This is a House of Commons Committee report, with recommendations to government. The Government has two months to respond.
This is the full report, read the report summary.
1. We launched our inquiry into cultural defence diplomacy on 14 October 2022. Since the launch of our inquiry, we chose to expand the scope to include the Global Defence Network—the UK’s network of defence staff stationed across the world. The terms of reference originally invited evidence on the following topics:
2. We published six pieces of written evidence and heard oral evidence from five witnesses. These included: Major General Buster Howes, CEO of the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo; Professor Jeremy Black, historian and former Professor at the University of Exeter; Professor Greg Kennedy, Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy at King’s College London; Air Vice-Marshal Mick Smeath CBE, director of the Global Defence Network at the Ministry of Defence; and the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon. Ben Wallace MP. We are grateful for their time and efforts in contributing to this inquiry. We are particularly grateful to the Secretary of State for his keen interest in the subject and for making the time to give evidence to us despite pressing international events.
3. Throughout the inquiry, we explored the UK’s soft power, before moving on to how best to utilise some of the UK’s assets. Finally, we explored the Global Defence Network, its value, and how best that value can be enhanced. Whilst our terms of reference asked about organisational support for defence diplomacy, measuring impact, and ceremonial roles, we were unable to collect enough evidence on these topics.
4. The term ‘soft power’ was initially coined by American political scientist Joseph Nye who wrote “What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”1 This is the starting point for defence diplomacy (just one aspect of soft power), which is the peaceful use of defence to achieve positive results in the development of relations with other countries.2 The UK first defined the term in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review White Paper where defence diplomacy was listed as a new mission.3
5. The Government’s Integrated Review 2021 set out the UK’s position and strengths with regard to soft power:
The source of much of the UK’s soft power lies beyond the ownership of government–an independence from state direction that is essential to its influence. The Government can use its own assets, such as the diplomatic network, aid spending and the armed forces, to help create goodwill towards the UK [ … ] Our allies are also taking a more strategic approach: cultural relations is one of the three pillars of German foreign policy and an important part of French foreign policy.4
The Integrated Review Refresh in March 2023 also mentioned soft power, saying that the Government will promote the soft and cultural power the UK possesses and will do more to “bring soft power into its broader foreign policy approach”.5
6. Whilst soft power is the opposite side of the coin to hard power, to be credible it is necessary to have both elements as a leading nation. We heard that the UK’s new-found interest in soft power might be related to diminishing hard power. Professor Greg Kennedy, Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy at King’s College London, told us:
Are you turning to soft power because you cannot do anything else? Discuss. And, if you are going to discuss that soft power, its context and when you do it, then this is where the IR comes in. If it is not co-ordinated and not connected across Departments, the overall effect of just having soft power put into the MoD and the defence attaché realm in a way that it had not been significant before, would be that it is irrelevant.6
7. The British Council—one of the UK’s principal soft power agencies—carried out a study into the UK’s soft power advantage, which was used to inform the 2021 Integrated Review. The study found that the UK’s military expertise was particularly valued in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study also noted that the UK is Europe’s leading military power and needs to be engaged and collaborative in Europe.7
8. Whilst soft power does not instinctively fall within the remit of the Ministry of Defence, it plays a part in ‘defence engagement’, which is the military contribution to soft power. ‘Defence engagement’ itself is defined as “the means by which we use our Defence assets and activities, short of combat operations, to achieve influence.”8 Within that, there are seven generic objectives:
In practice, the objectives set out include actions such as joint training exercises, defence related education, defence networks, and ceremonial exchanges. These objectives are outlined in the Joint Doctrine Note 1/15 (JDN) on Defence Engagement, dated August 2015. JDN 1/15 was written to “help readers to understand the frameworks, actors, activities, strategies, and planning processes that currently underpin defence engagement”.10
9. The Joint Doctrine Note on Defence Engagement was last updated in August 2015, and has been overtaken by recent events (such as the growth of the UK’s Defence Network and the invasion of Ukraine) and publications (such as the 2021 Integrated Review, 2021 Defence Command paper, and the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh). After the publication of the forthcoming refresh of the Defence Command Paper, the MoD should seek to update the Joint Doctrine Note on Defence Engagement.
