This is a House of Commons Committee report, with recommendations to government. The Government has two months to respond.
Update to the UK's Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
Date Published: 18 December 2022
This is the full report, read the report summary.
1. The Government published Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (hereafter “the Integrated Review”, or “IR”) on 14 March 2021. The IR was declared to be the biggest review of its kind since the end of the Cold War.1
2. In September 2022, less than 18 months after the IR’s publication, then-Prime Minister, Liz Truss, announced that the Government would undertake a “refresh” of the document.2 The refresh process has continued under the new Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, with the updated IR expected to be published in February or March 2023.3 According to the Government, the IR update will take account of the “huge geopolitical shifts” that have taken place since March 2021, including “the sharpening of inter-state competition due to the actions of countries like Russia, China and Iran.”4
3. Since the publication of the IR, the challenges to the rules-based international order and the UK’s liberal democratic values have grown and been brought closer to home.5 The large increase in the cost of living currently being faced by the British people illustrates how geopolitical events directly impact our everyday lives. While the blame for the war in Ukraine lies solely with Vladimir Putin, the failure of the west sufficiently to challenge Putin’s incursion into Georgia in 2008, his annexation of Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014 and his sponsorship of state murders in the UK in 2006 and 2018, undoubtedly emboldened him. More assertive sustained sanctions, especially following the first invasion of Ukraine, might have led Putin to think again before engaging in a further invasion in 2022. Greater and clearer-sighted prescience could also have enabled the UK and her allies to prepare better for the oil, gas and food supply problems that would inevitably result from a lengthy war in Ukraine, thereby weakening Putin’s hand. As the economic and humanitarian crisis created by Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine continues, so do challenges elsewhere in the world. The Government also has to navigate a complex relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that is characterised by both interdependence and competition and, if mishandled, could have significant implications for the UK’s security and economy.
4. The Integrated Review is intended to act as a guiding framework through which Government departments pursue the UK’s objectives and address the risks and threats it faces over the next five years.6 Given the UK’s highly complex strategic environment and the growing threats to the international order, getting this framework right is critical. We cannot accept a refreshed document that is based on empty rhetoric or overly-ambitious posturing. That is why we launched our inquiry into the Integrated Review update in November 2022 and why we are now publishing this report, which sets out recommendations for the Government to take into consideration for the IR update.
5. The Integrated Review set out broad and relatively flexible parameters to guide UK foreign policy. Many of the assumptions underpinning the Integrated Review have since been tested by subsequent geopolitical events and have broadly been proven to be valid.7
6. Both Air Marshall Edward Stringer and RUSI Research Associate Ed Arnold told us that the IR needs very little in the way of changes, although it could be “rebalanced a little”.8 Ed Arnold noted that as the fundamental assumptions remain the same, any edits are not necessarily significant enough to have warranted a formal update to the Global Britain document. He suggested that any modest alterations or changes in emphasis could have been updated in other ways, for example through the introduction of new departmental strategies or through changes to the Defence Command Paper and Defence Industrial Strategy.9 The defence industry association, ADS, on the other hand, suggested that the IR update provides an “ideal opportunity to accelerate delivery of underpinning strategies”.10 We await with particular interest the publication of the Government’s forthcoming National Resilience Strategy,11 which was originally introduced in the IR in 2021. It is quite evident from events since the last IR that the UK, and its allies, have not invested significantly enough in resilience, be it within supply chains or across all aspects of our societies from energy to education, business and beyond. This is an urgent priority—a twenty-year project which the Government must urgently pursue on a cross-Government basis.
7. While Global Britain is generally viewed as having withstood the geopolitical developments of the past 18 months, it is the Defence Command Paper (DCP) and related Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) that require the most updating in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. More generally, witnesses suggested that the DCP and DIS did not adequately set out the respective “ways” and “means” for achieving the “ends” of the Global Britain document. Alongside the DCP and DIS, the successful implementation of the IR will depend on the effectiveness of its other underpinning strategies such as the National Resilience Strategy12 and the more focused National Semiconductor Strategy.13 If these strategies do not connect the IR’s objectives with their requisite ways and means,14 the IR will be weakened as a result.15 The financial constraints faced by the FCDO risk limiting its operating abilities, as the available resources are much lower than envisaged in the original IR. The House of Commons Scrutiny Unit has calculated that FCDO day-to-day spending will be cut by 36.3 per cent in real terms, from financial year 2019/20 to 2024/25.16 Given the current economic environment, both the IR update and the National Resilience Strategy will need to clearly explain to the public why investment in resilience is important, given that other public services are also competing for finite resources.17 The Government also needs to ensure all Government departments introduce improving resilience as a core objective.
8. ADS told us that the UK’s place in the world has shifted since the publication of the IR, with consequences for its foreign relations.18 Recent years have seen significant international slippage away from democracy and towards autocracy. Some countries have retreated into authoritarianism. Some existing authoritarian regimes have become more internally repressive and externally aggressive. Many have challenged the international rules-based order. This increasingly leaves open democratic countries that enjoy and guarantee full freedom of speech, association and assembly, such as the UK, vulnerable. International checks against human rights abuse have been undermined, creating a culture of impunity, which has emboldened the worst international state actors. Upholding human rights, for instance through the use of Magnitsky sanctions on human rights abusers, including in countries we consider to be allies, is an important part of maintaining our international reputation. As one of the primary architects of the post-war rules-based system, the UK should be one of its most robust defenders.
9. ADS referenced the establishment of AUKUS,19 the publication of NATO’s strategic concept, and the developing UK-EU relationship, stating that “the international landscape for collaboration has shifted” as a result of these developments.20 These shifts are coupled with a worsening global economic situation and resulting constraints on the UK’s ability to project influence. Furthermore, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan is symptomatic of a more inward-facing American foreign policy, which has created an opportunity for the UK to be more assertive on the international stage—something that should be reflected in the updated IR.
