51.Our predecessor committee in 2014 underlined the need for financial devolution. It highlighted how fiscal devolution “provides enhanced local autonomy”, “would encourage greater economic growth across England”, and “presents an opportunity to improve accountability” of local politicians. In 2016 another committee report reiterated this call, stating that it expected further action by government on devolution during that Parliament “including moves towards fiscal devolution.” With regards to London it was stated that “we believe fiscal devolution is essential to London’s continuing success”. Five years on, the necessity for action on this front has grown. The pressures on local government finances, which we have recently detailed, have persisted and have been augmented by the impact of covid-19. This chapter makes the case for financial devolution and examines what form it could take.
52.The case for financial devolution has been previously stressed by the Prime Minister. In 2014, when Mayor of London, he advocated to our predecessor committee the devolution of five property taxes (stamp duty, council tax, business rates, annual tax on enveloped dwellings and capital gains tax) to London and other large cities. He said of fiscal devolution “This is a reform whose time has really come.” This advocacy was echoed in the continued support we heard for the recommendations of the London Finance Commissions of 2013 and 2017 for devolving property taxes.
53.The need for financial devolution was also emphasised in our evidence. Professor Colin Copus from De Montfort University declared that: “The need for fiscal devolution is vital now. We have got to a stage where we cannot sustain the system we are developing based on handouts from the centre.” The Metro Mayor of the North of Tyne Combined Authority, Jamie Driscoll proclaimed “If we are going to make a difference, though, it is going to require significant fiscal devolution”, and that “there is no chance of devolution working unless fiscal devolution comes with it—none whatsoever.” The benefit of fiscal devolution was explained by Ed Hammond, Director of the Centre for Public Scrutiny, who argued that fiscal devolution was needed to ensure the sustainability of local government. In particular giving “fiscal freedom” in place of ringfenced funding would facilitate taking longer-term, more strategic decisions. It would overcome the situation of accountability without responsibility in issues such as transport, where mayors are blamed but lack the funding and powers to directly tackle the problems. Furthermore, the County Councils Network cited a report by Oxford Economics arguing devolution of taxation and spending to “counties could save £36 billion over five years, and add £26 billion to the economy.”
54.Local government currently draws its tax revenue from council tax and business rates (formally called non-domestic rates). Our predecessor committee’s report in 2019 into local authority finance pledged that the devolution inquiry would examine the issue of new bands for council tax. Earlier this year, we called for reform to council tax and business rates.
55.We received evidence calling for reforms to the council tax system. These could include abolishing the referendum requirement for increases of 2% or above in general council tax, and following the example of Wales in adding extra council tax bands. Council tax was criticised as regressive and needing a national revaluation, organised to ensure it is revenue neutral. It was suggested there could be devolution of the determination of council tax discounts (for example for students and single persons), possibly to groupings of local authorities.
56.Business rates are based on a nationwide valuation of properties, with the rateable value of a property reflecting the annual rent that would have been charged on the open market. Multipliers, set as the pence in the pound of rateable value, are then set by central government. Both the setting of valuations and multipliers was formerly undertaken by local government—valuations were assessed locally until 1948 and the multiplier was set locally until 1988. The standard multiplier in England is 51.2p, meaning a rateable value of £100,000 would mean the business would have an annual liability of £51,200. Properties of a rateable value of under £51,000 have a multiplier of 49.9p.
57.A recent development has been the piloting of the retention of 75% or 100% business rate revenue by certain local councils and combined authorities. The combined authorities in Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region, West of England, and West Midlands, along with Cornwall Council, have had 100% retention of business rates from 2017–18. This has meant them foregoing some grant funding from the government. For local councils other than Cornwall, the Government’s proposal for 100% retention proposed in 2015 was reduced to 75% in 2017. This in turn was postponed in 2019 and 2020. We recently recommended that local councils should be able to retain 75% of business rate revenue from 2022 without a commensurate cut in grant funding. We also advocated reforming business rates to level the playing field between physical and online retailers and consideration of alternatives to business rates and council tax. These proposals echoed our predecessor committees’ calls for business rate retention to be used to tackle existing cost pressures and the devolution of other property taxes to local councils, for an online sales tax to help the high streets, and consideration of alternatives to business rates. In 2018 the then Government held a consultation into business rate retention, but there has been no Government response. Nor did the Government engage with the previous committee’s proposal for devolution of other property taxes. The Treasury has been consulting about business rates. But the final response to consultation has been postponed until the autumn of 2021.
