference, paragraph numbering in brackets refers to the order in which they are presented in the Committee’s Report.

1.Frequently conducting supplementary reviews outside of the quinquennial schedule established during the 2010 SDSR risks undermining the credibility of the UK’s security and defence policy and creates undue uncertainty for UK defence planners. Our recommendations contribute to ensuring that the Integrated Review provides a framework for the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy for at least the next five years. (Paragraph 15)

In 2010, the Coalition Government set an expectation of quinquennial defence reviews to align with the parliamentary cycle. This resulted in the 2010 Strategic Defence Review and the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, following a thirteen-year gap since the previous full defence review in 1998. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) believes that a five-year cycle is right as it allows for detailed analysis and a significant implementation period in which to monitor the outcomes. The 2016 referendum decision to leave the European Union and a re-emergence of state-based threats necessitated a re-examination of the defence and national security capabilities in the form of the 2017 National Security Capabilities Review and the 2018 Modernising Defence Programme. These were not full defence reviews, but they usefully illustrate the need to balance the certainty provided by a pre-determined cycle of reviews and the need for agility to respond to shifts in the international security environment.

When the Prime Minister launched the Integrated Review, he set out his vision for it as the most significant review of our foreign, defence, security and development policy since the end of the Cold War. This is a defining moment for the UK and our relationships with the rest of the world. The Government wishes to take this unique opportunity to reassess our priorities and our approach to delivering them, including in light of COVID-19. The Review will cover all aspects of international and national security policy, which includes diplomacy, development and national resilience as well as defence.

2.In its response to this report, the Government should set out how and when the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers will be involved in the Review process. Additionally, we seek clarity regarding:

a.Which Cabinet Minister will chair the Review process in the Prime Minister’s absence

b.What role the No 10 Policy Unit and Specialist Advisers will play in the Review process

The Government should:

c.Set out the respective roles and responsibilities of the NSC and its relevant sub-committees, the Cabinet and Government Departments in the Review process

d.Explain what role the National Security Adviser and NSC(O) will play in the Review process and what role the National Security Strategy and Implementation Group will play in driving integration at an official level, and

e.Explain whether thematic workstreams have been identified. (Paragraph 25)

The Integrated Review is led by the Prime Minister and delivered through the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC(O) supports the NSC. The Foreign Secretary, as First Secretary of State, is also chairing a Ministerial Small Group to support the process. The Small Group has submitted political advice to the Prime Minister on some of the critical policy issues. While the NSC is the main forum for Integrated Review policy decisions, other Ministerial fora such as the National Space Council will make decisions within their remit that will be reflected in the final strategy.

The Cabinet Secretariat Integrated Review team is led by Alex Ellis (Deputy National Security Adviser for the Integrated Review) who reports to the National Security Adviser. The team is responsible for coordinating the cross-Whitehall policy process, document drafting and engagement coordination.

The No.10 Integrated Review Taskforce is a small group comprising experts and officials in the No.10 Policy Unit and includes one special adviser (Professor John Bew, the Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy Adviser). The Taskforce supports the Prime Minister and works closely with the Cabinet Secretariat team to ensure that the Government’s priorities are being delivered through the Integrated Review.

The Review has focused its work so far on five thematic workstreams:

I. Resilience;

II. Foreign policy (covering UK in the world and global issues);

III. Defence;

IV. Science, technology and data; and

V. Strengthening HMG’s systems.

3.The Review should assess and report on the effectiveness of existing Government structures and policies designed to facilitate cross-Government collaboration. This should include a review of the National Security Council and associated policy frameworks and funds, such as the Fusion Doctrine and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. If existing collaboration is inadequate, the Review should identify ways to ensure greater cross-Government collaboration in the future. (Paragraph 26)

The Review is considering all cross-Government collaboration in the context of our national security and international policy, strategy and delivery, including assessing the effectiveness of all relevant structures and systems.

4.To ensure lessons are learned from previous security and defence Reviews, the Integrated Review should engage with a wide range of stakeholders who were engaged in or scrutinised previous Reviews and the policies, programmes and military deployments that flowed from them. (Paragraph 30)

When he launched the Review, the Prime Minister was clear that it should be as open and transparent as possible. Throughout the Review, officials across departments have met with former Ministers, senior national security officials as well as former defence officials, all with experience of previous Reviews. This engagement has and will continue for the duration of the Review.