10. The Integrated Review has provided a robust and flexible framework to guide UK foreign policy decisions out to 2025. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has tested many of the assumptions underpinning the IR, and these have been found to hold true. A full-scale refresh is only warranted, given the scale of resources and time required to complete it, particularly at this exceptionally challenging time for Britain’s foreign and security policy, if the Government makes considerable changes or is prepared to fill in some of the gaps in more detail to justify this use of resources. Enhancing the resilience of the United Kingdom should be central to the refresh.
11. We recommend that the forthcoming National Resilience Strategy includes the creation of a national resilience lead. Effective implementation of this strategy would include regular cross-Government meetings that discuss shared efforts to improve UK’s resilience to threats across all policy areas.
12. The Integrated Review described China as a “systemic competitor”, stating that the country’s increasing power and international assertiveness are likely to be “the most significant geopolitical factor of the 2020s”.21
13. The strategic challenge posed by the Chinese Communist Party has been brought into sharper focus in the 18 months following the publication of the IR. The IR was published before the recent months of substantially heightened international pressure from China, which includes increased malign Chinese engagement in the developing world, especially in smaller nations and islands,22 as well as increasingly aggressive posturing with regard to Taiwan and the PRC’s “One China Policy.”23 The CCP is unambiguous on its long-term goal for Taiwan: the CCP’s 20th Party Congress enshrined President Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term with clear language about the ambition to absorb Taiwan.24 This, coupled with a more assertive Chinese foreign policy due to perceived US or Western weakness, as well as less favourable Taiwanese attitudes to China that make the PRC’s preferred option of “peaceful reunification” appear less likely,25 and further heightens the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.26 Notably, Taiwan was not mentioned once in the 122 pages of the IR.27 This is a surprising omission given the IR’s emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, and the fact that Taiwan is a core part of the UK’s interests in this region. The UK Government has failed to sufficiently voice that its policy is acknowledgment of the PRC’s “One China Policy” rather than acceptance of it, and that it supports Taiwan’s policy that the status quo should not be changed by force. This is an important distinction when determining the UK’s posture towards Taiwan.
14. The British Foreign Policy Group (BFPG) noted that the IR’s description of China as a systemic competitor “has been argued by some to be insufficiently strong”. Some critics have suggested that the Government used the term “systemic competitor” in order to avoid the word “threat” and that the Government’s language does not provide enough clarity.28 These critics will likely view the IR update as an opportunity to correct this perceived shortcoming.
15. In a speech on 28 November, the Prime Minister set out his intentions for an “evolutionary leap” in the Government’s approach to the geopolitical challenges facing the UK. He stated that this will mean standing up to competitors “not with grand rhetoric but with robust pragmatism”.29 We agree with the assertion implicit in the Prime Minister’s statement, which is that decisive actions will serve the UK’s interests far better than strong language alone. It is noted by the Committee that during the Summer Conservative Leadership contest, the now Prime Minister asserted that he would change China policy “on day one”. The refresh of the Integrated Review provides the opportunity to deliver on this promise in a meaningful way, albeit later.
16. When asked whether “systemic competitor” is a useful term to use in reference to China, Sir Malcolm Rifkind told us that
Whether we like it or not, it is a fact and the review must refer to facts, not aspirations or hypotheses. It does not commit us to a specific policy because the question, therefore, is what the consequences are that flow from that.30
The IR’s language regarding China is currently broadly consistent with that used by our allies in the US and Europe.31 For example, the most recent US National Security Strategy (NSS) describes China as the most consequential global competitor for the US.32 Witnesses to this inquiry emphasised the importance of aligning the UK’s language with that of the EU and US, with some noting that the language used by these allies “reflects the realities of the situation”.33
17. Any abrupt change to the UK’s language on China is unlikely to yield tangible benefits and may cause harm to British interests in the long term. The BPFG told us that characterising China as a “threat” could potentially trigger an aggressive response that would cut off opportunities for collaboration in important areas (see Chapter 4). However, in evidence we heard about the threats that the Chinese government poses to the UK, including by stealing our intellectual property, intimidating British citizens and UK residents, and undermining our values on the international stage through human rights abuses. The Government should be mindful of the potential consequences of changing its language on China and the language it uses should reflect the complex realities of the current relationship. The Integrated Review designated China as a “systemic competitor”. Strong language that is not coupled by action does nothing to alleviate confusion, and risks increasing uncertainty and undermining our credibility. The Government needs to be firmer and more explicit in articulating the UK’s security interests when it comes to China. The primary responsibility of the state is to keep its people safe. China poses a significant threat to the UK on many different levels. We would support the Government changing the language from “systemic competitor” to “threat” if it were accompanied by carefully calibrated and proportionate policy change, particularly on domestic resilience and security, rather than empty rhetoric.
18. The Integrated Review articulated the view that it is possible to have a multifaceted relationship with China, in which the UK can stand up for its values and protect its national security interests, whilst also pursuing continued economic ties. Some critics of this approach have accused the UK of trying to “have its cake and eat it”.34 However, for the foreseeable future, China will continue to be a strategic competitor and also an essential partner to the UK, not just economically but also in terms of cooperation on issues such as climate change and trade.
19. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated in March 2021 that “Our relationship with China will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.”35 This principle also currently applies to the UK, although the detail and consequences will differ from those of the US.36
20. The CEO of the China-Britain Business Council (CBBC), Andrew Seaton, told us that the fundamental factors that drove the IR’s conclusions on China remain “very much at play”, noting that maintaining a “sensible and well-managed” trade and investment relationship with China is in the UK’s economic interests.37 Sir Malcolm agreed with this view, stating that he saw “no good reason why economic trade should not continue”.38 Noting the complexities of the UK-China relationship, the BFPG observed the “need for a clear-sighted but calibrated approach to China ( … ) which recognises and integrates a sophisticated appreciation of trade dynamics.”39 A similar approach was implied within the “robust pragmatism” promised by the Prime Minister (see paragraph 13); however, the Government has yet to set out in detail exactly what this will look like. Should the IR update fail to provide clarity on this, the Prime Minister’s speech on 28 November will be perceived by our allies and competitors as simply empty rhetoric—which is precisely what the Prime Minister pledged to avoid.