10. The Ministry of Defence and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office should set out how it measures the value of soft power and defence diplomacy, and against what objectives.
11. The Armed Forces own and operate a number of assets that could be—and sometimes are—used for diplomatic purposes. In particular the Royal Navy has vessels that can be used for diplomatic purposes—more so than the other Services. This is coupled with the reputation that, historically, the UK has been a maritime nation and is particularly strong in that field. Dr Carlos Solar, senior research fellow at RUSI, told us:
Given the historical dominance of the Royal Navy around the world and its civilian legacy in establishing maritime trade that connected continents, naval assets are an advantage to the UK’s defence diplomacy as they symbolise centuries of sea tradition but also cutting-edge technological capabilities. British vessels arriving at foreign ports break the coastal view with their magnitude. They are tremendous to see and usually make the local news, and families gather to see the arrival of vessels.11
12. The Royal Navy’s handbook sets out three types of visits to foreign ports:
13. Whilst the Royal Navy handbook makes clear that operational visits should avoid formalities and calls, there appears to be scope for the diplomatic use of naval assets where the ship is on a formal or informal visit. We heard that naval assets could provide a platform for further diplomacy. Professor Alexander Evans, Professor in Practice at the LSE has stated that naval assets are “brilliant platforms for hosting diplomatic receptions, trade and investment missions, and King’s Birthday Party events.”13 Professor Jeremy Black also made the point that naval assets could plug gaps where the UK’s presence is more modest, therefore exploiting the full potential of an existing asset already in the region.14
14. One of the Royal Navy’s recent successes was the voyage of the Carrier Strike Group 2021 (CSG21). CSG21, spearheaded by HMS Queen Elizabeth, sailed to the Far East in what its Commander, Commodore Steve Moorhouse, described as “the most important peacetime deployment in a generation”.15 Despite being an operational deployment, the Group engaged 19 states and territories and participated in six military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region.16
15. Another potential benefit to using naval assets for diplomacy could be for trade. Between 2012–2021, ships made up the UK’s second biggest arms export, accounting for 16%.17 When asked if showcasing the Royal Navy’s assets could be good for trade, Professor Black agreed and told us that some of the UK’s shipbuilding abilities carried “a world reputation”.18
16. The Ministry of Defence should maximise the soft power value of Royal Navy visits to foreign ports. The Ministry of Defence should set out in response to this report how it currently uses Royal Navy assets to further diplomacy, and how other Government Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade use the asset for diplomatic and trade purposes.
17. Another aspect of defence diplomacy is the exchange of culture, especially with relation to the Armed Forces. As part of our inquiry, we focussed on the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo (REMT) and explored its role in defence diplomacy.
