40.Our evidence indicates that the merger of DFID into the FCO is an error, and the way that the decision has been taken is grievously flawed. That said, the task now is to establish the conditions, mechanisms and indicators that will make this change work as effectively as possible. The creation of the new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office presents an opportunity to assess the UK’s approach to its international development policy. It offers the chance to make sure that UK aid is spent in the most effective and transparent way, and that it maximises value for money for beneficiaries in country and UK taxpayers alike. We set out below the ways in which we believe the Government can spend UK aid in the best possible way, identifying risks and learning lessons from countries with merged development and diplomacy functions.
41.The Government’s Integrated Review will include a reassessment of the key principles of the UK’s international policy, including the role of development and its interaction with the UK’s diplomatic, security and trade objectives. We believe that maintaining a core focus upon poverty reduction is the fundamental basis of an effective UK aid policy. Without an independent DFID, there is a risk that poverty reduction could be diluted amongst other competing policy objectives.
42.COVID-19 will deepen the challenge of tackling global poverty, with the World Bank warning that the pandemic will push 49 million people into extreme poverty this year.67 The pandemic has the potential to wipe out the development gains of the past 30 years, imposing a catalogue of challenges upon the poorest and most fragile countries. These societies are facing severe damage to their economies, combined with stretched national healthcare systems, reduced access to education and challenges to food security.68 The effects of the pandemic will be felt for years to come.69
43.Against this backdrop, the predicted contractions to gross national income (GNI) in donor countries mean there will be less money available than before to fund development. Current estimates from the Bank of England predict a 14% drop in UK GNI in 2020.70 Therefore, it is key that future UK aid spending maintains its focus on poverty reduction, helping the very poorest and most vulnerable people.
44.It is in the UK’s national interest to provide development assistance which is targeted at reducing global poverty, and helping those in the very poorest countries. Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Sir Stephen O’Brien said,
“it is in the interests of the UK and her people to partner with the countries where there is most need as we are making a significant impact on the ability of people to be their own agents and call for good governance themselves”.71
Through tackling poverty, UK aid extends the UK’s influence on the international stage, creating soft power. Whether through the response to the Ebola crisis, or support to refugees fleeing Syria, UK aid targeted towards the poorest and most vulnerable underlines the UK’s reputation for working towards the global common good, extending UK diplomatic influence at both bilateral and multilateral level.72
45.Reflecting upon his experience as UK Ambassador to Jordan, Peter Millett felt that “our programmes certainly enhanced our influence”73 and former UK Ambassador to Yemen Frances Guy told us that the UK’s international aid commitments “count towards general respect for the UK in multilateral institutions and gives the UK a bigger voice in multilateral meetings”.74 Reflecting on her experience in Yemen, she said,
“having a big aid programme certainly helped in discussions on other issues with the government, including on international terrorism, and meant that the UK’s views had to be taken into account”.75
In evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee earlier this year, former US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power added,
“DFID’s contribution, not only in international development as such—helping developing countries to grow more stable over time—but as a tool in our respective foreign policy arsenals, enhances British leverage.”76
46.In 2018, the majority (55%) of the UK’s bilateral aid spending was focused upon Least Developed and Other Low-Income Countries.77 In the Prime Minister’s announcement of the merger, he questioned this focus, stating,
“We give as much aid to Zambia as we do to Ukraine, though the latter is vital for European security. We give ten times as much aid to Tanzania as we do to the six countries of the Western Balkans, who are acutely vulnerable to Russian meddling.”78
47.Of the countries mentioned by the Prime Minister, Zambia and Tanzania are classified by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as Least Developed Countries (the very poorest), whereas Ukraine and the Western Balkans six are classified as Middle Income Countries.79 DFID concentrates its spending upon 33 priority countries, with interventions predominantly focused on low income countries (in 2018, DFID spent 62.5% of its country-specific aid in Least Developed Countries .80
48.In contrast, non-DFID ODA has a different geographic profile, with around three-quarters going to middle income countries such as China and India.8182 The FCO administers ODA through its departmental budget and through the cross-government funds83 and, prior to the merger, is the third largest non-DFID ODA administering department. Unlike ODA administered through DFID, ODA administered through the FCO does not explicitly seek to focus upon the very poorest countries, nor upon the very poorest people in Middle Income Countries.