21. Appreciating the nuances of the UK-China relationship will require a significant improvement in the UK’s China expertise. As evidenced by the removal of FCDO funding to the Great Britain-China Centre,40 the Government has failed to recognise that increased Mandarin capabilities and expertise in Sino Affairs are important investments in our security and prosperity.41 Moves to this effect should be reversed.
22. It is in the UK’s national interest to maintain a pragmatic and carefully managed economic relationship with China. This means that maintaining a multifaceted approach to China—which encourages strong economic relations where possible while safeguarding national security and standing up for UK values—will be necessary for the foreseeable future. However, it is likely to become increasingly difficult to manage this relationship if China continues to challenge the rules-based international order and undertakes to undermine Britain at home. For now, policy areas can largely be treated as discrete and compartmentalised. Whilst trade, security and human rights are inherently interlinked, the Chinese government separates them out, and in general responds to UK actions or statements in one policy area with direct, mirror retaliatory actions. However, it is possible that China could change this approach.
23. Economic dependency constrains the UK’s ability to defend its own interests and values.42 As part of its increasingly assertive style of diplomacy, the Chinese government has repeatedly threatened the UK with a response to restrictions or actions it views as hostile,43 while at the same time calling for a closer and more collaborative relationship.44 While Andrew Seaton suggested that “it is easier to have a conversation about difficult things when there is a broader conversation and broader engagement taking place”, and the Committee agrees with the importance of maintaining dialogue and therefore calls on the PRC to withdraw its sanctions on British MPs, it is not unthinkable that possible future events, such as a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by China, would cause a seismic challenge to that relationship. This is a high-risk set of circumstances as the UK has a strategic dependency on supply chains involving China across almost every sector.45 This is highlighted by the recent global supply chain challenges resulting from China’s zero-COVID policy.46 According to Forbes, approximately one-third of the world’s global trade passes through the South China Sea.47 Equally 65 per cent of global semiconductors and 90 per cent of advanced semiconductors are produced in Taiwan, and as such the economic importance of Taiwan cannot be diminished. Any prolonged disruption in the region would therefore have a profound impact on the global economy, far more damaging than the renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine. The IR update should acknowledge the importance of avoiding this eventuality whilst providing strong assurances on contingency planning. Any such contingencies require first of all a comprehensive mapping of dependencies in critical value chains to be undertaken, this would ideally sit with the proposed new Government resilience lead.
24. Given the complexities and vulnerabilities highlighted above, a focus on UK resilience to geopolitical disruption is critically important.48 Economic dependence on China limits the UK’s response options when China challenges the international order and reduces the UK’s effectiveness as a global actor. While continuing cooperation with China in key areas, the Government’s goal should be to simultaneously increase the UK’s resilience: by reducing dependence on China for critical national infrastructure (new and emerging), energy security, consumer goods, critical minerals, medical products and technologies. Making the most of opportunities in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Canada, will be one way in which the UK can diversify its energy and critical minerals supply chains, although political instability in countries in these regions will need to be factored into the Government’s risk planning. A policy of diversification could never entail full economic decoupling from China. While identifying and accelerating the development of alternative supply chains in key areas should be a priority, maintaining a sensible level of economic engagement is important for UK interests. While protecting our security interests, the Government needs a clear plan for how it will manage the risk of decoupling, given recent US measures such as strengthened export controls. China represents an important security challenge for the UK; it is also an important partner. The Integrated Review acknowledged that the UK will need to continue to compete with China in some areas while cooperating in others. When updating the Integrated Review, the Government should address the long-term viability of this approach. The long-term goal must be to foster greater resilience and economic diversification, so that in the future the UK has more freedom to choose its actions in response to any aggression or human rights abuses by the PRC. Key to this is cooperation with key allies to improve our resilience, but also to ensure responses to hostile actions by the PRC are made multilaterally where possible. If we are more resilient to the PRC’s weaponisation of supply chains, we can be more effective on the world stage as a global player. Britain should stand absolute against interference in our own country by the PRC and this should be expressed within the IR.
25. We agree with the Integrated Review, that “the Euro-Atlantic region will remain critical to the UK’s security and prosperity”. The UK is uniquely placed geographically to embody this geopolitical reality and to act as a bridge between Europe and America (north and south). In our report A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, published in October 2020 prior to the IR’s publication, we recommended that both Europe and the Indo-Pacific should be priorities for UK foreign policy. This is because we cannot afford to choose between our near neighbourhood and a more distant region of great economic and geopolitical significance. We recommended that the UK would need to find new ways of maintaining its strong ties with European countries.49 However, the IR did not contain any substantive discussion of the UK’s future foreign and security policy relationship with the EU. This sent a clear message—advertently or inadvertently—that the UK intended to be less willing to see foreign policy cooperation with its EU allies as the default working assumption.