The Government has sought input from our most important allies and partners, including the defence industry, and is also taking views from civil society stakeholders including think tanks and academia. The exact mechanisms for this engagement vary between stakeholders.

5.The Government should review how far these activities were aligned with or deviated from the outcomes of previous Reviews, in order to better understand how to ensure the Integrated Review provides a sustainable and actionable framework for the future. In response to our report, if it has not done so before, the Government should:

a.Explain how existing lessons learned will inform the Review

b.Set out what new analysis will be carried out

c.Ensure that there are effective mechanisms for implementing the Review, and

d.Explain how the Review’s successes or failings will be measured. (Paragraph 30)

a. and b.) The Integrated Review approach has reflected on lessons from previous reviews, including in framing early political direction and use of evidence and challenge. The Review is making use of a wide range of analysis from internal and external sources including, but not limited to, assessment of Government’s systems and capabilities; deep analysis of national security risks, future scenarios and strategic trends including COVID-19 implications. The Review has sought input from a range of internal and external experts and the public Call for Evidence contributed over 450 submissions which have been collated and assessed.

c. and d.) The Government is committed to ensuring that there are effective mechanisms in place for implementing the Review and that, in this process, we learn lessons from previous reviews and successful models used by other nations. There will be a clear overarching governance structure at both Ministerial and official level, which will oversee the effective implementation of the Review. The detail on implementation and evaluation will be included in the published document.

6.We welcome the Government’s ambition to conduct the “deepest” and “most radical review since the Cold War.” At a time of such geopolitical and economic uncertainty, it is vital that the Review involves thorough consideration of the desired “ends” of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy as well as the “ways” and “means” required to achieve them. To realise its ambition, Government must identify and overcome the factors that contribute to a Review becoming a “business as usual” exercise. By answering the questions laid out in this report, the Review can overcome the tensions inherent in the Review process and identify and question assumptions at the heart of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy.

In response to this Report, Government should:

a.Set out the mechanisms and approach to challenging assumptions underpinning the UK’s defence strategy

b.Explain what role the Dstl’s Defence Wargaming Centre and MoD’s Strategic Net Assessment Unit will play (Paragraph 36)

The Government agrees with the Committee that appropriate challenge is critical to delivering the Integrated Review. External challenge is being invited and incorporated into the Integrated Review across the board, including through targeted workshops. We have set up an integrated, whole-of-government approach to deliver the UK’s ambitious vision for the next decade and to develop the capabilities and systems needed to achieve our aims. Policy work on the Review involves detailed horizon-scanning, covering future trends, opportunities, risks and threats; evidence-gathering and policy analysis; and engagement, undertaken within a structured cross-Whitehall process. This process is designed to identify the detail underpinning policy, capability and systems reform options that will be developed alongside the Spending Review process, for decision-making in the Autumn.

The MOD has built mechanisms into its internal process to challenge the developing Defence proposition and the assumptions that lie beneath it. As stated above in response to Q4, the MOD is consulting widely inside and outside of Government, ensuring some of the UK’s best minds are feeding into its conclusions and challenging traditional Whitehall assumptions and thinking. The exact mechanisms for this engagement vary between stakeholders.

Threat assessment, Great Power Competition, hostile activity by foreign states and international terrorism was substantially evidenced by a range of Intelligence assessments, including longer-term analytical studies, specially commissioned pieces for the Integrated Review process, and real-time updates on the evolving COVID-19 situation and its effect on UK strategy. Evidence and expertise from both the Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (DSTL) Wargaming Centre and the Strategic Net Assessment Team have been used in the MOD’s Integrated Review process. Detailed findings from existing DSTL wargames have been used to inform the assessment of risk and develop capability. Expertise from the DSTL Wargaming Centre helped shape a critical cross-MOD senior exercise in early September.

7.It remains to be seen whether the foreign policy aspect of the Review will produce a distinct Foreign Policy Strategy or whether this will be combined with a National Security Strategy. Whether the Review produces one, two, or three documents, we have heard that it must first clearly identify the desired “ends” of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy. It is only by developing a detailed conceptual framework for the UK’s security and foreign policy that the Review will be able to identify and question current assumptions and provide an evidence-base to make decisions about the UK’s future defence policy and posture.