58.We received many sympathetic views concerning business rate retention. Examples of success were cited by Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Leadership Board and by Greater Manchester, with the latter claiming continuing with it “would help to put investment on productivity growth on a sustainable basis.” The London Assembly voiced unhappiness about the reduction from 100% to 75% retention in 2019–20 in London. Greg Clark MP argued that “Business rate retention has been very important in establishing that central connection between the leadership of a place and the businesses there.” Due to the success of retention the LGA commented that “It should be increased further without any additional responsibilities or phasing out of other grants.” Similarly, the Chief Executive of the Centre for Cities think tank, Andrew Carter, suggested there needed to be 100% retention everywhere, accompanied by other reforms to the tax.
59.These positive views of business rate retention were not universally shared. The British Academy argued that retention created perverse incentives to promote out-of-town distribution and shopping centres. Moreover, reduced redistribution left some “councils more dependent on a small number of large employers who may threaten to leave or be forced to do so by wider economic conditions.” It argued retention risked unpopular tax competition and variations in service provision resulting from different taxation; and cited NAO research to argue that “the statistical ratio between business rates yield and need is precisely zero”, and that “There is no direct link between economic activity and business rate yield.”
60.There was concern that business rates did not provide sufficient revenue for local councils. Guy Ware, Director of Local Government Performance and Function at London Councils, stated: “Sitting on business rates as a form of income is not very comfortable right now.” Professor Colin Copus from De Montfort University saw this as part of a wider problem of the insufficiency of existing local government taxation, stating that “English local government has the narrowest basket of taxation powers available to it across Europe.” We were also told that there needed to be reform to business rates. Proposals included reducing the length of transitional relief, and devolution of exemptions to local authorities.
61.We reiterate our recommendation from our recent report into local authority financial sustainability that the Government should allow councils to retain 75% of business rates from 2022, and that it should not impose commensurate cuts to grant funding. The additional funding should then be put towards equalisation in a separate grant designed for this purpose. As we also recommended in that report, in the longer term, the Government should consider options for wider reform of council tax and business rates, including possibly replacing them with a proportional property tax.
62.There was support for devolving income tax. David Phillips, Associate Director at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, explained that it had researched local income tax as a major tax capable of generating £5 to £15 billion a year. It was seen as preferable to devolving corporation tax, stamp duty, or VAT. Its benefits were fourfold: it would raise substantial revenue, it is administratively easier to access, it is paid for by local voters who can hold local politicians to account, and it would provide “broader incentives to local politicians and councils to boost the economy.” We were told that in most countries where income tax is devolved there was a flat rate devolved rather than the power to vary rates across different income thresholds. This is to prevent tax competition, and to reduce the fluctuations in revenue and inequalities between local authorities. We heard that the main barrier to devolution is that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) do not know where 5% of taxpayers live. However, it was pointed out that such problems were overcome when devolving income tax rates to Scotland.
63.Various submissions recommended a tourist tax as a way to raise revenue. This can fund the cultural amenities, and the physical infrastructure used by tourists. Bath Council proposed such taxes in 2017 and 2018. The Isle of Wight council are said to be considering a tax, levied at £1 to £1.50 on each vehicle visiting the island. They are also found in Italy, Germany and the Netherlands.
64.Three challenges were outlined with introducing a tourist tax. First, not all areas attract the same volume of tourists and therefore revenue would be unevenly distributed across the country. Secondly, a clear purpose is needed for the tax—is it to raise revenue or is it to off-set the costs imposed by tourists? This is particularly important if it were devolved to an authority where tourism is heavily concentrated in one part of the town, county or city as it would raise questions about where the revenue should be spent. Thirdly, it is estimated it would only raise c.£420 million a year across England if levied at the £1 per overnight stay proposed by Bath council. If it were levied at £5 per overnight stay it could raise over £2 billion. It was therefore questioned how far a tourism tax could raise the significant sums needed to fund greater devolved powers or meet the rising costs of local services, for example the needs of adult social care.