18. The REMT was created in 1949 and held its first performance in 1950. A military tattoo is a military performance or display of music. The REMT is the longest-running military Tattoo in the world, incorporating musicians, pipers, drummers and dancers. It is performed annually in August and runs alongside the Edinburgh festival to a global TV audience of over 100 million in more than 40 countries. The REMT also performs internationally, and has appeared in Australia as well as sending 12 performers to Mumbai to participate in a trade mission coinciding with a naval port visit.19
19. The REMT provides a platform for government and military figures to entertain guests. At each performance there is a recognised person who is the ‘salute taker’. Each salute taker has up to 24 guests with them, which has the potential to be used strategically to host guests and develop relationships, including with potentially hostile states. In 2022 the First Sea Lord hosted the US Chief of Naval Operations at the performance.20 Major General Buster Howes, CEO of the REMT, explained the potential strategic uses of attending the REMT with guests included having “sensitive and difficult conversations” with a wide range of people, including with those whom the UK might have complex relationships with.21
20. For each night that the Tattoo is performing, one of the Services handles the VIP guest list and is able to strategically invite guests that it wishes to host and develop relationships with. Major General Howes told us that the Services take advantage of the opportunity to host guests.22 However, we were told that Cabinet Ministers of the UK Government do not utilise the opportunity to host guests at an impressive cultural event, despite being invited every year.23 The Secretary of State for Defence told us that he himself last attended the Tattoo as a member of the public 10–15 years ago.24
21. The REMT also told us about some of the difficulties that it faces in attempting to coordinate its international activities. The FCDO’s ‘GREAT’ campaign is the UK’s international brand marketing campaign that aims to promote the best of the UK abroad.25 Major General Howes told us that this campaign was “quite difficult to navigate” when seeking to perform abroad.26 As such, the REMT told us that it would welcome a single point of contact within the FCDO to liaise with it.27
22. The Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo is an exceptional event that showcases some of the best of the UK. The Tattoo also provides excellent opportunities to further relationships and diplomatic aims. The UK Government should do more to leverage the opportunities it presents by ensuring that the Ministry of Defence sends a Minister each year to curate the guest list to enhance relationships, including potentially with those states that it might not usually engage with.
23. The FCDO’s GREAT campaign (the Government’s mechanism for promoting the UK abroad) can be difficult to navigate. A single point of contact should be created within the FCDO’s GREAT campaign to ensure that the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo, and other similar organisations, face fewer barriers to its overseas activities.
24. Defence Attachés are the Chief of Defence Staff’s representatives abroad, working as the heads of defence sections in UK missions around the world, to support ambassadors and high commissioners globally. Their remit includes:
As of June 2022, the UK had 164 Defence Attachés/Advisors, up from 149 in 2021.29
25. Defence Attachés and defence sections within embassies have multiple roles to play, as listed in paragraph 24. Professor Jeremy Black told us that the key role of successful and able Defence Attachés is strategic prioritisation, aligning the UK’s strategy with allies, and helping allies to understand the UK’s position.30
26. The Defence Command paper, published in March 2021 (and due to be updated imminently at the time of publication of this report), set out the goals and actions of Defence in relation to the Integrated Review. As part of the plans for ‘persistent engagement overseas’, the MoD said it plans to:
Have a larger, professionalised cadre of permanently deployed personnel, delivering defence diplomacy around the globe. We will increase our global network by a third, expanding our Defence Attaché network and our British Defence Staffs to co-ordinate activity across regions.31
Air Vice-Marshal Mick Smeath, who gave evidence to this inquiry, was appointed as the head of the Global Defence Attaché network in January 2023. Part of his role is to “professionalise and operationalise the network”.32 Air Vice-Marshal Smeath explained how the MoD envision the reinvestment of Defence Attachés:
what we want is a defence attaché who would work in, say, Bahrain, but then would come back to maybe the single service, maybe to work in policy and operations, to reinvest that back into the home base. They would then be talent-managed and taken back out to go and work in the middle east [ … .]33
27. One of the issues that the Defence Attaché network faces is that personnel are often moved around with little logic. The Secretary of State elaborated:
What has often happened is that someone has done a two or three-year posting in a middle eastern country. The next thing you know, you find them on the other side of the world, in the Philippines or somewhere. We have put all that value into you—all that training—and we want you to be a diplomat for defence in a region.34