We therefore recommend that the Review explains how the Government views risk, includes clear and detailed definitions of how the Government understands key terms such as “security” and “resilience” and provides answers to the following questions:

a.What is the UK’s understanding of the concepts of national, international and human security and the relationships between them?

b.What does domestic resilience mean and how is it related to the UK’s foreign and defence policy?

c.What security and defence priorities emerge from an analysis of the UK’s domestic priorities? In what ways are they complementary and in what ways do they conflict?

d.How does the UK view the international system and its place within it? (Paragraph 42)

The Integrated Review is addressing all of these issues.

8.We have heard that in order to identify the desired “ends” of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy, the Review must clearly articulate the UK’s interests and values. Whilst scrutiny of the UK’s foreign policy falls to the Foreign Affairs Committee, from a defence perspective we believe that the Review should answer the following questions:

a.How does the UK define its national interest abroad?

b.What role do values play in the UK’s foreign policy?

c.How will the UK pursue its objectives through hard and soft power instruments? (Paragraph 46)

All of these points will be addressed. The review will consider the ends, ways and means of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy.

9.Particularly at a time of such geopolitical uncertainty, it is vital that the foreign policy aspect of the review reflects the UK’s understanding of, and ambitions for, its international relationships and partnerships. Our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee are conducting an inquiry into the foreign policy aspects of the Review, but, from a defence perspective, the politics and power involved in international relationships are an essential reference point for understanding the threats and risks to the UK’s national and international priorities and the defence capabilities which are required to defend and protect them.

The Review should therefore include a clear and detailed analysis of the UK’s approach to:

a.Bilateral relationships (notably, with the U.S. and key EU member states)

b.Multinational security and defence alliances (notably, NATO and the Five Eyes)

c.Relationship with the European Union and the U.N, Commonwealth, G20/G7 and other regional groupings. (Paragraph 57)

The Integrated Review will define the Government’s ambition for the UK’s role in the world and the long-term strategic aims for our national security and foreign policy – setting out how the UK will be a problem-solving and burden-sharing nation. This is a defining moment in how the UK relates to the rest of the world. The Government wants to take this unique opportunity to reassess our priorities and our approach to delivering them. We know that we cannot always act alone, and our ultimate capability is our network of bilateral relationships and alliances. This will be an important theme of the Review.

10.It remains to be seen whether the forthcoming Review will include an update to the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) or whether a new approach will emerge. Whether or not the Review uses the terminology of the NSRA, we suggest that if this aspect of the Review is to provide a useful guide to inform the UK’s defence posture, it should adhere to the following principles:




• Draws on a wide range of sources

• Considers the capability and intent of the UK’s adversaries and allies

• Considers the impact and threats posed by new and emerging technologies

• Recognises the drivers of conflict and instability

• Takes account of the changing character of warfare

• Establishes broad threat and risk categories

• Distinguishes between short term and long-term risks and threats

• Includes a clear and realistic prioritisation

• Subject to robust challenge from within and outside Government

• Communicated to Parliament and the public in a way that balances the need for secrecy with the benefits of transparency

(Paragraph 74)

The National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) is produced every two years and assesses the likelihood and impact of the most serious, malicious and non-malicious risks facing the UK or its interests overseas. The methodology underpinning the assessment is regularly iterated in light of lessons learned from real-world events and training exercises, as well as new scientific and technical evidence when it becomes available. The Integrated Review is considering resilience with a wide aperture and encourages all stakeholders to consider policy and capability building across the whole risk management lifecycle (identifying, assessing, preventing, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from, risks) and to better reach out across the whole of society to build resilience. Risk assessment work, including the valuable data collated as part of the NSRA, will continue to be integral to building resilience and informing the UK’s defence posture. Any recommendations stemming from the Integrated Review will be incorporated into the NSRA as appropriate.

11.We welcome the Review’s focus on intensifying geopolitical competition in

light of COVID-19. To deliver a robust assessment of the capabilities and short- and long-term ambitions of hostile foreign states, the Review must consider the full range of Russia and China’s economic, diplomatic and military activities and include a thorough assessment of their internal political dynamics. (Paragraph 75)

The Integrated Review has drawn on all source assessment of many countries’ current and future capability, intent (including internal dynamics and drivers) and the implications for UK national security.