65.Various other taxes were suggested to us as suitable for devolution. This included the creation of an e-commerce levy. A couple of witnesses pointed to the success of sales taxes in the USA as suggesting VAT could be devolved; although it was noted that local variations in VAT could be hard to administer. There was also support for creating and devolving a land value tax. This was seen as a way to raise revenue for infrastructure in places of high house values.
66.There were also proposals to devolve stamp duty land tax. These were particularly urged in a London context, where stamp duty land tax was criticised for acting as a barrier to Londoners wishing to move. However David Phillips from the Institute for Fiscal Studies argued that stamp duty had very volatile revenue over time and revenue would differ across England because of the differences in property markets.
67.Given the potential problems posed by the uneven distribution of revenue across England, an alternative option involves allocating revenue from designated taxes to local and combined authorities. This could take two forms—allocating a set proportion of a national tax or taxes to local authorities; or assigning a proportion of the revenue raised by a tax in an area to that area’s local authority. There are examples of this. A share of the VAT revenue raised in Scotland is allocated to the Scottish Government. European countries such as Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Denmark all have allocations of different taxes to sub-national and local government.
68.There was wariness about the dedication of certain tax revenue (hypothecation) to individual services such as social care. This resulted both from worries about variations in revenue, and a wish for greater freedom for local authorities to decide what to spend on (including revenue from fees and charges).
69.However, we also heard were calls for the allocation of revenue from income tax, from fuel duties, and from stamp duty. It was also proposed that a portion of revenue raised in London through vehicle excise duty should be allocated to Transport for London to fund trunk roads. The CBI’s Head of Regional Policy, Jim Hubbard articulated a preference among businesses for funds to be put into the hands of councils rather than “developing a network of a confusing tax landscape that would lead to some negative impacts down the line.” This reflected wider support amongst our witnesses. For instance, Cllr James Jamieson from the LGA commented “I quite like incentivisation. By assigning a proportion of income that is raised locally, it can incentivise people, for instance, to support growth and so forth”.
70.We also received proposals to raise money from other, non-tax, sources. One such source was increasing the amount of money captured from the uplift in land values resulting from infrastructure projects. This echoes the recommendations in our predecessor committee’s report of September 2018. Secondly, there was a wish for greater borrowing powers for combined authorities. Thirdly it was proposed combined authorities should have greater commercial freedoms. Fourthly, there could be greater freedom over how sales, fees and charges can be spent, and that local authorities should be able to set planning fees to recover the costs of the planning system.
71.Financial devolution is necessary to ensure the success of devolution through giving devolved authorities greater freedom from central government, enabling them to take longer-term decisions reflective of their strategic purpose, and enhancing their direct accountability to their electorates. It must be accompanied by redistributive measures to ensure areas with lower revenue raising potential do not lose out. We therefore recommend that the Government should:
72.The Government should commission research into how income tax or other national tax revenue could be allocated to local and combined authorities, or how a local income tax across a combined authority area could work, including details of tax setting, funding equalisation, and how HMRC can better identify where taxpayers live. The Government should consider permitting other measures, including land value capture for local authorities, to help them raise additional money.
73.The other side of financial devolution is ensuring sufficient money for devolved areas, so that areas less able to raise revenue do not lose out. Equally, we heard calls for greater control over money spent in devolved areas, including over aspects of the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) and reducing the conditions attached to local authority funding.
