Humanitarian crises monitoring: impact of coronavirus (interim findings) Contents

---

1Introduction

Inquiry

1.In April 2020, very shortly after being established, the Committee launched an inquiry into the impact of the coronavirus on developing countries and the work of DFID in response.

The coronavirus pandemic

2.On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization (W.H.O.) was informed of a cluster of cases of pneumonia of unknown cause detected in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. The first reported fatality was a 61 year old man who failed to respond to treatment and died of heart failure on 9 January 2020. On 12 January, it was announced that a novel coronavirus had been identified and that initial analysis suggested that this was the cause of the outbreak. This new virus was termed ‘SARS-CoV-2’ and the associated disease, ‘Covid-19’. By the end of that month, the W.H.O. had declared the outbreak a “public health emergency of international concern” (its highest level of alarm).

3.During January, the coronavirus spread to all parts of China and cases were reported in the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, the US, Nepal, France, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Taiwan.

4.On 30 January, the W.H.O. declared the coronavirus a global emergency as the death toll in China jumped to 170 and cases were reported in more countries: India, Russia, Spain, Sweden Canada, Germany, Japan, the UAE—and the UK.

5.During February, many more countries reported coronavirus cases for the first time: Egypt (the first country in Africa), Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Norway, Romania, Greece, Georgia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, North Macedonia, Malaysia, Brazil, Estonia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Iran (including two deaths reported within hours after confirming its first cases), Israel, Italy and Japan. Deaths from the virus also began to rise across the world.

6.During March, other places, including Turkey, Ivory Coast, Gaza, Honduras, Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Panama and Mongolia confirmed their first cases and the numbers were rising in Italy, Spain and the US.

7.On 11 March, the W.H.O. officially, designated the coronavirus, “a pandemic” and on 1 April, UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, said that it presented the world with its “worst crisis” since World War II, as the global total of confirmed Covid-19 cases reached one million and the worldwide death toll topped 50,000.1

8.As this report was being finalised, the situation was once again looking dire, with a number of countries, including the UK, in the midst of formulating responses to what was clearly a second wave of the pandemic, with some—like India—seemingly still in the grip of a grim first wave.2

Terms of reference

9.The terms of reference for the inquiry initially identified the following priorities:

a)the emergence, incidence and spread of coronavirus virus infections and the Covid-19 disease in developing countries

b)the direct and indirect impacts of the outbreak on developing countries, and specific risks and threats (particularly relating to countries with existing humanitarian crises and/or substantial populations of refugees or internally displaced persons)

c)the UK’s response, bilaterally and with the international community, to the spread of coronavirus to developing countries

d)the impact of the outbreak on DFID’s operations (staff absences or reassignments, the impact of travel restrictions and other risk mitigation measures)

e)lessons identified and learned/applied from previous experience with infectious diseases (for example, Ebola); the implications for DFID’s policy on a global heath strategy

f)whether there are particular risks of transfer of the coronavirus from conflicted and fragile environments to other countries

g)the risks of negative national or local behaviours arising from perceived risks of cross-border re-infections

h)the impact of the outbreak, and consequential mitigation measures, on fund-raising by UK-based development charities and NGOs, and

i)the impact of the outbreak on UK aid funding in the longer term.

Evidence

10.We have been very grateful for the time taken by our witnesses—many of whom were directly involved in responding to the pandemic—to put together well over 130 written contributions3 and also those who grappled with the challenge of providing oral evidence via digital means.4 In that vein, we were also grateful for the work of a wide range of House Service staff who played a part in the very swift installation and coordination of the systems, processes and procedures needed to deliver online live broadcast sessions of oral evidence. It is worth noting that this new ability of select committees to gather oral evidence online from interlocutors located around the globe is one very positive development of this experience. In addition to formal hearings we benefited from a number of informal private briefings, for example Dr Grant Hill-Cawthorne, Head of the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) and a virologist

11.In this first phase the Committee took oral evidence5 about:

• humanitarian relief and development advocacy (15 May and 15 September) and selected crisis environments (4 June) from a range of actors and providers
• non-coronavirus immunisation and health issues (16 June) from Gavi, DFID’s Chief Scientific Adviser and the Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI)
• research and development (R&D) into coronavirus vaccines, treatments and tests (2 July) from delivery partnerships and collaborations between public, private and not-for-profit sector organisations
• the UK’s contribution to the global response from then new Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP, then DFID & FCO Minister of State, Rt Hon James Cleverly MP, and senior DFID officials (initial questions on 28 April and further exchanges on 6 July), and
• the latest situation in selected areas from humanitarian organisations and on the availability of data from epidemiologists from Imperial College and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (15 September).