12.Existing spending commitments are a necessary but insufficient basis for approaching funding decisions in the Integrated Review. Whilst the economic outlook for the UK remains uncertain, it is imperative that funding considerations are informed by the Review’s strategic analysis and not the other way around.

The Integrated Review should look beyond the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP on defence to consider what financial resources are required to ensure that defence can contribute to achieving the priorities of the UK’s security. (Paragraph 82)

We have not limited our thinking by setting unnecessary constraints or red lines. That is why we are running the Comprehensive Spending Review in parallel to the Integrated Review; to ensure that Departments are equipped with the resources to enact the Review’s conclusions. The UK Government remains committed to spending at least 2% of GDP on Defence. The commitment to the 2% benchmark should certainly be seen as a floor and not a ceiling, but equally, we should not fixate on percentages. Setting the Defence budget is about assessing the threats we face and determining the capabilities we will need to deal with them. The Integrated Review will inform this process.

13.To ensure that the Review considers the ways, ends and means of the UK’s security, defence, development and foreign policy in the round, the Government must set out the mechanisms that will be used to ensure the alignment between the Integrated Review and the Comprehensive Spending Review and clarify the baseline for increases in defence spending. (Paragraph 90)

The Government is keenly aware that ambition must be tied to resource, and so the Integrated and Comprehensive Spending Reviews will remain closely aligned to ensure that Departments are equipped with the resources they need to enact the Integrated Review’s conclusions. In particular, the MOD recognises the importance of ensuring its Comprehensive Spending Review submission to HM Treasury reflects delivery of the policy proposition for the Integrated Review. The MOD is progressing its contribution to the Integrated Review by planning how best to meet tomorrow’s threats within its increasing budget. All of the MOD’s business areas are engaged on the Review to ensure that we have a robust and deliverable financial baseline.

14.We urge the Government to consider a long-term multi-year financial settlement for defence, in order to ensure that the Integrated Review provides a reliable basis for planning the UK’s future defence posture. Without this assurance, ongoing issues with the affordability and availability of the UK’s defence capabilities will persist and our role in the world diminished. (Paragraph 91)

The Comprehensive Spending Review will provide a multiyear financial settlement for Defence to enable the delivery of the policy priorities set out in the Integrated Review. The Government position on the Comprehensive Spending Review has not changed.

15.The Integrated Review is an opportunity for the Ministry of Defence to explain how our Armed Forces will fight in the future. It is promising that work is underway to develop new operating concepts but it is vitally important that this work is communicated to wider Government stakeholders involved in the Review before its completion. As demonstrated by COVID-19, our Armed Forces are required to fulfil a diverse range of domestic and international tasks. Their concept of operations must realistically reflect what commitments are possible with the resources and capabilities available. These concepts should inform capability and funding decisions made as part of the Review and, given their significance, one key output of the Review should be to formally record these new operating concepts in doctrine. (Paragraph 105)

The Integrated Operating Concept 2025, launched by the Secretary of State for Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff on 30 September 2020, sets out a new approach to the utility of armed force in an era of persistent competition. It represents a significant change in UK military thought and demands transformation in military capability. It highlights both the ‘ways’ that Defence will operate out to 2030 and the ‘means’ required for a modernised force for the 2030s. It builds on the Future Force Concept published in 2017 that provided the principal Defence-level guidance and coherence for all future force development. This concept is being used to inform Defence’s contribution to the Integrated Review, including the capability and resources required.

16.Capability decisions made as part of the Review should be informed by the Review’s foreign policy analysis, threat and risk assessment and defence operating concepts. Defence planning assumptions and the UK’s overall defence posture should be reviewed, and informed by the following questions:

a.What platforms, weapons and personnel, readiness and maintenance are required to ensure the resilience, availability and adaptability of the UK’s Armed Forces?

b.What “critical mass” is required for our Armed Forces to respond to the threats and risks to the UK?

c.What investment and innovation are required to respond to and exploit technological developments?

d.Which existing capabilities can be enhanced or retired? (Paragraph 106)

The Integrated Review is a unique moment for Defence to rebalance and prepare our forces for persistent global engagement and campaigning, with the ability to transition between operating and warfighting as required. We are determined to innovate relentlessly and transform, ensuring we have modern Armed Forces to tackle varied threats in an age of constant competition. Instead of mass and mobilisation, we must focus on speed and readiness, operating in the sub-threshold, conflict prevention, and resilience.