In attempting to rectify these types of scenarios, the Secretary of State spoke about how he wants to create a career path for those armed forces personnel that wish to become career defence attaches, whilst also progressing their rank. The Secretary of State told us:
What we have seen too many times in the past is it being an afterthought or a secondary career. It should be a prime, premier career for someone in the armed forces to decide, “You know what? I’m going to be an attaché. I’m not going to be a field commander, commanding a tank division, but I am going to be an expert in the middle east. I’m going to start junior and I’m going to do 20 years in the middle east, then into the Foreign Office, into the Department. I’ll know all the people in the region. I’ll know Arabic.” At the end of their career, they could be a two-star or a one-star.35
28. Given the critical role and the environment that Defence Attachés operate in, it is important that talented and skilled people are in those positions. Both Major General Buster Howes, a former Defence Attaché in Washington DC, and Professor Greg Kennedy, told us that these roles require “our brightest and best at a younger age”.36 However, one of the challenges of sending talented young officers, particularly in certain cultures around the world, is that of rank and hierarchy. Major General Howes explained:
In bureaucratic cultures, rank counts. You don’t get access and you can’t get to see people if you don’t have enough weight on your shoulder. I’m not quite sure how you square that circle.37
One of the suggestions made to resolve this issue is that of acting, local or temporary ranks—a practice that is becoming more popular.38 Air Vice-Marshal Smeath assured us that the MoD was trying to spot young talent at Captain level.39
29. Language is a key skill for an effective Defence Attaché. Speaking the local language enables defence personnel to interact with a greater range of interlocutors and to develop deeper relationships. The Secretary of State pointed to occasions where a more junior military advisor was preferred by some nations over the Defence Attaché due to a better grasp of the local language.40 Air Vice-Marshal Smeath told us that language provision required improvement and that this was being looked at as part of the professionalisation of the network.41 He noted that there are three different language training schools across the Government with the MoD’s language provision separate from that of the FCDO.42
30. Despite the need for improvement in the UK Government’s language provision, the UK’s military educational institutions are in high demand, including amongst foreign military personnel.43 These institutions both provide an excellent education, and also offer a means of delivering influence and soft power. The Secretary of State explained:
If you are worried about Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, one of the ways to challenge that is to take the next generation of African leaders and make sure they have attended your institutions. When I say “your institutions”, I do not just mean military institutions; it could be your universities or your civil service colleges. That is the way.44
However, there are capacity challenges around how many places can be made available.45 The Secretary of State agreed in principle that expanding institutions such as Sandhurst would be a positive step.46
31. We welcome the professionalisation of the Global Defence Network and commend the Ministry of Defence on the work that has been carried out so far. The appointment of a director for the Global Defence Network is an important step in the right direction. The UK’s Defence Attaché network is critical to the UK’s influence around the world and it is right that the Ministry should focus on developing more attractive and rewarding career paths in defence diplomacy. Defence Attachés across the world should be proud of the work they are carrying out on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the UK Armed Forces.
32. It appears that there is currently little thought given to talent management or strategic goals in Defence Attachés’ career paths. It is wasteful for someone who has built up knowledge, contacts and experience of a country and region to be moved to a role unconnected with that region. In response to this report, the Ministry of Defence should set out what work the Director of the Global Defence Network is doing to create a development and rotation plan to ensure the knowledge, contacts and experience built up by Defence Attachés is utilised within central Government.
33. The Government’s current provisions for language training appear to be disjointed, with different provisions across Government. The Government should consider consolidating language training provision. This could streamline the process, whilst also enabling people to make valuable contacts with colleagues. Given the importance of language skills, the Ministry of Defence should place a particular emphasis on its uptake for those Defence Attachés that are taking up posts in non-English speaking countries.
34. The UK’s educational institutions, including military colleges, are world renowned, and an important tool in the UK’s soft power. The Ministry of Defence should conduct a review into how Sandhurst and other military educational institutions can be better used to further defence diplomacy and set out a strategy for doing this.