74.The major fear about fiscal devolution is that retaining more tax revenue where it is raised will mean places with lower taxes bases would end up with less money to spend. Various submissions, particularly from local authorities, emphasised the need for sufficient spending for local government and that fiscal devolution should not disadvantage areas less able to raise revenue.Areas such as Hertfordshire Council which raise considerable revenue through council tax nonetheless stressed that there still needed to be equalisation. A further worry was that whilst there are numerous possible sources of funding from central government pots, and local authority and private sector schemes, access to them depends on the “internal capabilities” of local enterprise partnerships and combined authorities to access the scheme, which has created divisions and risks reinforcing regional divides. These are both concerns we recently highlighted in our report on local government finance. These concerns led two submissions to express scepticism about the principle and wisdom of financial devolution. The British Academy worried about the devolution of taxation “due to the potential impact this has on the pooling and redistribution of funds … Fiscal devolution increases the risk that some authorities may become financially unsustainable.” The Regional Studies Association similarly opined that:
the only governance set-up which is worse than a top-down centralised system, is a devolved system which is primarily dependent on local finances … Rapid fiscal decentralisation raises genuine concerns about zero-sum tax competition, which may adversely affect local public services and exacerbate regional divides.
75.However, it was also argued that fiscal devolution can help reduce inequalities between different parts of England. At present, as Lord Kerslake, the Chair of UK2070 Commission and former Head of the Home Civil Service, stated, “We have some regions whose productivity levels are lower than parts of East Germany at the point that it unified with West Germany.” It was noted that Germany had managed to combine high levels of financial devolution with sizeable redistribution of resources. Compared to other OECD counties, only a few nations such as Slovakia, the Republic of Ireland, and the Czech Republic (which have far smaller populations than England or the UK) have such a comparably low rate of tax revenue raised by local and regional government as the UK. These countries also have the greatest level of regional inequality. It was contended that evidence from other OECD countries showed that devolution there had invariably produced better value for money, “better recovery” and “better local solutions”. Andrew Carter from Centre for Cities noted that countries such as Sweden, Spain and Poland had, in the last twenty to thirty years, shifted aspects of tax-raising powers and their tax base from national to local level. It was acknowledged that no country had rapidly overturned problems with regional inequalities. The situation in England also contrasts with the block grants paid to the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive from the Exchequer through the Barnett Formula. This means they have greater levels of autonomy; and enjoy higher levels of expenditure per person than in England. Greater Manchester Combined Authority recommended the Scottish model, with greater predictability of revenues and investment support as an “appropriate aspiration for sub-national areas in England [rather] than one confined only to bespoke, time-limited deals.”
76.We received considerable evidence about the future of the UKSPF. This will replace the European Structure and Investment (ESIF) funds—specifically the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF)—received from the European Union prior to Brexit. In total England received on average £1.3 billion per year in 2014–20, out of the £2.1 billion received by the UK as a whole. Our predecessor committee’s report into the operation of European regional development funds in 2012 emphasised the need for value for money, support for innovative projects, and action to address the shortage of match funding from other sources often needed for projects to gain funding or to succeed.
77.The chair of our committee has co-written, with other select committee chairs, several letters calling for clarity on the how the UKSPF would operate. Other committees have also examined how the UKSPF could operate and have recommended a simple and accessible funding schemes in place of the complexity of the ESIF, and for devolution of funding decisions and delivery. There were calls for clarity on the amount of funding per year, the selection process for UKSPF and how it would relate to the Community Renewal Fund. The Government was also urged to hold a formal consultation on the UKSPF and evaluate its progress after one year. The NAO’s report on local enterprise partnerships in May 2019 also highlighted that MHCLG needed to learn from the problems with the Local Growth Fund when designing the new UKSPF.
78.The UK Government has made two major announcements on how the UKSPF will operate. The 2020 Spending Review pledged that UK-wide funding would rise to meet EU funding (which will finish being paid out in 2023) and reach c.£1.5 billion a year. Funding would partly be aimed at deprived places; and at people most in need, with employment and skills programmes focused on local need. It was also promised that further details of the UKSPF would be included in a UK-wide investment framework to be published in spring 2021. However, in March 2021 it was stated the UK-wide investment framework would be published later in 2021 and that the UKSPF investment framework was still being developed. Secondly, the 2021 Budget, announced a one-year pilot programme, the UK Community Renewal Fund. The fund would be worth £220 million, and funds would be allocated by competitively bidding. The Government has identified 100 priority places to receive capacity funding to help it coordinate their applications. The prospectus for the UK Community Renewal Fund stated that funding would be aimed at investment in skills, businesses and communities; and supporting people into employment. Mayoral combined authorities, the Greater London Authority, county councils, and unitary authorities would be lead authorities that should invite projects from local organisations and district councils. It was also stated that the fund’s arrangements would not necessarily be imitated by the UKSPF.