We are being clear-eyed about providing choices that remove capability with less utility and allow us instead to invest in capabilities that take us from industrial age platforms to an information age of systems. The MOD’s Defence Capability Planning teams are considering a range of possible future operating environments and the likely impact of technological, environmental and population changes, to assess the issues and risks emerging, and propose capabilities to counter the threats across timeframes to 2030 and beyond.

17.Given that systemic challenges have not been resolved in the previous thirteen reviews of defence procurement, we doubt that the Integrated Review will come up with even a short-term fix. We believe that the Review ought to address the strategic issues that should underpin the UK’s approach to defence procurement, in order to provide a sound basis to address these challenges in the future.

The UK’s capability priorities and force structure should inform the answers to the following strategic questions on the procurement process:

a.What capabilities and skills must remain sovereign and what can be bought “off-the-shelf”? What are the implications for operational advantage, freedom of action, cost and national prosperity?)

b.How does the UK define value for money in defence procurement?

c.How can UK defence procurement ensure the resilience of logistics and supply?

d.How can the procurement process be used to foster innovation and ensure access to intellectual property?

e.Is defence procurement, research and development keeping pace with future requirements?

f.How will lessons from procurement failures be captured and addressed?

The Committee welcomes ongoing work to review the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy. This strategy should be informed by the strategic decisions made as part of the Integrated Review. The Committee will continue to explore the UK’s defence industrial policy in our ongoing parallel inquiry on this topic. (Paragraph 115)

a)In March 2020, the Government launched a cross-Government review of the UK’s defence and security industry sectors. This work, being led by the MOD but carried out with input from across Whitehall, is considering the defence and security industry on a segment by segment basis, taking into account our national security requirements and opportunities to maximise our prosperity and global influence. Decisions on where and how we should adapt our existing procurement policies will be taken based on investment decisions made as part of the Integrated Review. We look forward to updating the Committee on this work in due course, including as part of the ongoing parallel inquiry into Defence industrial policy.

b)In line with HM Treasury guidance, our procurement approach seeks to consider all the relevant costs and benefits, including to wider UK society overall, taking into account all social, economic, environmental and financial impacts that could be relevant to society’s prosperity, where there is relevant evidence. Cost is defined as whole life cost, not just purchase price, taking into account the cost over time, including the capital, maintenance, management, operating and disposal costs. Achieving value for money means that paying more for higher quality may be justified, and this is assessed through relevant investment appraisal and procurement processes.

c)The MOD already operates, or is implementing, initiatives to better understand and manage overarching supply chain risks and opportunities. Our approach to supply chains and ensuring the security of our supply more generally is being considered as part of the review into the defence and security industrial sectors, with an increasing emphasis placed on the experiences of our response to COVID-19. Much activity is already underway to address the opportunities and risks of a globalised supply chain, but this review provides an opportunity to bring greater coherence to the various strands of activity across Defence. It also brings an opportunity to amplify and enhance our policies and procedures related to the security of supply, including a greater focus on supply chain mapping and understanding.

d)and e) The MOD is also already increasing the pace and agility of our acquisition processes to better exploit innovation and enable the effective and more timely pull-through of emergent technology. We are exploring new ways of partnering the civil sector and industry earlier in the procurement process, to ensure we can benefit from innovation and new technology and inform requirements and delivery approaches at an early stage. Determining the Department’s intellectual property requirement is an important consideration to support this intent and ensure our ability to operate: the MOD has a dedicated Intellectual Property Rights advisory team and we are currently reinforcing our guidance to enhance programme practice and secure the right access to intellectual property needed by programmes through-life.

e)Defence has systems in place both to identify lessons and to conduct checks and balances as programmes are delivered. Defence Equipment and Support‘s Delivery Endorsement Committee reviews projects for their achievability, and the independent Infrastructure and Projects Authority reviews programmes at critical points, and where lessons are identified these are shared amongst the Project Delivery community. The Project Delivery Function and Chief Economist are working to improve lessons learned and project evaluation.

