12.Many countries have yet to increase ambition under the Paris ratchet mechanism: only 45 (44 countries and the EU) out of the 197 UNFCCC Parties met a UN deadline to submit updated NDCs by the end of 2020. At the time of writing, in April 2021, only 52 parties representing around 30% of global emissions have submitted updated NDCs, and the NDCs of several countries such as Australia, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, and Russia are no more ambitious than their first-round submissions.27 Some countries such as New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea have now committed to revise and increase the targets they submitted last year ahead of COP26, but more countries will need to follow suit if we are to keep the 1.5°C target within reach.28 The UN’s Initial NDC Synthesis Report shows that current NDCs put us on a path to achieve a less than 1 percent reduction in emissions by 2030 compared to 2010 levels.29 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by contrast, has indicated that emission reduction ranges need to be around 45 percent lower in order to meet the 1.5°C temperature goal.30 The FCDO acknowledge that the Synthesis Report shows that “we are a long way off what is collectively required” and argue that it will serve “as a call to action to all countries ahead of COP26”.31
13.Some of the largest emitters, such as China and the US, have yet to submit their second-round NDCs.32 Securing ambitious NDCs from these two major economies will be vital to the success of COP26.33 If the UK’s diplomatic efforts can help secure a significant increase in the NDCs of the US and China, it may encourage other, more hesitant countries to also come forward with enhanced climate pledges. Some positive signs have emerged: China announced a net-zero by 2060 target, whilst the US has recommitted to the Paris Agreement, appointed a Special Presidential Envoy for Climate and is likely to announce an increase in its ambition at its ‘Earth Day Summit’ on climate change on 22 April. However, the UK will need to continue to push for increased ambition if it is to ensure that these NDCs are in line with the principles expressed in the Paris Agreement.34
14.The UK Presidency will need to use all the tools they have at their disposal to create an atmosphere of collective purpose in the lead up to COP26.35 This includes mainstreaming COP objectives into the FCDO’s foreign policy and development strategies and putting climate at the centre of all diplomatic activities that take place prior to the event itself.36 Contributors emphasised that every foreign engagement the UK undertakes can be an opportunity to exercise environmental diplomacy.37 We were told that decisions on overseas aid, international security, and trade all needed to be aligned with COP objectives.38
15.Adapting to climate change comes with considerable economic costs for many vulnerable countries. Delivering the finance package that these countries need to build resilience to threats such as climate change and covid-19 will be fundamental if the UK is to build relationships and trust with these countries in the run up to COP26.39 At COP15, developed countries agreed to provide developing countries with “scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding”.40 To date, the UK has performed well against this target, providing US$6.1 billion of additional finance in 2018 against 2009 levels.41 The Integrated Review also promised that the UK would continue to lead in this field, aligning ODA spend to the Paris Agreement principles and making ‘climate and biodiversity’ a strategic priority for ODA in 2021–22.42 However, the Government’s recent decision to reduce the 0.7 percent of gross national income the UK spends on overseas aid to 0.5 percent raises questions. Although the UK remains among the most generous aid donors, its credibility as a leader in climate finance is reliant on direction, not just quantum. Contributors told us that these aid cuts may undermine the UK’s ability to ask other countries to step up, as well as damaging the trust that climate-vulnerable countries have in the UK’s COP26 Presidency.43
16.Covid-19 has dominated international politics for the past year. Governments worldwide have devoted significant amounts of time and money to recovery from the pandemic, which may influence their ongoing capacity and willingness to tackle environmental issues.44 We were told that “the geopolitics could hardly be worse”45 and that:
Covid-19 has disrupted the geopolitical landscape. Global cooperation and multilateralism are being tested, as evidenced by rising diplomatic tensions between the US, China, the EU and beyond… Before covid-19, diplomacy towards COP26 was taking place in a geopolitical landscape with rising headwinds with potential for climate objectives to form the basis for political and economic influencing of other countries. Now, however, covid-19 will dominate international politics for at least the next year.46
With a global context not favourable for swift action on climate, the need for UK leadership to deliver global cooperation on environmental issues is more critical than ever.47 The UK will need to do a lot of heavy lifting and actively lobby to put environmental issues back on the global agenda.48 Witnesses emphasised that, as we begin the recovery from covid-19, the UK Presidency will need to demonstrate that environmental agendas are not in competition but are highly complementary with health, development and security issues.49 The UK will need to show that climate change itself poses risks to global security through its potential to exacerbate existing conflicts and create new ones. It will similarly need to show that climate change has the potential to negatively impact global health and exacerbate health inequalities.50