49.This trend is typified by the Government’s pursuit of mutual prosperity, where aid is spent in areas where it delivers benefits both for the recipient country and for the UK economy. Prosperity Fund projects are specifically targeted towards Middle Income Countries, and projects tend to focus upon fostering conditions to create general economic growth in a country. For example, in China this includes supporting reforms to the financial services sector, such as supporting international participation in China’s bond and equities market and developing its regulatory approach to financial innovation.84 By their nature, these projects are not focused directly upon helping the poorest and most vulnerable in society.85 In the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s (ICAI’s) recent report into the use of UK aid to enhance mutual prosperity, ICAI expressed concern that the mutual prosperity agenda could,
“skew the allocation of resources of aid towards countries or sectors where the UK has commercial interests, rather than those with the greatest impact on poverty”.86
50.The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk argued that there is a “serious risk that a merger would result in strong pressure on DFID to spend ODA in a similar manner to how the FCO spend ODA, with an emphasis upon assistance to Middle Income Countries, rather than specifically targeting interventions towards the world’s very poorest and most vulnerable people”.87 The Prime Minister’s comparison of UK ODA spending in Zambia and Ukraine suggests that he is keen to undertake this reappraisal.
51.The mergers in Australia and Canada were followed by a geographic repositioning of the countries’ aid budgets. Since the 2013 integration of AusAID into the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia has focused its assistance upon its immediate neighbourhood in the South Pacific and South-East Asia (all of Australia’s neighbours are ODA recipients except New Zealand). It has also halved its ODA spend in Africa.88 In 2017–18, the majority of Australia’s allocated aid budget was designated for Middle Income Countries, and its top two recipients, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, are both Middle Income Countries.89
52.The Australian Government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper underlined this approach, stating that the country’s development assistance would “reflect our values while supporting our interests”90 and would “support efforts to build a stable and prosperous world, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific”.9192 In December 2019, the Australian Government began the process of developing a new international development policy, which is expected to place an emphasis upon economic development and retain a focus on the Indo-Pacific.93
53.Following the creation in 2013 of Global Affairs Canada, Leonard Cheshire told us that Canada’s aid was characterised by a greater focus on Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as a focus upon middle income countries such as Vietnam.94 Canada’s ‘Official Development Assistance Accountability Act’ defines the purpose of Canadian ODA to be provided,
“with a central focus on poverty reduction and in a manner that is consistent with Canadian values, Canadian foreign policy, the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2, 2005, sustainable development and democracy promotion and that promotes international human rights standards.”95
In June 2017, Canada launched its ‘Feminist International Assistance Policy’, which targets ODA towards interventions with “the greatest potential to close gender gaps and improve everyone’s chance for success”.96
54.The Government’s Integrated Review of International Policy, due to conclude in the autumn, will create a new international strategy for the UK, including defining the role that an effective development policy can play as part of a joined-up approach in partnership with foreign affairs and security. In the written statement launching the Review, the Prime Minister said it would,
“set out the way in which the UK will be a problem-solving and burden-sharing nation”.97
55.Poverty reduction is a key element of an intersecting, forward thinking strategic international policy, that seeks to reduce global instability and threats whilst helping those most in need. Accordingly, poverty reduction has run as a thread through previous Governments’ international policy strategies. The 2015 UK Aid Strategy designated “Tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable” as a core objective, sitting alongside objectives to strengthen peace, security and governance; strengthen resilience and response to crises; and to promote global prosperity. Building on this, the 2018 National Security Capability Review designated development as a core national security capability, with a focus upon tackling the drivers of poverty.98
56.The UK’s refreshed international policy should also continue the UK’s commitments to the Sustainable Development Goals and DFID’s important work to leave no-one behind. The Overseas Development Institute’s Nicola Jones analyses that DFID’s work has “raised the international profile and supported the wellbeing of the world’s most marginalised”,99 underpinned by its 2018 Strategic Vision for Gender Equality, 2016 Youth Agenda and 2018 Strategy for Disability Inclusive Development.100
57.UK aid spending amplifies the UK’s voice on the world stage, promoting our national interest by projecting our core values, and transforming the lives of people living in the very poorest countries. A potential shift of the UK’s ODA budget away from helping the very poorest people would be counterproductive - global poverty drives conflict and instability, and inaction on tackling poverty will compromise the other strands of the UK’s international policy.