1. The Joint Doctrine Note on Defence Engagement was last updated in August 2015, and has been overtaken by recent events (such as the growth of the UK’s Defence Network and the invasion of Ukraine) and publications (such as the 2021 Integrated Review, 2021 Defence Command paper, and the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh). After the publication of the forthcoming refresh of the Defence Command Paper, the MoD should seek to update the Joint Doctrine Note on Defence Engagement. (Paragraph 9)
2. The Ministry of Defence and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office should set out how it measures the value of soft power and defence diplomacy, and against what objectives. (Paragraph 10)
3. The Ministry of Defence should maximise the soft power value of Royal Navy visits to foreign ports. The Ministry of Defence should set out in response to this report how it currently uses Royal Navy assets to further diplomacy, and how other Government Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade use the asset for diplomatic and trade purposes. (Paragraph 16)
4. The Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo is an exceptional event that showcases some of the best of the UK. The Tattoo also provides excellent opportunities to further relationships and diplomatic aims. The UK Government should do more to leverage the opportunities it presents by ensuring that the Ministry of Defence sends a Minister each year to curate the guest list to enhance relationships, including potentially with those states that it might not usually engage with. (Paragraph 22)
5. The FCDO’s GREAT campaign (the Government’s mechanism for promoting the UK abroad) can be difficult to navigate. A single point of contact should be created within the FCDO’s GREAT campaign to ensure that the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo, and other similar organisations, faces fewer barriers to its overseas activities. (Paragraph 23)
6. We welcome the professionalisation of the Global Defence Network and commend the Ministry of Defence on the work that has been carried out so far. The appointment of a director for the Global Defence Network is an important step in the right direction. The UK’s Defence Attaché network is critical to the UK’s influence around the world and it is right that the Ministry should focus on developing more attractive and rewarding career paths in defence diplomacy. Defence Attachés across the world should be proud of the work they are carrying out on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the UK Armed Forces. (Paragraph 31)
7. It appears that there is currently little thought given to talent management or strategic goals in Defence Attachés’ career paths. It is wasteful for someone who has built up knowledge, contacts and experience of a country and region to be moved to a role unconnected with that region. In response to this report, the Ministry of Defence should set out what work the Director of the Global Defence Network is doing to create a development and rotation plan to ensure the knowledge, contacts and experience built up by Defence Attachés is utilised within central Government. (Paragraph 32)
8. The Government’s current provisions for language training appear to be disjointed, with different provisions across Government. The Government should consider consolidating language training provision. This could streamline the process, whilst also enabling people to make valuable contacts with colleagues. Given the importance of language skills, the Ministry of Defence should place a particular emphasis on its uptake for those Defence Attachés that are taking up posts in non-English speaking countries. (Paragraph 33)
9. The UK’s educational institutions, including military colleges, are world renowned, and an important tool in the UK’s soft power. The Ministry of Defence should conduct a review into how Sandhurst and other military educational institutions can be better used to further defence diplomacy and set out a strategy for doing this. (Paragraph 34)
Tobias Ellwood, in the Chair
Sarah Atherton
Robert Courts
Dave Doogan
Richard Drax
Mark Francois
Kevan Jones
Emma Lewell-Buck
Gavin Robinson
John Spellar
Draft Report from the Sub-Committee (Defence Diplomacy: A softer side of UK Defence), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 34 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Seventh Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).
Adjourned till Tuesday 23 May 2023 at 10.00am.