17.Due to covid-19, the UK and Italian Presidency now coincides with the UK’s Chair of the G7 and Italy’s Chair of the G20. This gives the UK and Italy a unique opportunity to build a partnership that will shape the global agenda on climate diplomacy throughout 2021. Thematically connecting the two events would ensure greater preparation for compromise and commitment between the major democracies and the industrialised nations. Witnesses told us that the UK and Italy must weave a “golden thread” of climate action through these major moments of international cooperation, using their presidency of the G7 to leverage political support for both climate and biodiversity actions.51 E3G argued that:
HMG could strengthen this by embedding environmental diplomats into internal G7/G20 teams. The UK must shift the conversation about environmental issues from environment and energy ministers, to mainstreaming it across ministries and at the highest levels (Heads of State and Finance Ministers).52
18.Environmental diplomacy can enhance the UK’s global leadership in line with the UK’s vision for ‘Global Britain’ set out in the Integrated Review. Covid-19 has delayed international progress on climate action but has provided more time for the UK to prepare the ground for a successful COP26. Every foreign engagement the UK undertakes in the lead up to COP26 can be an opportunity for environmental diplomacy. Environmental negotiations will need to take place within UN frameworks, in bilateral talks with countries, during trade negotiations, at the G7 and the G20, and in the UK’s engagement with NGO’s and the private sector. The UK will also need to ensure that climate objectives are effectively integrated into other foreign policy decisions, including decisions on international security, global health, and overseas aid.
19.The Government should ensure its objectives for COP26 are brought into all of the FCDO’s foreign policy activity, including trade deals, decisions on overseas aid and bilateral and multilateral conversations with other UNFCCC parties. The Government’s international development strategy should be published before COP26 and prioritise climate and biodiversity, listing the commitments that the UK will make along with pledges secured by partners. The recovery from covid-19 will require a Marshall Plan-scale commitment from many and the UK should ensure that this aligns with environmental ambitions, embedding a green outlook into a new economy. The FCDO should communicate to its partners that environmental agendas are not in competition but integral to health, development, and security policies. For COP26 to be successful, the Government should ensure alignment with G7, G20 and COP15 processes and decisions. As both the COP26, G7 and G20 Presidents, the UK and Italian Governments are well placed to ensure this alignment.
20.Encouraging all 197 UNFCCC parties to submit new, ambitious and comprehensive NDCs will be a huge diplomatic task for the UK Government and the FCDO in particular. In order to reach all UNFCCC parties, the UK Government will need to organise parties into various blocs to make the negotiation process more efficient.53 The French COP Presidency followed this approach, inviting ministers or heads of delegation from around 35–40 countries to multiple informal meetings in the lead up to COP21.54 Laurence Tubiana told us that this gave “a pretty fair representation of all the interests…of the countries” and helped to “bring people along”, creating a “group of friends” that could prove vital in the final negotiations.55
21.Our Integrated Review inquiry recommended that “the UK should use its convening power and thought leadership to bring together nimble networks of like-minded nations by agreeing a baseline for cooperation between them”.56 These sentiments were echoed during the course of this inquiry. Many contributors argued that, in order for COP26 to be successful, the UK Presidency must build ‘coalitions of the willing’, getting groups of like-minded countries to rally behind certain climate proposals.57 These coalitions of like-minded nations can be used to increase the pressure on all global actors, including major polluters, to commit to strong climate action. We were told that:
The UK has a strong record for building coalitions for climate action, such as the High Ambition Coalition at UN climate negotiations, and the Powering Past Coal Alliance. The UK should redouble efforts to create coalitions of the willing for progressive negotiated outcomes at UNFCCC negotiations.58
Robert Falkner, Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, argued that ‘this is something that no presidency can do on its own’ and told us that it would require a long-term process of engaging with other countries and high-ranking individuals who could help the UK build coalitions of countries to push for action on certain issues.59 Events like the US Earth Day Summit, Petersberg Climate Dialogue, COP15 and the G7 Leaders’ Summit will provide critical opportunities for the UK to progress negotiations and push for increased ambition.60 We heard that the UK must play a leading role in the preparations for these events and ensure that they are aligned with COP26 objectives.
