Government transparency and accountability during Covid 19: The data underpinning decisions Contents

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4Transparency

Local lockdown and tiering decisions

134.This chapter considers whether there was sufficient data transparency underpinning key decisions.

Lifting the first lockdown

135.The first national (UK-wide) lockdown began on 23rd March 2020 and was eased from May. From the 18th May, individuals were given more freedom to meet outdoors, and a phased reopening of schools began on the 1st June. On 13th May, the National Statistician gave evidence to this Committee (ahead of the launch of this inquiry) and said:

We are through the current peak. As a nation, we need to be worried that, as we come through this current peak, we do not seed another one … We are now seeing a reduction in the deaths in each of those areas [community, care homes, hospitals], but not, at the moment, one as speedy as we would perhaps like.118

136.The Committee recognises the inherent complexity of the decision to lift the first lockdown and that it involved consideration of many factors including public health, livelihoods, and education. As previously noted, this report does not pass judgement on whether decisions were right or wrong and recognises that lockdown decisions have ultimately been judgements without an obviously correct or easy answer. Our interest throughout this report is understanding whether these decisions were transparent and informed by data. We did not look in depth at the decision to lift the first lockdown but, given this was an absolutely key decision, we did put questions on this to Ministers.

137.At the core of this inquiry is a basic expectation that Ministers should be able to justify key decisions through explaining the various data considered. The Committee expected that Ministers would be able to talk us through the types of data that were considered, how public health and other considerations were balanced, and the governance and accountability arrangements underpinning decisions.

138.Unfortunately, the Ministers who appeared before this Committee were unable to provide answers to the most basic of these questions and neither had been involved in the decisions.

139.When asked about lifting the first lockdown, the Paymaster General started by saying “I think that is probably better directed to the taskforce in Health” then went on to say:

the Cabinet Office … is responsible for the co-ordination … across Government, liaising with the Joint Biosecurity Centre, Public Health England, ONS, SAGE, Government Departments and also local government, importantly. It will put the information into various products, including the Covid 19 dashboard, which people will be familiar with.119

140.It is clear that the Department of Health and Social Care could not have made the decision to lift the first lockdown, given the range of wider considerations. Indeed, our understanding is that it did not make the decision and the Paymaster General’s own description of events seem to confirm that. It is, therefore, unclear why she felt that question was better directed to DHSC.

141.James Bowler, the second Permanent Secretary of the Cabinet Office gave more detail:

the lockdown began on 23 March. A roadmap was published on how to unlock on 11 May. That was produced by the Cabinet Office, and collective decision-making was done via Cabinet and Cabinet Committee to inform it. Regarding the data used, it was a mix of health, economic and social data: level rates and location of infection; core healthcare metrics, with care homes being key to that; mobility data; school attendance; economic data; and international comparisons. It is worth saying that that roadmap, as it was called, had a staggered set of unlocking coming out of the first lockdown.120

142.However, while James Bowler’s answer is helpful in stating the range of data used to inform the decision, the Committee did not receive answers to its core questions. For the lockdown decision to be transparent, it is important to know how various data were weighted against each other. While it is not possible to judge on the basis of this answer whether the decision was data-informed, it can be concluded that it was not transparent, and indeed Ministers who were not part of the decision-making progress were unable to explain it using the information they had been given.

143.It is deeply worrying that Ministers were unable to answer basic questions about the decision to lift the first lockdown. Proper Parliamentary scrutiny leads to better decision-making and builds trust. While this report does not comment on whether the Government made the right decision, the Committee expects Ministers to be able to justify the Government’s decisions and to explain the data underpinning them. Fielding Ministers who cannot answer questions is wilful evasion of scrutiny. Given how absolutely crucial that decision was for the health, wellbeing and fundamental freedoms of everyone in the country, the inability of Ministers to answer this Committee’s questions was lamentable and unacceptable.

144.It is clear to even a casual observer that the decision to lift the first lockdown (and all subsequent lockdowns) must have also taken into consideration a range of factors, including health, economic and educational outcomes. It is, therefore, our judgement that such decisions can only be made by the Centre of Government, in the Cabinet Office or Number 10. When the Committee has asked about these decisions—both in writing and in person—the Cabinet Office has passed the buck to the Department of Health and Social Care. This is both confusing and unacceptable because the Department of Health and Social Care is clearly not well placed to make decisions that include wider considerations beyond health.