26. We acknowledge the difficulties and sensitivities in play at the time of the IR’s publication. The EU’s importance to collective security cannot be overlooked. Continued tensions between the UK and the EU, and failure to establish effective working relationships, would threaten the wider ability of the West to come together on many national and international security issues.50 The renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine has provided a new lens through which to examine our relationships with our European neighbours. The IR correctly identified that Russia would be “more active around the wider European neighbourhood”. The renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of cooperation with European partners on regional security issues,51 having created a humanitarian crisis and precipitated a global economic crisis with major impacts on the people of the UK,52 as well as heightening tensions in the Western Balkans. This has heightened the imperative for identifying areas and potential mechanisms for cooperation, as well as more clearly articulating our relationship with Turkey. Russian aggression in Europe directly threatens the UK and will continue to require dedicated and substantial focus, potentially through changes to European security structures to improve their resilience. Witnesses referred to the benefits of more concrete plans for closer cooperation with the EU and other European countries, through both mini-lateral and bilateral mechanisms.53
27. The original IR was drafted with the assumption that nuclear war was not a significant risk to the UK. Following the renewed illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, the nuclear threat now looms larger than it has for 30 years, and we expect this to be reflected in the IR.
28. Since the renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have both applied to join NATO. This highlights the increased security concerns of European countries as well as underpinning the primacy of NATO as Europe’s main defence alliance. The renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine has also led the US Biden administration to re-emphasise commitment to European defence. Political instability, economic problems and frequent changes in senior personnel have changed the way the UK is perceived. Working effectively in an alliance such as NATO requires trust. The Government has not yet set out a clear UK strategy for its relationship with the EU, which risks worsening as a result of continued disputes over the Northern Ireland Protocol.
29. There are signs that this gap has been recognised and is being bridged. On 28 November, the Government stated that the updated Integrated Review
will ensure that the UK remains on the cutting-edge of defence and security policy, keeping us safe around the world as we strengthen our foundations at home. It will set out the importance of building strong ties in Europe in the era after the UK’s departure from the EU, while also deepening partnerships in other parts of the world.54
The Prime Minister elaborated
We’re also evolving our wider post-Brexit relations with Europe … including bilaterally and engaging with the new European Political Community. But this is not about greater alignment. Under my leadership we’ll never align with EU law. Instead, we’ll foster respectful, mature relationships with our European neighbours on shared issues like energy and illegal migration … to strengthen our collective resilience against strategic vulnerabilities.55
30. We expect the updated IR to provide details on how the Prime Minister intends to realise these ambitions. The UK’s strategic culture is more conducive to broad and flexible arrangements, whereas the EU prefers, if not an institutional relationship, something that is more formalised.56 On the spectrum of informal to informal, the IR should articulate where it wants the starting point for this relationship to be and why. For this reason the Foreign Affairs Committee will doing further work to explore what form future EU-UK security and foreign affairs cooperation should take, and how this could be formalised.
31. The IR update provides the Government with an opportunity for a public explanation of the objectives and values underpinning the UK’s support for Ukraine. Clearly setting this out in the IR will support the public’s understanding of the increased spending that is required to defeat President Putin’s renewed illegal invasion of a democratic country.57 It also offers the opportunity to set out clearly that the UK has proven it remains committed to European security and its near neighbourhood. The Integrated Review notably lacked detail on the future of the UK’s relationship with its European partners and the EU. The renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine has altered the dynamics of European politics and provided a clearer lens through which to view UK-Europe security relations. It is important that the updated IR clarifies the nature of the UK’s security relationship with key European partners and the EU. We will be exploring further the extent to which this relationship should be formalised or institutionalised.
32. The world’s geopolitical and economic centres of gravity are continuing to shift towards the Indo-Pacific. This has not changed since the publication of the IR. Indeed, China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy and growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the growing economic strength of countries such as India and Indonesia, have highlighted the importance of this region for UK foreign policy.
33. Several significant events have taken place since the publication of the IR. US-led alliance structures have taken a big step forward with the formation of both AUKUS on 15 September 2021 and more intensive working within the Quad, of US, India, Japan and Australia. In our 2020 report on the Integrated Review, we recommended that the Government publishes clear priorities and additional resource allocations for the Indo-Pacific, and what the specific gains for the UK will be.58 The Government did not do so.
34. We urge the Government to set out how it intends to maximise the benefits of AUKUS for the UK in the IR update. We also expect that the Government’s ambitions for the UK’s future relationships with the Quad and ASEAN59 will be articulated in the document. A clear message on how the Government intends to undertake strategic coordination with France, as an important partner for the Indo-Pacific tilt, will also be important.60 In addition, the Indo-Pacific tilt notably lacked detail on the Government’s plans for future relations with India, which is an important omission given India’s growing global influence. We expect the IR update to address this gap, building on the Government’s May 2021 UK-India 2030 Roadmap.
35. The IR was ambitious in its objective for the UK to be a leading partner in the Indo-Pacific whilst also maintaining its leadership in Europe and across the world. The updated IR will need to take into account the UK’s new economic circumstances, as set out in paragraph 7. The current financial constraints facing the UK necessitate a re-evaluation of these ambitions. It could now be more challenging for the UK to exert leadership across the world in the way that the IR originally envisaged. The Government will need to make very difficult choices about the UK’s priorities over the next five years, about where the yield on investment will be highest, and about how to balance investment in crisis response and short-term measures (notably in the Euro-Atlantic) while also preparing to adapt to a world in which China is expected to be the largest economy by 2030.