Intervention: window of opportunity

12.Having received urgent representations from a number of humanitarian organisations, and in the light of a specific report on mitigating the pandemic by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Chair, Sarah Champion, wrote to the International Development Secretary on 4 May seeking to amplify some concerns. From their experience with Ebola, the relevant NGOs made a compelling case that there was a narrow window of opportunity for action to prepare systems in developing countries for the anticipated challenges of coronavirus; and that they had the agility and trusted relationships on the ground to best exploit that window laying the groundwork for mitigation of both primary and secondary impacts of the pandemic. The then DFID Secretary of State replied that:

• The UK contribution to the global response was £744 million
• Civil society organisations and NGOs were key delivery partners (but not the only ones) for much of this new UK funding
• Global crises demanded work through multilateral organisations for scale and coordination
• DFID was working with the UN to ensure funding gets to NGOs and other recipients as quickly as possible
• use of the Rapid Response Facility should ensure availability for use within a few weeks by expert pre-qualified UK and international NGOs
• other funding would be accessible to UK NGOs downstream (including, £50 million for a DFID-Unilever Covid-19 hygiene initiative and funds freed from some DFID country programmes after Covid-responsive reviews of existing portfolios.6

13.In addition, the Secretary of State shared with us her letter to all DFID supply partners on responding to the pandemic, maintaining delivery of essential programmes and the support on offer from HMG, and DFID specifically, to assist the management of the impacts of the pandemic on UK-based organisations and staff.

14.The Committee welcomed many positive aspects in this reply. However, the thrust of our early intervention was about speed, frontline healthcare and also tackling the secondary impacts of the pandemic. The Minister’s reference to a turnaround time of ‘weeks’ for funding channelled multilaterally, contrasted unfavourably with the NGOs’ claim of 48 hours for deployment of direct funding; especially in view of the speed at which this pandemic spreads. Also, the headline reference to the UK’s £744 million included a large proportion for R&D into vaccines, therapies and tests of which a substantial sum may well not be ODA-eligible. Taken with the anticipated squeeze on ODA (from reduced GNI), this may act to constrain ODA allocated for frontline care and secondary impacts—which were a key concern throughout our evidence.7

Interruption: DFID/FCO merger

15.In the midst of the crisis, our inquiry, and the Government’s own Integrated Review of international policy—without warning—the Prime Minister announced the merging of the Department of International Development into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to form the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (effective from 1 September 2020). The Committee had to postpone a planned hearing on R&D into coronavirus vaccines and therapies etc., to be able to hear the Prime Minister’s Statement.8 The Committee had published an interim report from our Effectiveness of UK Aid inquiry, a week earlier, recommending strongly against a merger.9 The Prime Minister’s decision flew in the face of the evidence and analyses that the Committee had gathered (and pre-empted the Government’s own Integrated Review). Our response to the substantive issues raised by the merger is contained in a further Effectiveness of UK Aid report on its implications10 and a Government reply covering both reports was received in September.11

16.In relation to the coronavirus crisis, the explanation provided by the Prime Minister for the timing of the decision, announcement and implementation was that it was needed not despite the pandemic but because of the coronavirus crisis. However, neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Secretary articulated a very compelling case for this position. On 16 June, the Prime Minister told the House:

Amid this pandemic, the House may ask whether this is the right moment to reorganise Whitehall, but I must say that in reality this crisis has already imposed fundamental changes on the way that we operate. If there is one further lesson, it is that a whole-of-Government approach, getting maximum value for the British taxpayer, is just as important abroad as it is at home. This is exactly the moment when we must mobilise every one of our national assets, including our aid budget and expertise, to safeguard British interests and values overseas. The best possible instrument for doing that will be a new Department charged with using all the tools of British influence to seize the opportunities ahead.12

And the Foreign Secretary added, in answer to an Urgent Question two days later:

For too long, we have indulged an artificial line, dividing the goals that our aid budget and foreign policy serve. This coronavirus crisis has confirmed just how artificial that line is. Across Whitehall, I have chaired the international ministerial group, bringing all relevant Departments together to support the most vulnerable countries exposed to Covid-19; to energise our pursuit of a vaccine, working with our international partners; to return stranded British citizens from abroad; and to keep vital international supply chains open. In every one of these areas, we have been compelled to align our development, trade, security and wider foreign policy objectives.13

17.It is early days for any assessment of the impact of the UK’s new integrated approach to aid and diplomacy, but no witness complained of substantial distraction or upheaval due to the merger. For example, we heard from the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) that: “FIND has been working closely, and will continue to work closely, with DFID, no matter where DFID eventually ends up and how things work out. We will work with DFID.”14

This report

18.This report seeks to identify the threats and risks arising from both coronavirus infections and cases (direct or primary impacts) and those arising from official, and unofficial, measures taken to prevent, avoid or reduce infections and the spread of the virus (indirect or secondary impacts).

19.Falling between these categories are various obstacles and challenges thrown in the path of effective humanitarian and development responses to the pandemic—ranging from practical transport difficulties for humanitarian personnel and materiel to the loss of trust and engagement in international medical provision by local communities or dangerous lapses in observance of the basic norms of humanitarian law.

20.The report also considers the UK response, bilaterally, as well as within the wider multilateral effort, such as the UK’s role in the multilateral response to the pandemic, including the search for vaccines, treatments and test for Covid-19, and plans, resources and commitments to ensure the equitable global availability of products developed, regardless of economic power.

21.The Committee also aimed at setting out the latest state of play with regard to the spread of coronavirus in DFID’s partner developing countries across the Global South. There are certainly a wide range of reports and tracking initiatives available but, overall, in this objective the Committee had to settle for pointing towards the best possible information while setting out the various issues and challenges around the gathering and interpreting of coronavirus and Covid-19 data.

22.We conclude by looking at the impact of the UK’s own struggle to contain and deal with the coronavirus pandemic on the resources available for UK aid efforts. Finally, we consider options for next steps.