145.Time has passed for Ministers to explain to this Committee why the first lockdown was lifted when it was. It is clear that Ministers are unable to answer that question, and we are sure that this will be picked up by a public inquiry of the kind this Committee recommended in its previous report. It is vital, however, that lessons are learnt, and changes made during this ongoing pandemic. The Committee will ask similar questions when Ministers and officials appear before this committee in future and will expect complete and cogent answers.

146.This report is not considering the accuracy of decisions, but this Committee has serious concerns about the lack of transparency and clarity in decision-making. The Cabinet Office must outline in its response to this report the range of data and information it will use to lift current and future lockdowns.

Local tiering decisions

147.After the national lockdowns were eased from May 2020, more localised responses came into effect. In England, local restrictions were introduced in Leicester from 29th June, and in other cities including Manchester, parts of Yorkshire, and later Newcastle from 30th July. From 12th October, these stand-alone restrictions (brought in as regulations under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984) were replaced with three England-wide tiers with the most restrictive measures (tier 3) including closure of hospitality. On 19th December, the Government introduced a 4th tier (stay at home) which closed non-essential shops, some other venues (including sports venues) and restricted almost all contact between households. Since December, the Government has moved back to a national approach, and from 5th January, there has been an England-wide lockdown akin to the March 2020 lockdown. On 22nd February, the Government announced a roadmap out of lockdown in four phases.

148.The introduction of more localised responses further emphasised the need for data transparency. First, transparency enables local leaders and officials to plan and organise but, secondly, it is vital for people coming within the purview of these restrictions to understand why. This report previously discussed seeking “democratic consent” and how important this is when the Government is asking so much of the public. This chapter considers the moments in which the Government restricted the freedoms of some people, depending on their locality. In this system, which has inherent inequalities, democratic consent is even more vital. NHS providers told us:

As we enter a phase of local surges, it is imperative that the data and rationale on which the Government bases decisions around local lockdowns is clearly explained and accessible to the public and local leaders.121

The test for lifting lockdowns or moving tiers

149.Since the first national lockdown was lifted in May there has not been a consistent framework for introducing or lifting restrictions. In June, the Government introduced five tests for lifting lockdown; in November, there were five indicators to make tiering decisions; and the February 2021 roadmap introduced 4 tests for easing national restrictions. All were subtly different and included measures that reflected the specific situation at the time of introduction (for example, the July tests included PPE shortages and the February roadmap includes vaccines). This lack of consistency has not made it easy to plan, and it was clear that there were no clearly defined parameters in place for local tiering decisions in October, (a fact supported by the evidence from local government leaders).

150.The Committee was told that the lack of a clear framework for introducing or alleviating restrictions in local areas, prior to the November indicators, had meant that local areas were being treated differently from one another. In October, Joanne Roney Chief Executive of Manchester City Council said:

I think we all understood that the purpose of bringing in the tiers was to have simplified messages for the public and to make it easier to understand. What went slightly wrong was every individual tier ended up negotiating additional flexibilities anyway, so there was still a degree of confusion, not only which tier you were in but how tier 3 in Greater Manchester was different to tier 3 in Liverpool, for example, which is less than 40 minutes away—many families commute and move around.122

151.In February 2021, the Committee asked Ministers and officials why there had been changes to the frameworks for introducing and lifting lockdowns and tiering decisions. James Bowler, Head of the Covid Taskforce, said:

It is about learning and knowing, and each time we know more. In November we set a clear objective of what we are trying to do. We published it in a strategy, and we said, “These are the five measures that we will look at.” The reason we chose those five is that we thought that they were the most pertinent. They included the new data that we had on case rates for over-60s. We chose that because obviously we know that over-60s are more likely to be seriously ill and potentially die from this pandemic. This was classic learning and adapting, but I think that the winter plan published in November was very good at setting out a transparent approach of how we were going to operate.123

152.The five indicators introduced in November (after the evidence session with local leaders) were designed to create more clarity about how decisions were made on which tier a local area would move in to. The indicators were:

• case detection rates in all age groups;
• case detection rates in the over 60s;
• the rate at which cases are rising or falling;
• Positivity rate (the number of positive cases detected as a percentage of tests taken); and
• pressure on the NHS, including current and projected occupancy.124

153.However, the indicators were not underpinned by thresholds indicating which tier an area would go in to at a certain data point. This did not address the key concerns raised in October by local leaders. For example, Councillor Ian Hudspeth, Leader of Oxfordshire County Council and Chairman of the LGA Community Wellbeing Board, had said:

there do not seem to be any fixed criteria that say, “If you hit this particular level, you need to go into a different tier”. Likewise, my understanding is that there do not seem to be any criteria around which tier we go back into when we move out on 2nd December.125

154.When we put this to Ministers and Officials in February 2021, James Bowler, said that putting thresholds in place could lead to “perverse results”:

We took a deliberate decision not to give absolute hard thresholds that would absolutely trigger things moving from tier A to B or 2 to 3, for example. That was a deliberate judgment so that the analytical framework that we use, via the Joint Biosecurity Centre, could consider local circumstances in its decisions. There were all sorts of examples of where, if you used a very hard set of thresholds, you might get perverse results. … For example, if you had an outbreak in a particular Army camp, which you could contain and stop, or a prison, for example, would the whole of that area be put into a higher tier, or not if you felt it was contained? Those are the types of issues that we use so as not to set absolutely hard triggers.126

155.Local leaders had called for more consideration of specific local circumstances when making decisions, but as discussed in earlier chapters, the public understands that the Government and local leaders “do not have a crystal ball”127 and that judgements need to be made. The lack of transparency around decisions creates more mistrust and confusion than being open and honest, even when uncertainties or caveats are noted.

156.As Professor Spiegelhalter explained, when communicating complex data or decisions “you start off with what you know, but then you follow it with what you do not know and … Crucially, you then say, the advice will change …”. Taking this model and adapting it, it would be more transparent—and build more trust—if Government were to state thresholds for each indicator, then explain that a balance would be struck where an area fell into more than one threshold, and acknowledge that there are unknowns or uncertainties (such as the possibility of an isolated outbreak) that might need to also be considered. Instead, decisions were taken in an opaque fashion, which did not help build public trust and support.

157.In the midst of opaque decision making, there developed a sense of confusion and mistrust. It very quickly became apparent that some areas had been placed into higher tiers than neighbouring areas with worse infection rates. This confusion persisted all the way through to the December lockdown decisions when many commentators looked to infection rates to judge tiering decisions. The charts below, drawn on data submitted to this inquiry by Election Maps UK, shows the 7-day infection rate leading up to tiering decisions on 26th November and 19th December against the tier those areas were put in to.128 It shows that there were significant overlaps between tiers in terms of infection rate, to the extent that on 19th December 26 local authorities were put into tier 4 in spite of having infection rates in the same range as areas in tier 2.

7-Day Rate (Cases from 15th-21st November) and 26th November tier

7-Day Rate (Cases from 8th-14th December) and 19th December tier

158.In October, some local leaders had requested tiering decisions that were rejected by Government on the basis of unclear or opaque data. For example, Councillor Hudspeth explained that he had asked for his area to be placed tier 2 (the middle tier) but the area had been placed into tier one (the lowest tier). Eight days after his initial request the area was moved up to tier 2.

[Requesting tier 2] was a system-based decision, it was not something random. It was based on the information that was provided by the director of public health who, as I say, was looking at the trend and he was very clear about that. Then we put in the recommendation, but obviously Government and the Department of Health were looking at other data as well. You would have to ask them for the reasons why we did not move into tier 2 at an earlier stage.129

159.This confusion was not aided by the lack of clarity in data underpinning the tiering decisions, even after the indicators were announced in November. While there had been improvements in the availability of data by this point, data was still fragmented and hard to find. The Chair of this Committee wrote to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on 25th November noting:

It is, however, very hard to find data which explains how well local areas perform under these tests. The data, where it is available, is spread over multiple sources. When users of the Government website search for a postcode, the data they are given does not clearly link back to the 5 tests outlined. Sometimes areas even seem to be doing relatively well against indicators but are still in tiers two or three with no clear explanation.130

160.On 26th November, the day after tiering decisions were published, the Government released a slide pack with underlying data.131 This was a significant improvement in transparency, but the data was only made available after the decision had been made and was not useful for charting a path out of lockdown as it was only point in time data.

