Introduction
1. Climate change is a global problem, but its effects are being felt most strongly by the Arctic, which is warming up to four times faster than the rest of the world, with potentially dire consequences for both the Arctic region and for the globe.1 Rapidly rising temperatures are causing snow, sea ice, and permafrost to melt, and some research now predicts that the Arctic may well be sea ice free in the summer as soon as the 2030s.2 The consequences for the 4 million people that call the Arctic home, especially the Indigenous Peoples living there, are huge, and the consequences of the rapid, transformational changes in the Arctic must sound alarm bells for the environmental health of the globe.
2. After the end of the Cold War, the eight Arctic States had sought to maintain the Arctic as a region of cooperation and low tension, with peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law. More recently, however, the receding sea ice has led to increased human activity in the Arctic, resulting in heightened interest in the region’s resources, and ensuing elements of competition and tension in the geopolitics of the region. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has caused increasing levels of tension and militarisation in the Arctic, which has had inevitable consequences for the Arctic environment and for scientific research, since most forms of cooperation with Russia have been suspended.
3. The UK is a non-Arctic state, but it is the non-Arctic state which is geographically closest to the region, and therefore the Arctic’s nearest neighbour. The UK has much to gain from the Arctic, a great deal to contribute to its preservation, and a moral imperative to minimise its contribution to environmental degradation. Our scientists make a world-leading contribution to research in the Arctic, which is recognised as essential to finding ways to halt or reverse climate change. The implications of climate change in the Arctic are also profound for the UK, through rising sea levels and changes to our weather.
What is the Arctic?
4. There is no universally agreed definition of the Arctic. Current definitions used by the scientific community and policy makers vary from the area within the Arctic Circle (66° 34’ North); the area within the July 10°C isotherm (a line on a map connecting points having the same temperature at a given time or on average over a given period); and the area within the Arctic tree line.
5. Eight countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle: the United States (Alaska), Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland, a member country of the Kingdom of Denmark), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland. These eight countries are often referred to as the Arctic countries or Arctic States, and they are the member states of the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental forum that promotes cooperation in the Arctic. A subset of the eight Arctic countries are the five countries that are considered Arctic coastal states because they have mainland coasts with waters north of the Arctic Circle: the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Greenland (and therefore Denmark).3
Figure 1: Arctic definitions
Source: Arctic Portal, “Arctic Definitions Combined”
The UK Government’s Arctic policy framework
6. The UK Government’s approach is set out in recent Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office [FCDO] and Ministry of Defence [MoD] documents on Arctic policy, namely “Looking North: The UK and the Arctic” (2023),4 which updates “Adapting To Change” (2013)5 and “Beyond the ice” (2018),6 and “The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North” (2021).7
About this inquiry
7. We launched our inquiry in February 2023, with the objective of examining three broad aspects of the UK’s relationship with the Arctic and its environment: the implications for the delicate Arctic environment of an increasingly tense geopolitical situation, provoked by Russia; the ramifications of the exploitation of the Arctic for its resources; and the UK’s leadership role in Arctic research.8
8. We received 26 written responses to our call for evidence, and held five public evidence sessions, hearing from 18 witnesses, including academics, Arctic researchers, representatives from the shipping and fishing industries and public bodies. Together with the House of Lords International Affairs and Defence Committee, we held a roundtable discussion with representatives of Indigenous Peoples across the Arctic whose homelands are being affected by changes in the environment. As part of the Committee’s inquiry, we visited the British Antarctic Survey in Cambridge, and undertook a visit to Norway and Svalbard, to hear from a range of Arctic stakeholders and to see the UK Arctic Research Station in Ny-Ålesund (the most northerly inhabited place on Earth at 79 degrees north). To conclude the oral evidence to the inquiry, we heard from Jane Rumble OBE, Head of the Polar Regions Department in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and George Freeman MP, the Minister for Science, Research and Innovation in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
9. We are very grateful to all of those who took the trouble to submit written evidence, who provided oral evidence, and who otherwise assisted us in this inquiry, especially to those who facilitated and hosted our illuminating visit to the region. We would, in particular, like to thank Thomas Johnson, PhD candidate in the Department of Earth Sciences at University College London, specialist adviser to this inquiry, for his invaluable contribution.9
10. In Chapter 1 we will consider how climate change is affecting the Arctic, and the implications for the region’s biodiversity and ecosystems. In Chapter 2 we look at how rising tensions in the Arctic, arising from Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, are affecting environmental cooperation in the region. Chapter 3 will examine the UK’s contribution to understanding the Arctic through research, and how this effort can best be supported. In our last chapter, Chapter 4, we consider the economic opportunities that are emerging in the Arctic as the ice retreats, and their environmental implications.
1 The effects of climate change on the Arctic
11. The Arctic is in flux. In this chapter, we examine the Arctic’s physical response to human-caused climate change, and the ripple effects these have on the UK. Observed changes include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures, and the alteration of Arctic weather systems. The thawing permafrost and evolving vegetation represent more than just temperature changes—they are fundamental transformations of ecosystems, as habitats slip away like the melting ice. The impacts are not limited to the natural world: they extend to human communities, challenging traditional livelihoods and cultures in the region, and also straining infrastructure and economies.
Climate change in the Arctic region
12. The Arctic is feeling the impact of climate change far more intensely than the rest of the Earth. In the Arctic, temperatures are rising nearly four times faster than the rest of the globe.10 This is known as Arctic amplification (see box 1). The much faster warming of the Arctic is like a self-fulfilling prophecy, since it is at least partly due to factors such as the loss of sea ice, and we were told that the “main driver of the Arctic sea ice loss” is “human influence”.11
Box 1: Arctic amplification and ice-albedo feedback
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The Arctic is warming much faster than the rest of the world, including Antarctica. This is observed in paleoclimate records, instrument observational records, and in climate models. It is now thought that the Arctic is warming four times faster than the rest of the globe. From 1979 to 2021, temperatures in the Arctic have been increasing by 0.73°C every decade, while the global average temperature has been rising by 0.19°C per decade.12 This phenomenon is called Arctic amplification. There are several mechanisms behind Arctic amplification, but the main driver of this enhanced warming in the Arctic is loss of sea ice. Sea ice is a bright surface that reflects solar radiation. When sea ice melts, it reveals the open, much darker, ocean below it—i.e. it has a lower albedo—absorbing more solar energy than sea ice. Consequently, more heat is absorbed by the Earth’s surface, leading to increased surface temperatures in turn, and further enhancing the loss of sea ice. |
13. We heard from Professor Terry Callaghan CMG, Professor of Arctic Ecology, School of Biosciences, University of Sheffield that:
There are dramatic changes, and they are getting faster. We are seeing more and more extreme weather events, which are getting more intense and more frequent. We are seeing bigger landslides through permafrost thaw, increasing permafrost temperatures, damage to infrastructure, changes in vegetation and changes in carbon emissions, which are getting faster and faster. In terms of ecosystem change, we are also seeing dramatic events such as mass deaths of reindeer, where tens of thousands are killed in one winter, which we have not seen earlier.13
14. About 40% of the ice cover in the Arctic Ocean at the September minimum14 has been lost since 1979, when satellite records began.15 Degradation of sea ice cover is not just limited to its extent: in the same period “[s]ubstantial declines have been seen in its age, [and] thickness”.16 Professor Mark Brandon, MBE, Associate Dean and Director of STEM Research, Faculty of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics, Open University, told us that the sea ice is melting relentlessly:
Every year it is a clear indication of whether climate change has become worse or not, but the trend is the important thing. The trend is relentlessly downwards, about 13% a decade of less extent in the summer. It is melting at every single month of the year. We have less sea ice in every single month now compared to 40 years ago.17
Figure 2: Northern hemisphere extent anomalies, September 1979–2022
Source: NASA National Snow and Ice Data Center, Sea Ice Index, Version 3.0, (G02135), September 2022
15. It is now predicted that the Arctic could be practically sea ice free during the summer as soon as the 2030s, which is about a decade sooner than researchers previously predicted.18 The research suggests that this outcome “could materialise even if nations manage to curb greenhouse gas emissions more decisively than they are currently doing”, compared to earlier projections which had found that stronger climate action might have been enough to preserve the summer ice.19 Professor Dirk Notz, an oceanographer at the University of Hamburg, who is one of the study authors, commented that “[w]e basically are saying that it has become too late to save the Arctic summer sea ice”.20
16. Henry Burgess, Head of the Natural Environment Research Council [NERC] Arctic Office, told us that this means that in the Central Arctic Ocean, there will be an entirely new sea. He said:
Climate change is literally and figuratively shining a light into the Arctic. At some point in the next couple of decades, we will have, in the summer at least, essentially a new ocean or a new sea that we have access to and that other countries have access to—and that has not happened anywhere in the world since the North Sea opened up 10,000 or 20,000 years ago.21
Mr Burgess added that many countries are beginning to sharpen their focus on the potential of the Central Arctic Ocean, looking at the ecosystem, blue carbon stores, and potential fisheries. He added that this was an area of “great potential” for the UK.22 Scientists should study these areas, so that decision makers can “make wise choices about the exploitation of, governance of or access to that region in the future”.23
17. Professor Mark Brandon painted a profound picture of the many ways in which climate change is changing the Arctic environment:
In the physical environment, just about every climate indicator is in retreat. We have decreasing snow cover; we have decreasing sea ice; we have decreasing glacial ice; we have the great icecaps of Greenland and the other northern icecaps losing ice through melts.24
Permafrost
18. Permafrost, or ground that remains frozen for at least two consecutive years, constitutes roughly 22% of land in the northern hemisphere.25 The Met Office told us that permafrost is warming from 1°C per decade in colder permafrost to less than 0.3°C per decade in warmer permafrost. It told us that future projections suggest that the volume of permafrost could decrease by 10%–40% per 1°C of warming, and that the breakdown of permafrost will lead to ground subsidence and alterations in the landscape, which are likely to damage infrastructure.26
19. Professor Callaghan described how severely permafrost thaw affects the Arctic environment:
[T]here are huge impacts on the landscape if you have permafrost thaw. If the ground is rich in ice, when that ice melts, the water runs away, and the ground subsides. That means that houses fall down, roads break up, airstrips break up, riverbanks erode and coastlines erode. It means that the vegetation changes because, if you have an area of intact permafrost, that might be typical tundra vegetation with shrubs, grass and the like. As soon as that subsides, you get a lake. You cannot have a much greater change in biodiversity between those two. The whole of diversity, whether it is a classic diversity or terrestrial diversity, depends on permafrost thaw.27
20. Methane (CH₄), a highly potent greenhouse, is stored in the Arctic’s permafrost. The National Oceanography Centre and BIOPOLE, an interdisciplinary research programme, told us that methane pools in the Arctic require further study to “make high confidence predictions of future CH₄ emissions to the atmosphere from these key natural sources and quantify their future role in the global carbon system”.28
Fires
21. Dr Adriana Ford, Centre Manager for the Leverhulme Centre for Wildfires, Environment and Society, told us that a longer fire season, with “more frequent and more intense fires” has been observed in the Arctic. These fires release carbon sequestered over millennia and could enhance global climate change”.29 Professor Callaghan told us that tundra fire can “destroy ecosystems totally”.30
Biodiversity
22. BIOPOLE told us that climate change in the Arctic would have negative impacts on Arctic ecosystems,31 while the Scottish Association for Marine Science told us that these could have knock-on effects on the productivity of waters around the UK.32 The Arctic is, of course, an important habitat for polar bears, who largely live and hunt on sea ice. As the sea ice melts, particularly around Svalbard, polar bears are driven onto land for longer periods. WWF told us that “[t]his brings them in contact with people who live and work in the Arctic, threatening the safety of both people and bears”.33 There is the potential for a significant fall in polar bear numbers due to sea-ice loss: one study suggests that the number of polar bears could reduce by 30% over the next forty years, making the species vulnerable to extinction.34
23. Highlighting the extent of observed changes in ecosystems and biodiversity in the Arctic, Professor Callaghan told us:
Where we had the white fox—the arctic fox—that has gone and the red fox is there. We have magpies and crows that were not there. It is a step change in biodiversity that we could never have predicted. That is frightening.35
People in the Arctic
24. Four million people live in the Arctic, and climate change will have profound impacts on them. Professor Michael Bravo, Professor of the History and Geography of Science, University of Cambridge, told us that the main issues are isolation and loss of infrastructure. He told us that climate change leads to the degradation of both man-made infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, and natural infrastructure such as land and sea ice, leading to disruption in the interconnectedness of the Arctic which has impacts on traditional ways of life. Characterising the extent of the changes observed in the region, he told us that:
[The Inuit] have always been living with change, but in recent decades the change is of a different order, and they describe that by saying [that]… their vocabulary no longer adequately describes what they see around them. A vocabulary, where the grammar itself is highly sophisticated, that is challenged and stretched to the very limits and beyond to describe the changes that they have been seeing since about 1990 to 2000.36
25. We held a roundtable with Arctic Indigenous Peoples and heard that climate change was dramatically changing their homelands, affecting their livelihoods and their identity and foundations as people.37 As an example of this pressure on their identity, one participant told us that the word for the ‘Arctic’ in their language means ‘the frozen place’, and that therefore the thawing ice is creating a disconnect with the very name of their home.
26. We heard from academics that the way to halt or minimise the drastic changes taking place in the Arctic is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Professor Helene Hewitt OBE, Science Fellow at the Met Office, told us that “[f]rom a scientific point of view, the only way to stop… changes that we are seeing in the Arctic is to stabilise or reduce global warming”.38 Dr Duncan Depledge, Lecturer in Geopolitics and Security, Loughborough University, told us:
We also know that the most important action any country or organisation or, indeed, individual can take to help to reduce global warming in the Arctic is to drastically slash greenhouse gas emissions.39
27. The Government acknowledges that the Arctic is warming four times faster than the global average and identifies that “[c]limate change poses an existential threat to the Arctic as we know it”.40
28. The Arctic region is at the frontline of climate change and is warming four times faster than the rest of the Earth, on a feedback loop largely due to a reduction in sea ice. The Arctic is predicted to be summer sea ice free within a decade. Climate change in the Arctic is driven by human-made carbon emissions and is a global responsibility.
Effects of a changing Arctic on the UK
Sea level rise
29. We were told that sea levels in the Arctic are currently rising by 3.2mm per year, mainly due to the melting of the Greenland ice sheet and to open water expanding in volume, due to the ‘albedo effect’, with its dark blue colour absorbing more heat than ice does (see Box 1).41 The British Antarctic Survey told us that the Greenland ice sheet holds enough water to raise global sea levels by seven metres were it to melt completely.42 Researchers at the University of Liverpool told us that “Greenland alone is already committed to contribute between 17.5–52.4mm of global sea level rise by 2100 without any further warming” and that continued warming would increase it further.43
30. Rising sea levels pose a direct threat to the UK, with up to 1.5 million properties at an increased risk of flooding by 2080.44 Researchers from the University of Lancaster told us that “[s]ea level rise and associated coastal flooding is a major threat to much of the UK as an island nation”.45 Dr Jenny Turton, Senior Adviser at Arctic Frontiers,46 told us that this increase in flooding would in turn lead to enhanced erosion of our coasts, and will require the UK to upgrade the Thames barrier.47
31. The increase in floods here at home that will be caused by a changing Arctic will require difficult decisions by the Government. Jane Rumble, Head of the Polar Regions Department at the FCDO, told us:
The UK will have to make decisions about which part of its territory it seeks to defend with flood defences and management, and which areas it decides can be flooded to cope with the ingress of water.48
Weather
32. Climate change in the Arctic may also change our weather. Many scientists told us about the changes to UK weather that they expect to arise from climate change in the Arctic. Scientists from Lancaster University told us that they expect changes in sea ice to influence weather systems in the North Atlantic, leading to “increasing extreme weather events in the UK”.49 Researchers at the National Oceanography Centre told us that they expect climate change in the Arctic to cause more frequent and more intense heatwaves, droughts, and storm activity in the UK.50 Dr David K A Barnes, Marine Ecologist at the British Antarctic Survey, told us that “[i]ncreases in evaporation, [and] precipitation … are expected around the Arctic and these have varied but important impacts on Europe, including the UK”.51
33. However, we heard that the links between climate change in the Arctic and UK weather need further research.52 Professor Hewitt told us:
People have looked for a long time for links between what is happening in the Arctic and our weather. It does make a difference perhaps to the storm tracks, but it is quite difficult to prove the links. There is a lot of disagreement between research studies, so it is definitely an area of ongoing research, I would say. It is very hard to pin it down entirely—hints, but no definitive answers.53
34. We heard across our evidence that scientists were not confident in their understanding of linkages between climate change in the Arctic and the impacts at lower latitudes.54 According to Imperial College London’s Grantham Institute, this is why “[s]cientists need to take observations and improve their understanding of climatic processes in the Nordic Seas and the Arctic Ocean to fill gaps in knowledge about the links between the Arctic climate and the UK’s weather”.55
Ocean circulation
35. We heard many concerns relating to the potential for disruption of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (see Box 2).56 Professor Brandon told us:
The increased temperatures are causing melting of the large ice caps, like Greenland, and that is depositing a lot of fresh water into the ocean. From the long-term climate history of the planet, we have examples where the ocean circulation has changed, and people are trying to understand if that is happening again.57
Box 2: Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation
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The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) comprises a series of ocean currents in the Atlantic Ocean which circulate water, carrying warm equatorial waters to the north, and cold water to the south. Sometimes referred to as the ‘global conveyer belt’, warmer water near the surface is drawn northwards by the sinking of dense and salty waters in the North Atlantic. Should the surface waters cease to achieve the levels of salinity and density they need to sink—a process known as ‘freshening’—this circulation could be disrupted. The concern is that fresh water from melting ice, particularly Greenland’s ice sheets, would reduce the density of the water in this part of the ocean. In a total shutdown the northward transport of warm waters would be cut back by over half. |
Source: James A. Carton and Sirpa Hakkinen, “Introduction to: Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC)”, Deep Sea Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography, Volume 58, Issues 17–18, September 2011, pp 1741–1743
36. According to Imperial College’s Grantham Institute, AMOC is “responsible for the UK’s mild winters… [and] curtailment could affect its weather, possibly reducing temperatures substantially”.58 The National Oceanography told us that AMOC is an example of an irreversible tipping point, and stressed that more research was required to close knowledge gaps to model the effects of climate change on this process more accurately.59
Driving further understanding of the impacts of the changing Arctic on the UK
37. According to the Grantham Institute, the “UK has significant research expertise and experience to understand how global warming will change the Arctic’s environment and affect the UK” and the UK’s new polar research vessel, the RRS Sir David Attenborough, will enable innovative research to enhance predictions of extreme weather.60 We heard that this is an active area of research for UK science.
38. The Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling told us about a major research programme called ‘Climate change in the Arctic-North Atlantic Region and Impacts on the UK’ (CANARI), which aims to increase our understanding of how climate change in the Arctic will impact the UK.61 The programme will focus on the impacts of climate variability and the potential impacts of extreme weather events.62
39. In “Looking North” the Government noted that the UK will “continue to be a leading producer of Arctic science and an active partner in international research collaborations, including to contribute to global understanding of climate change”.63
40. The Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that the impact of changes in the Arctic on the UK was the “most pressing and urgent … prism through which we view the Arctic”.64 The Minister explained that the Government was doing “ahuge amount of work on adaptation”,65 and he told us that “[t]he UK uses cutting edge science, including advances in climate modelling and projections, to inform and prepare our response to rising sea levels and changes to our weather”,66 and that the Thames Estuary 2100 Plan was “[a]n example of a long term-approach … [in] upgrading flood defences to manage rising sea levels” which was “designed with climate change at its core”.67
41. We will explore the role of UK scientists and researchers in the UK’s relationship with the Arctic environment in more detail in Chapter 3.
42. What happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. Climate change in the Arctic is having an observable impact on the climate in the UK, including though more extreme weather events. Sea level rise also has the potential to affect UK coastal areas drastically through flooding, requiring urgent and difficult decisions of our Government.
43. Our understanding of future Arctic climate changes and their implications for human and natural systems remains incomplete. A great deal of further research is still required to assess and understand the full effects and implications of Arctic climate change, for the Arctic region, for the UK and for the world. However, there is already sufficient scientific evidence to show that more needs to be done to reduce greenhouse gas emissions more quickly.
Safeguarding the Arctic
44. We heard across our evidence that even if warming is successfully limited to the thresholds agreed by the Paris Agreement,68 the impact of climate change in the Arctic will remain substantial. Professor Callaghan told us that even if warming is limited to 1.5°C, “[y]ou cannot put the permafrost back or the glaciers back with warming, so we are committed to seeing everything we see now and more if we go to 1.5°C … we are looking at worse events [in the Arctic] than we see now”.69
45. According to the Grantham Institute, if an increase in average global temperatures were capped at an additional 0.5°C, the Arctic would still be expected to warm by double that, at another 1°C.70 Plymouth Marine Laboratory told us that even if warming is limited to 2°C, there will still be a notable risk of increased flooding and intensified storm surges in the UK’s low-lying regions.71
46. Scientists shared with us their concerns that they have been talking about the effects of climate change for decades, but that governments have been slow to take that message on board. Speaking about his work on Working Group 1, leading to one of the first IPCC reports,72 Professor Callaghan told us that scientists had been forecasting the changes we are now seeing for decades:
I am just going to be a little bit grumpy for a moment. I was involved in the very first IPCCs and I was involved in Working Group I of IPCC I. We forecast many of the changes that we see today, and no one listened to us. When you ask the question, “What should we do?” we should have been doing things 30 years ago.73
Dr Anna Jones, Director of Science at the British Antarctic Survey, echoed this, saying that there is a need to focus on what the consequences of climate change are, and what can be done about them, saying:
We do need to think about the consequences. We know what we need to do about it. We need to reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases. We have known that for decades. The frustration of the scientists plays out here because we have been saying for many years that this is going to happen. The studies all show that it is going to happen, and now the observations show that it is going to happen. The absolute best that we can do is get our emissions of greenhouse gases down. That is the key thing that we should be doing.74
47. In “Looking North”, the Government outlines its commitment to “raise awareness of climate change, and take action to tackle its impacts and increase climate resilience in the Arctic, as well as pushing for global delivery on the Paris and Glasgow Climate agreements”.75
48. If we want to continue to see the Arctic as the ‘frozen place’ that its Indigenous inhabitants know it as, and save our own country from the potentially dire impacts that climate change in the Arctic has in store for us, then the world must make efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change and keep within the Paris Agreement target of 1.5–2°C warming; a range that will still cause further drastic changes in the Arctic. The world is currently on track to exceed the 1.5–2°C threshold to which the Paris Agreement was designed to limit warming.
49. We recommend that the Government acts to limit future climate change by strengthening its emissions targets and policies to meet its carbon budgets and reach net zero by 2050 at the latest, and uses its influence on a global stage to persuade other countries to implement the Paris Agreement fully.
2 The geopolitics of a changing Arctic
Arctic geopolitics
50. The Arctic has historically been an area of low tension. However, a strategic acceleration caused by the dual drivers of climate change and increasing international tensions are leaving the geopolitics of the region in real flux.76 The retreating ice and increasing availability of Arctic resources is leading to a growth in human activities in the region, and there is emerging strategic competition between the West, Russia, and China. While there is still significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, these two factors have introduced increasing competition and tension into the geopolitical environment.77
51. These tensions have increased as a result of Russia’s illegal and unwarranted invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The activities of the Arctic Council, which has had such an important role to play in preserving the peace and healthy cooperation amongst Arctic states since its foundation in 1996, have all but ceased. Scientific and diplomatic engagement with Russia, and most activities of the Arctic Council are officially “paused”;78 competition for the Arctic’s valuable resources is markedly increasing; and Russia and NATO alike have significantly increased their military activity in the Arctic.79
52. We were concerned to hear that these geopolitical tensions are diverting attention from climate change in the region, disrupting “energy and synergy” between the Arctic nations and shifting the focus of Arctic stakeholders from climate change priorities to the challenges of Arctic security.80
53. In this chapter we will examine what effect these geopolitical changes in the region are having on environmental protection and scientific research.