36. In the context of the renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine and growing security threats to the wider European neighbourhood, there are those who question the rationale for the IR’s focus on the Indo-Pacific tilt. We do not accept that it is a question of “either-or” when it comes to UK engagement in the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic. Both are important to UK prosperity and security, and also reinforce one another. We do not have a choice as to where threats emanate from, nor where we must turn our focus to ensure our prosperity. As we stated in our 2020 report on the IR, the UK cannot effectively engage in the Indo-Pacific without a strong base in Europe, particularly considering the influence exercised by several European nations in international bodies such as the UN.61
37. The IR’s increased attention on the Indo-Pacific was correct and this remains the case. However, the term “tilt” implies a tilt away from something; in other words, away from Europe towards the Indo-Pacific. This is not the message the UK should be sending to the world. The renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the importance of the Euro-Atlantic for UK security. The IR update is an opportunity to set out, in more detail, how the Government will continue to pursue greater Indo-Pacific engagement, without this being at the expense of UK engagement in its European neighbourhood. The Government cannot afford to lose sight of the long-term challenges posed in the Indo-Pacific, nor that region’s wider relevance to the UK’s security and economic interests. However, the IR update will also need to address the immediate threat to European peace and security posed by Russia, and how the UK’s interests in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are not mutually exclusive. The Integrated Review was right to highlight the UK’s increasing interest in the Indo-Pacific. However, this refresh presents an opportunity to reset and clarify the UK’s relationships beyond the Indo-Pacific and specifically in the Euro-Atlantic. The Government should explain if, and how, it expects the UK to contribute to European security while maintaining the Indo-Pacific tilt, particularly at a time of considerably constrained resources. The IR refresh should also explain in more detail what policy objective the Government hopes to deliver with the Indo-Pacific tilt, or work away from the term “tilt”, and set out what the benefits to the UK will be.
38. Prioritising the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic does, by necessity, mean de-prioritising elsewhere. In our 2020 report on the IR, we asked the Government to publish what additional resources will be invested in the Indo-Pacific “tilt”, and what regions or budgets they will be drawn from.62 The Government has not been clear and transparent about this.
39. The original IR was notably sparse on details on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sahel regions. With the Government’s increased focus on the Indo-Pacific, as well as the need to address security concerns in the Euro-Atlantic, it is likely that leaders of MENA countries will be querying how they figure in the UK’s regional priorities. On support to security and sovereignty of MENA countries, the IR spoke of “self-reliance”.63 This language suggests that the UK may be withdrawing from its former responsibilities and commitments in the region. The IR did not provide any precise details on how it intends to facilitate this self-reliance, stating only that
We will ( … ) have thriving relationships in the Middle East ( … ) in support of a more resilient region that is increasingly self-reliant in providing for its own security.
40. A policy of security self-reliance implies a detachment from security in the region. This in turn risks creating a perception that the Government has a waning interest in supporting security and stability in countries with whom it has deeply entrenched historical ties. The goal of a security self-reliant MENA region may appear appealing from a UK perspective but, given the continued conflicts and fragility in the region, this will not be realisable in timeframe covered by the IR.64 Notably, power vacuums in Syria and Libya continue to fuel wider regional instability.65 The Integrated Review rightly acknowledged that instability overseas threatens our security at home. This statement does not align with any plans for reduced engagement with the world’s fragile states, as continued instability in these countries has direct consequences for the safety of people in the UK. Power vacuums, instability and other challenges in the Middle East risk threatening the UK people by, for example, increasing the terrorist threat, facilitating drugs flows into the UK, worsening humanitarian crises and intensifying the pressures caused by high migration in Europe, and potentially fuelling global health crises. The terrorist threat does not exist in a vacuum. It needs to be addressed by tackling issues of poor governance and the existence of safe havens for terrorist groups. Continued security support in fragile regions will be critical to upholding the UK’s resilience to these challenges.
41. Iran remains a destabilising actor in the Middle East through its proxies, and we note a lack of any global leadership on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), on which negotiations are continuing to founder.66 Iran also presents a very real and direct threat to the UK through its intelligence services, which on multiple occasions have planned to harm British nationals and individuals based in the UK.67 The updated IR will need to reassure us that the Government has clear plans for how it will challenge the rising threat of Iran.
42. The IR mentioned Afghanistan only twice, indicating little consideration had been given to the country. This lack of attention, and the shambolic failure of the US to engage with partners in advance of their declaration of withdrawal, had disastrous consequences. As we highlighted in our May 2022 report Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Government’s conduct of the Afghanistan withdrawal (Operation Pitting) involved systemic failures of intelligence, diplomacy, planning and preparation, much of which was attributable to the FCDO.68 We recognise the enormous evacuation effort that was undertaken, and praise all those who worked so hard to evacuate a record number of people in a short and difficult period. The IR stated that the UK “will support stability in Afghanistan, as part of a wider coalition”. This coalition is now dead, and it is unclear what the UK is now doing to support stability in the country following the withdrawal of allied forces. We expect to see clarity on this in the updated IR. A clearly articulated strategy for Afghanistan in the IR would help to reassure regional partners and provide an important guardrail for future FCDO policy decisions affecting these countries and the region.
43. Additionally, the refreshed IR will need to reflect that the UK may increasingly need to be able to operate without the support of the US. There are questions around the certainty of UK partnerships in the region, given that the Government called for NATO allies to help build a new coalition in Afghanistan to prevent the Taliban recapturing it, and this could not be established.
44. US reprioritisation towards the Indo-Pacific could create a leadership vacuum in other parts of the world that the UK could and should seek to fill, and as China will aim to do, for example through its new Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Belt and Road Initiative. The UK, with allies, will need to think about how it plans to counter China’s use of economic tools to expand its influence in non-aligned countries such as those in Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia. In this context, we welcome the pragmatic approach adopted by the Foreign Secretary to deepening relationships with such non-aligned countries and look forward to the IR update setting out how this will be done within the resources constraints we have highlighted. Recent years have shown that changes in political leadership in other countries can lead to significant changes in their national posture. The UK needs to adopt a foreign policy approach that is good for the UK whatever the season and regardless of who leads our major allies. The seeming withdrawal of the US from the international stage, coupled with the growing threats from authoritarian states, mean that it is more important than ever for the UK to fight for the multilateral system. As highlighted in our 2021 report, In the room: the UK’s role in multilateral diplomacy, for too long we have permitted authoritarian states to deeply embed themselves and expand their influence within the multilateral system, where we see them attempting to shape the language and control secretariats. It is not acceptable for the UK and others to simply criticise these states from the sidelines for pursuing their own ambitions, while failing to assert ourselves in these same fora.