22.We have seen some evidence of ‘coalition building’ from the UK COP Presidency. As part of its diplomatic efforts, the COP Presidency has initiated a series of multilateral campaigns and summits to build momentum for net zero, including the Race to Zero Campaign, the online Climate Ambition Summit, and the Climate and Development Ministerial, aimed at supporting countries most vulnerable to climate change. However, we were told that the Government would need to place more emphasis on coalition building and engaging with very vulnerable developing countries if it is to secure a successful outcome at Glasgow.61
23.Bilateral conversations will also be an important part of the FCDO’s diplomatic strategy. It is in these bilateral negotiations that the Government can discover the red lines of other parties and explore areas where there is negotiating flexibility.62 The FCDO can play an important role in this process, gathering intelligence from countries around the world to “help give the presidency a better sense of the overall ‘art of the possible’ and what landing zones there may be for COP outcomes”.63 Laurence Tubiana told us that you need bilateral conversations:
To understand where the big players are. In a way, it is easier in a bilateral conversation than in a club one. I have experienced that again and again.64
The COP26 President said that the diplomatic networks of the FCDO were being put to use, and Peter Hill, CEO of COP26, told the BEIS Committee that “the Permanent Secretary of the FCDO and the Foreign and Development Secretary have both, in recent weeks and months, written to the [diplomatic] network to ensure that they understand the priority that [COP26] needs to be given”.65
24.All countries share a common interest in preserving the planet—the global impacts of the climate crisis mean that COP26 will provide an opportunity for the UK to exercise soft power and rebuild relationships with key countries where differences remain on other issues. The UK Government should use its COP26 Presidency as an opportunity to open dialogues with countries and people around the world on common climate issues. The UK should capitalise on opportunities for collaboration, with like-minded partners on intellectual property sharing for green technology. The FCDO can play a key role in collecting information for the COP Unit, engaging in discussions with countries around the world to discover ‘red lines’ and areas where there is negotiating flexibility. If our diplomatic network is to be effective, posts will need to be set clear negotiating objectives. It will also be essential to secure public support for climate polices. We recommend that the FCDO sets out an engagement strategy that goes beyond governments, using international media and public engagement to promote behavioural change and popular commitment to climate polices.
25.The US Climate Summit and COP15 (the biodiversity COP) will be two key moments where the UK will need to take stock of progress and push for increased ambition. As the COP26 President, the UK should play a leading role in both the preparations for the US conference and during the conference itself. We recommend that the UK works closely with the US administration to align the objectives of the US climate summit on 22 April with the objectives of COP26. The United States’ unquestioned importance in the pledging of climate commitments should not replace the UK’s diplomatic role in bringing together other partners. It will be important for the FCDO to find ways to build bridges between both processes as well as pushing for ambitious commitments from the USA and China at COP26.
26.The UK has a strong record for building coalitions for climate action, such as the High Ambition Coalition at UN climate negotiations, and it could build upon this during its COP Presidency. Summits such as the global summit on climate and development provide an important opportunity to influence those countries most affected by the impacts of climate change. The UK Government should look to build overlapping circles of interest to build support for change and to drive forward global ambition. Building on partnerships that may be temporary, the UK should enable with staff support, though not always lead, groups of low-lying states, island nations, developing economies, high ambition states, and vulnerable country groups, amongst others, building on the work of the Small Island Developing States. We recommend that the FCDO make use of their relationships with the previous Chilean hosts, the Italian co-presidents, and other regional partners to build a network of sectoral leaders to help secure a worldwide push for increased climate ambition. The UK’s Presidency should be viewed as organisational and enabling.
27.In order to map the whole picture, it is important that the Government organise inclusive pre-meetings and do not simply hold pre-meetings on a regional basis. The Government should publish the agenda of these meetings to ensure inclusivity and to allow other countries to monitor the status of discussions.
28.In order to have credibility in discussions with international partners, the UK should lead by example, with strong domestic policies on environmental issues. Contributors emphasised the importance of the UK announcing ambitious climate policies, we were told that “If the UK is unable to ‘walk the talk’ on environmental policy the [FCDO] …will have no authority to influence international partners”.66 We have not explored the opportunities presented by exciting green innovations such as direct air capture plants, vertical farming, recycling technology, carbon capture gardens and smart villages, but the COP26 Presidency provides a key opportunity for the UK to position itself as a driver of innovation in these areas. The recently announced Net Zero Innovation Portfolio will provide a welcome source of funding for new low-carbon technologies and systems.67 By investing in and promoting the use of new green technologies the UK can position itself as a worldwide leader in low-carbon economies and influence other countries to follow our example.68
29.It is essential that domestic policy decisions support rather than undermine diplomatic efforts. We recommend that the UK leads by example and sets ambitious domestic climate policies. We welcome the introduction of the Net Zero Innovation Portfolio and recommend that the Government continue to explore and promote opportunities presented by new green technologies. HM Treasury is a key partner to the FCDO. Financial instruments that ensure enduring responsibility for environmental impact will be essential to demonstrate the UK’s enduring commitment to a green agenda and key to ensuring that the City’s leadership is used to embed change.