58.Poverty reduction should continue to form a central part of the Government’s international policy. Accordingly, it should commit to targeting the majority of the UK’s ODA spend towards the very poorest countries. The Government should also set out how its refreshed international policy intends to work towards attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals and ensure that no-one is left behind.
59.UK aid spending is underpinned by a strong basis of internationally agreed rules and domestic legislation. Maintaining this strong, rules-based approach is crucial to ensuring that UK aid retains its effectiveness and focuses upon poverty reduction.
60.The UK voluntarily adheres to an internationally recognised definition of aid—Official Development Assistance (ODA)—as defined by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).101 ODA is defined as assistance given to countries on the DAC list of ODA recipients (low and middle income countries) and to multilateral development institutions “with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective”.102 Loans to developing countries and multilateral institutions are also eligible, providing they are sufficiently “concessional in character”.103 The Government has confirmed that it intends to maintain adherence to the definition, which we welcome.104
61.UK aid is governed by four key pieces of legislation which create important safeguards to the quality of ODA spending (summarised in Figure 1 below). The International Development Act 2002 states that ODA must be “likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty”, and the 2014 amendment to the Act added the duty to consider gender equality.105
62.The International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 sets out the UK’s duty to spend 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) each year on ODA. The Government has provided assurances that the UK will continue to maintain its commitment to meet the target, but with the projected shrink in the UK economy this is likely to equate to a sizeable decline in real terms.
Figure 1: What does the law say about UK aid
Source: Center for Global Development, What does the law say on UK aid
63.The ONE Campaign argue that the UK’s
“determination not just to be a leading donor, but to legislate for it, sets a powerful example and makes a statement about the country’s role on the world stage”.106
Citing the UK’s International Development Act, and Sweden’s Policy Coherence for Development legislation, the Overseas Development Institute’s Nilima Gulrajani agrees, arguing that “legislation sends signals about development priorities against which government agencies can be held accountable”.107 Former President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said the UK’s commitment to 0.7 is commendable, and that she hoped the merger would not result in a change to this commitment.108
64.The UK’s development legislation plays an intrinsic part in ensuring that aid is spent well and is focused upon poverty reduction. The very presence of this legislation demonstrates the UK’s role as a serious player in international development, and accordingly the Government should commit to maintaining the UK’s development legislation.
65.Strong political leadership on poverty reduction is central to maintaining the ongoing effectiveness of UK aid spending. The Overseas Development Institute’s analysis suggests that, “Governments that possess a senior champion to lead development policy can improve aid effectiveness”,109 and that the presence of a leading political figurehead for development “safeguards against inferior aid quality, whatever structural configuration is in place.”110 The Secretary of State told us,
“When the new Department comes into place there will be one Secretary of State, who will be the Foreign and Development Secretary in charge of this new Department”.111
Evidence to our inquiry overwhelmingly supported the retention of a cabinet-level Secretary of State for International Development in order to maintain the UK’s focus on poverty reduction.112
66.Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada and Germany all have a dedicated minister for development who attends cabinet.113 In Australia, the Minister for Development and the Pacific reports to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has responsibility for representing development at cabinet level.114 These arrangements were in place prior to the merger. Therefore, unlike Australia, the merger means that the UK is losing a key decision maker on development.