Arctic exceptionalism
54. Professor Basil Germond, Chair in International Security at Lancaster University, told us that the Arctic had, for decades, enjoyed low levels of tension, and high levels of cooperation, which he called “Arctic exceptionalism”.81 Professor Germond defined “Arctic exceptionalism” as where “environmental/economic cooperation and interstate dialogue are not hindered by, or subordinated to, military/security considerations”.82 Professor Germond argued that this period of low tension had enabled scientific cooperation particularly with regard to climate change—its causes and effects—in the region.83
55. Dr Depledge was more cautious about the claim of historic ‘exceptionalism’ in the region. He argued that there is evidence to suggest that “the Arctic has always been affected by broader geopolitical currents”.84 He did accept, however, that the Arctic is currently experiencing the breakdown of the idea of “circumpolarity”—the notion that the eight Arctic states are “able to exert their primacy over the Arctic, based on a shared vision of what the Arctic’s future should be”.85 Instead, Dr Depledge argued that the geopolitics of the region are becoming “far more fractious” as the dividing lines between the Arctic states are becoming increasingly obvious.86
56. Dr Depledge told us that that one of the consequences of this breakdown of ‘circumpolarity’ would be the emergence of competing visions for the Arctic, especially between the West and Russia.87
Growing tension in the Arctic
57. Professor Germond explained that the Arctic is strategically important to Russia, especially for its navy and nuclear forces, and that the region is a zone of potential confrontation or friction between NATO and Russia:
I would say that the rising tension, the darkening of the rhetoric, if you will, the sabre rattling, the breakdown of communication and trust, all these things are lending themselves to a situation whereby if you did have incidents unfolding at sea, if you had suspicious activity … they are all being interpreted in a slightly different light now. I think that raises the risk of miscalculation and accident because everyone is more on edge. The chance of something going awry has increased and will remain high for the time being.88
58. We heard that the Arctic is an area of increasing strategic importance to both the UK and NATO allies, and to Russia, that it will increasingly be the “theatre of … assertive naval diplomacy”, and that “intelligence gathering (and counterintelligence) … will feature more prominently in the Arctic”.89 The UK Government has acknowledged the strategic importance of the Arctic, and that there is a need to increase the UK’s capabilities, along with NATO allies, in the region.90 We also heard that NATO has increased its operational presence to protect offshore infrastructure, and that the UK’s Royal Navy is tracking and shadowing Russian warships and submarines in the North Sea.91
59. The Arctic’s increasing militarisation is having an inevitable effect on the region’s delicate ecosystems. There are reports that the Barents Sea, which is host to some of Russia’s most important commercial and military hubs, is one of the most polluted marine areas in the world.92
60. International law regulates freedom of navigation, environmental protection, and the delimitation of rules such as Exclusive Economic Zones,93 and Professor Germond told us that that it was important for the UK, and the Arctic states, to uphold these laws, “especially in the face of more assertive naval diplomacy by Russia and the contesting of freedom of navigation and innocent passage”.94
61. Russia has declared a new Russian law on navigation of the Northern Sea Route, which requires all merchant vessels to obtain permission from the Russian State to enter the area, and seeks to control navigation of foreign warships.95 Russia’s claims of legal control of the Northern Sea Route is disputed by the USA, which holds that the straits are used for international navigation and are subject to the regime of transit passage.96
62. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership. Finland, which shares a border with Russia, was accepted as a NATO member on 4 April 2023. Dr Arruda and Dr Filijović told us that Finland joining NATO, and Sweden’s application to join also progressing, has changed the balance of power in the Arctic, with Russia now being the only non-NATO State. They suggested that one consequence of this changing balance of power is that—perhaps unsurprisingly—Russia is increasingly ready to work more closely with China. They argued that the suspension of the Arctic Council’s work with Russia has “created a window of opportunity for China to further expand its overall influence in the area, including that of a military nature”.97
63. We heard that the China has made it clear that it is interested in the Arctic for economic and security reasons, and that it has increased diplomatic and economic activities in the region.98 Professor Germond explained that Russia’s diplomatic isolation has led to the country working more closely with China, saying:
Russia is the junior partner, so if China wants to do something in the Arctic, eventually they will manage to get their way there. It is really linked to Russia’s position on the world stage and how the geopolitical situation will play out in the coming years.99
Economic interests in the Arctic
64. We heard that the Arctic was an area of contrasting agendas, bringing together competition for natural resources, geopolitical tensions, and territorial and maritime disputes.100 We consider further the benefits and drawbacks of the opportunities in Arctic resources presented by climate change in Chapter 4.
65. WWF argues that, while the Arctic may offer significant oil and gas reserves, mining opportunities, and opportunities for increased shipping traffic, these economic activities will have a disastrous impact on the Arctic environment if they take place without a full understanding of the impact on people and ecosystems in the region.101 Their view is that the variety of decentralised governance models in the region contributes to a lack of “consistent and adequate environmental management Arctic-wide”.102
66. Arctic national governments control their own territories, including their coastlines and territorial waters, extending 12 nautical miles (22.2 kilometres) out to sea.103 The rest of the Arctic Ocean is governed by international law of the seas that regulates freedom of navigation and navigation safety, resources exploitation, the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones, and environmental protection.104 We heard that a breakdown in the circumpolar vision of the Arctic, centred on the Arctic States, would facilitate more countries pursuing their economic interests in the Arctic as the ice recedes.105
67. Professor Germond noted that climate change in the Arctic allows for increasing economic opportunities, but highlighted the lack of infrastructure to deal with potential safety risks, saying:
[B]ecause they are small commercial operations and traffic in the Arctic, there is risk of more accidents and safety issues. There is a need for more constabulary presence, and more infrastructure in the Arctic to deal with the potential safety risks. That then creates more pressure on an already fragile ecosystem. I think there is a vicious circle at play.106
68. China and Russia work together in the Russian Arctic, cooperating on oil and gas extraction, as well as development of a Northern Sea Route—China’s so called “Polar Silk Road” along the Northeast Passage.107 It has been reported that, as Russia becomes more alienated from the West, and more concerned with economic investment from China, India and the Gulf States, that environmental protection has become less of a priority for them.108
69. Jane Rumble was of the view that the Arctic itself was not likely to be a driver of tension and confusion, and that maintaining the Arctic as a region of high cooperation and low tension is still the Government’s long-term aspiration.109 She told us that there was still a need to regard the Arctic in a circumpolar way, saying:
What has been driving the change now is that seven of the Arctic states will be NATO members … and huge interest from the Ministry of Defence. … [F]rom the Foreign Office’s perspective we want to try to balance that the Arctic is not turned into a kind of no-go region. There is still a huge amount of co-operation, which is really important for science, environment, biodiversity, marine protection.110
70. When asked about the rights of passage for ships in the Arctic, the Minister for Americas and the Caribbean told us that the UK would maintain an active role in upholding freedom of navigation and reinforcing the centrality of the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).111 The Minister told us that the UK would continue to protect the UK’s interests:
The UK recognises that, as an Arctic State, Russia has a significant presence in the region, but we expect Russia to comply with international law. The UK will continue to work with our partners and Allies to protect our interests.112
71. Climate change, the retreating ice, military tensions, and economic competition have made the Arctic an area of significant concern in global politics, and the Government should give greater thought to how to secure its future peace and prosperity.
72. Rising temperatures are rapidly changing the Arctic, allowing increased access to the region’s resources. This has led to increasing commercial activity and geopolitical competition over resources and shipping routes in the Arctic. The idea of a ‘low tension Arctic’ is becoming increasingly tenuous.
A representative for UK interests in the Arctic
73. The UK has significant interests in the north Atlantic region, which lies on its northern flank. Jane Rumble told us that these interests include security, energy security, and our considerable interest in scientific research.113
74. We questioned Jane Rumble on how the Government could ensure that the UK’s interests are represented in the Arctic, to which she asserted that the Government considered that the UK’s business engagement with the Arctic States was adequately covered by the Trade Envoys who represent the Nordic Baltic and North America.114 The Government does have a Minister who has responsibility for the Polar Regions, and Ms Rumble told us that engagement with the region sits firmly with a Minister.115 That Minister, as was made plain in his correspondence to us, is entitled the Minister for the Americas and the Caribbean.116 We recognise that the Minister’s portfolio, inter alia, includes the title of the Minister for the Polar Regions and regret that he was unable to give oral evidence to our inquiry. In his letter, the Minister for the Americas and the Caribbean told us that the UK’s international engagement on the Arctic was “across the whole of Government”.117
75. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that there are four Ministers with responsibility for policy related to the Arctic: the FCDO Minister who leads on the geopolitics of the Polar Regions, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [DEFRA] Minister who leads on environmental science, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero [DESNZ] Minister who leads on net zero, and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology [DSIT] Minister who leads on science and research.
76. The Minister said that these Whitehall structures are “quite siloed”118 which was aptly demonstrated by his—perhaps understandable—reluctance to articulate the UK’s position on several issues affecting the Arctic during our evidence session.119 We were concerned to hear that the four Ministers had never had a meeting to discuss Arctic matters.120 The Minister commented that “if you are going to have four Ministers they really need to be working together”,121 which is a view that we share. We would add that the MoD also has a significant interest in security in the Arctic, a view supported by the Minister, who told us that “there is a very good relationship between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence on security matters in hot theatres”.122 The Minister stressed that, while Ministers have not met to discuss the Arctic, Civil Service officials work extensively across Government Departments.123 We were nonetheless puzzled that no single Minister in Government seems to have overall responsibility for Arctic (or incidentally Antarctic) matters, and the fact that the four relevant Ministers have not yet met may well suggest an overall lack of enthusiasm or interest in these important issues.
77. Our predecessor Committee’s report on the Changing Arctic in 2018 recommended that the UK appoint a UK special representative or envoy to the Arctic, saying that doing so would help to address gaps in UK representation in the Arctic.124 Similar recommendations had previously been made by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic in 2015,125 and the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2018.126
78. Jane Rumble told us that capacity within the Polar Regions Team at the FCDO was soon to increase:
I am getting a senior ambassadorial rank deputy who will be the UK senior Arctic lead and will have more capacity than sometimes I have.127
79. Several other countries have Arctic ambassadors, including France, Singapore, Poland, and Japan, and we note reports that the US chose to appoint an Ambassador for the Arctic last year following Russia’s increased military activity in the region.128 When we asked the Minister for his opinion on the idea of appointing an Arctic ambassador, he said that the “case for someone to speak internationally and domestically about the importance of the [Arctic] and insist on a coherent approach” was an “interesting idea”.129
80. As international attention on the Arctic increases as a result of the increasing geopolitical tension due to Russia’s actions and the urgency of climate change, the UK needs to be ready to bring its influence to bear in the region where appropriate. In order to do this, it is vital that there is sufficient Ministerial capacity to prioritise the UK’s interests in the Arctic.
81. We were concerned to hear that the Ministers with portfolios that concern the Arctic do not meet to coordinate an approach to the Arctic on a regular basis. We recommend that Ministers from the FDCO, MoD, DEFRA, DESNZ and DSIT meet at least quarterly to discuss Arctic issues and to ensure a coherent approach to the region.
82. The fact that the Minister for the Americas and the Caribbean was unable to give oral evidence to our inquiry, despite being offered multiple dates, shows the capacity constraints of Government Ministers to give due attention to the Arctic. We accordingly recommend that the Government should consider recommendations that the UK should appoint a special representative or Envoy to the Arctic.
Impacts of the Russian war in Ukraine on scientific cooperation
83. We heard from witnesses across our oral and written evidence that Western scientific collaboration with Russia had stopped as a result Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.130 Official scientific channels have been shut down at multiple levels. These include cooperation through the Arctic Council; at Governmental and diplomatic level in the UK; the disbandment of the Science and Innovation Network in the British Embassy in Moscow;131 and university level contact.132
84. The UK Polar Network told us that this meant that “many connections and collaborations have been lost”.133 Professor Germond said that that was an unfortunate necessity:
Science collaboration is subordinated to security interests. Although collaborative climate research in the Arctic is unlikely to infringe on national security, it will remain politically inappropriate to engage with Russia in the foreseeable future.134
85. Professor Terry Callaghan, whose research has for many years focussed on the Russian Arctic, told us that understanding the Russian Arctic was fundamental to understanding climate change, telling us that the scientific community has now lost access to half of the Arctic:
We cannot understand what is happening in the Arctic or the rest of the world without understanding what happens on the 7,000 km stretch of the Russian Arctic. Half the northern hemisphere’s permafrost is there and most of the indigenous people live there. It is a huge hold.135
86. Dr Depledge expanded on this point, saying that that the loss of access for western scientists to the Russian Arctic “will have all kinds of implications for where science can be done and how science can be done”.136
87. Professor Germond told us that, because of the growing security tensions in the region, we could not expect all climate data to be open source.137 He explained that “not all data are benign just because they are about the climate”, citing:
For example, sea ice thickness data have obvious military applications, and data regarding the effects of climate change can impact on navigation. It can help with the exploitation of resources. So it is not possible to really think that all climate science data can be open source in the current context.138
88. The NERC Arctic Office told us that there was the potential for division in the international research community as a result of the loss of access to Russia, saying that some researchers from countries allied with Russia would have access to the Russian Arctic, while others, from the West, would not:
There is the potential for bifurcation in the Arctic research community, with information and access to the Russian Arctic available to some researchers and not others. This may become a significant challenge to those involved in ensuring that the highest quality and most representative information enters into Arctic and global environmental decision-making processes.139
89. Professor Germond hoped that some ad hoc arrangements with Russia for specific collaboration may be possible at some stage in the future. He argued that the Black Sea grain deal is an example of a concession made to Russia for the greater good of the world,140 and that the same should also apply to “climate change and its effects”, which are “crucial for the future of humankind”.141
90. Scientific cooperation is key to understanding the rapidly changing Arctic, and Professor Germond told us that we would “need to do more with Western allies” to help fill the gap left by the loss of access to the Russian Arctic,142 while Dr Depledge argued that the West needs a significant diplomatic effort to work with countries “outside the usual allies”:143
[T]he more countries that you can bring round to this position that we need good data from across the Arctic to understand climate change and all these other global challenges that we are confronted with, then those countries will put more pressure on Russia as a result. If Russia does not feel isolated—if Russia feels that it can go off with the other countries and do what it likes—that is going to be more problematic.144
91. Jane Rumble said that while there is some data being shared from Russia, the broader lack of openness and cooperation was challenging:
Some data is coming out of Russia where it pertains to international treaties. The World Meteorological Organisation, for example, is still getting some climate data, so some data is available, but big innovative science activities working in the Russian Arctic are not currently possible, and that is challenging. The lack of data at a time when we need to understand what is happening in a rapidly changing Arctic is fairly challenging.145
92. When asked about scientific collaboration in the Artic, Ms Rumble said that one of the big challenges for the research community was ensuring that they “have access to study the areas they want to study”, saying:
Of course, one of the big challenges right now is that we have an intransigent Russia that we can’t co-operate with and get the data out of. It is trying to facilitate researchers to get the connections for getting the science done that they want to engage with and ideally having that resourced logistically.146
93. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology defended the Government’s stance on scientific engagement with Russia. He said that there are rules and values that govern in the international science field and that it was necessary to take a stand against Russia’s actions in Ukraine,147 adding that:
I was absolutely adamant that we should … hit the Russian state, the criminal kleptocrats who are running this war machine, hard. That included science sanctions, but was not aimed at legitimate Russian science and scientists doing good work that is not supporting the Russian state. That is not an easy line. I immediately commissioned work for UKRI across the board. We identified a small number of Russian programmes that we felt had to be stopped immediately, and we have withdrawn from a number of international bodies.148
94. As a result of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, all UK scientific cooperation with Russia has halted, and we are unlikely to see any kind of ‘normalisation’ of relations with Russia in the foreseeable future. Despite that, understanding environmental change in the Russian Arctic is crucial to understanding climate change in the Arctic as a whole and therefore its impacts in the UK.
95. We are concerned that these geopolitical tensions, and increasing security concerns, have lessened international cooperation on climate change priorities.
96. We are concerned about the significant gap in our understanding of the Arctic that comes from the inability of researchers from the UK and other countries to collaborate with their Russian counterparts, and about the long-term implications of this gap for understanding climate change worldwide.
The Arctic Council
97. The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic. Its founding document is the Ottawa Declaration of September 19, 1996, a joint declaration signed by representatives of the eight Arctic States, who established the Arctic Council as a “high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States”.149
98. The Arctic Council includes other countries and organisations as recognised State Observers. The Council promotes circumpolar cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, Arctic Indigenous communities (recognised as Permanent Participants) and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular on sustainable development and environmental protection.150
Box 3: Arctic Council Member States, Permanent Participants, and Observers
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Arctic Council Member States: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Permanent Participants: The Arctic Athabaskan Council, Aleut International Association, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Sami Council. Observer States to the Arctic Council:
Intergovernmental and interparliamentary organisations with observer status:
|
Source: Arctic Council, The Arctic Council
99. The purpose of the Arctic Council, according to Dr Depledge, is to act as a forum for the Arctic States to discuss shared concerns and common interests in the Arctic, and to increase cooperation in the region.151 He stressed that the “Arctic Council is not a governing body for the Arctic”.152 International law underpins the basis of governance in the Arctic. The Arctic States are in control of their own lands and waters, and maintain national laws for their territories. Outside of those boundaries, the United Nations Conventions of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) manages environmental protections and resource entitlements in the oceans, and the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) Polar Code manages safe ship operation and the protection of polar waters.
100. The Arctic Council coordinated three legally binding agreements among the Arctic States (see Box 4). Dr Depledge told us that these agreements display the “spirit of circumpolar co-operation”.153
Box 4: Legally binding agreements signed by Arctic States
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2011: The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. Signed in Nuuk, Greenland. 2013: The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. Signed in Kiruna, Sweden. 2017: The Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. Signed in Fairbanks, Alaska. |
Source: Arctic Council, “Agreements and cooperation”
101. The remit of the Arctic Council is focussed on environmental and sustainable development issues and the founding Ottawa Declaration states explicitly that “[t]he Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security”.154
102. We heard that the Arctic Council is unique in adopting consensus-based diplomacy involving Arctic Indigenous Peoples alongside Arctic States, with six Indigenous Peoples’ groups having Permanent Participants Status.155 Observer status is open to non-Arctic states, global and regional intergovernmental and interparliamentary organisations, and non-government organisations. The UK has been an Observer to the Arctic Council since 1998 and was present at the signing ceremony in September 1996.
103. The Council’s activities are conducted in six Working Groups. Each group’s mandate is relevant to environmental protection, and they cover a broad range of subjects, from climate change to emergency response. Working groups typically comprise representatives from Member States, representatives of Permanent Participants and representatives of Observer States.156
Box 5: Arctic Council Working Groups
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Source: Arctic Council, “Working Groups”
The future of the Arctic Council
104. The work of the Arctic Council was paused as of 3 March 2022, in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In a joint statement the other Arctic States (the A7) condemned the invasion, stating that Russia’s actions were a grave impediment to international cooperation.157 The A7 issued a further statement 3 months later, on 8 June 2022, announcing the resumption of some of the Council’s work, in projects that did not involve the participation of the Russian Federation.158 Russia transferred the Arctic Council Chair to Norway on 11 May 2023, in a digital meeting based in the Russian Arctic city of Salekhard. The Council was resurrected to witness Russia hand the chair to the Norwegians,159 with Western Arctic States participating digitally.160
105. The formal suspension of the A7’s cooperation with Russia has raised doubts about the long-term future of the Arctic Council. Dr Depledge told us that even the end of the war in Ukraine will not bring back the former levels of cooperation at the Arctic Council, explaining that “there is now this trust deficit with Russia and that is going to make it much harder to do things with Russia in the future, even when the war ends”.161
106. Russia has even suggested that it may withdraw from the Arctic Council, and Dr Depledge told us that if this were to happen then the convening role of the Arctic Council would be lost:
Yes, [Russia] is going to pull out. It has also dropped several hints, I think, that if that were to happen it will find other countries to work with. It will look to countries like China, India and some of the others that I have mentioned, to come up with whatever it needs to secure the future of primarily the Russian Arctic … Does that mean we will not see any more of these circumpolar agreements? Potentially.162
107. On 21 February 2023 Russia published amendments to its Arctic policy statements which removed all mentions of the Arctic Council, and put greater emphasis on Russian national interests in the region, ahead of work towards economic, scientific and technological, and cultural cooperation.163
The impact of the Arctic Council
108. We heard that as a forum for the A7 States to collaborate, the Arctic Council remains an effective body. Dr Depledge told us that “the Arctic Council helps to maintain the spirit of circumpolar co-operation and a collaborative atmosphere, through which the Arctic states can project their primacy in Arctic affairs and pursue matters of common interest”.164 Dr Depledge argued that, despite the situation with Russia, the Arctic Council still plays an important role in representing the interests of the Arctic States, saying:
We should not condemn the Arctic Council and its existence yet. The value of the Arctic Council is that it establishes that clear primacy of the circumpolar states.165
109. We were told that, in addition to promoting cooperation and collaboration between the Arctic States, the strength of the Arctic Council really lay in the production of scientific knowledge on the Arctic. Henry Burgess told us that he considers the Arctic Monitoring and Protection Working Group reports to be “strong enough and powerful enough” that UK researchers would consult them when looking at areas to research in their own work.166
110. It was stressed to us that the Arctic Council is very important for Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, and the only international forum where they are given a voice on issues arising from the impacts of climate change.167 Dr Anthony Speca told us that this was an important role of the Arctic Council, and that the “Arctic Council offers Arctic Indigenous Peoples at least some of the voice and power that they rightly deserve regarding matters affecting their homelands”.168
The suspension of the Arctic Council
111. Henry Burgess told us that owing to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “it has been an extremely delicate time and it still is a difficult time” and that an enormous body of work, around 130 projects, have been “essentially paused in total through the Arctic Council”.169
112. We heard that the suspension of the Arctic Council had an impact on environmental protection and science. Plymouth Marine Laboratory told us that the primary impact of the suspension of the Arctic Council was the delay in the “adoption of new policies and initiatives, which in turn prevents coordination among Arctic nations on environmental matters”.170 The British Antarctic Survey told us that the closure of the Arctic Council working groups has had a negative impact on coordinating Arctic observations, such as the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks, and other Arctic Council programmes.171
The UK at the Arctic Council
113. As an Observer, the UK can contribute to the Arctic Council through attending meetings, providing scientific expertise to Working Groups, proposing projects and contributing financially (not to exceed financing from Arctic States, unless otherwise decided by the Arctic Council’s senior Arctic officials), and making statements.172 We heard that the UK’s influence is relatively modest, in part because of the way the Arctic Council is structured to give primacy to the Arctic states.173
114. The NERC Arctic Office told us that the Working Groups of the Arctic Council play an important role in advancing environmental understanding of the region.174 Henry Burgess told us that UK involvement in the Arctic Council projects was beneficial to UK research:
Where UK researchers can get involved in those projects it is enormously beneficial. We have had recent engagement within work on plastics, black carbon, tourism, safety in the Arctic sea ice, and those kinds of issues. I would hope that we can continue and build on that engagement in the future as Norway [as Chair] begins to restart all these different initiatives. It is now easier, because of Covid essentially, to participate in these events through Zoom.175
115. Lancaster University researchers told us that UK scientists have contributed to some of the scientific working groups of the Arctic Council, including the Arctic Monitoring Assessment Programme (AMAP), Pollution of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) and Conservation of Arctic Flora & Fauna (CAFF) working groups. They explained that this work has fostered good relationships between scientists, policymakers, and politicians from the circumpolar nations, and that this presence should be maintained and enhanced.176 The Scottish Association for Marine Science told us that around 10 UK scientists were working across the five working groups of the Arctic Council, saying that this was a form of ‘soft diplomacy’.177 BAS told us that additional funding to help researchers to work on the Arctic Council working groups would improve access to them.178
116. During our visit to Norway and Svalbard we heard that greater UK involvement would be welcomed by the Arctic Council. It was explained to us that there has never been funding earmarked by the Government for a UK presence at the Arctic Council. We heard that the UK could have a bigger role through more active participation in the working groups.