79.One theme of our evidence was calls for the devolution of control over the UKSPF. This would follow the previous practice of regional development agencies, and more recently Cornwall and Greater Manchester having powers over European funds. We were told that there was support in the north-east of England for a “locally designed UK Shared Prosperity Fund [that] could help local partners better address regional inequality.” This linked to the idea of a single pot of funding, which would be devolved to combined authorities and spent on local priorities. There was, however, opposition raised to letting LEPs administer the funds outside of combined authority areas, with county councils suggested as alternative administrators. David Phillips from the Institute for Fiscal Studies also suggested that if different problems were being targeted—social problems “which are much more of a local issues”, and economic problems covering a wider area—that the best approach “might be to split the money between different tiers or to allocate some of it down to lower tiers where issues are properly tackled.”
80.Another theme of our evidence was opposition to the UKSPF allocating funds through competitive bidding, Sheffield City Region argued funding should be targeted at “areas of need”, to aid in rebalancing the economy, and at supporting “those economies with the greatest potential to grow.” The CBI proposed that formulas be used to direct funds towards the most deprived parts of the country. Andrew Carter from the Centre for Cities and Guy Ware from London Councils supported a mixture of formula and objective based funding overseen by combined authorities and combinations of local authorities, modelled on the transforming cities fund. The latter emphasised that the fund should not replace existing local government funds as it would not be funding “bread-and-butter services”. David Phillips did acknowledge that the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ research into competitive bidding showed it had had mixed effectiveness, indicating cases exist where it has worked. If bidding were retained, Phillips argued it should only be retained for larger schemes. He also noted centrally attached conditions to spending reduced the accountability to local people for how it was spent.
81.It was also emphasised to us that there needs to be continuity of funding from that received from EU funds. This lay alongside complaints of the harm resulting from the lack of clarity on how UKSPF would operate. The advocacy group Core Cities supported continuity whilst arguing the UKSPF should differ from European funds in terms of revising the “rules on eligibility, supporting businesses more than once and the types of support provided”. Besides from continuity, there were calls that areas which would have been eligible for larger EU funds had the UK remained in the European Union should receive those greater funds through UKSPF. Furthermore, in 2013 the UK Government decided not to pass on the increase in funding to England for the 2014–20 period that would have resulted from a strict application of the EU allocation formula, because this would have considerably reduced funds to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
82.The Committee has persistently sought clarity from the Government about how the UK Shared Prosperity Fund will work. The Government has had over four years to design and bring forward a coherent alternative to the European Development Funds that will completely end in 2023. This delay has been unacceptable and requires an accelerated approach. The Government should bring forward as soon as possible its proposals for how the UK Shared Prosperity Fund will work, including the funding profile to be controlled by combined authorities or local authorities. The majority of the funding should be allocated as block grants with local and combined authorities empowered to allocate the funds within the general principles of bolstering regeneration and tackling unemployment and skill shortages already announced by the Government. The Government should confirm that the £1.5 billion, equivalent to that formerly provided by the EU, will be increased to retain its real value over time. It should also increase the total amount of funding for the UK Shared Prosperity Fund to ensure that English regions that would have been eligible for greater sums of structural funding had the UK stayed in the EU and if the Government had strictly followed the EU’s former allocation of funds do not lose out by its guarantee to retain the existing amounts of funding for other parts of the UK.
83.Our evidence from MHCLG stated that Mayoral combined authorities had “significant control over funding through three key levers: control of long-term new investment funding; devolution of centrally held budgets; [and] new local revenue raising powers.” The total committed long-term funding amounted to £7.43 billion, including the Transforming Cities Fund, alongside additional budgets to specific areas (for example Greater Manchester’s Housing Investment Fund). It has been suggested that the financial dependence on central government’s grants has seen mayoral combined authorities develop into ‘grant coalitions’, which focus “their limited capacity towards their relationship with central government, and lobbying to obtain additional funds and extend their formal power”.