45. The language of the Integrated Review and UK actions since its publication suggests that the Government is tilting away from the Middle East. We acknowledge the trade-offs involved in prioritising other regions but the Government should be careful to avoid any perception of disengagement from partners and fragile countries so close in proximity to our own. Instability in MENA will threaten UK citizens at home. We urge the Government to confirm whether it intends to deprioritise the Middle East and if so, how it will continue to promote peace and stability in these regions with fewer resources.
46. The IR should detail how the Government will actively fight to make sure the multilateral system remains one reflective of our core values and the rules-based international order. That means advancing a forward-leaning multilateral foreign policy and putting forward our own candidates in coordination with likeminded nations for key roles.
47. The Integrated Review update represents an important opportunity for the Government to revisit the assumptions underpinning the original IR, as well as to clarify its priorities and provide meaningful detail on areas previously overlooked.
48. When it comes to the UK’s relationship with China, the Government’s actions will be far more important than its words. Empty rhetoric will do nothing to help the UK address the challenge posed by China and any words that are not coupled with meaningful action will undermine the UK’s credibility. Ambitions to “decouple” from China must be tempered with pragmatism. While taking appropriate measures to protect our vital security interests and defend our values, we cannot achieve our global objectives on issues such as climate change without cooperation with China. The long-term goal must be resilience, so that we can continue to cooperate in important areas as needed but without being unduly constrained in our policy and security responses due to trade and supply chain dependencies.
49. The language of the Indo-Pacific “tilt” in the original Integrated Review sent an unhelpful message to the international community. To tilt towards something implies tilting away from somewhere else. We cannot afford any perceptions that the UK is deprioritising other vitally important parts of the world, notably the Euro-Atlantic. The increased focus on the Indo-Pacific region set out in the IR is sensible and well-justified; however, this cannot not be at the expense of our engagement in Europe or the Middle East. Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the importance of our relationship with our European neighbours; meanwhile, reduced UK engagement with fragile states in the MENA region and the Sahel risks further instability, with direct consequences for UK security. Balancing these regional priorities will be more difficult in the current constrained financial situation; but failure to do so risks further damage to the rules-based international order and increased risk to the security of the British people.
1. The Integrated Review has provided a robust and flexible framework to guide UK foreign policy decisions out to 2025. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has tested many of the assumptions underpinning the IR, and these have been found to hold true. A full-scale refresh is only warranted, given the scale of resources and time required to complete it, particularly at this exceptionally challenging time for Britain’s foreign and security policy, if the Government makes considerable changes or is prepared to fill in some of the gaps in more detail to justify this use of resources. Enhancing the resilience of the United Kingdom should be central to the refresh. (Paragraph 10)
2. We recommend that the forthcoming National Resilience Strategy includes the creation of a national resilience lead. Effective implementation of this strategy would include regular cross-Government meetings that discuss shared efforts to improve UK’s resilience to threats across all policy areas. (Paragraph 11)
3. The Integrated Review designated China as a “systemic competitor”. Strong language that is not coupled by action does nothing to alleviate confusion, and risks increasing uncertainty and undermining our credibility. The Government needs to be firmer and more explicit in articulating the UK’s security interests when it comes to China. The primary responsibility of the state is to keep its people safe. China poses a significant threat to the UK on many different levels. We would support the Government changing the language from “systemic competitor” to “threat” if it were accompanied by carefully calibrated and proportionate policy change, particularly on domestic resilience and security, rather than empty rhetoric. (Paragraph 17)
4. China represents an important security challenge for the UK; it is also an important partner. The Integrated Review acknowledged that the UK will need to continue to compete with China in some areas while cooperating in others. When updating the Integrated Review, the Government should address the long-term viability of this approach. The long-term goal must be to foster greater resilience and economic diversification, so that in the future the UK has more freedom to choose its actions in response to any aggression or human rights abuses by the PRC. Key to this is cooperation with key allies to improve our resilience, but also to ensure responses to hostile actions by the PRC are made multilaterally where possible. If we are more resilient to the PRC’s weaponisation of supply chains, we can be more effective on the world stage as a global player. Britain should stand absolute against interference in our own country by the PRC and this should be expressed within the IR. (Paragraph 24)
5. The Integrated Review notably lacked detail on the future of the UK’s relationship with its European partners and the EU. The renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine has altered the dynamics of European politics and provided a clearer lens through which to view UK-Europe security relations. It is important that the updated IR clarifies the nature of the UK’s security relationship with key European partners and the EU. We will be exploring further the extent to which this relationship should be formalised or institutionalised. (Paragraph 31)
6. The Integrated Review was right to highlight the UK’s increasing interest in the Indo-Pacific. However, this refresh presents an opportunity to reset and clarify the UK’s relationships beyond the Indo-Pacific and specifically in the Euro-Atlantic. The Government should explain if, and how, it expects the UK to contribute to European security while maintaining the Indo-Pacific tilt, particularly at a time of considerably constrained resources. The IR refresh should also explain in more detail what policy objective the Government hopes to deliver with the Indo-Pacific tilt, or work away from the term “tilt”, and set out what the benefits to the UK will be. (Paragraph 37)
7. The language of the Integrated Review and UK actions since its publication suggests that the Government is tilting away from the Middle East. We acknowledge the trade-offs involved in prioritising other regions but the Government should be careful to avoid any perception of disengagement from partners and fragile countries so close in proximity to our own. Instability in MENA will threaten UK citizens at home. We urge the Government to confirm whether it intends to deprioritise the Middle East and if so, how it will continue to promote peace and stability in these regions with fewer resources. (Paragraph 45)
8. The IR should detail how the Government will actively fight to make sure the multilateral system remains one reflective of our core values and the rules-based international order. That means advancing a forward-leaning multilateral foreign policy and putting forward our own candidates in coordination with likeminded nations for key roles. (Paragraph 46)
Members present:
Alicia Kearns, in the Chair
Chris Bryant
Stewart Malcolm McDonald
Bob Seely
Henry Smith
Royston Smith
Graham Stringer
Draft Report (Refreshing our approach? Updating the Integrated Review), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 49 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Fifth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).