117. We heard that, as an Observer State, the UK has had to be somewhat restrained in what it can say at the Arctic Council, and that “it has to work in the corridors and in the background rather than by making bold political statements about the region”.179 Dr Depledge told us that this restraint has been evident in “a lot of the statements that have come out in UK Arctic policy frameworks and so on over the years”. He added that the extent to which the UK can exert influence over the Arctic Council agenda is limited, but stressed to us that “the UK is seen as an important and valued contributor to the region”.180
118. Responsibility for the UK’s engagement with the Arctic Council rests with the FCDO. Henry Burgess told us that the NERC Arctic Office would be “very happy to support the FCDO, DSIT and others if they would like to up the UK’s engagement and incentivise UK participation in these processes”.181
119. In “Looking North”, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to engage with the Arctic Council, having supported its decision to pause its work following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.182
120. Jane Rumble told us that the Norwegian Chair of the Arctic Council was optimistic that they would maintain some of the co-operation on the core functions of the Arctic Council: the broader science assessment, the environmental assessment and regional co-operation. She suspected that political meetings as an Arctic Council would be very difficult “until and unless Russia ceases its unwarranted war in Ukraine”. Her opinion was that the UK should support the Arctic Council, saying:
Our role at the moment is to be supportive of the Norwegian chairship and the process that they are going through. At the moment that is on a relatively healthy trajectory. They have put an awful lot of effort into making sure there is a smooth transition and setting out their priorities, which have been agreed now by all eight Arctic states.183
121. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that it would “not be appropriate at this point to suddenly say that we think [the Arctic Council] is moribund”,184 adding that it was inevitable that the Arctic Council would get “caught in the crosshairs” of the tensions in Arctic geopolitics around Russia interests in the Arctic and Russia’s actions in Ukraine.185
122. Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has jeopardised much of the collaborative work of the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council is still active and there is more that the UK can do to promote its interests and support the region through the Arctic Council. The UK is a long-standing Observer to the Arctic Council, but we were told that the UK has had relatively ad hoc participation in the working groups, where the UK could have the most influence on the work and decisions of the Arctic Council. The UK has not been as active at the Arctic Council as our scientific strengths and varied interests in the region would warrant.
123. Notwithstanding the current difficulties at the Arctic Council, the FCDO should seek to increase the UK’s involvement in the Arctic Council as projects begin to restart with Norway in the Chair, such as through more active participation in the working groups.
Alternative Arctic fora
124. We also heard that Russia’s actions and subsequent suspension from the Arctic Council have shown the limits of the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental forum. The Council explicitly steers clear of military issues,186 and we heard that it is not possible to disaggregate security considerations from climate science and environmental considerations in the Arctic.187 Professor Germond argued that the Arctic Council is “probably not the ultimate solution to Arctic Governance anymore”.188
125. Professor Germond argued that any cooperation with Russia was now in doubt and that that makes environmental governance more difficult:
Without a level of institutional co-operation it is not possible to succeed with environmental governance, because the ocean is free liquid. Fish cross borders, as does the fishing industry; the maritime sector is a transnational economic sector. So we really need multilateralism and institutional co-operation if we want to achieve environmental governance successes in the Arctic. The Arctic Council was good at that and now, given the current situation, all that is at risk, which is why we have to think about a potential alternative future for institutional governance.189
126. We heard that the Arctic Council will not be a “panacea for climate cooperation regardless of Russia’s participation” and that the UK should push for further cooperation on climate issues in alternative forums such as the Arctic Circle Assembly and the International Maritime Organisation, where security issues can be addressed.190
127. Security issues concerning the Arctic can be addressed through existing mechanisms, such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. “The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North”, which sets out the UK’s defence approach to the Arctic in support of the Arctic Policy Framework, details how the UK intends to use its membership of this forum to “share information on the changing environment, improve collective awareness of and deconflict activity in the Arctic, and identify opportunities for further co-operation”.191
128. We heard that the UK has an influential role in Arctic politics, in part due to the UK’s long scientific presence in the region.192 Dr Depledge argued that our influence in the region was due to the capability to operate in the Arctic, in both science and defence, and that the “UK stands out quite strongly in the regard”, saying our influence “is not so much based on its proximity but being one of the few countries outside the Arctic that actually has a capability to operate up there”.193 Dr Depledge suggested that, when considering the future of the Arctic, the UK is “naturally going to be in a position to occupy a slightly bigger space in terms of charting out the future of the region”.194
129. Professor Germond believed there was the potential for the UK to play a bigger role in the Arctic, saying that:
[O]ne of the comparative advantages of the UK on the world stage now is to combine innovation and science power on the one hand with our power to influence the maritime domain on the other hand. That is something we can be very good at in the Arctic.195
130. The 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy confirmed the Government’s commitment to maintaining the Arctic region as one of high cooperation and low tension.196 “Looking North” says that “[t]he UK will ensure that it remains prepared and capable of protecting its Arctic interests”.197
131. The Government stated that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “fundamentally undermined the peaceful cooperation that had characterised the Arctic Council since its inception” and that it strongly supported the decision of the seven other Arctic States to suspend the work of the Arctic Council, committing to participate in multilateral cooperation across the Arctic when appropriate.198 The Government recognised the need for wide cooperation on Arctic issues, acknowledging that this has led to the development of several Arctic conferences, including the Arctic Circle Assembly, Arctic Frontiers, and Arctic Future, saying that these fora provide valuable opportunities for discussion, and that the Government will continue to encourage such meetings.199
132. Jane Rumble told us that the Arctic Council has been useful, and that there were numerous benefits that had come from it:
The benefit of the Arctic Council was that it brought together circumpolar assessment; it brought together, “What is the status of the entire circumpolar Arctic region?” It provided the incentive for the circumpolar Arctic states to agree co-operative action, including negotiating three treaties—under their auspices, of course—on oil spill prevention and response, search and rescue and science co-operation. That has been particularly useful.200
133. When questioned on the other fora where the UK could push for cooperation on science in the Arctic, the Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that he thought that there was a strong premise for the UK to engage “with other nations who share our values and our interest in polar research and to try to create minilats”.201
134. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally undermined the role of the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental forum on cooperation in the Arctic. While our witnesses were clear that the Arctic Council had historically been the most suitable forum for promoting cooperation in the Arctic, the geopolitical balance at the Arctic Council has been disrupted by Russia’s egregious war in Ukraine. We have very substantial concerns about whether the Arctic Council, without Russia, can ever in the foreseeable future fulfil its former role.
135. We welcome the Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology’s commitment to work internationally with other nations and urge the Minister to ensure that the issue of climate change in the Arctic remains a collaborative effort.
136. Other fora in addition to the Arctic Council are important for building international consensus on Arctic issues to do with the environment and should be supported. It is now urgent that the UK uses its position in other international fora, such as NATO, the UN, IMO and other intergovernmental organisations where we have a stronger voice than on the Arctic Council, to make the Arctic environment a higher priority on the international political agenda.
3 UK research in the Arctic
Arctic research
137. In the first chapter we explored the dramatic consequences of climate change for the Arctic, where significant changes in snow cover, sea and land ice, and permafrost are fundamentally changing the environment.202 In this chapter we explore how scientific research on, and in, the Arctic can inform our understanding of future risks both to the Arctic ecosystems, and to the rest of the world.
UK Arctic research
138. The United Kingdom has an outstanding and long-term reputation for scientific research in the Arctic, the general view being that we are “punching well above [our] weight” in terms of scientific engagement.203 According to one study, Arctic scientists based in the UK are ranked fourth in the number of published research articles (behind USA, Russia and Canada, all of which are Arctic States), and their papers are cited around twice as often as the global average.204
139. Over 70 UK universities and research centres carry out work in a broad range of Arctic-related research areas in the biological, physical, geological, and social sciences.205 Particularly well known—alongside the National Environmental Research Council (NERC), the British Antarctic Survey (BAS), the Scott Polar Research Institute and Royal Geographical Societies—are the National Centre for Atmospheric Science, the UK Meteorological Office, and the National Oceanography Centre.
140. We were left in no doubt from our evidence of the UK’s broad expertise in Arctic science, and in particular the contribution that the UK makes to international understanding of how climate change is affecting the unique ecosystems that exist in the Arctic.206 NERC told us that the Arctic Research community in the UK is:
[D]edicated, ambitious and highly skilled. They have access to a range of capable and innovative assets and are committed to working collaboratively and internationally.207
That echoed what we heard from the evidence we took during our visit to Norway and Svalbard. The Norwegians were particularly complimentary about, and grateful for, the UK’s contribution to collaborative projects which increase scientific understanding about the consequences of warming on the Arctic.
141. Witnesses argued that UK Arctic research has strengths in several fields. Dr James Lea, Reader in Geography and Planning at the University of Liverpool, told us that the UK was particularly helping to address some big unanswered questions about our understanding of the Arctic:
I am a glaciologist, but I am also aware that we are making contributions towards understanding biology and ecology, not only in terrestrial areas but in the oceans. We make contributions towards understanding past change, present change, and future change through a combination of fieldwork and observations through both short and long-term monitoring and also numerical modelling, which allows us to understand what might happen in the future under different scenarios.208
142. “Looking North” states that Arctic research helps to solve global challenges for the benefit of all. It asserts that research helps to develop practical responses in the face of unprecedented change and to better understand the role the Arctic has and will play within the global system.209 Jane Rumble told us that UK Arctic science is one of the UK’s interests in the region, among security and energy security interests, and that UK research’s great contribution to the region is highly regarded by Arctic states:
The contribution that we make in technical expertise and science expertise has been warmly welcomed by the Arctic states. The UK, being a good neighbour, obviously wants to make sure that we have good relations with our northern region while keeping it safe and secure. I think they are our big priorities.210
She added that one of the biggest strengths of UK Arctic research is the “volume and impact” of the UK’s science portfolio,211 highlighting the breadth of talent within the UK’s research community.212
143. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told the Committee that the UK has scientific and geopolitical influence in the Arctic, saying:
[P]olar research is an area in which it is clear to me the UK has real scientific and geopolitical influence and can demonstrate leadership internationally, contributing to our Global Science Superpower goals … I believe that we can build on these strengths and increase our contribution to Arctic science by making a commitment to sustained funding, aligning with partners to leverage more funding, promoting existing strengths in interdisciplinary science and bringing together the strategic aims of our institutions.213
144. UK research contributes a huge amount to the Arctic. We punch well above our weight, producing 10% of the world’s Arctic science, across a wide range of topics. We recognise that UK Arctic research has considerable strengths to offer the international scientific community and we welcome the commitments that the Minister has made to build upon the Arctic research community’s existing strengths.
Research gaps
145. Henry Burgess told us that the Arctic is still “radically understudied and under sampled”.214 Dr Anna Jones, Director of Science at the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) added to this, explaining that the Arctic posed a lot of “huge science questions” regarding the atmosphere, the ocean and biology, and that the effects of climate change on these systems will “have implications not just for the Arctic, but for lower latitudes also”.215
146. We heard from Arctic researchers that there were “big picture items that we need to study” to fill in our knowledge of the effects of climate change in the Arctic, including: summer sea ice patterns, the melting of the Greenland ice cap and the Greenland Ice Stream, iceberg calving processes, ocean productivity and the effects which changes in the Arctic will have on UK weather.216
147. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told the Committee that, while UK researchers understood the “scale of challenge in the Arctic”,217 it remains a region that is significantly under-observed and where there are significant gaps in understanding of the rapid pace of change in ecosystems in the Arctic:
It is a still an inhospitable location for research; difficult to access; largely un-studied in winter; and with ‘black holes’ of information.218
Observing systems
148. International attention is already being paid to knowledge gaps in Arctic research. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme recommended in its 2021 Arctic Climate update that there needs to be an expansion of monitoring and documentation of change in the Arctic, a conclusion endorsed by the International Arctic Science Committee which was especially concerned about sustaining Arctic observation networks.219
149. The Horizon-funded Arctic PASSION project (Pan-Arctic Observing System of Systems), aims to improve current observation systems by co-creating an integrated pan-Arctic observation system through international collaboration, including Indigenous and local communities, that can continuously provide unrestricted, high quality, science-based Earth observation information.220 Henry Burgess told us that this project will inform countries about where they need to invest their “skills, capacities and interests”, saying:
It will be interesting at that point to map the UK’s Arctic community to see what we are good at, and what we know that system of systems—that observation network, that ideal network—needs and where the UK can then contribute. At the moment there is not an exact list saying, “These are the 10 gaps; these are the 10 things we need to do. Let’s match it. That’s it.” It is more, as you say, a shopping list of things that we are interested in and are good at. This thinking is happening internationally.221
150. The Arctic is changing rapidly, and the UK could make a significant contribution to the world’s understanding of these changes by stepping up its contribution to longer-term scientific observing systems. The Government must ensure that the UK is well positioned to contribute to these systems and commit to supporting them long-term by ensuring that there is adequate support for the UK research community to do so.
Interdisciplinary research
151. We heard that there is a need for more cross-disciplinary research to provide a holistic view of Arctic ecosystems and how climate change is affecting them. We heard that that research by NERC and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) can tend to be siloed. Lancaster University said:
There is great research being done across UK institutions on environmental sciences and separately, great research undertaken on the effects of those environmental changes for people living in the Arctic. We need a top-down approach to promote collaborations between the social and environmental sciences studying the Arctic. There is real opportunity to combine expertise in earth observation techniques with traditional, social disciplines.222
152. As a good example of UK interdisciplinary work, we were signposted to the Canada-Inuit Nunangat-United Kingdom Arctic Research Programme 2021–2025 (CINUK). This programme addresses the impact of environmental changes in Inuit Nunangat (the homeland of the Inuit in Canada), including the social, human, engineering, and health consequences of these changes. The NERC Arctic Office told us that this is the most recent strategic investment in Arctic science, with £8 million provided by UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) through the Fund for International Collaboration led by NERC.223
153. The NERC Arctic Office told us that the key to the success of the programme was the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2021 between all the Canadian and UK funding partners as well as the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) organisation as an equal partner.224 They told us that this MOU sets out the expectations of the programme to deliver empowerment in research to Inuit communities across Inuit Nunangat.225
154. The UK Polar Network, which is a network for early career researchers, suggested that there is a division between natural sciences and social sciences within polar research which goes down to the graduate level, and pointed out that many of their members are NERC-funded natural science PhD students. It suggested that it would be transformative to the way Arctic scientific research is conducted if NERC were to start encouraging further social science integration into its funding opportunities at PhD level and beyond.226
155. Professor Michael Bravo made a similar point about the scarcity of researchers working in social sciences in the Arctic:
My colleagues in the Nordic countries tell me you have excellent researchers, not only in the sciences but also in the social sciences. I can only think of up to 10 researchers in the humanities and social sciences working on Arctic problems. Why is that? … That could be construed as a plea for funding.227
156. Dr Iain Williams, Director of Strategic Partnerships at NERC, told us that there is a trend of increasing interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research across the research community. He explained that future transdisciplinary research will become easier to fund in the future:
It will be easier as we change our processes across UKRI and harmonise more for researchers to apply across research councils in transdisciplinary ways as opposed to the danger of falling between two councils, which may have happened.228
157. The Government acknowledges the importance of integrating the environmental and social sciences to understand the effects of changes in the Arctic:
UK research, including social sciences and humanities, is at the heart of international efforts to understand the changing Arctic, as well as the implications of those changes on the wider planet … The UK’s approach recognises that increasing international and multidisciplinary collaboration is vital for tackling the most pressing research questions and solving global challenges for the benefit of all.229
158. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology pointed out that the Government has agreed with UKRI “very significant top-slicing of funding to fund interdisciplinary research”.230
159. More interdisciplinary research on the Arctic is needed to bring together the physical consequences of climate change with its impacts on communities in the region. Such research can provide a more holistic view of the changes occurring in the Arctic so that better informed decisions can be made. The Canada-Inuit Nunangat-United Kingdom Arctic Research Programme highlights the positive impact that UK cross-disciplinary work can have. But to consolidate and build on its position as a world leader in Arctic research, the UK must significantly expand its interdisciplinary output. We appreciate that this is dependent on wider funding structures beyond specifically Arctic research. Consequently, we recommend that UKRI should review how its funding structures for Arctic research can better incorporate interdisciplinary projects across the natural and social science, and use its findings from the Arctic as a case study model.
Support and funding for UK Arctic research
160. Dr Anna Jones, Director of Science at the British Antarctic Survey, told us that there are three key ingredients for good research: research funding, collaboration and community (national or international), and facilities.231 In this section we look at how well supported UK research is in these areas.
Funding
161. We heard that it is logistically challenging and expensive for UK scientists to conduct research in the Arctic.232 Dr James Lea told us that researchers ensure that they get the best value for money out of their research grants, but that a “huge amount is spent on logistics”, as research that takes place in the Arctic is “logistically complex and can be extremely expensive to do”.233
162. We were told that there were additional funding obstacles for researchers in the Arctic, as the UK does not have the same assets in the Arctic that it does in Antarctica.234 Professor Andrew Shepherd, Head of Geography and Environmental Sciences, Northumbria University, told us that:
In addition to the funding for the science, you need to make sure that there are ships and aeroplanes and all the other resources that are needed to conduct polar research in the north.235
163. Most Arctic science is funded at a national level, with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology responsible for funding Arctic research via UKRI. UKRI combines the seven Research Councils, Innovate UK and Research England, and has a total combined budget of more than £25.1 billion over the three financial years 2022–23 to 2024–25.236 The Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) is the UK’s leading public funder of environmental science, and is the research council that is the main source of Arctic funding, receiving £311 million in annual funding this year. Dr Iain Williams, Director of Strategic Partnerships at NERC, told us that this was split into two components: 40% national capability and 60% for response-led research.237
164. Other Research Councils such as the Economic and Social Research Council, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council and the Arts and Humanities Research Council also fund UK-based academics researching the Arctic, but at a much smaller scale.238 NERC also funds national capability: the large research infrastructure, services, facilities, and data centres that enable research and make its results available. This includes research stations around the globe, a fleet of ships and aircraft, and satellite technology to monitor gradual environmental change on a global scale.239
165. The NERC Arctic Office explained to us that as a funding body, NERC does not have an ‘Arctic research strategy’ document or anything similar, which sets out the parameters of research or which allocates funding on a hierarchy of importance.240 Instead, it explained, most research—with some exceptions—is funded ‘bottom-up’ by researchers identifying what they think is a critical research question and then testing that through a highly competitive and peer reviewed application process. This approach is not unique to Arctic research but is shared across the whole NERC portfolio.241
166. In “Looking North”, the Government reiterated its commitment made in the 2021 Integrated Review to maintaining a significant contribution to Arctic science.242 The FCDO told us that since 2012, Arctic researchers based in the UK have received over £56 million in science funding, in addition to investment in infrastructure and other assets.243 When we asked UK researchers about this funding, Professor Andrew Shepherd argued that this £56 million amounted to a mere fraction of research funding for Antarctic research:
That is £5 million a year, which is about a tenth of what we spent on Antarctic research. Yet 70% of polar science is on the Arctic, so it is out of step with the perceived importance of the issue.244
167. In other words, the majority of UK polar science is focussed on the Arctic, yet this is not reflected in the amount of money that NERC awards to research projects studying the region if infrastructure and logistics funding are included in the calculation. It may well be that if infrastructure spend is discounted,245 the amount of money awarded to competitive research projects is around the same for both the Arctic and the Antarctic, with, on average, 40 grants awarded to both poles.246 Jane Rumble agreed that the amount of research funding was relatively comparable between the two poles:
If you take out the logistics funding that BAS gets for maintaining a presence in the Antarctic, the actual science grant money seems to be relatively similar.247
168. The FCDO explained in its written evidence that decisions over which individual research projects or programmes are supported by UKRI are made independently from Government once the broad allocations are set at the Comprehensive Spending Review, in accordance with the Haldane principle, which rules that decisions about which research projects to fund should be made through independent evaluation by experts, based on the quality and likely impact of that research.248
169. Jane Rumble added that the Arctic has become more of a focus for study over the last decade, and that research should be led by researchers, rather than by the Government, articulating that the UK’s approach to the Arctic is necessarily different to its approach to the Antarctic:
Going back more than a decade ago there were not big research grants particularly targeted at the Arctic … Yes, that is different for the Antarctic because it has to provide world-class science and continual presence. It will determine what it will study in Antarctica. We don’t necessarily drive what the science is, but there will be this permanent presence. There is a slightly different driver in the Arctic, but it is clear that the Arctic will continue to be a big priority for UK science.249
170. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us:
[T]he historic commitment on logistics in the Antarctic has a very particular geopolitical rationale, and I think one could make a case that the Arctic now merits an increase as well.250
The Minister added that the Government needed to consider additional funding streams for Arctic research, saying that research infrastructure in the Arctic was “some of the most expensive research infrastructure”.251 The Minister suggested that the Government was considering both international partnerships, better coordination between projects, and new sources of funding.252 He added:
[A]s part of the S&T [Science and Technology] framework and the creation of the new Department, the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Secretary of State and I have identified that part of the challenge for us, in a society where there are now more and more people with very substantial resources, is to make it easier for people to philanthropically support this. It happens in medical life science very extensively; there is no reason why it should not happen in other frontline areas, and I think, from the Gates Foundation to other examples, there is an appetite. We tend often to think very academically about this; we need to have academic science and to make it easier for people to do philanthropy.253
Longer term funding
171. The British Antarctic Survey told us that sustained, long-term, monitoring of key Arctic climate variables was essential to understand and predict climate change, adding that long-term observations were important to support climate and weather services.254 Professor Mark Brandon described long-term funding to us as an “easy open goal”, saying:
One of the critical things with Arctic research is time series and length of data, so [we need] more consistent funding to keep that going.255
172. Professor Terry Callaghan explained to us the importance of time series in research, and the difficulties around getting grants for longer-term observations, saying:
I think of all the money and time that has been wasted in scientific papers that say “short-term effects of” in an experiment on some Arctic ecosystem. We know that things happen slowly. We know that we need long-term data and the first year of an experiment is utterly useless. They do not tell us anything. However, if we do not publish that paper, we do not get the money for the second stage of the experiment. Eventually, after 10 years, “long-term effects of” and that is the one that matters but, if we do not publish in the middle, we will not have our jobs or our grants. This long-term view of the processes is important.256
173. We heard this point echoed very clearly in our evidence from many scientists, who stressed the need for long-term observations in the Arctic. Professor Geraint Tarling, Principal Investigator at BIOPOLE, told us that long-term observations are key to understanding the Arctic, but that funding available for long-term observations was lacking:
A lot of the people I work with say that the strategic planning and the long-term funding of long-term observations is desperately needed. There is no funding body that can fund long-term Arctic science that presently exists. We have no long-term assets beyond the base and possibly the visit of the ship every year. We have no other long-term assets in the Arctic. That is because of the lack of strategic long-term funding. A body that can produce that and have this commitment to long-term funding in the Arctic is desperately needed. We will not be a major player in the Arctic unless we get these long-term observations under way.257
174. The Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling agreed that longer-term funding strategies are necessary to maintain and enhance the UK’s leadership in Arctic science. They also stressed that it is essential that strategic, long-term investment in research national capability is continued, saying:
It is essential that funding strategies are suited to the nature of the data we use. The volumes of data used, alongside subsequent analysis and maintenance, is vast and requires stable, long-term funding streams … Expanding long term funding strategies is one of the most pertinent differences that can be made for future Arctic research and would ensure that the UK remains a world leader in Arctic Science.258
175. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that the Government needs to ensure that the UK has research funding with the “right mixed model of long-term and short-term funding; some of which is strategically directed, some of which is led by researchers”.259 He told us that three-year funding cycles was a “traditional lament or concern in UK science” and explained his belief that “if you really want to support proper long-term scientific endeavour, you need long-term funding frameworks”.260
176. UK Arctic science receives 10% of the total state funding, with the balance of 90% going to Antarctica. However 70% of UK polar science is currently focussed on the Arctic. Arctic research is an area of considerable international interest and relevance and if the UK is to remain world-leading in Arctic science, continued and enhanced funding will be necessary. We support the Government’s ambition to leverage additional funding sources for Arctic research. There should be more funding made available, through UKRI or other sources, to UK scientific research about the Arctic, but this should not come at the expense of the Antarctic, where equally important questions for the future of the world are being studied by scientists.