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
Major General Buster Howes, CEO, The Royal Edinburgh Military TattooQ1–31
Professor Greg Kennedy, Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy, King’s College London; Professor Jeremy Black, former Professor of History, The University of ExeterQ32–49
Air Vice Marshal Michael Smeath, Director, Global Defence Network UK Strategic Command, Ministry of Defence; Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP, Secretary of State for DefenceQ50–92
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
CDD numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 Allfrey, Mr David (CDD0002)
2 Evans, Professor Alexander (Professor in Practice, London School of Economics and Political Science) (CDD0001)
3 Ministry of Defence (CDD0008)
4 Solar, Dr Carlos (Senior Research Fellow, International Security Studies, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)) (CDD0007)
5 The Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo (CDD0006)
6 UK Music (CDD0004)
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
The Treatment of Contracted Staff for The MoD’s Ancillary Services |
HC 187 |
|
2nd |
The Integrated Review, Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy |
HC 180 |
|
3rd |
Defence Space: through adversity to the stars? |
HC 182 |
|
4th |
Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls |
HC 282 |
|
5th |
Withdrawal from Afghanistan |
HC 725 |
|
6th |
Special Relationships? US, UK and NATO |
HC 184 |
|
1st Special |
Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings: Government response to the Committee’s fourth report of Session 2021–22 |
HC 267 |
|
2nd Special |
The Treatment of Contracted Staff for the MOD’s Ancillary Services: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 702 |
|
3rd Special |
The Integrated Review, Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 865 |
|
4th Special |
Defence Space: through adversity to the stars? Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 1031 |
|
5th Special |
Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Government Reponse to the Committee’s Fifth Report |
HC 1316 |
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Russia and Ukraine border tensions |
HC 167 |
|
2nd |
Women in the Armed Forces |
HC 154 |
|
3rd |
“We’re going to need a bigger Navy” |
HC 168 |
|
4th |
Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings |
HC 1069 |
|
1st Special |
Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 221 |
|
2nd Special |
Manpower or mindset: Defence’s contribution to the UK’s pandemic response: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 552 |
|
3rd Special |
Russia and Ukraine border tensions: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 725 |
|
4th Special |
Protecting those who protect us: Women in the Armed Forces from Recruitment to Civilian Life: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 904 |
|
5th Special |
“We’re going to need a bigger Navy”: Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 1160 |
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
In Search of Strategy—The 2020 Integrated Review |
HC 165 |
|
2nd |
The Security of 5G |
HC 201 |
|
3rd |
Pre-appointment hearing for the Service Complaints Ombudsman |
HC 989 |
|
4th |
Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain |
HC 699 |
|
5th |
Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability |
HC 659 |
|
6th |
Manpower or mindset: Defence’s contribution to the UK’s pandemic response |
HC 357 |
|
1st Special |
Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2018: Government Response to the Committee’s Eighteenth Report of Session 2017–19 |
HC 162 |
|
2nd Special |
Drawing a Line: Protecting Veterans by a Statute of Limitations: Government Response to the Defence Committee’s Seventeenth Report of Session 2017–19 |
HC 325 |
|
3rd Special |
In Search of Strategy—The 2020 Integrated Review: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 910 |
|
4th Special |
The Security of 5G: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 1091 |
|
5th Special |
Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report |
HC 1380 |
1 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
2 Lech Drab, Defence diplomacy - an important tool for the implementation of foreign policy and security of the state
3 House of Commons Library, The Strategic Defence Review White Paper, October 1998
4 Gov.uk, Global Britain in a competitive age, March 2021, p. 49
5 Gov.uk, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world, March 2023, p. 58
7 British Council, Global Britain: the UK’s soft power advantage
8 Joint Doctrine Publication 05, The Military Contribution, November 2022
9 Joint Doctrine Note 1/15, Defence Engagement, August 2015, pp. 21–22
10 Gov.uk, Defence Engagement (JDN 1/15), August 2015
11 Dr Carlos Solar (Senior Research Fellow, International Security Studies at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)) (CDD0007)
12 Royal Navy, Official visits, precedence and ceremonies
13 Professor Alexander Evans (Professor in Practice at London School of Economics and Political Science) (CDD0001)
15 Royal Navy, UK Carrier Strike Group heads on historic deployment after royal visit, 22 May 2021
16 Written evidence to the Defence Committee’s inquiry into UK Defence and the Indo-Pacific
17 House of Commons Library, UK arms exports: statistics, January 2023, p. 18
19 The Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo (CDD0006)
20 The Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo (CDD0006)
25 Gov.uk, Refreshed GREAT campaign launched in 145 countries, 9 June 2021
27 The Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo (CDD0006)
28 Gov.uk, Joint Doctrine Publication 05: Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution, p. 97
29 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2021–22, p. 22
31 Gov.uk, Defence in a Competitive Age, March 2021, p. 15
32 Question 58 once uploaded
33 Question 77 once uploaded
34 Question 68 when uploaded
35 Question 68 when uploaded