84.The case for greater flexibility in spending was put forward by Jamie Driscoll, the Metro Mayor, North of Tyne. He advocated for
invest-to-save and public service reform … We know that obesity is going to cost £50 million a year by 2050. The best way to deal with that is better, more integrated, cheaper public transport but, at the moment, there is no mechanism where you can shift one to justify the other.
The Centre for Cities similarly argued that revenue and capital funding to mayors should not have ringfencing, and proposed instead a “single multi-year budget, negotiated with HM Treasury.” The British Chambers of Commerce also proposed: “No more fragmented funding from central government, which has only served to maintain the grip of Whitehall and ministers on local areas.” However, it did complain of “un-ringfenced monies intended for economic development” was being used “to plug holes in their [local council’s] service budgets.” These criticisms of ring-fencing highlight how the progress in reducing it made under the Coalition Government has not been maintained.
85.This aversion to ring-fenced spending tied to a fatigue with competitive bidding. Bidding by both combined and local authorities was denounced for being bureaucratic, for leading to distorted priorities, for making it hard “to plan strategically”, for instance over a five, ten or thirty year period; and for being expensive as money had to be spent within a limited time period, and money is expended on the bid with no certainty of success.
86.One alternative approach, proposed by Cllr James Jamieson from the LGA, was more outcomes-based funding, modelled on the New Homes Bonus. Another alternative is greater block funding. The LGA proposed “a single investment pot rather than the current approach of decentralisation of funding streams”, including flexibility over capital spending. The UK 2070 Commission, who had investigated into city and regional inequalities, argued block allocations would enable local priorities to be targeted, integration of activities and escaping “silo-based budgeting”. Emphasis was also placed on the need for a long-term funding settlement to provide certainty. Fixing social care was considered essential to addressing the financial challenges facing local government.
87.A sustainable approach to local government funding requires longer term budgetary arrangements and discretion for local authorities and combined authorities over how to spend. We therefore welcome that the 2021 spending review will be multi-year. This reflects the wider need for a long-term plan to support the finances of local government. We recommend that the principle of devolution funding should be that grants are given on a block basis to cover all services of which local and combined authorities have oversight, without ringfencing or competitive bidding.
149 Communities and Local Government Committee, First Report of Session 2014–15, , HC 503, paras 25, 28, 30
150 Communities and Local Government Committee, First Report of Session 2015–16, , HC 369, paras 2, 96, 103
151 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Second Report of Session 2021–22, , HC 33, para 32
152 Oral evidence taken on 3 March 2014, HC (2013–14) 1018, , (Boris Johnson)
153 London Finance Commission, , May 2013; London Finance Commission, , January 2017; Core Cities (), Centre for London (), London Assembly ()
154 (Colin Copus, De Montfort University)
155 (Jamie Driscoll, Metro Mayor, North of Tyne Combined Authority). See also (James Palmer, Metro Mayor, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority), Centre for London ()
156 (Ed Hammond, Centre for Public Scrutiny)
157 DevoConnect ()
158 County Council Network ()
159 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Eighteenth Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 2036, paras 74-5
160 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Second Report of Session 2021–22, , HC 33, para 32
161 Core Cities (), UNISON (), Kent Association of Local Councils ()
162 (Guy Ware, London Councils)
163 (Andrew Carter, Chief Executive, Centre for Cities), (David Phillips, Associate Director, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
164 (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities), (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
165 , section 33; , schedule 7
166 Business Rates, Standard Note , House of Commons Library, April 2021, pp 5-6
167 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, , January 2019; Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, , February 2020; Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, , February 2021
168 Department for Communities and Local Government, Self-sufficient local government: 100% Business Rate Retention, July 2016; Reviewing and reforming local government finance, , House of Commons Library, August 2020, p 10; HC Deb, 29 April 2020, (Commons written ministerial statement)
169 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Second Report of Session 2021–22, , HC 33, paras 24-6, 32, 37
170 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Fifth Report of the Session 2017–19, , HC 552, paras 22, 26, 39
171 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 1010, paras 76-77
172 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Eighteenth Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 2036, para 64
173 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, , 13 December 2018
174 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Government Response to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2017–19 on Business Rates Retention, , August 2018, paras 34-6
175 HM Treasury, , July 2020; HM Treasury, , March 2021; HM Treasury and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, , July 2021