177. In view of the evidence that we have heard about the rapidly intensifying changes that are occurring in the Arctic, and the potential impacts that those changes could have for the UK, we recommend that environmental change in the Arctic should feature more explicitly within UKRI’s top priorities.
178. We have heard that long term monitoring and observations will be crucial to understand the changing Arctic, but we are concerned that current funding models are geared towards short-term projects. The Government and UKRI should set out how longer-term scientific monitoring over periods of at least 10 years can be successfully supported with a longer-term funding strategy.
Infrastructure
179. NERC National Capability includes polar scientific and operations infrastructure and facilities, which are operated on NERC’s behalf by the British Antarctic Survey to support and enable polar science and research activity.
RRS Sir David Attenborough
180. The RRS Sir David Attenborough (SDA) is the UK’s only Polar Ice Class 5 research vessel, meaning that she should be able to move through medium first year ice (about a metre thick) at a speed of three knots.261 The NERC Arctic Office explained that, considering the SDA’s research and logistical support roles in the Antarctic, and the annual maintenance programme, it is expected that there will be up to 50 days each northern hemisphere summer when the vessel could be available to deliver scientific research cruises, subject to the availability of funding.262
181. The SDA’s first scientific cruise to the Arctic will take place in 2024. Professor Tarling explained that the SDA will go to the region with a multidisciplinary programme called KANG-GLAC to measure past changes in marine-terminating glaciers. He explained that the project was a result of responsive funding, known as a highlight topic.263
182. NERC has a fleet of three ships that operate in the Arctic, including the SDA. The National Oceanography Centre ships, the RRS Discovery and the RRS James Cook, were described to us as “incredibly capable research vessels”, but are not ice strengthened.264 Dr Williams explained to us that NERC plans across the whole fleet of three ships, matching the requirements of researchers and their projects with the capabilities of each ship.265
183. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that the SDA is a “serious flagship for the UK’s commitment to global science and research … it speaks to Britain as a global force for good”, but that her deployment times are limited.266 We asked the Minister about the merits of the SDA conducting experiments at the North Pole, to which the Minister answered that “it is economically smart—it will win and attract investment—and diplomatically smart”.267
184. The RRS Sir David Attenborough is a much-needed platform for UK scientists in the Arctic. We welcome the Minister’s enthusiasm for the idea of a scientific voyage to the North Pole for the SDA and we believe that this would demonstrate the UK’s commitment to its responsibilities towards the Arctic environment and deepening international understanding of climate change in the region. The Minister should explore options with NERC for a voyage by the SDA to the North Pole.
185. We are concerned that the time that the RRS Sir David Attenborough can spend in the Arctic is limited, and recommend that consideration is given to the provision of an additional ship for UK scientists and researchers in the Arctic.
NERC Arctic Research Station
186. The UK’s only permanent research facility in the Arctic is the NERC Arctic Research Station in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, which celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2022. The facility is funded by NERC through National Capability Large Research Infrastructure funding and is operated by the British Antarctic Survey. NERC has invested around £400k in new capital assets for the station over recent years, including a new boat, marine sampling equipment, laboratory kit, outreach facilities and an internal refurbishment.268
187. We visited the NERC Arctic Research Station in March 2023 and were impressed by the facilities that it offers to UK Arctic researchers. The UK Arctic Research Station is undoubtedly an important hub for scientific research, contributing greatly to the profile of the UK as a science producer. It is situated in Ny-Ålesund on Svalbard, which is experiencing some of the most dramatic environmental changes as a result of climate change and is consequently one of the most important sites in the Arctic for research. Ny-Ålesund is home to the research stations of many countries, forming a truly international research community which allows researchers from across the world to meet.269
188. While we were in Ny-Ålesund we heard from scientists there that the polar winter is relatively understudied, despite the different ecosystems being far more active in winter than previously thought. This point was also made to us by Professor Geraint Tarling, who said that the “activity in wintertime is really important, and what we don’t have is those observations”.270 However, the Ny-Ålesund station is generally open only in the spring and summer months,271 when it hosts up to a dozen projects a year.272
189. Henry Burgess told us that the station is open “when it needs to be” and that there is no restriction on when it can be open.273 Yet it has not been open over the winter, at least in recent years. In 2022 NERC funded a modest Arctic Station Access Scheme aimed at increasing use of the station by new and early career researchers.274 The scheme now has had a second round of applications, focused on using the station in the latter part of the autumn, the winter and early spring, which would allow researchers some “modest financial support” to use the station then.275
190. Some written evidence suggested that there needs to be improved access to the NERC Arctic Research Station, saying that it “is currently out of reach for many due to prohibitively high costs and limited capacity”.276 Flight costs and subsistence costs are met by individual researchers through their grants or other funding routes. Researchers in receipt of UKRI funding are eligible to use the station, as are those in receipt of other competitively won and appropriate grants, such as Leverhulme Trust funding, free of charge. Professor Tarling made the point that if we wish to see the station made more use of throughout the whole year, adequate funding must be provided to ensure that the Artic station could be used as a resource.277
191. The NERC Arctic Office told us that rising energy costs and other facilities costs that are provided by the Norwegian hosts in Ny-Ålesund are likely to put “significant pressure” on the operation of the station in near future.278
192. Professor Mark Brandon told us that an additional platform for UK science in the Arctic would be helpful, arguing that “the payback for us would be a greater understanding of how quickly the sea level will rise … understanding that better would be a net saving”.279
193. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology acknowledged that the Arctic Research Station was an important facility for researchers, telling us that it had “provided a safe, secure and efficient location for Arctic science for over 30 years” and that the ability to access the station was “extremely valuable”. When we asked the Minister about opening the station for longer periods of the year, he told us that there are “no set periods when it is open and closed” but that it “would not be cost or carbon-effective to have the Station staffed continuously, unless the research requirement is there”.280
194. The Minister told us that the Government recognises that the Arctic is becoming increasingly open and that “the melting of the ice, the opening up of corridors and the geopolitical work there mean that it is increasingly important”, saying that “it seems to us that if we are going to punch above our weight globally in key theatres, this is one of them”.281 He added that that it is worth considering whether “a little more core resource infrastructure, possibly shared with some other nations, might open up much more research in the Arctic”.282
195. The UK Research Station in Ny-Ålesund is a key element of the UK’s science capacity in the Arctic. It is vital for UK researchers and for the UK’s scientific influence internationally. We are concerned that the operation of such a vital resource to researchers may be jeopardised by rising running costs. We urge NERC to ensure that the station receives adequate funding.
196. We understand that the station is typically open from March to September, in line with demand from researchers. On our visit to Svalbard we also heard that the Arctic ecosystems are more active over winter than scientists have previously thought, requiring more active and regular monitoring. The UK has the opportunity to enhance the international scientific community’s understanding of Arctic winters, and their role in environmental change, by conducting more research in Ny-Ålesund over the winter. We recommend that the station is given enhanced support by NERC to enable it to open for a longer period during the year and that researchers be encouraged to use the station during winter. NERC should give consideration to maintaining a year-round operational presence in the station.
197. There are numerous benefits to opening an additional platform in the Arctic for UK research, not limited to the potential for deepening scientific understanding of climate change in the Arctic. We urge the Government to consider increasing the infrastructure available to UK scientists in the Arctic.
National and international research collaboration
National collaboration
198. We heard concerns that despite the high quality of UK Arctic research there is a lack of coordination in research efforts conducted in individual institutions, universities, and research centres, resulting in a lack of cohesion in the UK’s approach to Arctic research.
199. Professor Andrew Shepherd told us that, in recognition of the increased impact of warming in the Arctic, more research attention has been focussed on the region, but that further strategic coordination of this activity is needed:
As well as long-term climate change, changes in the Arctic affect people’s weather and that affects many things we do, so the vast majority of work on polar science is now on the Arctic. Times have changed and I would say that there is a need in the UK for strategic coordination of Arctic research. I think it is important to the UK … and we will miss the opportunities that changes in the Arctic present if we do not do this.283
200. We heard that there was little coordination between the different universities and institutions that have Arctic interests. Dr James Lea told us that there had been occasions of researchers embarking on fieldwork projects and “bumping into people in airports in Greenland and having no idea those people were going there”.284
201. Dr Lea suggested that it would be valuable to have more coordination between researchers. He pointed to the practice of Danish researchers, where ahead of the summer season, researchers get together to “give presentations on what they are planning and then work out how to share resources to optimise the amount of work they can do”.285 This process is arranged informally between different universities.286 Professor Tarling told us that a similar role could be fulfilled by the UK Arctic and Antarctic Partnership Committee, which is a community-led initiative that aims to bring together researchers across a range of disciplines who are interested in the polar regions. Professor Tarling explained that the Committee brings together a lot of UK academics, although it is not currently used to coordinate research.287
202. NERC routinely designs targeted strategic research programmes for science in the UK.288 Professor Andrew Shepherd told us that “if the Government is interested in a strategic programme on plastics, pollutants or covid-19, they will go to the UKRI and will ask them to put it on”.289 Examples of Arctic focussed programmes include the CINUK Programme with £8 million provided by UKRI through the Fund for International Collaboration, BIOPOLE (Biogeochemical processes and ecosystem function in changing polar systems and their global impacts), which was granted £9 million over five years, and CANARII (Climate change in the Arctic-North Atlantic Region and Impacts on the UK) which was granted £12 million over five years, both through National Capability funding.290
203. However, the NERC Arctic Office stressed to us that its role did not extend to choosing, coordinating or making assessments on all Arctic research funded by UKRI or NERC.291 It explained that its role is to support UK-based researchers in the Arctic and High North, providing advice to policy and decision makers and to build new national and international opportunities for research projects.292 We heard praise of the NERC Arctic Office’s work in identifying and bringing together UK Arctic Research, but we also heard that this work does not have the kind of impact which a national science strategy for the Arctic would.293
204. During the course of the inquiry, we visited the FRAM Centre in Tromsø, Norway. The FRAM Centre is the Norwegian High North Research Centre for Climate and the Environment and consists of about 500 scientists from 20 Norwegian research institutions involved in interdisciplinary research in the fields of natural science, technology, and social sciences. The member institutions, in addition to their own research, collaborate on five flagship research projects, which are funded by the Norwegian Government. We heard from various Norwegian stakeholders that the FRAM Centre plays a key role in helping different research centres to come together to find solutions for climate change and to contribute to the management of the High North. We heard that projects are only approved if they are interdisciplinary, and we were told that this structure had been highly effective in institutional capacity building and increasing the cogeneration of knowledge.
205. Jane Rumble told us that the Arctic and Antarctic Partnership Committee played a role in looking across the polar research community and identifying priorities to inform the Government and funding agencies.294 She also told us that the NERC Arctic Office was developing a database of Arctic science that would be launched quite soon, to help to identify what research is going on across the community.295
206. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told the Committee that he was “confident that the polar landscape is well serviced by polar focussed research institutions” and that the NERC Arctic Office has an “important strategic and coordination role”.296 He told us that he believed that “the growing global race for investment, the urgency of climate change and the geopolitics of the Arctic” make the Arctic a rising issue, and that there is “potentially” merit in the idea of a Arctic research strategy to make UK research as effective as possible.297
207. We were struck equally by the efficacy of Norway’s FRAM centre and by the fact that no equivalent platform in the UK exists to coordinate Arctic research. Our evidence points to a need for national strategic coordination of Arctic research within the UK, to enable researchers on projects spread throughout different universities and organisations to collaborate, share resources, and optimise the amount of work that can be achieved. The Government, UKRI and NERC should explore options for further coordination, through a dedicated institute or body to provide strategic coordination of UK Arctic science.
208. The Government should consult on a strategic national Arctic research plan, including both the natural and social sciences, with its own long-term funding, to help to understand, anticipate and respond to the changing Arctic environment and its impacts for the UK and the rest of the world.
International collaboration
209. International collaboration is vital for effective polar research to help better understand and address the consequences of warming in the Arctic. The British Antarctic Survey told us that:
Arctic science is difficult, expensive, and logistically challenging. One nation alone does not have the capability to address major Arctic challenges; an international approach is mandatory.298
210. The Scottish Association for Marine Science told us that one of the keys to the UK’s success in Arctic research has been effective international collaboration, particularly with European partners. It pointed to the NERC Changing Arctic Ocean programme (2017–2022) as an example. That was a project co-funded by UKRI and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.299
211. The British Antarctic Survey pointed to the international programme MOSAiC (Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate), led by the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany. The UK played a key role in this project, which BAS said is as an example of the UK’s “soft power” influence in the region.300 MOSAiC is the largest ever scientific expedition to the Arctic. It involved an ice breaker drifting with the sea ice for the entire year 2019–20, enabling multi-disciplinary studies of the ocean-sea ice atmosphere system. The UK contributed significantly to MOSAiC, with the then Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy providing funding of £0.5 million for UK researchers to join the vessel, and seven associated UK research projects were supported by £1.8 million of NERC funding.301
212. Dr Jenny Turton told us that researchers could collaborate internationally to conduct Arctic science more effectively through the shared use of research infrastructure:
I would also like to point out that while Ny-Ålesund is the place where the British flag flies for the UK Arctic, there are also many other Arctic research stations that we could collaborate with and that we could use in a much better way. There are ones all across Greenland, for instance, which are not so well known but that have all the capacity and infrastructure that is needed, across Canada and Sweden.302
213. In its written evidence, the FCDO told us that the UK’s international research collaborations, alongside diplomatic missions and defence capabilities, is key to helping maintain the Arctic as a place that is safe, secure, peaceful, and well-governed:
The UK’s research expertise is an important part of the UK’s offer to the Arctic region, and these international collaborations also deliver benefits for the UK through strengthening our bilateral relationships with our Arctic partners and increasing our influence in multilateral forums, including through the Arctic Council’s Working Groups.303
214. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that he believed that “polar research [is] one of the three areas that I think we could, and should be doing more internationally”, highlighting better research infrastructure and better coordination as key ways of achieving this.304 He added that:
I have highlighted polar research because this is an area where, if we got together with a relatively small group of nations who share our interests and agreed to co-fund some bigger fellowships, and agreed on more data sharing and better resource infrastructure, then, with a bit of philanthropic funding, we could do a lot more without a huge amount of extra investment.305
The Minister highlighted that there was a “natural group” of countries “who share values, commitment and research” with whom the Government could consider looking at a collaborative, coherent approach to investment in Arctic science, naming Canada, the US, Norway, Sweden, Finland as potential partners.306
215. While UK Arctic researchers punch well above their weight, they also require international collaboration to be efficient and to maximise their impact. Polar infrastructure for science is expensive but necessary, and international collaboration is needed to enable us to understand the Arctic, such as through international projects to share different observations and modelling, and through the shared use of infrastructure. As part of the long-term research strategy that we recommend, the Government should include its approach to international collaboration, and how it will coordinate investment in research capability and infrastructure with like-minded countries.
Memoranda of Understanding
216. The NERC Arctic office told us that a new MOU had been signed between UKRI and the Research Council of Norway.307 The agreement allows for a level of reciprocal funding of each country’s researchers within national funding applications. This means that UK-based researchers could be directly funded (non-salary) by the Research Council of Norway where they are working in partnership with Norway-based researchers and vice versa. The agreement is not limited to the Arctic, but for two nations with strong Arctic research connections there is “great potential” for this to be used.308 The NERC Arctic office told us that it was aware of several Arctic research groups who are investigating this route.309
217. There is also a longer-standing agreement between NERC and the National Science Foundation in the United States for a broadly similar approach to polar funding between the UK and US to avoid ‘double jeopardy’ situations where researchers need to apply for funding from two countries.310 BAS suggested that such cooperation can provide innovative ways to incentivise the kinds of large-scale international collaboration required in Arctic research.311
218. The Scottish Association for Marine Science told us that the benefit of the research agreement with Norway was that “we are now able to fund Norwegian collaborators on our UKRI projects”, adding: “It would enable more productive international collaboration if we were able to do the same for other Arctic nations”.312
Indigenous knowledge holders
219. In 2021 a Memorandum of Understanding in support of the United Kingdom-Canada Inuit Nunangat and Arctic Region Research Programme was signed by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, United Kingdom Research and Innovation, POLAR Knowledge Canada, the National Research Council of Canada, Parks Canada Agency, and Fonds de recherche du Québec. The Memorandum of Understanding focuses on working in partnership on the development and administration of the new research programme, which aligns with National Inuit Strategy on research objectives and actions.313
220. Indigenous Peoples representatives told us that this agreement was a “good, constructive example of what can be done in polar research” but stressed that the “co-production of knowledge needs to be enhanced and developed in the context of indigenous knowledge” and that researchers should insist on the “ethical and equitable engagement of knowledge holders”.
221. Professor Terry Callaghan told us that this engagement with Indigenous knowledge holders is essential, and that the relationship needed to benefit Indigenous communities as well as the scientists conducting the research:
What I heard about [the Memorandum of Understanding in support of the United Kingdom-Canada Inuit Nunangat and Arctic Region Research Programme] is excellent because, as a director of an Arctic station in Swedish Lapland, I used to get very concerned by the exploitation of the research station, the Swedes and the Sami. People would come in from a European country, set up their experiments, get their data, pull out and leave nothing behind except their rubbish. I am happy that we now have a much better relationship and this bilateral component, where the data stays with the people who need it and the people that it helps.314
222. Dr James Lea told us that this kind of engagement was essential to ensure that engagement with Indigenous knowledge holders was mutually beneficial, and that UK researchers cannot rely on Indigenous Peoples collaborating with them for free.315
223. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that Polar Memoranda of Understanding are useful, saying:
Polar MoUs can be especially useful, given the need and opportunity to consider the mutual use of polar infrastructure such as ships, aircraft and stations. They also present the ability to streamline application and assessment processes, removing ‘double jeopardy’ constraints with the analysis of potential projects and incentivising international partnerships. The requirements for MoUs will vary from case to case and country to country. I have raised the possibility of framing coordination on Polar science through a government-to-government MoU with several countries.316
224. The Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Norway has been very valuable for UK Arctic science, enabling meaningful international collaboration. We strongly encourage the Government and UKRI to consider reproducing this model with other Arctic capable countries.
225. We welcome the UK-Inuit Nunangat Memorandum of Understanding as a constructive example of polar research engagement with Indigenous knowledge holders. We recommend that NERC prioritise more co-production of research with Indigenous Peoples across the Arctic. This engagement should follow the principle of the ethical and equitable engagement with Indigenous knowledge holders.
Fifth International Polar Year 2032–2033
226. So far, there have been four International Polar Years: 1882–1883; 1932–1933; 1957–58 and 2007–2008. The next International Polar Year will be held 25 years after the last one, taking place in 2032–2033.317 An International Polar Year provides a period of time that coalesces intensive, coordinated research efforts focussed on the polar regions, as well as awareness raising and capacity building on a global scale.318
227. Planning for the Fifth International Polar year is being led by SCAR, the International Arctic Science Committee, and the World Meteorological Organisation. SCAR says that the event highlights “the urgent need for coordinated international research to tackle the biggest challenges of polar research, for both the polar regions themselves and for the world as a whole”.319
228. Henry Burgess described the Fifth International Polar Year to us as a “genuine once-in-a-generation opportunity to scale up polar science as a whole”, explaining that the previous International Polar Years have a “great track record in bringing together new initiatives, new countries and new partners, putting some new money behind big new programmes”. Mr Burgess explained that UK would need to genuinely support the UK Arctic community’s contribution:
It will only be successful if we get research councils, funders and decision makers behind that. The community as a whole is not planning for just one or two years of effort around 2032 and 2033. It genuinely is ramping up effort from now, even more work in 2032 and 2033, and then beyond that as well. It is not a decade, but it is a ramp up of activity. The potential to use the Sir David Attenborough in the mid to late 2020s to support, develop and push that international polar year as part of the UK’s contribution, among other assets, will be welcome.320
229. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that the 5th International Polar Year offers an important opportunity for leadership in Arctic and Antarctic science, “to coalesce international commitments, skills and funding, leading to a step-change in understanding the polar regions”.321 The Minister told us that he believed that the International Polar Year was “not … a pause point to wait for and then discuss things, but as a building moment to build through and deepen collaborations towards it”.322
230. The Arctic community is building up towards the fifth international polar year in 2032–33, which has been described as a “once in a generation opportunity” to scale up polar science. The Government and UKRI should set out its targets for that year and put forth a strategic vision of UK activities to display our world-leading contribution to Arctic science, including through our research vessels.
Horizon Europe
231. We heard very clearly across our written evidence that since the UK’s departure from the European Union, the loss of access to certain funding streams such as Horizon Europe has had an impact on UK research.323 Horizon Europe is the EU’s key funding programme for research and innovation, aimed at facilitating collaboration and strengthening the impact of research.324 The British Antarctic Survey told us that uncertainty over the UK’s access to Horizon had meant that UK scientists could no longer participate in, or had even had to withdraw from, projects, and that further uncertainty about whether the UK can participate in future projects means that researchers were “hesitant to commit” to proposals.325
232. The UK agreed terms of association to re-join Horizon Europe on 7 September 2023, allowing the UK participation as a fully associated member for the remainder of the programme, which runs to 2027.326 The UK also agreed to re-join Copernicus, the European Earth Observation Programme, on the same date.327
233. To support researchers following the UK’s departure from Horizon Europe, the Government announced an extension to the support provided to UK Horizon Europe applicants until the end of September 2023.328 This support has totalled more than £882 million to date, where eligible successful applicants to Horizon Europe receive the full value of their funding at their UK host institution for the lifetime of their grant.329 The University of Liverpool told us that despite UKRI’s offer to underpin funding, “EU researchers have expressed reticence about being part of UK bid”.330 Professor Andy Shepherd told us that leaving Horizon had been damaging to UK science, stating:
We have been involved in programmes that have been developed over the past 20 years and we have been progressively wound out of those programmes. I can tell you, because I used to lead the Copernicus Climate Change Service for ice losses and we were eventually ejected from that service last year, but I am trying to be positive. Polar science demands international collaboration. We cannot do it without international collaboration because it is not efficient to do it without international collaboration. A satellite costs €300 million, for example. A ship costs £300 million. We cannot pay for this on our own and we should not pay for it on our own. We need to collaborate with our partners. We have to recognise that that is an obstacle, and we need to solve that, so we need to find some way around it.331
234. Dr Anna Jones told us that UK association with Horizon Europe enhances the reputation of UK scientists, allowing them to lead proposals, and run big international programmes, which in turn enhances the reputation of UK science.332 She added that access to Horizon funding allowed international scientists to work in the UK, and that “if people decide that they do not want to come here because we do not have access to that funding, that will be a very bad place to be”.333
235. Henry Burgess told us that access to Horizon Europe was very significant for the UK, and that UK science had benefitted from “over €45 million from 2010 to 2023”.334 He added that the EU Commission is looking at developing a European Polar Programme and suggested that the programme would be coordinated by the European Polar Board. Mr Burgess explained that remaining close to the European Polar Board and having access to the programme would enhance the UK’s ability to maintain and develop observations in the Arctic.335
236. The FCDO told us that the Government is committed to multilateral scientific collaboration, including with European counterparts—and including participation in Horizon Europe.
237. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that he acknowledges that the research community had said that it “wants us to be back in Horizon”,336 saying:
When I returned to Government in November ’21, I was surprised to discover that we did not really have a plan B—we did not have an alternative—which seemed to me to be, first, a weak negotiating position and, secondly, a policy failure. We needed to be thinking, “What would we do?”337
238. We have heard that the UK’s departure from Horizon Europe has been damaging for UK Arctic research. We are concerned that lack of access to Horizon funding and international cooperation, at a time when international collaboration on Arctic research has never been more urgent, has been detrimental to UK polar science, and has reduced our capability and influence.
239. We strongly welcome the agreement for the UK’s re-entry into Horizon Europe and Copernicus Earth.
Science and policy
240. During the course of our inquiry, we heard that “what happens in the Arctic, doesn’t stay in the Arctic”,338 and that climate change in the Arctic will affect the UK in a number of ways, as discussed in the first chapter, such as through sea level rises, changes to our climate and weather patterns, and changes to our shared biodiversity.339
241. Plymouth Marine Laboratory told us that “Arctic research can help the UK inform policy decisions and develop evidence-based approaches to address the challenges being faced in the region and globally”.340 Dr James Lea agreed, telling us that science was important for developing policy:
At the fundamental level, the sea level change projections have key effects on UK policy in terms of what protections we put in place for coastal defences, port infrastructure, and other forms of infrastructure. It is also about research that goes on the Arctic, and the atmosphere and the oceans, and how that might impact the UK’s climate, and planning for what the future might look like for the UK climate. It all goes into policy development.341
242. Plymouth Marine Laboratory told us that, through the delivery of “cutting edge environmental and social science in support of a healthy and sustainable ocean”, it was committed to ensuring that UK policy makers had the scientific evidence they needed to ensure that “UK policy is capable of anticipating and responding to the rapidly evolving challenges and threats posed by the climate emergency”.342 They told us that more support should be given to UK institutions to increase opportunities for collaboration and interdisciplinary research that includes “integrating with policy and economics”.343 Dr Andrew Shepherd told us that there are some links between science and policy, saying that NERC centres are all involved in the recently established National Climate Science Partnership, which acts as an interface between researchers and government.344
243. Jane Rumble told us that she had undertaken a science and policy fellowship to better understand the interface between policy and science.345 She explained that the NERC Arctic Office has a key role in ensuring that the Arctic community is aware of policy interests.346
244. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that there was no one route for researchers to talk about policy with decision makers, but there were several available avenues, including giving evidence directly to departments, and undertaking secondments and exchanges into bodies such as the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports.347
245. UK scientists are building increasing evidence that the UK’s climate is affected by changes in the Arctic. It is vital that the Government continues to use our world-class British research to inform policy and decisions about the use of Arctic resources, the governance of and access to the region, and possible ways that Arctic countries, and the UK, will need to adapt to the effects that the changes in the region will bring.
246. We heard very strongly in our evidence that UK researchers are committed to equipping UK policy makers with excellent academic knowledge, with a view to ensuring that UK policy is capable of responding to rapidly evolving climate threats. The Government should work with NERC to set out a map of knowledge exchange routes between Arctic science and policy makers, and identify areas where knowledge exchange could be strengthened.
4 Arctic resources
247. We have discussed how the Arctic is evolving, with observed and continuing reductions in permafrost cover and ice extent, in response to climate change. This has made the region increasingly accessible, sparking commercial interest in its natural resources from multiple countries and industries. The region holds significant mineral deposits, and it is estimated that one fifth of the world’s petroleum and gas reserves lie in the Arctic,348 while melting ice is allowing more shipping, fishing and tourism. This chapter explores these emerging economic opportunities in the Arctic region, covering both their benefits and drawbacks. It will consider how the UK’s interests in these areas can be realised with the least environmental impact, and it will examine their implications for the livelihoods, cultures and customs of the 4 million people who live in the Arctic, including but not limited to the Indigenous populations.
248. Regulation of the sustainable economic development of Arctic resources is set by the eight Arctic States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) individually, with each state having sovereign rights over their land, internal waters, and territorial seas.349 Relevant international agreements and treaties apply, including the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) Polar Code and the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Each Arctic State has exclusive rights to “explore, exploit, conserve and manage” natural resources in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as defined under UNCLOS.350 However, the retreating ice opens up commercial opportunities beyond their EEZ, and there is resulting growing interest from many countries and industries.351
249. The area within the Arctic Circle is home to around 4 million people, of whom around 10% are members of one of the 40 Indigenous ethnic groups who are largely dependent on the Arctic ecosystems.352 Climate change can provide opportunities for the economic development of local and Indigenous communities; but we also heard that increased commercial activities may risk endangering their traditional lifestyles.
Figure 3: Arctic exclusive economic zones
Source: Patricia Derepentigny et al., “Increased transnational sea ice transport between neighbouring Arctic states in the 21st century”, Earth’s Future, vol 8(3), March 2020
Environmentally sustainable development in the Arctic
250. According to Imperial College London’s Grantham Institute, the UK has “extensive” opportunities for economic activity in the Arctic “across trade, financial and legal services, mineral resource extraction, tourism and fisheries”.353 We heard throughout our inquiry that these opportunities come with environmental risks that must be anticipated and researched.354 Many witnesses were concerned about the potential environmental damage that enhanced economic activity could inflict upon the Arctic.355 We will explore these potential environmental impacts in more detail in this chapter.
251. In “Looking North”, the Government states that “the UK aims for a prosperous Arctic, with economic and commercial development achieved in a way that is safe, responsible and sustainable”.356
252. The loss of sea ice and permafrost creates new economic and social opportunities and risks in the Arctic. Further development of the Arctic is inevitable, and not undesirable, but it needs to be balanced with actions to limit environmental damage. The UK has a responsibility to ensure that commercial opportunities in the Arctic are guided by the principles of sustainable development and the Government should consider how the UK can use its expertise to ensure that development in the Arctic is both responsible and balanced against the risks to the environment and ecosystems of the Arctic.
Culturally sensitive development in the Arctic
253. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) says that increasing economic activity can further facilitate social and economic development of the Arctic communities through increased infrastructure investment, increased tax revenues for local and state budgets and other ripple effects such as increased employment. UNEP explains that:
Although increased shipping, petroleum activity and extraction of minerals represent important opportunities for the Arctic communities, this also entails environmental and social challenges that must be handled in the best possible way.357
254. According to the Grantham Institute at Imperial College London, seizing emerging economic opportunities in the Arctic is made more complex by tension between those who oppose expansion of economic activity in the region and those who view economic development as necessary for the region’s living standards to replace economic activity which may be hampered by the loss of the sea ice (such as hunting, fishing, and some kinds of tourism), and from increasing self-determination of Indigenous communities.358
255. Representatives of Indigenous communities pointed to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and the UK’s backing for it. UNDRIP “reaffirm[s] that Indigenous Peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should be free from discrimination of any kind”, and “ensur[es] participation of Indigenous Peoples on issues affecting them”. It is as a result considered by them to be an agreement of utmost importance.359 We were also told that agriculture and livestock herding were becoming more challenging for Indigenous Peoples because climate change was making it more difficult to predict weather patterns and because the loss of sea ice often prevented traditional activities and employment.
256. Highlighting the benefits of local knowledge when undertaking economic activity in the Arctic, Dr Anna Jones told us that:
We should be talking to the people who live there because they will know. They know their region and they know their system, so they will know what the important parts are.360
257. Dr Jan Peter Laurens Loovers, Research Fellow at the School of Social Science, University of Aberdeen, told us that Indigenous governance in North America and Greenland is increasing and strengthening. He told us that businesses aiming to undertake economic ventures in the Arctic would face operational challenges if they did not collaborate with Indigenous policy makers and community members, and emphasised the importance of forming these partnerships in the early stages of a project. He told us that “lack of partnership with Indigenous Peoples will lead to economic downfall later on in [a] project”.361
258. We heard about a powerful example of this in a roundtable we held with Arctic Indigenous Peoples, where we were told that a Norwegian court had ruled that the licences to build two windfarms in Norway were void because they violated Article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that Indigenous Peoples “shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”.362 The court found that traditional Sami reindeer herding was a form of protected cultural practice and the windfarms were considered to encroach on traditional reindeer pastures.363 However, roundtable participants told us that the Norwegian Government had not acted to enforce this decision, despite protests which have gained popular support, and that the Sami people fear that foreign capital may sometimes be more important than the human rights of the Indigenous people of the country.
259. In the same session, we also heard that companies often make applications for mining exploration in Greenland in English, rather than in the official language of the country, Greenlandic. That creates an obvious language barrier for the Indigenous sheep farmers and locals who as a result may well never hear about potential mining or other economic developments which may seriously affect their way of life. This was cited to us as example of a lack of engagement with local, and in the case of Greenland, majority, Inuit population, with one participant saying: “even when you are at the right table, it’s difficult to be heard”.
260. Jane Rumble described some of the ways in which the Government is placing emphasis on “engaging appropriately with Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic”, pointing both to the UK-Canada Inuit Nunangat and Arctic Region Research Programme and to a code of conduct for UK researchers going to the Arctic which is currently in development and which will cover safety, environmental responsibility, and respect for Indigenous Peoples.364 In “Looking North” the Government recommitted to “respect[ing] the rights, views, and interests of the people of the Arctic, including of the region’s indigenous communities”.365
261. Economic development in the Arctic as a result of the changing climate must only take place if it can be shown not to undermine the interests of Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, or their environment. We welcome the code of conduct for UK Arctic researchers that the Government is currently developing. The Government should ensure that UK businesses are supported to work in genuine partnership with Indigenous Peoples, by developing a parallel code of conduct with for businesses with Arctic interests.
Shipping
Emerging shipping routes
262. Three shipping routes stand as candidates for expansion of shipping activity within the Arctic Ocean. Each route passes through the Arctic region between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The Northern Sea Route, also known as the North-East Passage traverses around the northern coastline of Eurasia. The North-West Passage runs along the northern coastline of North America through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The third, the hypothesised Transpolar sea route, would cross through a region that currently has year-round ice cover in the Central Arctic.366
Figure 4: The three main shipping routes in the Arctic
Source: International Council on Clean Transportation, “Arctic sea shipping: emissions matter more than you might think”, 2 October 2013
263. We heard that there would be substantial benefits in leveraging these routes to increase shipping through the Arctic. Transit through the Northeast passage reduces the travel time between North Europe and Asia by approximately 11–14 days.367 This means lower fuel usage and emissions alongside very substantial cost savings, as some bulk carriers, oil tankers and container vessels are chartered at tens of thousands of dollars a day plus fuel costs.368
264. These routes also pose significant challenges. Lord Mountevans told us that the environmental conditions were highly variable, making navigation complex, and that satellite coverage in the region was inconsistent, adding further complexity to the navigation. He said:
[There is] extreme volatility of the weather. The waves can go to 40 feet. The spray can land on the ship and then ice and then you can get a problem of stability with weight building up. The remoteness is a very real factor”.369
265. Shipping routes, such as the northern passages, are predicted to open up, as the Arctic warms and sea ice diminishes. These could allow a vessel to cross the northern sea route from the Atlantic to Asia, or vice versa, saving 11–14 days at huge commercial benefit. But there is uncertainty over when, or if, such routes will emerge. The routes are likely to be hazardous and unpredictable, due to unmapped areas and severe weather.
Emerging opportunities for the UK in shipping
266. Current shipping activity in the Arctic is minimal,370 but that may well change as the sea ice extent further declines. That will make merchant and tourist transit of the North-West or North-East Passages, or perhaps even the Northern Sea Route (over the North Pole itself) much easier.371 Summertime shipping activity has already increased: from 2013 to 2019 there was a 25% increase in the number of vessels traversing the region, although actual numbers remain very small compared, for example, to the Suez or Panama Canal routes.372
267. Our evidence suggested that, of all possible commercial activities in the Arctic, shipping is one area in which the UK has significant expertise. Lord Mountevans, Honorary President of Maritime London, told us that the UK was “a repository of maritime expertise”, with particular strengths in “maritime engineering and shipbuilding”.373 He added that because of the risks associated with the hazardous conditions in the Arctic, the UK’s “leadership” in insurance “places us in quite an influential position”.374
268. We were told that emerging opportunities in shipping for the UK were likely to centre around these areas where we already excel. BIOPOLE, an interdisciplinary NERC programme examining biogeochemical processes in the polar systems, said that competition from well-established Arctic maritime industries in Canada, Finland, Norway, the USA, and Russia means that “[t]he prospects of UK being a leading actor in the Arctic shipping are not strong”, but that the UK is favourably positioned to gain advantages from the surge in shipping activities within the area, particularly in insurance, telecommunications, and satellites, as well as in new technologies for sea rescue and environmental clean-up.375 Lord Mountevans said: “I do not at this moment see a great potential for us to be involved in the ship-owning side … because they are highly specialised ships and extremely expensive”.376 Like BIOPOLE, he said that the opportunities are most likely in adjacent sectors such as “shipbuilding, and particularly in marine equipment, engineering, and manufacturing”.377
269. “Looking North” recognises the importance and substantial benefits of these newly accessible maritime trade routes. The framework outlines the role of the UK Hydrographic Office [UKHO] as a world leader in data streams that support maritime navigation, and emphasises that its publications are continually updated in response to “changing shipping patterns and new trading routes”.378 The Government highlights that “the UKHO is developing marine capability in geospatial information management to support the UK’s Arctic interests”.379
270. As a result of climate change-induced sea ice withdrawal, more shipping will become viable in the Arctic and there will be commercial interests in shipbuilding, marine equipment, engineering and manufacturing, as well as in professional maritime business skills such as chartering, ship finance and insurance. The Government must work with other likeminded partners to ensure that the pursuit of these economic interests do not come at the expense of harming the Arctic environment or Indigenous Peoples.
Challenges for Arctic shipping
271. We heard from Arctic scientists that “[e]merging hazards from changing environmental and navigational conditions in the Arctic … are multi-faceted and often create compound risks”, and make forecasting future navigability challenging.380 The response of glaciers to future climate change in terms of their stability, as well as their “potential to produce larger or smaller icebergs is currently unknown”.381 We heard that enhancing understanding of these dynamics is crucial, as it has the potential to impact the safety of future shipping activities and infrastructure development in the Arctic region. We also heard that knowledge gaps will create “research opportunities related to emerging business interests”.382
272. Our evidence suggested that as shipping increases, there should be an increased focus on marine spatial planning, which UNESCO defines as “analysing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribution of human activities in marine areas to achieve ecological, economic and social objectives”.383 WWF UK suggested that an “ecosystem approach” to voyage planning in the Arctic would lead to more effective implementation and strengthening of the IMO’s Polar Code, and stressed that a “holistic” approach to shipping related marine spatial planning should “account for migratory routes taken by cetacean species, to avoid ship-strike incidences”.384 The Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group (PAME) says that the implications of increased traffic in the Arctic Ocean are not yet fully understood and that “the first step is to fill a critical knowledge gap in shipping trends in the Arctic”.385
273. PAME also says that increased shipping through longer ‘open water’ seasons will have implications for Arctic inhabitants.386 It says that:
As shipping increases, it may interfere with communities’ subsistence harvesting of fish and marine mammals, foul their coastlines if they spill fuel or other toxic substances or impose a heavy burden upon their limited search and rescue and response capabilities in the event of an accident.387
274. We heard in our roundtable with Arctic Indigenous Peoples that when there are maritime accidents in the Arctic it is often they who become involved in rescue missions. Participants told us that they are “concerned” that there is inadequate search and rescue infrastructure to support the growth in maritime activity in the Arctic. We will discuss search and rescue concerns later in this chapter.
275. In “Looking North”, the Government recognises that new and emerging technology will be necessary to mitigate challenges of transportation through the Arctic and also identifies “implications for insurance, environmental and labour regulation”.388
276. We questioned the Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology on how the UK is contributing to the international conversation on safe, clean shipping, to which the Minister answered: “we are very focussed on two things: the research into impact, effect and mitigation; and the innovation that might be able to mitigate and be deployed”.389
277. The UK should use its leadership in Arctic research to help to fill the knowledge gaps needed to ensure that emerging opportunities in shipping are pursued sustainably. The Government should back this research with funding, such as for marine spatial planning.
Environmental impacts of shipping
Fuel
278. We heard very clearly about the need to safeguard against negative environmental impacts from increased shipping in the Arctic.390 For example, the Scottish Association for Marine Science (SAMS) said that shipping posed “increase[d] atmospheric and marine pollution, noise pollution effects on marine wildlife, and the introduction of non-native species” and an “increase in risk of oil spills and contamination”, including the release of grey water and sewage.391
279. We were told that the Arctic faces considerable risks associated with oil spills, due to cooler temperatures, its remoteness—which hinders clean-up—and use of heavy fuel. Lord Mountevans explained that:
[I]f there is a collision or an accident involving the escape of fuel, that would be very serious indeed because very low temperatures make it very hard to get the hydrocarbons to disperse, if at all—hopefully at some stage, but it is very difficult. There are no facilities there for clean-up.392
Box 6: Heavy fuel
|
Hydrocarbons are molecules made up of hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon. The number of carbon atoms in a hydrocarbon determines the chain length. Increasing chain length is associated with increasing boiling point, viscosity, and a reduction in flammability. Crude oil is a mixture of hydrocarbons with different chain lengths. As crude oil is refined, this mixture of hydrocarbons is separated by their chain lengths in a process known as fractional distillation. The lower chain lengths (such as gas, petrol, then kerosene, and diesel) are removed first. This leaves behind the hydrocarbons with a longer chain length, often containing contaminants from the refining process, and can be processed into residual fuels, also known as Heavy Fuel Oils (HFOs). HFOs are characterised by their high viscosity and lower flammability compared to other fuels which have shorter chain lengths. |
Source: Allen D. Uhler et al., “Chemical character of heavy fuel oil and lubricants”, in Scott A. Stout and Zhendi Whang (eds.), Standard Handbook Oil Spill Environmental Forensics, (Elsevier, 2016), pp 641–683
280. We heard about mitigations that can be implemented to reduce the risk from oil spills in the region. Heavy fuel oil (HFO) is more difficult to clean up than alternative fuels, particularly at cold temperatures (see Box 6).393 When HFO is combusted, it releases more black carbon into the atmosphere than alternative fuels.394 Black carbon, a carbon based aerosol produced by the incomplete combustion of fuels which is emitted as nearly invisible sooty particles of engine exhaust, lowers the reflectivity of snow and ice surfaces.395 This results in more solar energy being absorbed, which accelerates the melting process.396 Although the IMO has approved a ban on HFO from 2024, this will be subject to exemptions until mid-2029. This has led to criticism and calls to strengthen the ban from the Clean Arctic Alliance.397
281. The Met Office told us that “targeted reductions of certain sources of black carbon … could offset the enhanced Arctic warming rates by the mid-21st century”.398 The Cruise Lines International Association said that work is already underway in its industry to reduce the environmental impact of fuel use. This includes investing in alternative fuels such as liquified natural gas (LNG), which “produces zero sulphur emissions, 85% lower nitrogen oxide emissions, almost 100% fewer particulate and black carbon emissions, and a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions”, as well as biofuels and synthetic e-fuels.399 It also told us about new hybrid technology for cruise ship engines, which combine LNG fuel and battery power. While its members have committed not to burn HFO since 2019, it said that “the technology for carbon-free cruising is still years away and sustainable marine fuels and propulsion are not yet available at scale”.400
282. The FCDO said that it was “leading international efforts at the IMO to reduce emissions from international shipping, as part of the transition to Net Zero for the UK’s maritime services sector”.401
283. We welcome the International Maritime Organisation’s decision to ban the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil by ships in the Arctic from 2024. However, the exemptions and waivers mean that the ban will only take full effect in 2029, and we are concerned that the ban as it stands will prove ineffective. As shipping increases in the Arctic, the amount of heavy fuel oil used in the Arctic will only increase unless a full ban is in place. We urge the Government to press the IMO for an earlier full adoption of this ban in 2024, and to work with them to set limits for black carbon in the Arctic.
284. We welcome the steps already being taken by some UK businesses to minimise their use of HFO and to transition to alternative fuels. These efforts must be accelerated as climate change opens up more shipping routes.
The Polar Code
285. IMO’s International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (also known as the ‘Polar Code’) “includes mandatory measures covering safety and pollution prevention”.402 It is a legally binding framework covering design, construction, operations, training, search and rescue, and environmental protection of large (over 500GT (gross tonnage)) vessels that operate in the Polar regions.403
286. We were told that while there were more large vessels entering into the Polar Code Area (PCA), the main increase in voyages into the area was from fishing vessels, which are smaller.404 Researchers from Lancaster University added that “there has already been an increase in rescues of private yachts that lack specialist equipment needed to navigate the Arctic Ocean, particularly around Svalbard”.405 WWF-UK told us that strengthening the Polar Code would reduce risks associated with shipping.406
287. In “Looking North”, the Government committed to “advocate for the highest possible shipping standards and adherence to the Polar Code” as new shipping routes in the Arctic emerge.407 Jane Rumble expanded on this commitment in oral evidence. She said that the UK was extensively involved in the negotiation of the Polar Code through the IMO, and that while the current Polar Code does not apply to all ships, stage two of the Polar Code will include pleasure yachts, fishing vessels, and small cargo ships under 500GT. She added that “the UK would like to ensure that all shipping activity in the polar regions is covered by the Polar Code”, and underlined the importance of “making sure there is a level playing field”.408
288. We strongly support strengthening the Polar Code to minimise safety and pollution risks from shipping in the Arctic. The Government must continue to use its position at the IMO to push for the Polar Code not only to be strengthened to include a wider range of vessels, but also to be implemented and monitored effectively. The Government should ensure that all UK businesses with Arctic maritime interests and UK registered vessels visiting the Arctic region are Polar Code compliant.
Fishing
289. The UK’s fishing operations in the Arctic were once much larger than now. Jane Sandell, CEO of UK Fisheries, said that “there was once a great industry” but that “we are now down to one vessel”, operated by her company.409 That vessel, the Kirkella, has an annual quota of just over 6,000 tonnes,410 worth approximately £2 million.411
290. While the UK’s fishing quota in the Arctic is now 6,000 tonnes, in 2019 it was more than double that, at 13,500 tonnes.412 Gary Taylor, Fisheries Consultant at GT Fisheries, explained that the 2019 figure is “half of what was caught within UK waters by UK vessels” in the same year.413 Given that “70% of UK seafood imports between January and November 2021 came from countries within the Arctic region”,414 and that in 2019 the Arctic catch constituted 10% of the fish that went into British fish and chip shops, Jane Sandell suggested that this reduction in quotas has implications for UK food security.415 Gary Taylor added that the reduction in UK fishing in Arctic waters has corresponded with an increase in imports from other countries and increases in price for the end consumer.416
291. Jane Sandell suggested that a good option for expanding the UK’s fishing interests could be found within the Arctic, saying of the total quota available: “this year the quota is just under 600,000 tonnes in the Arctic. In the North Sea it is less than 22,000 tonnes”. She argued that because of this, “there is huge potential for the UK to negotiate far better fisheries deals”.417
292. Part of the opportunity derives from the effects of climate change, which is causing migratory behaviour in certain fish species. For example, more temperate fish species are moving northwards as a result of ‘Arctic Atlantification’ (see Box 7).418 This is complicated by changes in marine ecosystems caused by climate change that make it difficult to predict how sustainable opportunities for Arctic fishing will be.419 At the same time, melting glaciers are causing some Arctic fish stocks, such as cod, to decline, potentially reducing the opportunities for increased fishing.420
293. Academics also pointed out to us that the fishing needs of Indigenous Peoples—for whose culture and diet fish is essential—must be considered, particularly the ways in which their ability to fish is being affected by climate change.421 In our roundtable with Arctic Indigenous Peoples we heard that many fishermen had had to relocate further north to find fish, and that fisheries in Greenland, where fish makes up more than 90% of the country’s exports, are facing real challenges in adapting, and are investing in new equipment to catch the new species they are seeing in their waters.