Adjourned till Tuesday 10 January at 2 pm
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
Air Marshal Edward Stringer (Ret’d) CB, CBE, Senior Fellow, Policy Exchange; Ed Arnold, Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)Q1–14
Andrew Seaton, Chief Executive Officer, China-Britain Business Council; Veerle Nouwens, Senior Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI); Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind KC, Former Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth OfficeQ15–32
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan |
HC 169 |
|
2nd |
The cost of complacency: illicit finance and the war in Ukraine |
HC 168 |
|
3rd |
Encoding values: Putting tech at the heart of UK foreign policy |
HC 170 |
|
4th |
Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls |
HC 282 |
|
1st Special |
Lagos calling: Nigeria and the Integrated Review: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2021–22 |
HC 573 |
|
2nd Special |
Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 630 |
|
3rd Special |
The cost of complacency: illicit finance and the war in Ukraine: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 688 |
|
4th Special |
Encoding values: Putting tech at the heart of UK foreign policy—Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 811 |
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
In the room: the UK’s role in multilateral diplomacy |
HC 199 |
|
2nd |
Never Again: The UK’s Responsibility to Act on Atrocities in Xinjiang and Beyond |
HC 198 |
|
3rd |
Sovereignty for sale: the FCDO’s role in protecting strategic British assets |
HC 197 |
|
4th |
The UK Government’s Response to the Myanmar Crisis |
HC 203 |
|
5th |
Global Health, Global Britain |
HC 200 |
|
6th |
Sovereignty for sale: follow-up to the acquisition of Newport Wafer Fab |
HC 1245 |
|
7th |
Lagos calling: Nigeria and the Integrated Review |
HC 202 |
|
1st Special |
A climate for ambition: Diplomatic preparations for COP26: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 440 |
|
2nd Special |
Government response to the Committee’s First Report of Session 2021–22: In the room: the UK’s role in multilateral diplomacy |
HC 618 |
|
3rd Special |
Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report: The UK Government’s Response to the Myanmar Crisis |
HC 718 |
|
4th Special |
Government response to the Committee’s Third Report: Sovereignty for sale: the FCDO’s role in protecting strategic British assets |
HC 807 |
|
5th Special |
Never Again: The UK’s Responsibility to Act on Atrocities in Xinjiang and Beyond: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 840 |
|
6th Special |
Global Health, Global Britain: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report |
HC 955 |
|
7th Special |
Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report: Sovereignty for sale: follow-up to the acquisition of Newport Wafer Fab |
HC 1273 |
1 Gov.uk, PM outlines new review to define Britain’s place in the world, 26 February 2020.
2 Gov.uk, Prime Minister to tell UN General Assembly: I will lead Britain for a new era, 21 September 2022.
3 Letter from the National Security Adviser to Dame Margaret Beckett, 9 December 2022.
4 Gov.uk, Prime Minister: “Freedom and openness have never been achieved by standing still”, 28 November 2022.
5 Lord Howell of Guildford said that while the IR was a “valuable and useful document”, it suffered from the disadvantage that “it was completed before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which many predicted would never occur, and subsequent major global disruption of new and unanticipated kinds.” See: Lord Howell of Guildford (IRR0002).
6 The Integrated Review introduced two separate but related documents that were published shortly afterwards: the Defence Command Paper and the Defence Industrial Strategy. This report focuses primarily on the Integrated Review introduced in Global Britain, which set out the Government’s understanding of the UK’s strategic environment out to 2030 and the ways in which the UK will prepare, adapt and respond through its security, defence, development and foreign policy. Unless stated otherwise, any mentions of the IR in this report refer to the Global Britain document.
7 Air Marshall Edward Stringer gave the example of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which substantiated the IR’s designation of Russia as the “acute military threat”. RUSI’s Ed Arnold expanded on this, stating that “The UK got the fundamentals right in terms of the Euro-Atlantic being critical, Russia being the most acute threat across the domains, and NATO primacy, because that was a contested concept within European security.” See - Q1 [Edward Stringer and Ed Arnold].
9 While acknowledging that Government could have chosen to update the IR in other ways, Ed Arnold did not contest that the update is taking place.
11 UK Cabinet Office, The National Resilience Strategy: A call for evidence, 13 July 2021.
12 Centre for Long-Term Resilience (IRR0010)
13 Centre for Long-Term Resilience (IRR0010)
14 Ends (interests and objectives), ways (courses of action) and means (available resources) is the formulaic model commonly associated with the practice of strategy. General Sir Nick Carter said that the Government’s ends were defined in the integrated review. See: James F. Holcomb, Managing strategic risk, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2012; General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of Defence Staff IISS speech, Gov.UK, 31 March 2021.
15 Paul O’Neill, The UK’s Integrated Review at one year: fit for purpose? RUSI, 31 March 2021.
16 Analysis by the House of Commons Scrutiny Unit. Real terms changes have been calculated using GDP deflators, published by the Office for Budget Responsibility in November 2022. It should be noted that a large proportion of this change is due to reductions in ODA expenditure, the change from 0.7% of GNI to 0.5% of GNI, announced by then- Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, in November 2020. It should also be noted that in 2019–20, the FCO and DFID had yet to be merged.
19 The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) Partnership is a defence and security partnership established in September 2021 to protect and defend the participating country’s shared interests in the Indo-Pacific. See: Gov.uk, UK, US AND Australia launch new security partnership, 15 September 2021.
21 Integrated review of UK security, defence, development and foreign policy 2021
22 This includes the introduction of Xi Jinping’s Global Development Initiative, which is intended to serve as a means through which the PRC will assert its influence overseas through state aid and development projects. See: Chris Cash, What is China’s Global Security Initiative? Council on Geostrategy, 29 September 2022.