Figure 2: Ministerial structures with development responsibility across DAC donors
|
Position in cabinet |
No position in cabinet |
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Minister with dual portfolios |
Austria* |
Australia** |
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Belgium |
Ireland** |
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Czech Republic* |
Italy** |
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Finland |
Portugal** |
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France* |
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Greece* |
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Hungary* |
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Iceland* |
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Japan* |
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Luxembourg |
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Netherlands |
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New Zealand* |
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Poland* |
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Slovak Republic* |
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Slovenia* |
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South Korea* |
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Switzerland* |
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United States* |
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Minister with dedicated portfolio on development |
Canada |
Spain** |
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Denmark |
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Germany |
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Norway |
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Sweden |
Note *Development/international cooperation is not explicitly mentioned in the Ministerial title but responsibility for it falls within the portfolio;
**The portfolio is held by a Secretary of State or Minister of State, working as a subordinate to the Foreign Minister
Source: Nilima Gulrajani, “Post-merger development governance in the UK: A preliminary cross-national investigation of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors”, Overseas Development Institute, July 2020
67.In addition to Cabinet, the UK Secretary of State for International Development sits on the UK Government’s National Security Council, making sure that development is considered in national security policy discussions and fostering an approach that considers reducing poverty. The Foreign Secretary has said that future representation on the National Security Council would be by the Secretary of State for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, providing no guarantee that a specific development voice would be around the table.115
68.In international terms, the UK is a leader in ensuring there is a dedicated development voice at meetings of national security bodies. In France, Japan and New Zealand, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (who cover development as a part of a broad portfolio) attends national security meetings.116 In Canada and Australia, the Minister for International Development does not attend national security meetings, although in Australia development representation is made at the National Security Committee (the equivalent of the National Security Council) through the Minister for Foreign Affairs.117 In the United States, the Administrator of USAid sits on the Deputies Committee of the US National Security Council (a sub-committee).118
69.We recommend that the Government appoints a Minister for Development with responsibility for the totality of the UK’s aid spend, and that this Minister attends Cabinet. We also recommend that this Minister attends the National Security Council.
70.The merger provides a natural break for the Government to take stock of its aid spending and ensure that all aid programmes are delivering the best possible results. Our interim findings report found that the quality of aid spending across Whitehall is a mixed picture. A review of ICAI reports by the Center for Global Development found that 80% of DFID spend received amber/green ratings or better. By contrast, 80% of FCO spend was amber/red, including the FCO’s flagship programme on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict (PSVI).119
71.In the ONE Campaign’s Real Aid Index (which ranked the performance of departments against three criteria: poverty focus, effectiveness and transparency) no department performed as well as DFID. The FCO achieved only ‘weak’ for poverty focus and ‘moderate’ for effectiveness, with ONE expressing concern about limited local consultation or ownership of programmes.120 However, our interim report noted that spending by other government departments appeared to be improving, and cautioned that a reorganisation of the aid budget could risk disruption to this progress.
72.The FCDO will inherit a substantial number of long-term development programmes from DFID; programmes which promote long-lasting, transformational change in some of the poorest societies in the world. Development rarely happens on a linear path; achieving true change in tackling poverty can take years. Maintaining these commitments is important both for recipient communities to realise the benefits of these programmes, but also for UK taxpayers to see value for money from aid spending.