Box 7: Arctic Atlantification
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The term ‘Atlantification of the Arctic’ refers to observed changes in the Arctic Ocean whereby conditions are becoming much more similar to those typically observed in the Atlantic. The Arctic Ocean has a layered structure, with cold fresh water sitting on the top of warmer saline water from the Atlantic. Typically, this cold fresh water is continually replenished from melting ice. In the Barents Sea, reductions in sea ice extent have reduced the flow of cold fresh water into the top layer. This has resulted in this layered system becoming weakened, and causes the warmer saltier Atlantic water from below to mix with the top layer. This increasing influence of Atlantic waters in the Arctic Ocean brings changes in temperature and salinity, and is known as Arctic Atlantification. |
294. There were concerns in evidence that the environmental impact of increased fishing activity in the Arctic should be managed responsibly and not lead to over-exploitation of fish stocks.422 One of the concerns is that the shifts in species distribution pose challenges for the international governance of fisheries.423 One mechanism for regulating fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean is the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA), developed by the Convention of the Parties for CAOFA. This introduced an interim 16-year moratorium on commercial fishing to prevent unregulated fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean so that the impacts can be better understood.424 Henry Burgess told us that the Central Arctic Ocean will essentially be a new sea in a couple of decades, as it becomes ice free over the summer, and that other countries are beginning to focus on the ecosystems, fisheries and blue carbon that it holds. He told us that this is an area of “great potential for the UK community”.425
295. In “Looking North”, the Government expressed its support for the development of CAOFA and stated its intention to join CAOFA in order to “protect vulnerable habitats and ecosystem and tackle Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing”.426 It also identified that the effects of climate change are likely to become more pronounced, and emphasised the need to work with Arctic nations “to promote the sustainable use of stocks and responsible management of our respective waters”.427
296. Jane Rumble highlighted the unpredictability of the future distribution of fish stocks, calling it “a million dollar question”. She added “[t]here is a lot of work going on to try to work out what the changes are likely to be”.428
297. The Minister for Science, Technology and Innovation told us that, on fishing:
There are a number of very interesting and important research streams running … I am thinking particularly of the work that Maersk have been doing on using Earth observation data to track fish migrations. This is one of those areas where the integration of datasets—multidisciplinary research—comes together. It is one of the key pieces of research, where UKRI’s multidisciplinary top slicing is funding deliberately aimed at bits of research that pull together Earth observation data, marine data and neural network data.429
298. The effects of climate change are altering the composition of marine ecosystems in the Arctic. Fish stocks are becoming more distributed as Arctic species move further north to colder water. These changes offer opportunities for UK fisheries and ultimately UK consumers of fish, but these opportunities must only be pursued if it can be shown that they do not undermine the interests of Indigenous Peoples or the environment: we received evidence that many Arctic fish species are already in decline as a result of environmental change.
299. Arctic fish constitutes 70% of UK seafood imports but the growth of the UK distant water fishing industry in the Arctic is dependent on international agreements. Were the Government to negotiate larger fishing quotas in the Arctic, that must take place within a sustainable level of the overall catch..
300. We welcome the Government’s intention to join the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement. The UK should do so without delay.
Mineral resources
Opportunities for mineral extraction
301. The Arctic holds substantial resources of fossil fuels and minerals. It is estimated that 13% of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil reserves, and 30% of the world’s undiscovered conventional gas reserves, are north of the Arctic Circle.430 Our witnesses suggested that the UK is not currently involved in mining activities in the Arctic, but that we have “great potential” to help to assure the safety and environmental responsibility of mining activities.431 Uplift, an organisation which supports a fossil fuel-free UK, suggested in evidence that the UK does have some oil and gas fields in the Arctic, if using a broader definition of the Arctic boundary used by the Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.432
302. The region is also likely to offer “increased mineral extraction opportunities”, as reductions in sea ice enhance shipping viability and the possibility of deep sea extraction and prompt changes in terrestrial environments, especially as reductions in the Greenland ice shelf expose previously unknown resources.433 Researchers from Lancaster University told us that “[w]ith the ice receding, the solid rocks will be gradually exposed, and these will need to be geologically mapped for the first time. Until this mapping is done it will not be clear what type of mineral reserves are present”.434
Box 8: Critical Minerals
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Critical Minerals are minerals that meet the following three criteria:
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303. Several minerals found in the Arctic are categorised as critical minerals (see Box 8).435 Plymouth Marine Laboratory told us that more extensive mineral extraction in the Arctic would produce pollutants such as black carbon, greenhouse gas emissions, and toxic metals, while Uplift pointed to damage caused by existing operations including industrial waste and harm to marine ecosystems.436 On the other hand, some academics pointed out that certain critical minerals that are an essential component of elements of the green transition such as for electric cars and batteries are thought to be located under the Arctic Ocean.437 Dr Jenny Turton urged us that the potential impacts must be balanced in order for UK obligations under the Paris Agreement to be met.438
304. Scientists at the University of Liverpool told us that the second largest deposit of critical minerals in the world was located at Kvanefjeld, South Greenland, and that while expanding mining activities was controversial and challenging, these large deposits of critical minerals could de-risk supply chains.439 At the same time, they also told us that climate change might pose risks to mining infrastructure:
The prospective future Kvanefjeld mine (and other potential locations of critical mineral extraction in Greenland) will be affected by iceberg production from nearby marine terminating glaciers … [t]hese factors pose a possible risk to mining infrastructure development, maintenance, and export of ore and/or refined products.440
Deep sea mining
305. The International Energy Agency says that demand for critical minerals is set to increase fourfold by 2040, and that deep sea mining is one way to meet the demand to facilitate the green energy transition.441
306. There were calls, proposed by Chile, France and Costa Rica, at the 28th Session of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), held between 10–28 July 2023, for a precautionary pause on deep sea mining to ensure the protection of the marine environment..442 The ISA was due to develop guidelines for the mining industry this year, but ultimately agreed to postpone discussions on deep sea mining guidelines and to consider a policy on conservation of the marine environment in 2024. More than 20 countries in the assembly supported a precautionary pause on mining operations, arguing that not enough is known about mining’s impact on deep-sea ecosystems to proceed.443 The UK pushed for high environmental standards at the meeting and said that it would not support deep sea mining licences until there was sufficient evidence of the potential impact on deep sea ecosystems, but is one of 14 nations to have sponsored exploration contracts for research purposes, the only type allowed so far.444
307. The Government recognises the potentially harmful impacts from mining activities on the Arctic environment and has committed “to encourage all countries to adopt the highest standards of environmental and social governance”:445
The UK Government has also committed not to sponsor or support the issuing of any exploitation licences for deep-sea mining projects unless and until there is sufficient scientific evidence about the potential impact on deep-sea ecosystems, and strong and enforceable environmental regulations and standards have been developed by the ISA and are in place.446
308. “Looking North” also identified the importance of critical minerals for the green transition.447 Similarly, the FCDO told us that “[s]ecure access to critical minerals is required to deliver the UK’s Net Zero strategy”.448
The environmental risks of mineral extraction
309. Dr Jenny Turton told us that in order for the economic benefits of critical mineral extraction in the Arctic to be realised, further research will be required to study the geology and to identify key regions of interest for resource extraction, and to understand political and social implications.449 She said that “[t]he UK has a strong history in geologic research”,450 while Dr James Lea said that the UK has great potential to contribute to “[m]onitoring and understanding process and risk” to ensure that mining activity is undertaken as safely and as responsibly as possible.451
310. As one example of this research, Professor Geraint Tarling told us about the Changing Arctic Ocean Seafloor, a £60 million NERC-funded programme. The programme mapped out areas of the Arctic Ocean seafloor “where there was a lot of carbon sequestration”—areas of carbon stored in the seabed. He suggested that “we should think about trying to preserve those areas to make sure that things such as mining do not go in and disturb the sediment, outgassing all the carbon that has been sequestered over many hundreds of years”.452
311. We heard concerns from several of our witnesses about the potential environmental impacts of resource extraction in the Arctic.453 In written evidence, the Plymouth Marine Laboratory told us that “[t]he risks to the climate and environment from industry in the Arctic, especially extractive industries, is significant”.454 It identified a need for collaborative efforts between industries and Government to ensure that mining activity in the Arctic is sustainable by mitigation of damage to ecosystems and increases in pollution. This was echoed by scientists at Lancaster University who told us that “[l]egislation needs to be in place to control environmental degradation associated with any such mineral extraction. Environmental degradation legislation should consider the preservation of wilderness landscapes, flora, fauna, and geology”.455
312. The Minister for Science, Technology and Innovation told us that deep sea mining was an important area of research, saying:
Through NERC, we recently invested £4 million in a consortium of UK researchers led by the National Oceanography Centre, which I visited just before the recess, to provide the scientific research, understanding and evidence base to support evidence-based policymaking on reducing the risks of polymetallic nodule extraction from the sea floor. We are doing what we can in terms of the research piece. We absolutely recognise that the pressure to extract deep sea resources and the growing geopolitical pressure to commercialise in the Arctic create huge and serious issues regarding the impacts of mining activities in the fragile marine environment, and we take that very seriously.456
313. Changes to the Arctic as a result of warming temperatures will allow more access to resources such as oil, gas and minerals. The potential for expansion of these industries must only be pursued in ways that are consistent with the Paris Agreement commitment to reduce carbon emissions. The risks to the climate and environment from mining in the Arctic, especially extractive industries, is significant, as many industries contribute to greenhouse gas emissions and habitat destruction. We welcome the Government’s commitment not to sponsor or support the issuing of any exploitation licences for deep-sea mining projects until there is further evidence about the potential impact and enforceable regulations are in place. However, the Government must go further and commit to a precautionary pause for deep sea mining which would be directly analogous to the precautionary pause in fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean.
314. The Government must increase financial support for research into the potential consequences and mitigation strategies related to mineral extraction in the Arctic, to ensure that a sustainable business approach is employed and that adequate policies are in place to protect the Arctic region, its environment, and its inhabitants.
Tourism
Emerging opportunities for the UK in tourism
315. The Arctic Marine Tourism Project, co-led by the UK, Iceland, and Canada, reported that numbers of individual passenger vessels in the Arctic increased by 35% between 2013 and 2019.457 Emerging trade routes and developing infrastructure in the Arctic are expected to further boost tourism in the region.458
316. BIOPOLE told us that “[n]ature adventure tourism can provide a moderate niche for the UK touring industry”, but that the success of this would depend on securing access to the Arctic EEZs and fostering collaboration with Arctic nations.459
317. Researchers at the School of the Environment, Geography and Geosciences at the University of Portsmouth, and the University of the West of England, said that growing tourism in the Arctic could cause “[d]amage to [the] environment and cultural heritage”.460 They outlined the potential impact to local communities from “unwanted interference of cruise ship populations” and the possibility of “tourism [acting as a] trigger in fire-prone landscape”.461
318. Dr Jan Peter Laurens Loovers told us that:
UK Arctic policy-makers and UK businesses, too, need to work directly with indigenous policy-makers to ensure that indigenous interests are being heard and implemented. This is certainly the case with anything that affects their lives such as … tourism.462
The UK’s involvement in sustainable Arctic tourism
319. The UK has been involved, through the Arctic Council, in developing understanding of and guidelines for tourism in the Arctic. It co-led the PAME Working Group Arctic Marine Tourism Project, which looked at passenger vessel trends in the Arctic between 2013 and 2019. This project aimed to better understand recent developments, identify gaps in data, and explore the feasibility of obtaining information on the whereabouts of smaller tourist or recreational vessels, which are not required to carry Automatic Identification System transponders, expanding upon the best practice guideline established by the Arctic Council in 2015.463
320. We heard from the Cruise Lines International Association about steps that are already being taken by the UK tourism industry to prioritise and respect safety, the environment, and local culture.464 These include:
- Using GPS hi-tech stabilisers instead of anchors to protect the seafloor;
- Reducing water needs onboard;
- Advanced wastewater treatment and reduction systems;
- Waste reduction systems;
- Following the protocols of the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators, which includes having to develop specific environmental briefs for each sensitive area visited, establish a code of conduct for passengers, and booking time slots to avoid two vessels being in the area at the same time;
- Collaborating with local communities and offering training and career opportunities to Indigenous Peoples;
- Participating in citizen science and making ships available to scientists and researchers; and
- Entering into partnerships with conservation groups.
Search and rescue
321. University of Liverpool researchers were concerned about the safety of tourists in the Arctic, explaining that:
Given the currently sparsely populated nature of these areas and relative lack of rapid response search, rescue and environmental emergency infrastructure, the future risks associated with iceberg damage to commercial and/or tourist shipping are not well constrained. As a result, there remains a real prospect of environmental emergencies arising from damage to, or sinking of commercial shipping, and/or humanitarian crises resulting from increasing tourist cruise ship traffic (where several hundred people on board may require evacuation and rescue).465
322. The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue was agreed under the Arctic Council in 2011, which aimed to coordinate international search and rescue operations in the region. The marine search and rescue activities in the Arctic include commercial shipping traffic, tour ship operations, cargo traffic as well as significant over-water aircraft traffic, and the agreement delimits the areas of search and rescue responsibility for each state party.466 Outside of the Arctic Council, search and rescue is still governed by international agreements, such as the IMO’s Polar Code.
323. Jane Rumble said in evidence:
I think the Foreign Office takes the stance that pretty much any cruise ship, wherever it is in the world, is likely to have a British national on board, but cruise ships in the Arctic are visiting Arctic states. Once they have gone into port or made a landing, they are under the jurisdiction of the Arctic state, so their rules apply.467
324. Ms Rumble added her concern that search and rescue responsibilities and the advice given to cruise ships should be as robust as they can be. She continued, saying that visitors to the Arctic should be aware that in remote areas there is no guarantee that you would be able to be transported to hospital, and that cruise ships should be able to “handle quite a lot of their own medical emergencies”.468 Finally, she said that the FCDO fed into advice for Arctic visits, including single yachts, and that “there is a consular network across the Arctic, which would have to be called upon if there were British nationals in trouble”.469
325. In “Looking North”, the Government reiterated its commitment to ensuring that tourism in the Arctic is safe and sustainable:
We support the work of the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) and its goal to manage responsible, environmentally friendly and safe tourism in the Arctic and its efforts in striving to set the highest possible operating standards … The UK therefore supports safe, responsible and sustainable tourism in the Arctic that enables visitors to experience the uniqueness of the region, which respects the preserve of local communities while supporting their economy and protects the fragile environment for future generations.470
326. The Government has been successful in fostering links with Arctic nations, such as the Faroe Islands, in sustainable tourism.471 Jane Rumble said that ultimately:
The challenges of tourism in the numbers, how they visit the Arctic and the responsibilities of overwhelming Indigenous Peoples has to be balanced with how the Arctic states would like to encourage tourism. There are pros and cons to the tourism and it is for the Arctic states to determine who they give licences to visit them.472
327. The Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology told us that:
We are aware that, for various reasons, Arctic and Antarctic tourism is growing. Across Government, there is a recognition that we need to make sure that British nationals engaging in that are safe, and that tourism to wilderness areas—to areas of fragile habitat and ecosystem—should be deeply sustainable. There is quite a lot of research work going on into how you define sustainable ecotourism.473
328. Tourism in the Arctic is likely to increase in the future. Arctic tourism can bring economic opportunities to the region if it is managed correctly, but there are risks around cultural and environmental impacts, and the safety of vessels and passengers. We welcome the steps already being taken by some in the industry to manage these impacts, and these steps should be developed continuously as environmental change opens up new opportunities and challenges. The UK should work with Arctic states and other relevant bodies to co-ordinate safe and sustainable tourism in the region.
Conclusions and recommendations
The effects of climate change on the Arctic
1. The Arctic region is at the frontline of climate change and is warming four times faster than the rest of the Earth, on a feedback loop largely due to a reduction in sea ice. The Arctic is predicted to be summer sea ice free within a decade. Climate change in the Arctic is driven by human-made carbon emissions and is a global responsibility. (Paragraph 28)
2. What happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. Climate change in the Arctic is having an observable impact on the climate in the UK, including though more extreme weather events. Sea level rise also has the potential to affect UK coastal areas drastically through flooding, requiring urgent and difficult decisions of our Government. (Paragraph 42)
3. Our understanding of future Arctic climate changes and their implications for human and natural systems remains incomplete. A great deal of further research is still required to assess and understand the full effects and implications of Arctic climate change, for the Arctic region, for the UK and for the world. However, there is already sufficient scientific evidence to show that more needs to be done to reduce greenhouse gas emissions more quickly. (Paragraph 43)
4. If we want to continue to see the Arctic as the ‘frozen place’ that its Indigenous inhabitants know it as, and save our own country from the potentially dire impacts that climate change in the Arctic has in store for us, then the world must make efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change and keep within the Paris Agreement target of 1.5–2°C warming; a range that will still cause further drastic changes in the Arctic. The world is currently on track to exceed the 1.5–2°C threshold to which the Paris Agreement was designed to limit warming. (Paragraph 48)
5. We recommend that the Government acts to limit future climate change by strengthening its emissions targets and policies to meet its carbon budgets and reach net zero by 2050 at the latest, and uses its influence on a global stage to persuade other countries to implement the Paris Agreement fully. (Paragraph 49)
The geopolitics of a changing Arctic
6. Climate change, the retreating ice, military tensions, and economic competition have made the Arctic an area of significant concern in global politics, and the Government should give greater thought to how to secure its future peace and prosperity. (Paragraph 71)
7. Rising temperatures are rapidly changing the Arctic, allowing increased access to the region’s resources. This has led to increasing commercial activity and geopolitical competition over resources and shipping routes in the Arctic. The idea of a ‘low tension Arctic’ is becoming increasingly tenuous. (Paragraph 72)
8. As international attention on the Arctic increases as a result of the increasing geopolitical tension due to Russia’s actions and the urgency of climate change, the UK needs to be ready to bring its influence to bear in the region where appropriate. In order to do this, it is vital that there is sufficient Ministerial capacity to prioritise the UK’s interests in the Arctic. (Paragraph 80)
9. We were concerned to hear that the Ministers with portfolios that concern the Arctic do not meet to coordinate an approach to the Arctic on a regular basis. We recommend that Ministers from the FDCO, MoD, DEFRA, DESNZ and DSIT meet at least quarterly to discuss Arctic issues and to ensure a coherent approach to the region. (Paragraph 81)
10. The fact that the Minister for the Americas and the Caribbean was unable to give oral evidence to our inquiry, despite being offered multiple dates, shows the capacity constraints of Government Ministers to give due attention to the Arctic. We accordingly recommend that the Government should consider recommendations that the UK should appoint a special representative or Envoy to the Arctic. (Paragraph 82)
11. As a result of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, all UK scientific cooperation with Russia has halted, and we are unlikely to see any kind of ‘normalisation’ of relations with Russia in the foreseeable future. Despite that, understanding environmental change in the Russian Arctic is crucial to understanding climate change in the Arctic as a whole and therefore its impacts in the UK. (Paragraph 94)
12. We are concerned that these geopolitical tensions, and increasing security concerns, have lessened international cooperation on climate change priorities. (Paragraph 95)
13. We are concerned about the significant gap in our understanding of the Arctic that comes from the inability of researchers from the UK and other countries to collaborate with their Russian counterparts, and about the long-term implications of this gap for understanding climate change worldwide. (Paragraph 96)
14. Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has jeopardised much of the collaborative work of the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council is still active and there is more that the UK can do to promote its interests and support the region through the Arctic Council. The UK is a long-standing Observer to the Arctic Council, but we were told that the UK has had relatively ad hoc participation in the working groups, where the UK could have the most influence on the work and decisions of the Arctic Council. The UK has not been as active at the Arctic Council as our scientific strengths and varied interests in the region would warrant. (Paragraph 122)
15. Notwithstanding the current difficulties at the Arctic Council, the FCDO should seek to increase the UK’s involvement in the Arctic Council as projects begin to restart with Norway in the Chair, such as through more active participation in the working groups. (Paragraph 123)
16. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally undermined the role of the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental forum on cooperation in the Arctic. While our witnesses were clear that the Arctic Council had historically been the most suitable forum for promoting cooperation in the Arctic, the geopolitical balance at the Arctic Council has been disrupted by Russia’s egregious war in Ukraine. We have very substantial concerns about whether the Arctic Council, without Russia, can ever in the foreseeable future fulfil its former role. (Paragraph 134)
17. We welcome the Minister for Science, Innovation and Technology’s commitment to work internationally with other nations and urge the Minister to ensure that the issue of climate change in the Arctic remains a collaborative effort. (Paragraph 135)
18. Other fora in addition to the Arctic Council are important for building international consensus on Arctic issues to do with the environment and should be supported. It is now urgent that the UK uses its position in other international fora, such as NATO, the UN, IMO and other intergovernmental organisations where we have a stronger voice than on the Arctic Council, to make the Arctic environment a higher priority on the international political agenda. (Paragraph 136)
19. UK research contributes a huge amount to the Arctic. We punch well above our weight, producing 10% of the world’s Arctic science, across a wide range of topics. We recognise that UK Arctic research has considerable strengths to offer the international scientific community and we welcome the commitments that the Minister has made to build upon the Arctic research community’s existing strengths. (Paragraph 144)
20. The Arctic is changing rapidly, and the UK could make a significant contribution to the world’s understanding of these changes by stepping up its contribution to longer-term scientific observing systems. The Government must ensure that the UK is well positioned to contribute to these systems and commit to supporting them long-term by ensuring that there is adequate support for the UK research community to do so. (Paragraph 150)
21. More interdisciplinary research on the Arctic is needed to bring together the physical consequences of climate change with its impacts on communities in the region. Such research can provide a more holistic view of the changes occurring in the Arctic so that better informed decisions can be made. The Canada-Inuit Nunangat-United Kingdom Arctic Research Programme highlights the positive impact that UK cross-disciplinary work can have. But to consolidate and build on its position as a world leader in Arctic research, the UK must significantly expand its interdisciplinary output. We appreciate that this is dependent on wider funding structures beyond specifically Arctic research. Consequently, we recommend that UKRI should review how its funding structures for Arctic research can better incorporate interdisciplinary projects across the natural and social science, and use its findings from the Arctic as a case study model. (Paragraph 159)
22. UK Arctic science receives 10% of the total state funding, with the balance of 90% going to Antarctica. However 70% of UK polar science is currently focussed on the Arctic. Arctic research is an area of considerable international interest and relevance and if the UK is to remain world-leading in Arctic science, continued and enhanced funding will be necessary. We support the Government’s ambition to leverage additional funding sources for Arctic research. We support the Government’s ambition to leverage additional funding sources for Arctic research. There should be more funding made available, through UKRI or other sources, to UK scientific research about the Arctic, but this should not come at the expense of the Antarctic, where equally important questions for the future of the world are being studied by scientists. (Paragraph 176)
23. In view of the evidence that we have heard about the rapidly intensifying changes that are occurring in the Arctic, and the potential impacts that those changes could have for the UK, we recommend that environmental change in the Arctic should feature more explicitly within UKRI’s top priorities. (Paragraph 177)
24. We have heard that long term monitoring and observations will be crucial to understand the changing Arctic, but we are concerned that current funding models are geared towards short-term projects. The Government and UKRI should set out how longer-term scientific monitoring over periods of at least 10 years can be successfully supported with a longer-term funding strategy. (Paragraph 178)