161.When this question was put to Ministers, the Paymaster General conceded that finding data was difficult:

Local data is incredibly important, and I know from my own experience as a local MP—who was put into a higher tier earlier than elsewhere—that getting information about the presence of the variant was very difficult indeed. I think that is a fair criticism.132

162.Additionally, witnesses told us that the indicator “pressure on the NHS” was not clearly defined and data was hard to interrogate. As Simon Briscoe, a consultant in statistics and economics, told us in his written evidence:

The detailed hospital data is of limited analytical value as the bed occupancy data is not set against either the occupancy in the first wave (the data starts from August) or the capacity data (capacity data is quarterly and not split Covid v non-Covid). For any given hospital it is impossible to know if, say, 50 Covid 19 patients is a lot or near capacity.133

163.Dr Jeanelle de Gruchy of the Association of Directors of Public Health wrote, explaining:

It is quite difficult to work out, for instance, bed occupancy percentages and so on because the data changes so rapidly. There have been issues in terms of understanding where things are at.134

164.Local leaders also shared their frustrations that they were not adequately informed about tiering decisions before they were made, and they often found out which tier their areas would be in through the media. Cllr Georgia Gould explained:

One of the frustrations we have had throughout this is that, quite often, key information about decisions is leaked, often on a Friday night or a Saturday, which promotes huge fear in the community and means we have to try to respond at pace while officers are not at work. I cannot overestimate the level of trauma from the first lockdown in places and communities that have been disproportionately impacted, the mental health concerns and the fear among older people. It would have been much better if there was a conversation with us earlier so we could prepare our communications, prepare our reassurance and work with communities… In every single instance of national changes, unfortunately, it has happened in the same way. There has been some kind of leak and we find out from the papers at the same point as our communities do. That is not a good way to prepare.135

165.In terms of whether the tiering decisions should have been shared with local areas (specifically local MPs), Ministers shared their concerns about information being leaked. Minister for Social Care, Helen Whately told us:

If I call MPs saying, “There is likely to be an announcement to do with your area, and there is going to be a tiering change,” before I have even finished chairing one of those calls that information is on Twitter and then being announced on the national media, rather than being announced to Parliament. Because we were briefing MPs it was then on national media, but we all know that we try to announce things to Parliament. I would say that there is a dilemma here between always wanting to involve Members of Parliament when things affect their constituents. Also, there is the consequence that then sometimes turns out to be effectively putting the information in the public domain at that moment.136

166.The Paymaster General went on to say that:

It is, first of all, very well understood that giving the public, giving businesses, giving public servants as much notice as possible is a good thing. From having seen decisions being taken in Whitehall, I know that that is very much thought through. Where there has been no notice given it is because of a rapidly changing picture. There is always great pressure on Ministers to take the path of least resistance.137

The February 2021 roadmap

167.On 2nd February 2021, the Prime Minister announced a “roadmap” out of lockdown. The evidence for this inquiry was collected prior to this announcement so this report does not comment on it in detail, but lessons can be drawn from earlier experiences.

168.The roadmap contains four core indicators:

a)The vaccine deployment programme continues successfully.

b)Evidence shows vaccines are sufficiently effective in reducing hospitalisations and deaths in those vaccinated.

c)Infection rates do not risk a surge in hospitalisations which would put unsustainable pressure on the NHS.

d)Our assessment of the risks is not fundamentally changed by new Variants of Concern.138

169.The roadmap commits to lifting restrictions in four steps and it sets the earliest dates at which each step can be taken. Step one, from no earlier than 29th March will include allowing socialising outdoors with one other person; step two, from no earlier than 12th April, will open some non-essential businesses and outdoor attractions; step three, from no earlier than 17th May, will lift most social contact restrictions; and step four, from no earlier than 21st June, will lift all legal limits on social contact.