73.In Australia, the integration of DFAT and AusAID created a move towards short term rather than long term development programmes. Australian think tank the Lowy Institute argue,
“Aid is becoming more transactional, in large and small ways. Management of bilateral programs by in-country missions also favours short-termism, with DFAT staff, despite best intentions, often working to solve problems of the day, and losing focus on the long-term strategic objectives of aid projects.”121
74.In response to the anticipated reduction in the UK aid budget, the Government is reviewing its aid programmes to identify potential areas for cuts. Media reports suggest that this will equate to 30% budget reductions by the Treasury to ODA-funded projects,122 confirmed by the Secretary of State as equating to a £2bn drop in the UK aid budget.123 The Secretary of State told us,
“Because of the drop in GNI, we also had to have a fairly mammoth review of all our programmes, and to assess, working with the Treasury and other ODA spending departments, where our priorities lie and which programmes will have to be delayed or shrunk, mostly, to meet that GNI 0.7%.”124
75.The Secretary of State told us that the delivery of humanitarian support is “at the top of the list” in the Government’s priorities for projects to be retained.125 Nonetheless, we are concerned that these cuts may fall disproportionately upon grants to local Civil Society Organisations working in country rather than larger international development contractors undertaking contracts. Following news of the merger, these organisations are already facing an unsettling wait whilst they find out whether their work will continue to be funded by the UK.
76.UK aid will increasingly have to balance short term diplomatic needs and initiatives with long term development objectives. Ultimately, ensuring that UK aid interventions are high quality is crucial to maintaining the UK’s reputation as a top-level development provider, and we are concerned that the FCO’s performance in ICAI reviews suggests it is not yet reaching the performance level required. The Government should set a target for all FCDO programmes to achieve a minimum ICAI grading of ‘green/amber’ within the next year.
77.In the face of pandemic-related budget cuts, difficult decisions will need to be made as to how savings can be made whilst protecting the overall effectiveness of aid spending. Given the grave challenges faced by developing countries in tackling COVID-19, disproportionately cutting long-term and locally led development programmes would hamper both present efforts to tackle the pandemic and long-term development goals. The Government should maintain a commitment to multi-year programming and grants to locally led projects in order to safeguard hard-won development gains. In its current review of ODA spending, it should prioritise life-saving projects across the global south.
78.Within the structure of the new FCDO, the new department must work both to retain the technical development expertise of former DFID colleagues, and to harness this expertise to ensure that future programmes are successfully targeted towards poverty reduction. Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) told us,
“We also note the importance of the collective level of development expertise within DFID as a factor in Britain’s effective development work. DFID is highly respected across the world and international development system as having some of the highest qualified staff in the world.”126
79.The UK’s development expertise adds credibility to its development work and extends UK influence overseas. Reflecting upon his experience as UK Ambassador to Jordan, Peter Millett, noted that the UK’s reputation as a development expert meant that support could be viewed “not as lecturing or patronising, but as a tangible contribution to Jordan’s reform efforts” which “enhanced the UK’s reputation as a friend of Jordan”.127 Any potential loss of this expertise could damage the credibility of UK development interventions, potentially resulting in a loss of influence overseas.
80.In the face of an unsettling merger, the new FCDO will need to focus upon the retention of existing staff in order to maintain the reputation of UK aid as the top-quality development provider. In Australia, the 2013 integration of AusAID and DFAT resulted in considerable loss of staff, impairing the quality of Australia’s aid interventions.128 In written evidence, Marie Stopes International told us,
“since the merger of AusAID and DFAT, significant numbers of locally engaged, highly qualified AusAID staff have left the department taking with them years of specialist expertise and contacts.”129
In his analysis of the merger, former AusAID Deputy Director General Richard Moore estimates that “up to 2000 years of expertise in total may have been lost”.130
81.Acting Permanent Secretary of DFID Nick Dyer told us he had spoken to his Canadian counterpart, who had told him,
“We are still working on culture, but the main things you have to do and accelerate are things like common core training. Get that done early, so that you are building an understanding across the two organisations about what each other do. You accelerate the pace of promoting across different parts of the business, so that people have experience of different parts of the business. You go early in terms of people building up their skills and knowledge of how to do financial management and accountability well.”131
82.As discussed in Chapter Two, the new FCDO will also need to focus upon training FCO staff to undertake development projects in order to safeguard the quality of UK aid. Diplomacy and development are fundamentally different skillsets, and FCO staff will need to quickly learn both the principles and approaches which underpin successful, poverty-reduction focused development programmes, whilst also learning the project management and transparency reporting requirements needed for ODA spending. Professor Malcolm Chalmers (Royal United Services Institute) said,
“Heads of missions in key developing countries will need to spend more time overseeing programmes that had previously been managed by DFID. Career paths in a fully integrated FCDO will become much more focused on showing an ability to contribute to the effective management of the programmes that will make up the bulk of the work of the new department.”132
83.To safeguard the effectiveness of UK aid interventions, the Government should set out how it intends to capture and retain DFID expertise in doing development well, and what plans are in place to rapidly train FCO staff in the skills necessary to manage effective and poverty reduction focused development programmes.