Our most complex programmes are also subject to regular deep dives by a group of the most senior staff in the Department, providing support and challenge to our Senior Responsible Owners. We have upgraded our investment decision-making approach to take better account of the complexity and risk associated with each programme. The introduction of three-step approvals, with the Strategic Outline Case as a new and earlier approval point, provides upfront clarity of programme scope and understanding of critical risks. We have made changes to facilitate the proportionate scrutiny of individual programmes, maintaining rigour while focusing on what matters. By setting up programmes for success from the outset and exploiting this proportionate approach, we expect to improve, and where appropriate speed up, overall delivery.

18.We have heard that external engagement in the Review process provides a challenge function to the Government’s understanding, can act as an early signpost to stakeholders who can contribute to achieving the UK’s security and defence priorities and contributes to the legitimacy of the review’s outcomes. External consultation must be structured in a clear and transparent way so that all interested stakeholders can contribute. In some cases, there may be existing mechanisms for Government to solicit the views of external stakeholders (such as the Defence Suppliers Forum, the CDS’ Strategy Forum, and the Defence Policy Board) and in other cases new mechanisms and approaches should be explored.

In its response to this report, Government should describe the process by which the following constituencies will be involved in the Review:

a.Parliament (including relevant Select Committees)

b.The public

c.Civil society and academia

d.International allies and partners

e.Industry and trade associations

f.Serving Armed Forces personnel of all ranks (Paragraph 130)

The Government is keen to ensure that some of the best minds in the UK and beyond are feeding into the Review’s conclusions and challenging traditional Whitehall assumptions and thinking.

a)Several informal briefings to MPs and peers have taken place since the Integrated Review re-started in June. The aim of these has been to inform as well as seek input from parliamentarians. Ministers and senior officials also continue to be available for public appearances in front of Select Committees.

b)The public Call for Evidence ran for four weeks, from 13 August to 11 September. It was open to any member of the public and allowed the Government to take into account a wide range of views to help inform the content and conclusions of the Review. Despite the compressed timelines we received over 450 submissions, twice the usual amount received in a 10-week process. Over 160 of the substantive submissions were defence-related.

c)We are engaging with experts beyond Whitehall (at home and abroad) and wider stakeholders with interest in our nation’s security and prosperity, and the global challenges the UK will face over the coming years. This engagement has taken the form of direct conversations with the lead Deputy National Security Adviser; roundtables and workshops; outreach by departments; and the public Call for Evidence.

d)Ministers and officials across Whitehall have engaged with international partners throughout the Integrated Review process. This engagement will continue for the rest of the Integrated Review process and beyond. We are also working through HMG’s extensive overseas network to involve perspectives from our international partners.

COVID-19 has inevitably constrained MOD’s original plans, but we have nonetheless delivered a broad programme of engagement with our key stakeholder groups, including those highlighted by the Committee. As part of a regular pattern of broader engagement, MOD Ministers and officials have also offered to engage with the three Devolved Administrations on progress with the Integrated Review. The MOD has sought input from many of our most important allies and partners, including the defence industry, and is also taking views from civil society stakeholders including think tanks and academia. The exact mechanisms for this engagement vary between stakeholders.

e)MOD has sought input from industry stakeholders through established ministerial and senior official fora and bespoke sessions. The Review has been discussed regularly at the Defence Suppliers’ Forum (comprised of strategic suppliers, mid-tier companies, SME representatives, and trade associations), one-to-one supplier engagements, and sessions with trade associations. Alongside this, the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy Review team has also undertaken UK and international engagement with trade associations, international partners, and business of all sizes, in both existing and bespoke fora, to inform its developing recommendations and the Integrated Review.

f)The single Services have had input into shaping our initial Defence proposition. Front Line Commands adopt their own arrangements to involve key stakeholders, experts and commanders to influence decision making. Outside the direct chain of command, there is a network of senior Warrant Officers in each of the Services as well as Strategic Command. Each is the enlisted advisor to their respective Chief, and they participate in their Service or Command’s executive board. They engage routinely to share policy and personnel-related issues from across all ranks within their own Service or Command, including information relating to the Integrated Review.

Published: 22 October 2020