170.The Committee welcomes Prime Minister’s commitment to a “data not dates” approach,139 but notes that the roadmap actually contains several dates and very little in the way of data. The detailed roadmap does have a data annex containing current information on vaccinations, infections and other key indicators. But the indicators themselves do not have any clear data thresholds. Wording like “vaccine deployment continues successfully”140 is not sufficient as success is not defined. The risk of this is that people will not understand the reason for decisions.

171.We have stressed the importance of trust, and there is a risk is that the roadmap will be undermined if the Government is not able to lift restrictions in line with the dates outlined. Transparency will be key to this and while the announcement was clear that the dates outlined are “earliest”, the Government must be able to justify any change to the anticipated dates.

172.The Committee welcomes the commitment to sharing decisions seven days in advance of them coming into effect, and the commitment to giving time for data to move through the system before decisions are made.

173.The framework for lockdown and tiering decisions has changed repeatedly throughout this pandemic. While the Committee does not object to the inclusion of new metrics (such as vaccines), changes in the framework to date have not always appeared to reflect new information. This has amounted to a moving of the goalposts, which creates uncertainty, makes it impossible to see trends and therefore must stop.

174.The priority now must be a clear and consistent framework for making lockdown decisions as a path back to normality is charted. The Committee, therefore, welcomes the roadmap. The Government should not make further changes to it, in terms of setting new tests or boundaries. It is concerning that the roadmap does not appear to contain any guidance for moving back into lockdown in the event of a new variant or other unexpected turn of events, even though the Government has taken the stance that this should be the last lockdown.

175.Lockdown decisions have been met with confusion because the data has been unclear. Data was not initially available for local leaders to understand the tiering decisions and there were no adequate frameworks for escalation and de-escalation in place. While this data has improved, gaps remain.

176.The new roadmap must be updated to point to where data can be found under each indicator. The roadmap indicators should be added to the dashboard, with clear links through to the data at lower local authority level underpinning each one.

177.The Government did not publish thresholds for tiering decisions which made it hard for local authorities and businesses to plan. This must be changed for the future. The Committee does not believe including thresholds in the roadmap will cause perverse outcomes (as James Bowler suggested in his evidence). It is, of course, possible that England progresses quickly against some indicators and more slowly against others, in which case the Government would need to make a judgement on whether to move to the next step on the roadmap. Increased transparency created by clear thresholds will increase public trust and confidence.

178.The Government must publish thresholds aligned to the roadmap in ranges or using minimum requirements, and with appropriate caveats if needed. This should be done immediately with the information available before decisions are taken to take the first steps.

Decisions affecting businesses

179.Decisions at various points to lockdown part or all of the country have had a profound effect on businesses and, as a result, on jobs and livelihoods. In December, the Committee heard from some of the affected sectors. The prevailing message was that the data underpinning decisions was not clear. In fact, Emma McClarkin, Chief Executive of the British Beer and Pub Association (BBPA), went as far as to say:

The evidence and the data that they have claimed or used to make these decisions has sometimes not even been there. It is more based on perception or a gut feel.141

180.A key frustration shared by the witnesses was that measures they had put in place in order to reopen after the first national lockdown was eased in Spring 2020 had not been taken into account when local lockdowns and tiering were brought in later in the year. Andrew Goodacre, Chief Executive of the British Independent Retailers Association (BIRA) said:

A shop today is very different from what it was back in February or early March in that it has plenty of Perspex screens and protection for employees. There are safe social distancing measures in place. There is hand sanitiser everywhere you go, and face coverings were made mandatory back in the summer.142

181.Emma McClarkin explained that the pub sector had invested over £500 million in measures to protect the public, only for them not to be considered when tiering decisions were made.

We have invested as a sector over £500 million in making sure all the equipment is there for our staff: the face masks; they had visors to begin with; there are Perspex screens inside our venues. We have also created one-way zones, travel zones inside, hand sanitisation, everything. Table service has been introduced and it has made incredibly secure and safe areas to socialise in, and I think that needs to be recognised.143

182.Sectors had worked with the Government to put clear plans in place to re-open in spring 2020. Bill Sweeney, Chief Executive of the Rugby Football Union (RFU), explained what this had looked like for sports, and specifically for professional rugby.