84.The merger presents a unique opportunity to tighten up ODA transparency standards across Whitehall, ensuring that taxpayers can see clearly how and where aid is spent, and that interventions are high quality. The transparency standards of departments administering ODA across Whitehall are variable. The 2015 UK Aid Strategy set a target for all UK government departments administering ODA to be ranked ‘good’ or ‘very good’ in the international Aid Transparency Index (ATI) by 2020. However, only three departments - DFID, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) and the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) - have met the target.133 The Government has made no future commitment to aid transparency targets.134
85.In Publish What You Fund’s 2020 Aid Transparency Index, which assesses the transparency of international aid funders, DFID retained its ranking as ‘very good’. By contrast, the FCO ranked near the bottom of the ‘fair’ category and scored zero for performance information including objectives and results.135 However, this is an improvement on its previous ranking of ‘poor’. The ranking of donors is given in Figure 3 overleaf.
86.Aid spending through the FCO continues to raise concerns relating to transparency and quality of programming. With the new FCDO set to become the largest implementing department of UK aid spending, this trend is very concerning. The Government should set out how it intends to ensure that ODA administered through the new FCDO meets high standards for transparency in its programming. Consequently, it should commit to all UK ODA funding meeting the transparency standard of ‘good’ within the next year.
Figure 3: Aid transparency index 2020: Overall scores and ranking

Source: Publish What You Fund: 2020 Aid Transparency Index
87.Multilateral spending forms a significant proportion of the UK’s ODA, accounting for 33% (£5.1 billion) of total UK aid spending in 2019.136 The Government will need to set out the role of multilateral spending in the UK’s future development policy, especially with the UK’s contributions to EU development spending drawing to an end. The UK’s contributions to multilateral funds are pooled with other donors to form the budget of these organisations, such as the World Bank International Development Association. By its nature, this makes tracking this spending more complex.
88.However, oral and written evidence to this inquiry drew attention to the lack of transparency over the substantial amounts of aid disbursed through large multilateral development partners, such as the World Bank, and other delivery partners such as the UK’s development finance institution, CDC Group (CDC), and the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG).137
89.In Australia, the integration of AusAID into DFAT led to a growth in the proportion of ODA administered through multilaterals, initially introduced as a “temporary scale-up strategy”. Multilateral spending rose from around 34% of the Australian aid programme in 2013–14 to around 48% in 2016–17.142 Former AusAID official Richard Moore argues that Australia’s choice to channel increasing amounts of ODA through multilateral organisations in part reflected a loss in its capability to undertake intensive bilateral cooperation.143
90.Moreover, we are concerned that the combination of the upheaval of the merger with the legal requirement to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA may lead to increased funnelling of UK ODA spending through untargeted multilateral channels. We are particularly concerned about the potential for increased use of promissory notes (legally binding agreements to provide funding at some point in the future), which count towards a country’s ODA spend when they are issued, not when they are spent.144
91.Multilateral spending forms an important part of the UK’s ODA, but we are concerned that the merger may lead to an increase in funds provided to these organisations for generalised future spending rather than targeted funds delivering immediate benefits. As part of the Integrated Review, the Government should set out its strategy for development spending through multilateral institutions over the next five years, including the proportions of UK ODA to be spent through bilateral and multilateral channels, whether it intends to honour existing agreements and how it will it will seek to influence these organisations to ensure that UK aid is spent in the best possible way.