25. The RRS Sir David Attenborough is a much-needed platform for UK scientists in the Arctic. We welcome the Minister’s enthusiasm for the idea of a scientific voyage to the North Pole for the SDA and we believe that this would demonstrate the UK’s commitment to its responsibilities towards the Arctic environment and deepening international understanding of climate change in the region. The Minister should explore options with NERC for a voyage by the SDA to the North Pole. (Paragraph 184)
26. We are concerned that the time that the RRS Sir David Attenborough can spend in the Arctic is limited, and recommend that consideration is given to the provision of an additional ship for UK scientists and researchers in the Arctic. (Paragraph 185)
27. The UK Research Station in Ny-Ålesund is a key element of the UK’s science capacity in the Arctic. It is vital for UK researchers and for the UK’s scientific influence internationally. We are concerned that the operation of such a vital resource to researchers may be jeopardised by rising running costs. We urge NERC to ensure that the station receives adequate funding. (Paragraph 195)
28. We understand that the station is typically open from March to September, in line with demand from researchers. On our visit to Svalbard we also heard that the Arctic ecosystems are more active over winter than scientists have previously thought, requiring more active and regular monitoring. The UK has the opportunity to enhance the international scientific community’s understanding of Arctic winters, and their role in environmental change, by conducting more research in Ny-Ålesund over the winter. We recommend that the station is given enhanced support by NERC to enable it to open for a longer period during the year and that researchers be encouraged to use the station during winter. NERC should give consideration to maintaining a year-round operational presence in the station. (Paragraph 196)
29. There are numerous benefits to opening an additional platform in the Arctic for UK research, not limited to the potential for deepening scientific understanding of climate change in the Arctic. We urge the Government to consider increasing the infrastructure available to UK scientists in the Arctic. (Paragraph 197)
30. We were struck equally by the efficacy of Norway’s FRAM centre and by the fact that no equivalent platform in the UK exists to coordinate Arctic research. Our evidence points to a need for national strategic coordination of Arctic research within the UK, to enable researchers on projects spread throughout different universities and organisations to collaborate, share resources, and optimise the amount of work that can be achieved. The Government, UKRI and NERC should explore options for further coordination, through a dedicated institute or body to provide strategic coordination of UK Arctic science. (Paragraph 207)
31. The Government should consult on a strategic national Arctic research plan, including both the natural and social sciences, with its own long-term funding, to help to understand, anticipate and respond to the changing Arctic environment and its impacts for the UK and the rest of the world. (Paragraph 208)
32. While UK Arctic researchers punch well above their weight, they also require international collaboration to be efficient and to maximise their impact. Polar infrastructure for science is expensive but necessary, and international collaboration is needed to enable us to understand the Arctic, such as through international projects to share different observations and modelling, and through the shared use of infrastructure. As part of the long-term research strategy that we recommend, the Government should include its approach to international collaboration, and how it will coordinate investment in research capability and infrastructure with like-minded countries. (Paragraph 215)
33. The Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Norway has been very valuable for UK Arctic science, enabling meaningful international collaboration. We strongly encourage the Government and UKRI to consider reproducing this model with other Arctic capable countries. (Paragraph 224)
34. We welcome the UK-Inuit Nunangat Memorandum of Understanding as a constructive example of polar research engagement with Indigenous knowledge holders. We recommend that NERC prioritise more co-production of research with Indigenous Peoples across the Arctic. This engagement should follow the principle of the ethical and equitable engagement with Indigenous knowledge holders. (Paragraph 225)
35. The Arctic community is building up towards the fifth international polar year in 2032–33, which has been described as a “once in a generation opportunity” to scale up polar science. The Government and UKRI should set out its targets for that year and put forth a strategic vision of UK activities to display our world-leading contribution to Arctic science, including through our research vessels. (Paragraph 230)
36. We have heard that the UK’s departure from Horizon Europe has been damaging for UK Arctic research. We are concerned that lack of access to Horizon funding and international cooperation, at a time when international collaboration on Arctic research has never been more urgent, has been detrimental to UK polar science, and has reduced our capability and influence. (Paragraph 238)
37. We strongly welcome the agreement for the UK’s re-entry into Horizon Europe and Copernicus Earth. (Paragraph 239)
38. UK scientists are building increasing evidence that the UK’s climate is affected by changes in the Arctic. It is vital that the Government continues to use our world-class British research to inform policy and decisions about the use of Arctic resources, the governance of and access to the region, and possible ways that Arctic countries, and the UK, will need to adapt to the effects that the changes in the region will bring. (Paragraph 245)
39. We heard very strongly in our evidence that UK researchers are committed to equipping UK policy makers with excellent academic knowledge, with a view to ensuring that UK policy is capable of responding to rapidly evolving climate threats. The Government should work with NERC to set out a map of knowledge exchange routes between Arctic science and policy makers, and identify areas where knowledge exchange could be strengthened. (Paragraph 246)
Arctic resources
40. The loss of sea ice and permafrost creates new economic and social opportunities and risks in the Arctic. Further development of the Arctic is inevitable, and not undesirable, but it needs to be balanced with actions to limit environmental damage. The UK has a responsibility to ensure that commercial opportunities in the Arctic are guided by the principles of sustainable development and the Government should consider how the UK can use its expertise to ensure that development in the Arctic is both responsible and balanced against the risks to the environment and ecosystems of the Arctic. (Paragraph 252)
41. Economic development in the Arctic as a result of the changing climate must only take place if it can be shown not to undermine the interests of Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, or their environment. We welcome the code of conduct for UK Arctic researchers that the Government is currently developing. The Government should ensure that UK businesses are supported to work in genuine partnership with Indigenous Peoples, by developing a parallel code of conduct with for businesses with Arctic interests. (Paragraph 261)
42. Shipping routes, such as the northern passages, are predicted to open up, as the Arctic warms and sea ice diminishes. These could allow a vessel to cross the northern sea route from the Atlantic to Asia, or vice versa, saving 11–14 days at huge commercial benefit. But there is uncertainty over when, or if, such routes will emerge. The routes are likely to be hazardous and unpredictable, due to unmapped areas and severe weather. (Paragraph 265)
43. As a result of climate change-induced sea ice withdrawal, more shipping will become viable in the Arctic and there will be commercial interests in shipbuilding, marine equipment, engineering and manufacturing, as well as in professional maritime business skills such as chartering, ship finance and insurance. The Government must work with other likeminded partners to ensure that the pursuit of these economic interests do not come at the expense of harming the Arctic environment or Indigenous Peoples (Paragraph 270)
44. The UK should use its leadership in Arctic research to help to fill the knowledge gaps needed to ensure that emerging opportunities in shipping are pursued sustainably. The Government should back this research with funding, such as for marine spatial planning. (Paragraph 277)
45. We welcome the International Maritime Organisation’s decision to ban the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil by ships in the Arctic from 2024. However, the exemptions and waivers mean that the ban will only take full effect in 2029, and we are concerned that the ban as it stands will prove ineffective. As shipping increases in the Arctic, the amount of heavy fuel oil used in the Arctic will only increase unless a full ban is in place. We urge the Government to press the IMO for an earlier full adoption of this ban in 2024, and to work with them to set limits for black carbon in the Arctic. (Paragraph 283)
46. We welcome the steps already being taken by some UK businesses to minimise their use of HFO and to transition to alternative fuels. These efforts must be accelerated as climate change opens up more shipping routes. (Paragraph 284)
47. We strongly support strengthening the Polar Code to minimise safety and pollution risks from shipping in the Arctic. The Government must continue to use its position at the IMO to push for the Polar Code not only to be strengthened to include a wider range of vessels, but also to be implemented and monitored effectively. The Government should ensure that all UK businesses with Arctic maritime interests and UK registered vessels visiting the Arctic region are Polar Code compliant. (Paragraph 288)
48. The effects of climate change are altering the composition of marine ecosystems in the Arctic. Fish stocks are becoming more distributed as Arctic species move further north to colder water. These changes offer opportunities for UK fisheries and ultimately UK consumers of fish, but these opportunities must only be pursued if it can be shown that they do not undermine the interests of Indigenous Peoples or the environment: we received evidence that many Arctic fish species are already in decline as a result of environmental change. (Paragraph 298)
49. Arctic fish constitutes 70% of UK seafood imports but the growth of the UK distant water fishing industry in the Arctic is dependent on international agreements. Were the Government to negotiate larger fishing quotas in the Arctic, that must take place within a sustainable level of the overall catch. (Paragraph 299)
50. We welcome the Government’s intention to join the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement. The UK should do so without delay. (Paragraph 300)
51. Changes to the Arctic as a result of warming temperatures will allow more access to resources such as oil, gas and minerals. The potential for expansion of these industries must only be pursued in ways that are consistent with the Paris Agreement commitment to reduce carbon emissions. The risks to the climate and environment from mining in the Arctic, especially extractive industries, is significant, as many industries contribute to greenhouse gas emissions and habitat destruction. We welcome the Government’s commitment not to sponsor or support the issuing of any exploitation licences for deep-sea mining projects until there is further evidence about the potential impact and enforceable regulations are in place. However, the Government must go further and commit to a precautionary pause for deep sea mining which would be directly analogous to the precautionary pause in fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. (Paragraph 313)
52. The Government must increase financial support for research into the potential consequences and mitigation strategies related to mineral extraction in the Arctic, to ensure that a sustainable business approach is employed and that adequate policies are in place to protect the Arctic region, its environment, and its inhabitants. (Paragraph 314)
53. Tourism in the Arctic is likely to increase in the future. Arctic tourism can bring economic opportunities to the region if it is managed correctly, but there are risks around cultural and environmental impacts, and the safety of vessels and passengers. We welcome the steps already being taken by some in the industry to manage these impacts, and these steps should be developed continuously as environmental change opens up new opportunities and challenges. The UK should work with Arctic states and other relevant bodies to co-ordinate safe and sustainable tourism in the region. (Paragraph 328)
Annex 1: Summary of the Committee’s visit to the Arctic
To experience the Arctic environment first hand, the Committee visited Tromsø, Ny-Ålesund, and Longyearbyen in Norway from 29 March to 5 April 2023. Members were accompanied by Henry Burgess, Head of the NERC Arctic Office, Dr Anna Jones, Director of Science at the British Antarctic Survey, and Clare Filshie, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy in Norway. The itinerary, principal interlocutors at the Committee’s formal meetings, and main topics of discussion are set out below.
Tromsø
The Committee heard from:
- Clare Filshie, Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy in Oslo
- Dr Linda Dahlberg, Science and Innovation Policy Adviser, British Embassy in Oslo
- Ole Arve Mesund, Director, Norwegian Polar Institute
- Harold Steen, Director of Research, Norwegian Polar Institute
- Representatives of three Arctic Council Working Groups (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme; Arctic Contaminants Action Programme; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response)
- Kathryn Donnelly, Leader for Research Coordination, FRAM Centre
- Terri Souster, Changing Arctic Ocean Project, FRAM Centre
The main topics discussed included:
- The UK and Norway’s bilateral relationship, with particular reference to research collaboration;
- The roles and responsibilities of the Norwegian Polar Institute;
- The operation of the Arctic Council and the UK’s involvement in the Arctic Council; and
- The work of the FRAM Centre.
Ny-Ålesund
The Committee heard from:
- Geir Gotaas, Leader of the Ny-Ålesund Programme, Norwegian Polar Institute
- Lars Ole Saugnes, Director, Kings Bay AS
- Ingrid Skrede, Higher Executive Officer, Norwegian Ministry for Education and Research
- Iain Rudkin, UK Research Station Manager
- Guy Hillyard, Laboratory Manager, British Antarctic Survey
- Dorothea Moser, PhD Student, British Antarctic Survey
- Julie Trømborg, Kings Bay Research Adviser
- Ingrid Rekkavik, Kings Bay Adviser
The main topics of discussion and activities conducted include:
- The history of Ny-Ålesund, its contribution to science, and the effects of climate change on Ny-Ålesund;
- The Norwegian Government’s priorities for polar research;
- The impact of the UK Research Station;
- The relationship between UK Arctic research and UK government policy;
- Observing and participating in field research on the impact of melting and refreezing on snow;
- Observing the Austre Broggerbreen Glacier; and
- Visiting the marine laboratory, a traditional house from the town’s mining period, the world’s most northerly post office, the Amundsen villa, the Norwegian Mapping Authority, and the French-German research station (AWIPEV).
Longyearbyen
The Committee heard from:
- Shrider Jawak, Remote Sensing Officer at Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observing System (SIOS)
The main topics of discussion included:
- The role of SIOS and the UK’s involvement.
Annex 2: Summary of roundtable with Arctic Indigenous Peoples
We jointly held a roundtable event with the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, with representatives of Indigenous Peoples from the Arctic. While not designed to be representative of the views of all Arctic Indigenous Peoples, the event allowed us to speak directly with representatives of Indigenous Peoples to understand their perspectives, and hear anecdotal evidence, on matters that had been raised through the course of the Committees’ inquiries. Summarised points raised by participants have been included below, for illustrative purposes.
On climate change in the Arctic
Climate change is significantly impacting industries like sheep farming, hunting, and fishing in southern Greenland. Unpredictable weather patterns present a major challenge. Farmers struggle to forecast summer weather, affecting sheep fodder growth. Droughts and wet seasons complicate agricultural planning. Storms and rain damage infrastructure, especially gravel roads between farms. Unpredictable sea ice obstructs travel in fjords and fields. Springtime drift ice further hampers navigation for fishermen, hunters, and farmers. Overall, this uncertainty in weather and climate patterns poses difficulties for local industries.
In southern Greenland, climate change profoundly impacts traditional lifestyles and businesses. Reindeer herders struggle with extreme winter weather, making food for reindeer scarce, leading to a five-year crisis. The shifting ecosystem poses challenges for fishermen and hunters. Reliance on natural resources intensifies these impacts. The mainland faces different challenges with less reliance on ice and snow for travel. Climate patterns have changed, affecting activities like sheep farming and increasing polar bear encounters. This year saw a decrease in hooded seals on drift ice. Fish populations have declined since the 1980s, but are slowly recovering. However, many fishermen have had to relocate northward, especially in East Greenland. New and unfamiliar species, including various types of sharks, are appearing, indicating a shift in the ecosystem.
A cold winter in East Greenland led to an abundance of drift ice but fewer seals and polar bears were spotted. In a warming climate, sheep farming faces challenges as the weather becomes unstable. Both animals and humans are adapted to colder climates. Warmer weather leads to issues such as mould on animal skins and reduced meat production due to summer droughts. This makes survival for sheep farmers increasingly difficult, resulting in a decline in their numbers from 100 in the 1960s, to 38 today. While individual farmers now have more sheep, climate changes make it harder to sustain a livelihood through sheep farming.
One participant attended COP 27 with a young hunter from the Disco Bay Area who shared their concerns with them, saying that climate change negatively impacts their identity, livelihoods, and homeland. The term “Arctic” means “frozen place” in their language, but it’s thawing. Climate change directly affects their human rights, illustrated by a young hunter’s inability to apply ancestral knowledge due to unstable ice conditions. They highlight that climate change has no positive aspects and is swiftly altering their way of life. The Inuit, though adaptable, face unprecedented changes driven by external factors such as industrialised nations’ emissions and pollution affecting their resources.
One participant emphasised the importance of reindeer herders in preserving culture and knowledge. They mentioned the Sami community’s resilience during the covid-19 pandemic due to their reliance on traditional foods. Climate change, particularly altered snow patterns, threatens this way of life.
On changes to Arctic geopolitics
One participant expressed concern about the current geopolitical situation affecting Inuit communities across Canada, Alaska, Chukotka (Russia), and Greenland. They highlighted the challenge of reaching Inuit in Russia due to their small population. They emphasised the importance of the Arctic Council, a unique collaborative body, in maintaining cross-border collaboration. The participant noted that during the Cold War, it was challenging to include Inuit from Russia, and similar communication difficulties persist today, making it harder to monitor their human rights situation.
The Inuit Circumpolar Council is a co-founder and permanent participant in the Arctic Council. They hold Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) accreditation, participating for over four decades. While they prefer direct representation, they work within the current Non-Government Organisation framework, advocating for recognition of their representative institutions in UN processes. They also have provisional consultative status in the International Maritime Organisation, vital for collaboration across borders. Climate change directly impacts them through permafrost thaw, affecting settlements, infrastructure, hunting, and livelihoods in Alaska and Greenland.
The participant emphasised the recent Arctic Council meeting on 11 May 2023, highlighting its continued relevance with the eight States and six Permanent Participants. They believed it will remain a crucial governance and collaborative body for the Arctic.
On Indigenous Peoples’ rights
One participant emphasised the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which protects their rights and acknowledges their equal status. They stressed the principle of “nothing about us without us”, advocating for their involvement in decisions concerning them. They asserted that Inuit are pro-business, desiring responsible development while recognising that their traditions evolve. They insisted on equal participation in shaping their future. The participant expressed concerns about external pressures, including green colonisation and geopolitical interests in the Arctic. They called on states to uphold their promises of respecting Indigenous rights in this context.
Across Inuit Nunangat (Inuit homeland), there are diverse conditions and constituencies. In Alaska, ICC Alaska represents native corporations overseeing various resource developments. In Canada, land claim organisations form the ICC Canada membership. In Greenland, it involves civil society groups, including the Sheep Farmers Organisation. Self-determination, including decision-making on economic, social, and cultural development, is a fundamental right emphasised by the UN Declaration.
There is a common perception of a North-South divide in climate funding. This framework hinders equitable access to funds like the Loss and Damage Fund for Indigenous Peoples worldwide. Despite residing in so-called developed countries, Indigenous communities are often marginalised, facing both climate-related and social challenges. This includes high suicide rates, mental health issues, and health problems like diabetes due to imported foods. Climate change and external pollution further threaten food sovereignty.
Engagement in the Arctic requires tailored approaches, respecting local communities’ involvement in decision-making. The Equitable and Ethical Engagement Protocols, established by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, outline eight key principles for engaging with Inuit in the Arctic. Recognising the distinct rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities is crucial. The Inuit Circumpolar Council and Sami Council have developed policy briefs addressing the conflation of these groups.
Support for the ICC’s consultative status in the International Maritime Organisation is essential. The speaker said it is important to acknowledge the positive contributions of Indigenous Peoples in various international processes, including climate negotiations, IMO, and IPCC. Overall, recognising and including Indigenous perspectives is paramount.
The international Decade of Indigenous Languages highlights the importance of preserving linguistic diversity. Out of 6,000 languages globally, 4,000 are Indigenous, representing their cultural heritage. Continued support from likeminded states and organisations is crucial for Indigenous participation in international processes. Capacity building is needed due to the smaller populations of Indigenous communities involved in numerous international organisations. The participant said this support benefits not only Indigenous Peoples but also contributes to global cultural richness and diversity.
On economic development
In Norway, there is a significant issue involving wind turbines on crucial reindeer herding lands. The Supreme Court ruled two years ago that these permissions were illegal, as they violate the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Despite this, the Norwegian government has not taken substantial action. There have been protests, including a 500-day manifestation in Oslo, calling for the return of the land to reindeer herders. The Government has engaged in dialogue with Sami communities, but no agreement has been reached. The situation highlights a prioritisation of foreign capital over the rights of their own citizens. Public awareness of Norway’s violations of human rights, particularly in the case of Fosen, is growing, driven in part by a Supreme Court decision. It is crucial that Indigenous People become part of the solution, understanding our reliance on nature, and striving for a just transition to preserve it for future generations. The participant encouraged us to read the Sami Council and Sami Parliamentary Council climate change report for deeper insights into specific challenges.
One participant emphasised the need to repurpose already industrialised areas in the Sami homeland, which have been abandoned or face environmental issues. They advocated for reduced consumption and expressed concerns about a proposed railway project for mineral extraction. They stressed the importance of respecting human rights, particularly those of local and Indigenous Peoples.
The speaker expressed concern about the impact of the “green transition” on Sami land, leading to stress and mental health issues. Overall, they see few positive outcomes from these challenges.
In Greenland, Inuit are the majority, and Greenlandic is the primary language. However, in industries like mining, applications for exploration are often in English. This creates a language barrier, even though the work is taking place in Greenland. Requests for translations are often denied, with the explanation that it is not the company’s responsibility. This situation highlights the challenge of being heard, even when at the right table.
Fisheries constitute over 90% of Greenland’s exports, making it the largest industry in the country. While there has been discussion about mineral and potential oil and gas development, Greenland’s current stance is to allow onshore mining only. The [Greenlandic] Government is focusing on small and medium-sized mining projects for sustainability. However, the fishing industry faces significant challenges due to ongoing changes. Both large commercial and private fishing companies must adapt and invest in new equipment. Smaller fishermen face difficulties adjusting to potentially new species for commercial use. The heavily regulated nature of Greenlandic fisheries can sometimes pose challenges in keeping up with evolving circumstances. The fisheries sector has played a pivotal role in shaping Greenland’s foreign policy and diplomatic relations, particularly in negotiations with entities like the EU and the UK. Despite being an industrialised and professional industry, it grapples with the profound changes occurring in its environment.
Protecting the Arctic is vital for safeguarding the planet, as changes in the Arctic impact the entire world due to its role in regulating global temperatures. While there are varying degrees of self-determination across Inuit Nunangat (Inuit homeland), decisions on activities like mining and exploration are made locally in places like Greenland. The participant said that the global community must include Indigenous Peoples in negotiations and agreements, adapting agreements like the Paris Agreement to better accommodate smaller Indigenous populations with different power structures. Greenland, for instance, has not signed the Paris Agreement due to its structure, which primarily serves larger states. A shift in thinking is needed to ensure collaboration and the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples in decision-making processes worldwide.
On science collaboration
There is significant international interest in climate change in Greenland, drawing many scientists. However, there is a frustration as scientists often conduct research without involving local expertise. Indigenous Peoples need true collaboration, not just in name, with a more equitable sharing of knowledge and involvement of local experts like hunters, fishermen, and farmers. The participant said that this is an issue that needs addressing.
On the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
The Inuit Circumpolar Council has long-standing policies against militarisation in Inuit Nunangat. However, the reality is different, with heavily militarised areas across the region, including in Russia. The history of militarisation in Greenland is linked to colonisation, with examples like forced relocations for military bases. Instances like Camp Century and Project Ice Worm have left lasting scars. While security is important, increased militarisation raises concerns, especially in light of geopolitical tensions. For the Sami, living on the border of NATO and non-NATO countries has been a reality, causing worry about potential conflicts. This situation also creates divisions within the Sami community, especially for those in Russia who face additional challenges. The participant said the presence of militarisation has a significant impact on Sami life and security.
In South Greenland, sheep farmers faced challenges due to a significant increase in the price of winter fodder, causing some to close their businesses. The situation is exacerbated by inflation and disruptions in Ukrainian goods production and exports, impacting the region.
Regarding Indigenous Peoples in Russia, communication with the Russian Inuit is limited due to the current situation, raising concerns about their safety and human rights. Russia recognises over 40 Indigenous Peoples, with additional unacknowledged groups. The Sami people of Russia are also represented by the Sami Council.
Recommendations for the UK
One participant encouraged the UK Government not to be discouraged by the challenges faced by Indigenous Peoples. They said it was crucial to engage in a genuine dialogue with representative bodies of the affected communities. They encouraged us to recognise that there may be conflicts between Indigenous and local communities. They heeded that different perspectives may emerge, so that it was important not to lump them together.
Formal minutes
Monday 11 September 2023
Members present
Philip Dunne, in the Chair
Barry Gardiner
James Gray
Caroline Lucas
Anna McMorrin
Dr Matthew Offord
Cat Smith
The UK and the Arctic Environment
The Committee deliberated.
Draft Report (The UK and the Arctic Environment), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 328 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Annexes agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
Adjournment
Adjourned till Monday 18 September 2023 at 4.00 pm.
Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
Monday 27 March 2023
Professor Terry Callaghan CMG, Professor of Arctic Ecology, School of Biosciences, The University of Sheffield; Professor Mark Brandon MBE, Associate Dean and Director of STEM Research, Faculty of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics, The Open University; Professor Michael Bravo, Professor of the History and Geography of Science, University of Cambridge; Professor Helene Hewitt OBE, Science Fellow & Ocean Modelling Group Leader, Met OfficeQ1–48
Wednesday 24 May 2023
Dr Duncan Depledge, Lecturer in Geopolitics and Security, Loughborough University; Professor Basil Germond, Professor of International Security, Lancaster UniversityQ49–71
The Lord Mountevans, Honorary President, Maritime London, Chairman, Baltic Exchange Council; Jane Sandell, CEO, UK Fisheries Ltd; Gary Taylor, Fisheries Consultant, UK Fisheries LtdQ72–98
Monday 12 June 2023
Dr Jenny Turton, Senior Adviser, Arctic Frontiers; Professor Andrew Shepherd, Head of Geography and Environmental Sciences, Northumbria University, Director, Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling; Dr James Lea, Reader, Geography and Planning, University of Liverpool; Professor Geraint Tarling, Principal Investigator, BIOPOLEQ99–142
Dr Anna Jones, Director of Science, British Antarctic Survey; Dr Iain Williams, Director of Strategic Partnerships, Natural Environment Research Council; Henry Burgess, Head of the Natural Environment Research Council Arctic Office, NERC Arctic Office at the British Antarctic SurveyQ143–180
Monday 17 July 2023
Jane Rumble OBE, Head of the Polar Regions Department, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development OfficeQ181–247
Monday 04 September 2023
George Freeman MP, Minister of State (Minister for Science, Research and Innovation), Department for Science, Innovation and TechnologyQ248–304
Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
ARC numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 Arruda, Prof. Dr Gisele (Professor Researcher, Anvivo Polar Research, UARCTIC); and Filijović, Dr. Marko (Researcher, Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER)) (ARC0013)
2 BIOPOLE (ARC0011)
3 Barnes, Dr David K A (Marine Ecologist, British Antarctic Survey) (ARC0005)
4 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
5 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ARC0022)
6 Cruise Lines International Association (ARC0029)
7 Edwards, Professor Mary (Professor Emerita (retired), University of Southampton) (ARC0023)
8 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
9 Germond, Professor Basil (Professor of International Security, Lancaster University); and Suri, Professor Neeraj (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security, Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
10 Heyburn, Mr James (Policy & Engagement Officer , Imperial Policy Forum); Richards, Dr Fred (Lecturer, Department of Earth Science and Engineering, Imperial College London); and Ford, Dr Adriana (Centre Manager, Leverhulme Centre for Wildfires, Environment and Society) (ARC0008)
11 Lea, Dr James (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow, University of Liverpool); Brough, Dr Stephen (Lecturer in Glaciology, University of Liverpool); Mair, Professor Douglas (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool); Nias, Dr Isabel (Lecturer in Glaciology, University of Liverpool); and Shiggins, Mr Connor (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology, University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
12 Loovers, Dr Jan Peter Laurens (CINUK Research Fellow, University of Aberdeen) (ARC0016)
13 Lovell, Dr Harold (Senior Lecturer, University of Portsmouth); Pepin, Dr Nick (Reader, University of Portsmouth); Boston, Dr Clare (Senior Lecturer, University of Portsmouth); Hardiman, Dr Mark (Senior Lecturer, University of Portsmouth); and Rumble, Dr Heather (Senior Lecturer, University of the West of England) (ARC0010)
14 Met Office (ARC0027)
15 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
16 National Oceanography Centre (ARC0009)
17 Naylor, Dr Angus (Research Fellow, University of Victoria (British Columbia, Canada)) (ARC0002)
18 Parkes, Dr David (Senior Research Associate, Lancaster University); Maddalena, Dr Jennifer (Research Associate, Lancaster University); Gilbert, Dr Jennie (Senior Lecturer, Lancaster University); Halsall, Professor Crispin (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences, Lancaster University); Leeson, Dr Amber (Reader in Glaciology, Lancaster University); and Wynn, Dr Peter (Reader, Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
19 Planet Labs (ARC0024)
20 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015)
21 Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021)
22 Speca, Dr Anthony (Managing Principal, Polar Aspect) (ARC0020)
23 Turton, Dr Jenny (ARC0006)
24 UK Polar Network (ARC0025)
25 Uplift (ARC0004)
26 WWF UK (ARC0018)
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.
Session 2022–23
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Building to net zero: costing carbon in construction |
HC 103 |
|
2nd |
Pre-appointment hearing: Chair of the Environment Agency (Pre-appointment hearing) |
HC 546 |
|
3rd |
Recommendations on the Government’s draft environmental principles policy statement |
HC 380 |
|
4th |
Accelerating the transition from fossil fuels and securing energy supplies |
HC 109 |
|
5th |
Seeing the wood for the trees: the contribution of the forestry and timber sectors to biodiversity and net zero goals |
HC 637 |
|
1st Special |
Water quality in rivers: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2021–22 |
HC 164 |
|
2nd Special |
Greening imports: a UK carbon border approach: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2021–22 |
HC 371 |
|
3rd Special |
Building to net zero: costing carbon in construction: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 643 |
|
4th Special |
Accelerating the transition from fossil fuels and securing energy supplies: Government and Regulator Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report |
HC 1221 |
Session 2021–22
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Biodiversity in the UK: bloom or bust? |
HC 136 |
|
2nd |
The UK’s footprint on global biodiversity |
HC 674 |
|
3rd |
Green Jobs |
HC 75 |
|
4th |
Water quality in rivers |
HC 74 |
|
5th |
Greening imports: a UK carbon border approach |
HC 737 |
|
1st Special Report |
Energy efficiency of existing homes: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 135 |
|
2nd Special Report |
Growing back better: putting nature and net zero at the heart of the economic recovery: Government and Bank of England Responses to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 327 |
|
3rd Special Report |
Biodiversity in the UK: bloom or bust?: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 727 |
|
4th Special Report |
Green Jobs: Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 1010 |
|
5th Special Report |
The UK’s footprint on global biodiversity: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 1060 |
Session 2019–21
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Electronic Waste and the Circular Economy |
HC 220 |
|
2nd |
Pre-appointment hearing for the Chair-Designate of the Office for Environmental Protection (OEP) |
HC 1042 |
|
3rd |
Growing back better: putting nature and net zero at the heart of the economic recovery |
HC 347 |
|
4th |
Energy Efficiency of Existing Homes |
HC 346 |
|
1st Special Report |
Invasive species: Government Response to the Committee’s First report of Session 2019 |
HC 332 |
|
2nd Special Report |
Our Planet, Our Health: Government Response to the Committee’s Twenty-First Report of Session 2017–19 |
HC 467 |
|
3rd Special Report |
Electronic Waste and the Circular Economy: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 1268 |
Footnotes
1 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023
2 “Arctic summer could be practically sea-ice-free by the 2030s”, Carbon Brief, 7 June 2023
3 Arctic Council, Arctic States
4 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023
5 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Adapting to Change: UK policy towards the Arctic, 2013
6 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Beyond the Ice: UK policy towards the Arctic, 2018
7 Ministry of Defence, The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North, 2021
8 The inquiry was undertaken by the Environmental Audit Committee’s Sub-Committee on Polar Research, chaired by James Gray MP.
9 Mr Johnson made the following declaration of interests on his appointment:
- Membership of the Labour Party
10 Mika Rantanen et al., “The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979”, Communications Earth & Environment vol 3, 11 August 2022
11 Q4 [Professor Helene Hewitt]
12 Mika Rantanen et al., “The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979”, Communications Earth & Environment vol 3, 11 August 2022
14 Arctic sea ice usually reaches its minimum thickness and extent (the area in which satellite sensors show individual pixels to be at least 15% covered in ice) in September each year. Some ice melts during the Arctic summer in June through to August, where the region experiences warmer temperatures and longer hours of sunlight, reaching around half the size of the winter maximum before beginning to expand again during the Arctic autumn and winter. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change Indicators: Arctic Sea Ice, accessed 4 September 2023
15 Juhi Yadav, Avinash Kumar, and Rahul Mohan, “Dramatic decline of Arctic sea ice linked to global warming”, Natural Hazards vol 103, 21 May 2020, pp 2617–2621; Met Office (ARC0027)
16 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020
18 “A Summer Without Arctic Sea Ice Could Come a Decade Sooner Than Expected”, The New York Times, 6 June 2023
19 “Arctic summer could be practically sea-ice-free by the 2030s”, Carbon Brief, 7 June 2023
20 “Arctic summer could be practically sea-ice-free by the 2030s”, Carbon Brief, 7 June 2023
28 National Oceanography Centre (ARC0009); BIOPOLE (ARC0011)
29 Mr James Heyburn (Policy & Engagement Officer at Imperial Policy Forum); Dr Fred Richards (Lecturer, Department of Earth Science and Engineering at Imperial College London); Dr Adriana Ford (Centre Manager at Leverhulme Centre for Wildfires, Environment and Society) (ARC0008)
32 Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021)
34 Eric V. Regehr et al. “Conservation status of polar bears (Ursus maritimus) in relation to projected sea-ice declines”, Biology Letters vol 12, 31 December 2016
37 See Annex 2 for a summary of the roundtable. Participants were from the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Sami Council, and from Greenland, the Manager of the UNESCO World Heritage Site at Kujataa.
40 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 22
41 Dr David K A Barnes (Marine Ecologist at British Antarctic Survey) (ARC0005)
42 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
43 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
44 Climate Change Committee, ‘Managing the coast in a changing climate’, October 2018
45 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
46 Arctic Frontiers, located in the Fram Centre, Tromsø, has, since 2007, organised the annual Arctic Frontiers conference, which gathers scientists, businesses, policymakers and representatives of local and Indigenous Peoples for holistic discussions about the future of the Arctic region. Additionally, the organisation hosts year-round activities, including Arctic Frontiers Abroad events, Arctic Frontiers Open events for the public and Arctic Frontiers Young events for the future generation of Arctic leaders between 5–35 years old.
49 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
50 Dr David K A Barnes (Marine Ecologist at British Antarctic Survey) (ARC0005); National Oceanography Centre (ARC0009)
51 Dr David K A Barnes (Marine Ecologist at British Antarctic Survey) (ARC0005)
52 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020
54 Dr David K A Barnes (Marine Ecologist at British Antarctic Survey) (ARC0005); Dr Jenny Turton (ARC0006); National Oceanography Centre (ARC0009); Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
55 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020
56 Dr David K A Barnes (Marine Ecologist at British Antarctic Survey) (ARC0005); National Oceanography Centre (ARC0009)
58 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020
59 National Oceanography Centre (ARC0009)
60 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020
61 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ARC0022)
62 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
63 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 10
66 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
67 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
68 The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change. It was adopted by 196 Parties at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris, France, on 12 December 2015. It entered into force on 4 November 2016.
Its overarching goal is to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”. UNFCCC, The Paris Agreement
70 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020
71 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015)
72 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the United Nations body for assessing the science related to climate change.
75 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 10
76 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
77 US Congressional Research Service, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress”, 24 March 2022
78 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
79 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
80 Prof. Dr Gisele Arruda (Professor Researcher at Anvivo Polar Research, UARCTIC); Dr. Marko Filijović (Researcher at Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER)) (ARC0013)
82 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
83 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
89 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
90 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
91 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
92 “‘Nature is being destroyed’: Russia’s arms buildup in Barents Sea creating toxic legacy”, The Guardian, 24 July 2023
93 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS, accessed 07 September 2023
95 “New Russian Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation: Gathering Arctic Storm or Tempest in a Teapot?”, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 9 March 2023
96 “New Russian Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation: Gathering Arctic Storm or Tempest in a Teapot?”, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 9 March 2023
97 Prof. Dr Gisele Arruda (Professor Researcher at Anvivo Polar Research, UARCTIC); Dr. Marko Filijović (Researcher at Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER)) (ARC0013)
98 Prof. Dr Gisele Arruda (Professor Researcher at Anvivo Polar Research, UARCTIC); Dr. Marko Filijović (Researcher at Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER)) (ARC0013)
100 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003), Prof. Dr Gisele Arruda (Professor Researcher at Anvivo Polar Research, UARCTIC); Dr. Marko Filijović (Researcher at Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER)) (ARC0013)
101 WWF Arctic, Governance
102 WWF Arctic, Governance
103 WWF Arctic, Governance
104 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
107 “China Wants to Support Norway in Restoring the Arctic Council”, High North News, 28 April 2023
108 “‘Nature is being destroyed’: Russia’s arms buildup in Barents Sea creating toxic legacy”, The Guardian, 24 July 2023
111 Letter from the Minister for Americas and the Caribbean (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office), following up on questions raised at the UK and the Arctic Environment evidence session of 17 July, dated 18 August 2023
112 Letter from the Minister for Americas and the Caribbean (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office), following up on questions raised at the UK and the Arctic Environment evidence session of 17 July, dated 18 August 2023
116 Letter from the Minister for Americas and the Caribbean (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office), following up on questions raised at the UK and the Arctic Environment evidence session of 17 July, dated 18 August 2023
117 Letter from the Minister for Americas and the Caribbean (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office), following up on questions raised at the UK and the Arctic Environment evidence session of 17 July, dated 18 August 2023
124 Environmental Audit Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2017–2019, The Changing Arctic, HC 842
125 House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic, Report of Session 2014–15, Responding to a changing Arctic, HL Paper 118
126 Defence Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2017–19, On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic , HC 388
128 “US to appoint its first Arctic Ambassador”, BBC News, 27 August 2022
130 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003); Dr David K A Barnes (Marine Ecologist at British Antarctic Survey) (ARC0005); Prof. Dr Gisele Arruda (Professor Researcher at Anvivo Polar Research, UARCTIC); Dr. Marko Filijović (Researcher at Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER)) (ARC0013); NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014); Dr Jan Peter Laurens Loovers (CINUK Research Fellow at University of Aberdeen) (ARC0016); Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021); Professor Mary Edwards (Professor Emerita (retired) at University of Southampton) (ARC0023); UK Polar Network (ARC0025); British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
131 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
132 UK Polar Network (ARC0025); British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
133 UK Polar Network (ARC0025)
134 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
139 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
140 The UN Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports allows for commercial food and fertiliser exports from three key Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea: Odesa, Chornomorsk, Yuzhny/Pivdennyi. This saw the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports, and supported the stabilisation of food prices worldwide. United Nations, “Black Sea Grain Initiative Joint Coordination Centre”
149 Arctic Council, About the Arctic Council
150 Arctic Council, About the Arctic Council
154 Arctic Council, International Cooperation in the Arctic
155 The category of Permanent Participant was created to allow for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic Indigenous Peoples within the Arctic Council. Permanent Participants include: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Sami Council.
156 Arctic Council, Working Groups
157 “Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”, Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, 3 March 2022
158 “Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”, Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, 3 March 2022
159 “The Rise and Sudden Fall of the Arctic Council”, Foreign Policy Magazine, 31 May 2023
160 “Lavrov: “The Arctic Council’s future depends on whether a civilised dialogue can continue””, High North News, 15 May 2023
163 “Russia amends Arctic policy prioritising ‘national interest’ and removing cooperation within Arctic Council”, High North News, 15 March 2023
167 Q59 [Professor Basil Germond]
168 Dr Anthony Speca (Managing Principal at Polar Aspect) (ARC0020)
170 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015)
171 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
172 Arctic Council, “Observers”
174 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
176 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
177 Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021)
178 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
182 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023
186 Arctic Council, Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council, 19 September 1996
190 Professor Basil Germond (Professor of International Security at Lancaster University); Professor Neeraj Suri (Distinguished Professor & Chair in Cyber Security at Lancaster University) (ARC0003)
191 Ministry of Defence, The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North, March 2022
192 Dr Jan Peter Laurens Loovers (CINUK Research Fellow at University of Aberdeen) (ARC0016)
196 HM Government, Global Britain in a competitive age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 2021
197 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 34
198 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 9
199 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 21
201 Q293. Minilaterals refer to informal and more targeted initiatives intended to address specific issues with fewer states sharing the same interest for resolving it.
202 AMAP, Arctic Climate Change Update 2021: Key Trends and Impacts. Summary for Policymakers, 2021
204 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023
205 Natural Environment Research Council Arctic Office, Research
206 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017); WWF UK (ARC0018); Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ARC0022); Professor Mary Edwards (Professor Emerita (retired) at University of Southampton) (ARC0023); British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
207 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
209 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 30
213 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
216 Q112 [Professor Andrew Shepherd, Dr James Lea, Dr Jenny Turton, Professor Geraint Tarling]
217 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
218 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
220 Arctic PASSION, Arctic PASSION Pan-Arctic Observing System of Systems
222 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
223 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
224 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
225 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
226 UK Polar Network (ARC0025)
229 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 30
232 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
236 UKRI, 2022–23–2024–25 budget allocations for UK Research and Innovation
238 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
239 UKRI, What we do
240 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
241 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
242 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 9
243 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
245 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
248 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
254 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
258 Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ARC0022)
259 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
261 “Attenborough ship proves its polar credentials”, BBC News, 31 March 2022
262 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
268 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
274 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
276 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
278 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
280 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
288 Q117 [Professor Andrew Shepherd]
290 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
291 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
292 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
293 Q118 [Professor Andrew Shepherd]
296 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
298 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
299 Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021)
300 Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021)
301 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
303 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
307 UKRI, Collaborate with researchers in Norway
308 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
309 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
310 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
311 NERC Arctic Office (ARC0014)
312 Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021)
313 CINUK, About
316 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
317 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Plans for a Fifth Interpolar Year 2032/33, 25 April 2023
318 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Plans for a Fifth Interpolar Year 2032/33, 25 April 2023
319 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Plans for a Fifth Interpolar Year 2032/33, 25 April 2023
321 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
323 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007); National Oceanography Centre (ARC0009); Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010); BIOPOLE (ARC0011); Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015); Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ARC0022); Professor Mary Edwards (Professor Emerita (retired) at University of Southampton) (ARC0023); British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
324 European Commission, Horizon Europe, accessed 05 September 2023
325 British Antarctic Survey (ARC0028)
326 Prime Minister’s Office and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology “UK joins Horizon Europe under a new bespoke deal” 7 September 2023
327 Prime Minister’s Office and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology “UK joins Horizon Europe under a new bespoke deal” 7 September 2023
328 “Apply for Horizon Europe guarantee funding”, UKRI, 24 August 2023
329 Horizon Europe Guarantee fund awarded to UK researchers and innovators Open Access Government, accessed 10 October 2023
330 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
339 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
340 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015)
342 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015)
343 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015)
347 Letter from the Minister of State for Science, Innovation and Technology responding to the Sub-Committee’s letter of 24 July 2023, dated 2 August 2023
348 Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of undiscovered oil and gas in the Arctic”, National Library of Medicine vol 324(5931), May 2009, pp 1175–1179
349 Council on Foreign Relations, “Arctic Governance: Challenges and Opportunities”, November 2018
350 House of Lords, UNCLOS: The law of the sea in the 21st century, Second Report of the International Relations and Defence Committee, Session 2021–22, HL paper 159
351 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023
352 WWF, “Arctic communities”
353 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020, p 5
354 E.g. Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling (CPOM) (ARC0022); Professor Mary Edwards (Professor Emerita (retired) at University of Southampton) (ARC0023)
355 Dr Jenny Turton (ARC0006); Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015); Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
356 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 11
357 UN Environment Programme, “Arctic region”
358 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020
359 UN, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
361 Dr Jan Peter Laurens Loovers (CINUK Research Fellow at University of Aberdeen) (ARC0016)
362 UN, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
363 “Norway court rules two windfarms harming Sami reindeer herders”, The Guardian 11 October 2021
365 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 10
366 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020; Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
368 Congressional Research Service, “Changes in the Arctic: background and issues for Congress”, updated 5 July 2023; Q82 [Lord Mountevans]; Q83 [Lord Mountevans]
370 Amanda Perkins, “Environmental Protection of the Arctic Ecosystem”, 26 April 2023
371 Imperial College London, “The Arctic and the UK: climate, research and engagement”, Grantham Institute, Discussion paper 7, June 2020
372 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017); Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
378 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 40
379 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 40
381 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
382 Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010)
383 UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, Marine Spatial Planning; Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015); WWF UK (ARC0018)
385 Arctic Council, “Navigating the future of Arctic shipping”, 10 May 2021
386 Arctic Council, “Navigating the future of Arctic shipping”, 10 May 2021
387 Arctic Council, “Navigating the future of Arctic shipping”, 10 May 2021
388 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 39
390 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015); Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017); WWF UK (ARC0018); Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021); Met Office (ARC0027); Q98 [Lord Mountevans]
391 Scottish Association for Marine Science (ARC0021)
395 Clear Seas “Black Carbon in the Arctic: What You Need to Know”, 10 August 2021
396 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
397 Clean Arctic Alliance, “MEPC 79/14/1: Proposal for a revision to MARPOL Annex I regulation 43A on the special requirements for the use and carriage of oils as fuels in Arctic waters”, 7 October 2022
399 Cruise Lines International Association (ARC0029)
400 Cruise Lines International Association (ARC0029)
401 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
402 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “MGN 637 (M) International code for ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code)”, 17 January 2022
403 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019); Met Office (ARC0027)
405 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
407 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 40; Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
411 Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010)
414 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 41
418 E.g. Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
420 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007); Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010); Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015)
421 Dr Jan Peter Laurens Loovers (CINUK Research Fellow at University of Aberdeen) (ARC0016); Q37 [Professor Terry Callaghan]
422 Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010)
426 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 42
427 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 41
430 Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of undiscovered oil and gas in the Arctic”, National Library of Medicine vol 324(5931), May 2009, pp 1175–1179
431 Q72 [Lord Mountevans]; Q110 [Dr James Lea]
433 Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010)
434 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
435 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
436 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015); Uplift (ARC0004)
437 Dr Jenny Turton (ARC0006); Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
439 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
440 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
441 “‘Playing with fire’: the countdown to mining the deep seas for critical minerals”, Financial Times, 1 May 2023
442 International Seabed Authority, The 28th Session of the International Seabed Authority
443 “International talks end without go-ahead for deep-sea mining”, The Guardian, 29 July 2023
444 “Future of deep-sea mining hangs in balance as opposition grows”, The Guardian, 8 July 2023
445 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 41
446 Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, pp 29–30
447 Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, pp 29–30
448 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
453 Dr Jenny Turton (ARC0006); Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015); Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
454 Plymouth Marine Laboratory (ARC0015)
455 Dr David Parkes (Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennifer Maddalena (Research Associate at Lancaster University); Dr Jennie Gilbert (Senior Lecturer at Lancaster University); Professor Crispin Halsall (Faculty Director of Natural Sciences at Lancaster University); Dr Amber Leeson (Reader in Glaciology at Lancaster University); Dr Peter Wynn (Reader at Lancaster University) (ARC0017)
457 Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (ARC0019)
458 Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010)
460 Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010)
461 Dr Harold Lovell (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Nick Pepin (Reader at University of Portsmouth); Dr Clare Boston (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Mark Hardiman (Senior Lecturer at University of Portsmouth); Dr Heather Rumble (Senior Lecturer at University of the West of England) (ARC0010)
462 Dr Jan Peter Laurens Loovers (CINUK Research Fellow at University of Aberdeen) (ARC0016)
463 Arctic Council Protection of the Marine Environment Programme, “Arctic marine Tourism Project: Passenger trends in the Arctic region (2013–2019)”, May 2021
464 Cruise Lines International Association (ARC0029)
465 Dr James Lea (Reader in Glaciology, UKRI Future Leaders Fellow at University of Liverpool); Dr Stephen Brough (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Professor Douglas Mair (Professor in Glaciology, Head of School of Environmental Sciences at University of Liverpool); Dr Isabel Nias (Lecturer in Glaciology at University of Liverpool); Mr Connor Shiggins (Postdoctoral Researcher in Glaciology at University of Liverpool) (ARC0007)
466 Arctic Council, Agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic
470 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 37
471 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Looking North: the UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic policy framework, February 2023, p 15