176 “”, Financial Times, 18 February 2021
177 Greater Manchester Combined Authority (), Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly Leadership Board (). See also (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
178 London Assembly ()
179 (Greg Clark MP)
180 Local Government Association (
181 (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities)
182 Sunderland City Council (), Cumbria Council ()
183 British Academy ()
184 British Academy ()
185 (Guy Ware, Director of Local Government Performance and Function, London Councils). See also IPPR North (), (Lord Kerslake, UK2070 Commission)
186 (Colin Copus, De Montfort University)
187 (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities), (Lord Kerslake, UK2070 Commission)
188 (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities)
189 Core Cities (), Local Government Association ()
190 Mebyon Kernow (), UK2070 Commission (), (Colin Copus, De Montfort University), (James Palmer, Metro Mayor, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority)
191 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
192 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
193 Institute for Fiscal Studies, , March 2019, p 49
194 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
195 (Guy Ware, London Councils)
196 Core Cities (), Centre for London (), Centre for Cities (), Local Government Association (), (Colin Copus, De Montfort University), (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
197 Core Cities ()
198 Centre for London (
199 “”, Sky News Website, 13 January 2018
200 “”, Daily Express, 9 September 2021
201 Institute for Fiscal Studies, , March 2019, Table 2.1 p 14
202 (Colin Copus, De Montfort University)
203 Institute for Fiscal Studies, , March 2019, pp 58-60
204 Institute for Fiscal Studies, , March 2019, p 60
205 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
206 Britain’s Leading Edge (), (Sir Richard Leese, Leader, Manchester City Council and the Chair, Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership), (James Jamieson, Local Government Association)
207 Centre for London (), Local Government Association ()
208 , (Colin Copus, De Montfort University), (Guy Ware, London Councils)
209 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies). See also Institute for Fiscal Studies, , March 2019, p 43
210 British Academy (), Centre for London (), (Jamie Driscoll, Metro Mayor, North of Tyne Combined Authority)
211 Royal Town Planning Institute ()
212 Mebyon Kernow (), Core Cities (), London Assembly ()
213 Centre for London ()
214 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
215 HM Treasury, , 22 November 2018.
216 (Lord Kerslake, UK2070 Commission), IPPR North (). See also Institute for Fiscal Studies, , March 2019, Table 2.1, p 14
217 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies), (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities)
218 Local Government Association (), Centre for London (), (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities), (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
219 Local Government Association (), (Colin Copus, De Montfort University)
220 Local Government Association (), (Colin Copus, De Montfort University)
221 Centre for London (), London Assembly (), (Guy Ware, London Councils)
222 (Jim Hubbard, CBI). See also (Mike Short, UNISON)
223 (Greg Clark MP), (Lord Kerslake, UK2070 Commission)
224 (James Jamieson, Local Government Association)
225 Core Cities (), UK2070 Commission (), (Jamie Driscoll, Metro Mayor, North of Tyne Combined Authority), (James Palmer, Metro Mayor, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority), , (David Williams, Hertfordshire Council)
226 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Tenth Report of the Session 2017–19, HC 766
227 Core Cities (), (Jamie Driscoll, Metro Mayor, North of Tyne Combined Authority)
228 (Colin Copus, De Montfort University)
229 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies), (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities)
230 Local Government Association ()
231 Sunderland City Council (), Cumbria Council (), UNISON (), Kent Association of Local Councils ()
232 (David Williams, Hertfordshire Council)
233 Regional Studies Association ()
234 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, Second Report of Session 2021–22, , HC 33, paras 24-26, 31-2, 36-7, 42-4
235 British Academy ()
236 Regional Studies Association ()
237 (Lord Kerslake, UK2070 Commission)
238 (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities)
239 (Guy Ware, Director of Local Government Performance and Finance, London Councils)
240 (James Jamieson, Local Government Association)
241 , (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities). See also Midland Heart ()
242 (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities)
243 HM Treasury, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2021, , July 2021, Table 9.3b, p 128
244 Greater Manchester Combined Authority ()
245 The UK Shared Prosperity Fund, Research Briefing , House of Commons Library, January 2021, p 6
246 Communities and Local Government Committee, Second Report of Session 2012–13, , HC81, paras 25, 41, 50, 56
247 , 17 September 2020; , 13 October 2020. See also: , 5 June 2020; Letter from , 19 June 2020; , 23 July 2020; , 3 September 2020; , 8 October 2020; , 29 October 2020
248 Work and Pensions Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2017–19, , HC 848, paras 15-17
249 House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on the Rural Economy, Session 2017–19, , para 135; Education Committee, Third Report of Session 2019–21, , HC278, paras 114-17.