67 “The impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) on global poverty”, World Bank Blog, 20 April 2020
68 “The Impact of COVID-19 on Food Security and Nutrition”, United Nations, 9 June 2020
69 For example, each percentage drop in global GNI is expected to result in an additional 0.7 million stunted children. (Ibid, page 3)
70 Bank of England, “Monetary Policy Report”, Monetary Policy Committee May 2020. Page 3
71 WQ67. Also, Frances Guy told us that “it is in our national interest that the poorest are lifted out of poverty so that global markets are inclusive”. WQ53
72 The Mines Advisory Group described UK aid as enabling the UK “to convince others rather than coerce, and to shape others’ preferences by appeal and attraction” Mines Advisory Group (EUA0026). See also British Council (EUA0022) and Save the Children (EUA0030)
77 International Development Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2019–21, “Effectiveness of UK aid: interim findings”, HC 215, paragraph 17 and Figure 3
79 Ukraine and Kosovo are classified as Lower Middle Income Countries, whereas Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia are classified as Upper Middle Income Countries
80 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (EUA0028). The statistic excludes some ODA spent through global and regional programmes. Least developed countries (LDCs) are 47 countries identified by the UN as facing severe structural impediments to their development: see the OECD list at link. ICAI also included Zimbabwe in the statistic, which is a low-income country but not on the official list of LDCs
81 International Development Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2019–21, “Effectiveness of UK aid: interim findings, HC 215, para 18
83 The cross-government funds are the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) and the Prosperity Fund
84 Department for International Development, “Data underlying the SID publication”, 19 September 2019
85 The Fund does have some experience in reaching poorer communities, such as through the provision of sanitation facilities to displaced communities living in Colombia’s regions. HM Government, “The Prosperity Fund: Annual Report 2018/19”, September 2019, page 20
89 OECD DAC Australia donor information 2017–18, accessed 23 June 2020
90 Australian Government, “2017 Foreign Policy White Paper”. November 2017, page 11
92 The White Paper set four tests against which Australian ODA would be allocated; “is this in our national interest? Will this promote inclusive growth and reduce poverty? Does Australia’s contribution add value and leverage partner funding? Will this deliver results and value for money?” (Ibid, page 90)
93 Donor Tracker, “Donor Tracker Australia”, accessed 22 June 2020. Work on this strategy has been paused due to the pandemic
95 Official Development Assistance Accountability Act 2008, Subsection 2(1) See also Nilima Gulrajani, “Post-merger development governance in the UK: A preliminary cross-national investigation of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors”, Overseas Development Institute, July 2020
96 Global Affairs Canada, “Feminist International Assistance Policy”, 2017
97 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy: Written statement—HCWS126, 26 February 2020
98 HM Government, “National Security Capability Review”, March 2018, pages 12 and 41
99 “DFID and FCO merger: our experts’ views”, Overseas Development Institute, 23 June 2020
100 See, for example, Christian Blind Mission (EUA0006) Terre des Hommes (EUA0018), Bond Child Rights Working Group (EUA0034), Action Aid (EUA0040)
101 Some countries, such as China, do not adhere to these rules and adopt their own definition of aid
102 OECD, “Official development assistance - definition and coverage”, accessed 11 June 2020
103 From 2018, this equates to a grant element on a sliding scale of 45% for grants to the very poorest countries, to 10% to multilateral institutions. (Ibid)
104 HL Deb, 18 June 2020, col 2321 [Lords Chamber]
105 International Development Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2017–19, “Definition and Administration of ODA”, HC 547, paras 5 and 6