23 Lord Howell of Guildford (IRR0002).
24 “Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakable commitment. […] Complete reunification of our country must be realized, and it can, without doubt, be realized!”. See: Xi Jinping, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects, Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 16 October 2022.
25 Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University, Changes in the independence-unification stances of Taiwanese as tracked in surveys by the Electoral Study Centre, NCCU.
26 It should be noted that Xi Jinping has not given a timetable for reunification. It is expected that any invasion would be preceded by 18 months of visible military build-up, meaning that such an invasion would not come as a surprise. See: John Culver, How we would know when China is preparing to invade Taiwan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 October 2022.
27 Taiwan Policy Centre (IRR0017)
28 House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, The UK and China’s security and trade relationship: a strategic void, 10 September 2021, HL Paper 62
29 Gov.uk, PM speech to the Lord Mayor’s banquet, 28 November 2022.
30 Q20 [Sir Malcolm Rifkind]; RUSI Senior Research Fellow Veerle Nouwens agreed with Sir Malcolm’s view, stating that “systemic challenge” described the relationship with China “very well” and that she does not see any need to change that. Q20. [Veerle Nouwens].
31 The European Commission’s 2019 Strategic Outlook on EU-China relations described China as a “partner, competitor and a systemic rival”. The EU External Action Service said in April 2022 that the EU’s approach to relations with China set out in the 2019 Strategic Outlook. See: European Commission, EU-China Strategic Outlook, 2019; EU External Action Service, EU-China relations factsheet, 1 April 2022.
32 CEO of the China-Britain Business Council, Andrew Seaton, pointed to the most recent US National Security Strategy (NSS), which describes China as the most consequential global competitor for the US. Q20 [Andrew Seaton].
33 Q20 [Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Andrew Seaton]
34 House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, The UK and China’s security and trade relationship: a strategic void, 10 September 2021, HL Paper 62
35 Q20 [Sir Malcolm Rifkind]; Antony Blinken, The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China, The George Washington University, 26 May 2021
39 The BFPG also noted that the UK needs to be doing much more to build “system-wide strategic capability” so that the UK can continue to defend its essential national interests and play a strategic role among its Allies. See: BFPG (IRR0020)
40 Foreign Office slashes China centre funding, The Spectator, 30 June 2022
41 Beijing to Britain and the Oxford China Policy Lab told us that only 70 members of FCDO staff reached fluency or near fluency in Mandarin, while only 14 Foreign Office officials were trained last year. See: Beijing to Britain and Oxford China Policy Lab (IRR0006).
42 This is exemplified by European dependence on Russian fossil fuels, which has constrained the policy response to the illegal invasion of Ukraine.
43 Australia and Lithuania have recently faced economic coercion by the Chinese government, as retaliation for actions that the Chinese government viewed as going against its interests.
45 James Rogers, Dr Andrew Foxall, Matthew Henderson, and Sam Armstrong, Breaking the China Supply Chain: How the ‘Five Eyes’ can Decouple from Strategic Dependency, Henry Jackson Society, 14 May 2020
46 BFPG (IRR0020); Simon Geale, How China’s zero-COVID policy is affecting global supply chains, Proxima, 25 2022
47 The UN Conference on Trade and Development similarly estimated in 2016 that one-third of global shipping is carried through the South China Sea. See: Jill Goldenziel, China Claims To Own The Taiwan Strait. That’s Illegal, Forbes, 28 June 2022; UNCTAD, Review of maritime transport 2016, 2016.
48 While emphasising that the UK-China trade relationship must be maintained, Sir Malcolm highlighted the need for resilience, stating that “We have to be much more sensitive both on supply chains, so that we are not dependent on China for parts of our crucial national infrastructure, and also on shared technology, so that we do not end up allowing them, either legally or illegally, to gain access to technology they do not yet have for themselves.” Q21 [Sir Malcolm Rifkind]
49 Fourth Report of Session 2019–20, A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, 22 October 2020, HC 380
50 Professor Malcolm Chalmers, The UK as a reluctant middle power? RUSI, March 2021
52 British Foreign Policy Group (IRR0020)
54 Gov.uk, Prime Minister: Freedom and openness have never been achieved by standing still, 28 November 2022
55 Gov.uk, Prime Minister’s speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 28 November 2022
58 Fourth Report of Session 2019–20, A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, 22 October 2020, HC 380
59 ASEAN, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is a political and economic union of ten partners: Brunei, Cambodia, Loa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The UK has been a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN since 2021 and the first Plan of Action to implement the Dialogue Partnership was agreed on 4 August 2022. The Plan of Action outlines UK and ASEAN shared priorities across political, security, economic and global issues over the next 5 years. See: ASEAN, Member States, N.D; Gov.uk, UK-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership: Plan of Action 2022–2026, 4 August 2022.
60 SC Strategy (IRR0005); Mr Antoine Levesques (IRR0023)
61 Fourth Report of Session 2019–20, A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, 22 October 2020, HC 380
62 Fourth Report of Session 2019–20, A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, 22 October 2020, HC 380
63 Integrated review of UK security, defence, development and foreign policy 2021
64 Inga Trauthig, The Integrated Review and the Middle East: Trade Priorities, Self-Reliance and Pitfalls, King’s College London, 9 June 2021
65 Inga Trauthig, The Integrated Review and the Middle East: Trade Priorities, Self-Reliance and Pitfalls, King’s College London, 9 June 2021
66 Anchal Vohra, The Post-Iran-Nuclear-Deal World Won’t Be Pretty, Foreign Policy, 17 November 2022
67 MI5, Director General Ken McCallum gives annual threat update, 14 July 2022
68 First Report of Session 2022–23, Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, HC169, 24 May 2022