30.COP26 must aim to secure a form of realistic pricing of carbon output that prevents carbon offshoring and fully prices in the cost of the production of goods and transport. Building on the G7 and G20 to ensure the burden is carried by the commissioning country, and to incentivise change in producing nations, will change a simple equation based on the cost of energy to one based on the cost to the planet. The UK’s financial services sector, and particularly its insurance industry, is well placed to understand these costs. Using new forms of finance to look at cost-sharing based on innovative ledgers would provide an opportunity to realise the impact and share the reward of growth, while encouraging cross-industry and jurisdictional cooperation on climate targets.
27 CAT Climate Target Update Tracker, List of non-updating countries, accessed 7 April 2021
28 UNFCCC, Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement Synthesis report by the Secretariat, February 2021; Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations, dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021
29 UN Climate Press Release, Greater Climate Ambition Urged as Initial NDC Synthesis Report Is Published, February 2021
30 UN Climate Press Release, Greater Climate Ambition Urged as Initial NDC Synthesis Report Is Published, February 2021
31 Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations, dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021
32 CAT Climate Target Update Tracker, List of non-updating countries, accessed 7 April 2021
33 ODI (CLI0032), para 37; Qq8, 12, 32, 67
35 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2019–21, COP26: Principles and priorities—a POST survey of expert views, HC1000, P 16
36 See, for example, E3G (CLI0015); CAFOD (CLI0013); International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033); WWF (CLI0026); Q8
37 See, for example, E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism) (CLI0015); WWF (CLI0026)
38 See, for example, Bond Development and Environment Group (CLI0023); CAFOD (CLI0013); E3G (CLI0015); Global Justice Now (CLI0029); International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033); ODI (CLI0032); Tearfund (CLI0018); Q87
39 See, for example, Bond Development and Environment Group (DEG) (CLI0023)
40 UNFCCC, Draft Decision CP.15, 18 December 2009
41 International Institute for Environment and Development, UK aid cuts threaten climate leadership role of COP26 president, accessed 9 April 2021
42 Cabinet Office, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 16th March
43 See, for example, International Institute for Environment and Development, UK aid cuts threaten climate leadership role of COP26 president, accessed 9 April 2021; Q87
44 E3G (CLI0015)
45 Q6
46 E3G (CLI0015), para 27
47 WWF (CLI0026)
49 See, for example, E3G (CLI0015), para 31; International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033)
50 See, for example, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CLI0013); United Nations World Food Programme (CLI0028);
51 E3G (CLI0015) para 35; see also, Born Free Foundation (CLI0008); Royal Society of the Protection of Birds (RSPB) (CLI0016); Q28
52 E3G (CLI0015), para 35.
53 Q73
54 Qq82, 91
55 Q82
56 Foreign Affairs Committee, A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, Fourth Report of Session 2019–21, HC380, See also, Samantha Power (Qq1 and 6); Lord Hague of Richmond (Qq22 and 28); Alexander Downer (Q40); Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Q58); and Koji Tsuruoka (Q119)
57 See for example Robert Falkner (Q73); Laurence Tubiana (Q89); CAFOD (CLI0013); Christian Aid (CLI0004); International Fund for Animal welfare (CLI0017); Royal Society of the Protection of Birds (CLI0016)
58 E3G (CLI0015) para 15
59 Q17
60 Chatham House, 2021: A ‘super year’ for climate and environment action, Accessed 9th April 2021
61 See, for example, COP26 Coalition (CLI0030), Global Justice Now (CLI0029); WaterAid (CLI0021)
62 Christian Aid (CLI0004); Laurence Tubiana (Q89)
63 Christian Aid (CLI0004),
64 Q89
65 Oral evidence taken before the Business Energy and Industrial Skills Committee on 19 January 2021, HC 144, Q193
66 E3G (CLI0015); See also, COP 26 COALITION (CLI0030); Global Witness (CLI0002); Christian Aid (CLI0004); Katie White (Q11); ODI (CLI0032); UK Youth Climate (CLI0012); WWF (CLI0026); Q22
67 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Net Zero Innovation Portfolio, 3 March 2021
68 Dr Mara Oliva (CLI0005)
Published: 19 April 2021 Site information Accessibility statement