107 Nilima Gulrajani, “Merging development agencies: Making the right choice”, Overseas Development Institute; January 2018, para 5.1
110 Nilima Gulrajani, “Merging development agencies: Making the right choice”, Overseas Development Institute; January 2018, para 4.2
111 Oral evidence taken as part of the Humanitarian crises monitoring: impact of coronavirus inquiry, HC 292, Q168
112 For example, Christian Blind Mission (EUA0006), Marie Stopes International (EUA0008), Terre des Hommes (EUA0018), Bond (EUA0064), Bond Conflict Policy Group (EUA0031), VSO (EUA0032), Mercy Corps (EUA0055), ONE (EUA0059) and Save the Children (EUA0030)
113 Nilima Gulrajani, “Governing development: A preliminary cross-national investigation of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors”, Overseas Development Institute, July 2020; Response from the Library of Parliament Canada to request ECPRD 4342 on Organisation of International Development Work in Government
114 “Portfolio Ministers”, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed 23 Jun 2020
116 Nilima Gulrajani, “Post-merger development governance in the UK: A preliminary cross-national investigation of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors”, Overseas Development Institute, July 2020
117 “National Security Committee”, Australian Government, accessed 23 June 2020
118 “National Security Presidential Memorandum”, Whitehouse.gov, accessed 23 June 2020 . See also evidence from Institute for Development Studies (unpublished)
119 For further information on the FCO’s PSVI work, see APPG on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict (EUA0021)
121 “Submission to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Review of Australia’s Development Program”, Lowy Institute, 5 March 2020
122 Alberto Nardelli, Tweet, 24 June 2020; and “DFID seeks cuts of up to 30% on aid projects”, Devex, 30 June 2020
123 Oral evidence taken as part of the Humanitarian crises monitoring: impact of coronavirus inquiry, HC 292, Q153
128 “The 2015 Australian Stakeholder Survey certainly suggests the merger reduced the perception that DFAT staff were effective (Wood et al., 2016)”, Nilima Gulrajani, “Merging development agencies: Making the right choice”, Overseas Development Institute; January 2018
130 “Reset required for DFAT-AUSAid integration”, The Interpreter, 25 March 2019
131 Oral evidence taken as part of the Humanitarian crises monitoring: impact of coronavirus inquiry, HC 292, Q162
132 Professor Malcolm Chalmers, “Farewell Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Welcome Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office”, RUSI commentary, 16 June 2020
134 Publish What You Fund state, “it is noteworthy that the UK government’s transparency targets will also soon expire with no obvious successors.” (2020 Aid Transparency Index - Press release, 24 June 2020)
135 Publish What You Fund, 2020 Aid Transparency Index - Press release, 24 June 2020
136 Department for International Development, “Statistics on International Development: Provisional UK Aid spend 2019”, April 2020, page 8
137 Q12; Publish What You Fund (EUA0007), Health Poverty Action (EUA0012), Global Justice Now (EUA0014), CAFOD (EUA0025), James Rogers (EUA0037), UK Youth Climate Coalition (EUA0046), STOPAIDS (EUA0058), Human Rights Watch (EUA0060); and Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), “CDC’s investments in low-income and fragile states”, March 2019
138 Department for International Development, “Annual Report and Accounts 2018–19”, HC 2390, 11 July 2019, page 159
140 DFID development tracker, Second phase of DFID’s Support to the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), IATI Identifier: GB-GOV-1–300351
142 Richard Moore, “Strategic Choice: A future-focused review of the DFAT-AusAID integration”. February 2019, page 16
144 Promissory notes are treated as liabilities in departments’ financial accounts. DFID is responsible for the majority of the UK’s aid expenditure through promissory notes. Between 31 March 2018 and 31 March 2019, DFID’s balance of promissory notes increased by £1.5 billion (33%) from £4.5 billion to £6.0 billion (source: DFID annual report and accounts, 2018–19, Note 10.3)
Published: 16 July 2020