The medical working group had advice from SAGE, the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, and we were given information on the current state of the pandemic and the impact on sport. Probably the most important aspect of that is the fact that it was collaborative, so the chief medical officers of the various different sports were able to work together with Government authorities to work out a roadmap for both the professional and community games to start. … Through the identification of certain protocols and a five-stage process for the return of the professional game, from individual training to group training to the resumption of matches in August, it came about as a result of those protocols. It was a very open process, a very transparent process, and a good deal of collaboration on both sides.144

183.It was particularly frustrating, therefore, to hear that some industry representatives felt this hard work had been disregarded as part of later decision-making. As Julian Bird, Chief Executive of the Society of London Theatre noted:

In order to open venues, seated venues, across the UK, we worked with the Government on a five-stage reopening plan … In August we reached stage 4, which allowed indoor venues to open with a socially distanced audience … compulsory mask wearing [and] temperature checking … [But] The new tiering system that has come in takes very little account of all the work that has happened. For example, in tiers 1 and 2 we now find that caps, or capacity caps, have suddenly been applied, and we have not seen any evidence as to why that has happened. That effectively rips up all the work that had been done before.145

184.Witnesses also raised concerns that there would be unintended consequences to the tiering decisions. Emma McClarkin felt that, following the introduction of Covid-safe measures in pubs in spring: “we are a safe, regulated environment to socialise in, as opposed to private households mixing, which we are seeing, where we know the transmission is going up”.146 Andrew Goodacre said:

closing down simply creates pent-up demand so that when shops reopen you get another wave of people. Instead of having a stable demand in a place, a stable number of people, we end up with surges.147

185.There was sense from witnesses that some industries felt they had been targeted in spite of there being very little evidence that they were causing transmission. Andrew Goodacre said:

SAGE itself has issued a report saying that closing non-essential shops will make very little difference to the spread of the virus.148

186.The evidence received on the safety of safety of hospitality venues and shops was far from conclusive. Emma McClarkin stated that “Covid 19 reports that are published weekly, consistently show that hospitality is responsible for only 2 per cent of outbreaks”,149 but other evidence received highlights that a small number of outbreaks have the potential to cause a large number of infections. Professor Richardson, President of the Royal Statistical Society, explained that:

A small fraction of infected people creates a larger number of infections. Currently the estimate ranges from 5 to 20 per cent of cases seeding up to 80 per cent of infections … .Some social or work contexts are favourable to these superspreading events as they tend to involve having a large number of people in close proximity.150

187.Professor Richardson cited research undertaken in Hong Kong involving “detailed back tracing of clusters”, concluding that:

There is substantial potential for SARS-CoV-2 superspreading in settings where large numbers of people gather such as bars, weddings, and religious events. Interventions targeting social settings may be key in reducing the risk of SSEs and SARS-CoV-2 transmission.151

188.Of course, none of this evidence is conclusive on whether places people might mix (such as bars, theatres, spectator sports, or shops) can be considered Covid-safe now, with the various measures that have been taken. Nor does it consider newer research on issues like ventilation when considering indoor versus outdoor mixing, But, it does highlight that the Government was not clear on the evidence underpinning their decisions. As Emma McClarkin told us:

we had no evidence shared with us, with the sector, prior to [the tiers being announced]. It was released after the tiering system had been announced, and that was several days.152

189.Fundamentally, if the Government is asking businesses to close—risking jobs, livelihoods and the very survival of those businesses—it must be clear why this should happen, and the evidence outlined above demonstrates that the lack of clear communication of any evidence that does exist to underpin decisions has created frustration and mistrust.

190.When these questions were put to Ministers, the Paymaster General said:

There had been some work done generically to try to ensure that we were engaged properly, as a Government, with business.153

191.The hospitality and entertainment sectors have not seen sufficient data to underpin decisions relating to their industry. The evidence the Committee received was inconclusive over whether restrictions on hospitality and entertainment sectors were sensible and indeed it is not the purpose of this report to come to a judgement on that. However, building trust with these sectors is absolutely essential and the level of transparency has not been sufficient.

192.The Government should publish the data that underpins the restrictions that will remain in place on businesses at each step of roadmap as a matter of urgency. Hyperlinks to this data must be included on pages explaining the restrictions for maximum transparency.