250 Scottish Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2021–22, HC 52, paras 11, 16, 24-5, 33
251 National Audit Office, Local Enterprise Partnerships: an update on progress, , May 2019, para 13
252 HM Treasury, Spending Review 2020, , November 2020, Box 3.1, p 37
253 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, , March 2021, section 1.3
254 HM Treasury, Budget 2021 — Protecting the Jobs and Livelihoods of the British People, , March 2021, p 60
255 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, , March 2021
256 Communities and Local Government Committee, Second Report of Session 2012–13, , HC81, paras 31-38
257 Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly Leadership Board (), Greater Manchester Combined Authority ()
258 Local Government Association ()
259 Core Cities (), Sheffield City Region Combined Authority (), Greater Manchester Combined Authority (), (Francesca Gains, University of Manchester), (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities), (Guy Ware, London Councils), (James Palmer, Metro Mayor, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority), (Jamie Driscoll, Metro Mayor, North of Tyne Combined Authority), (David Williams, Hertfordshire Council), (Amy Harhoff, Durham County Council)
260 County Council Network (), Cumbria Council ()
261 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
262 Sheffield City Region Combined Authority ()
263 CBI ()
264 (Andrew Carter, Centre for Cities), (Guy Ware, London Councils)
265 (Guy Ware, London Councils), Regional Studies Association ()
266 (David Phillips, Institute for Fiscal Studies)
267 Durham County Council (), Core Cities ()
268 Sheffield City Region Combined Authority ()
269 Core Cities ()
270 Sheffield City Region Combined Authority ()
271 The UK Shared Prosperity Fund, Research Briefing , House of Commons Library, January 2021, Box 2, p 17
272 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government ()
273 Mark Sandford, ‘Is devolution to England’s cities here to stay’, in , edited by Akash Paun and Sam Macrory, (2019), p 89. See also Mark Sandford, “”, Local Economy, vol. 34.2 (2019), pp 106-22
274 (Jamie Driscoll, Metro Mayor, North of Tyne Combined Authority)
275 Centre for Cities (). See also (Colin Copus, De Montfort University), (John Stanton, University of London)
276 British Chambers of Commerce ()
277 National Audit Office, Local government funding: Assurance to Parliament, , June 2014, pp 7-8
278 (Jim Hubbard, CBI), (James Jamieson, Local Government Association), (James Jamieson, Local Government Association), (Lord Kerslake, UK2070 Commission), (Greg Clark MP)
279 (Francesca Gains, University of Manchester)
280 (Jamie Driscoll, Metro Mayor, North of Tyne Combined Authority), (James Palmer, Metro Mayor, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority), , (Amy Harhoff, Durham County Council)
281 (Jamie Driscoll, Metro Mayor, North of Tyne Combined Authority)
282 , (James Jamieson, Local Government Association), (Lord Kerslake, UK2070 Commission). See also (Ed Hammond, Centre for Public Scrutiny)
283 Local Government Association ()
284 UK2070 Commission ()
285 (Simon Parkinson, Workers’ Educational Association), Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle University, UK ()
286 (James Jamieson, Local Government Association), Mr Richard Styles ()