This is a House of Commons Committee Special Report.
International Development Committee
UK aid for refugee host countries
Date Published: 20 October 2023
The International Development Committee published its Eighth Report of Session
2022–23, UK aid for refugee host countries (HC 426), on 26 May 2023. The Government response was received on 30 August 2023 and is appended to this report.
1. We welcome the committee’s report and its recommendations regarding UK aid for refugee host countries. We thank the committee for their valuable work examining the responsiveness of UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the needs of refugees and whether it provides effective, sustainable support for refugee host countries when displacement crises become protracted.
2. New displacement crises have emerged as protracted ones continue, bringing the number of forcibly displaced people to 108 million by the end of 2022. We all know this stretches the international community’s attention and the capacity of the humanitarian system to respond to new emergencies, with humanitarian-led responses increasingly unsuited to address protracted displacement crises. However, as the committee rightly highlights, the international community must maintain a resolute focus on displacement crises everywhere – this is our shared responsibility.
3. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made this even harder. It has displaced almost 14 million people and left around 18 million in need of humanitarian assistance as of May 2023. Not only has the invasion displaced millions of people it has also worsened food insecurity across the world, stretching humanitarian budgets even more thinly. The situation in Ukraine and emerging global challenges cannot be ignored, and it is right the UK should rise to meet these challenges by allocating ODA resources to them.
4. The UK remains committed to protecting the most vulnerable and returning to spending 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA as soon as the fiscal situation allows. We continue to be the third highest G7 spender of ODA as a percentage of GNI and have used our ODA strategically to influence other donors to support the most vulnerable. For example, through our joint leadership with the US and EU, we helped to delay a complete stop in food rations for over 960,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh by pushing back a break in the World Food Programme’s funding for food rations.
5. However, as the committee’s report rightly outlines, responding to the needs of refugee and host communities is not solely a humanitarian challenge, but also a development challenge. Ensuring Low- and Middle- Income Countries (LMICs) have predictable development financing to facilitate the inclusion of refugees into national systems (e.g., health, education, employment) is of paramount importance.
6. Whilst the committee’s report reflects on the UK’s efforts in supporting a shift towards longer-term, development-based approaches, particularly through the Jordan Compact, we would also note the wider changes in the donor landscape that we supported during the same period resulting from the World Bank’s Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) within the International Development Association (IDA; part of the World Bank Group). This was created in IDA18 (the eighteenth replenishment of IDA) and was a watershed moment to deliver support to refugees and host communities and reduce the burden on refugee host countries. Whilst our funding to IDA replenishments has not been specifically earmarked for the WHR, the UK was the largest donor to IDA18 (2017–20) and IDA19 (2021–22), with contributions of £2.52bn and £3.06bn, respectively. Of the total IDA18 envelope of $75bn, $1.9bn was channelled through this window. For IDA19, $1.3bn was channelled through this window from a $71bn envelope. Currently, as the third largest donor to IDA, we continue to support the World Bank to ensure refugee hosting countries have sustainable and long-term access to development finance, allowing them to support both refugee and host communities.
7. Whilst the committee’s report acknowledges that refugee host countries might resist implementing policies and programmes that signal that refugees could remain in their country, we believe in addition to resources challenges cited, it is also important to recognise the political challenges. Political will plays a central role in driving refugee host governments’ decision-making around whether to include refugees into national systems. We continue to advocate with refugee host countries the benefits of allowing refugees to access to rights (e.g., freedom of movement and work) and services (e.g., education and health). As the committee highlights in its report, Jordan is one example where we have had success with this combined diplomatic-humanitarian-development approach.
8. The UK championed a longer-term, development-based refugee response in the form of the Jordan Compact in 2016. The report identifies the Compact as a watershed moment in integrated development approaches to address protracted displacement, particularly in terms of its focus on access to employment. The Compact has generated positive outcomes for both refugee and host communities.
9. We welcome the achievements of the Compact to date, with over 350,000 work permits issued to Syrian refugees for employment in construction, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors. The presence of Syrian refugees in the labour market has provided a much-needed boost to local markets, as they bring a variety of skills and talents they can use in the Jordanian economy. Additionally, they contribute to the local economy through their spending.
10. However, barriers persist which have limited the full realisation of the Compact’s aims. One of the main challenges is the limited number of job opportunities available to refugees, particularly in sectors such as healthcare, education, and engineering, where refugees possess significant skills and experience. Additionally, the cost of obtaining a work permit can be prohibitive for some refugees, which can limit their access to employment opportunities. Faced with these challenges, including high youth unemployment, we are working with the Government of Jordan to minimise the obstacles to accessing permits and to encourage employers to employ refugees. We recognise that more investment and system strengthening is required to build an enabling environment where refugees and their hosts alike can deploy their skills and the benefits can accrue to local communities.
11. Since the Compact was signed in February 2016, the UK has funded over £500m in ODA (including Conflict Security and Stability Fund) programming. UK bilateral and CSSF ODA to Jordan for 23/24 is £28.2m (£22.8m bilateral and £5.4m CSSF) 76% of which is for the refugee response. It will be £58.6m (£53.2m bilateral and £5.4m CSSF) for 24/25 83% of which is for the refugee response. We provide humanitarian and development aid to help Jordan host refugees from regional conflicts and are working with Jordanian institutions to strengthen the economic, environmental, and political resilience needed to support Jordan’s stability. Our ODA programming supports Jordan’s macroeconomic stability through technical assistance, sustainable and inclusive growth through evidence and capacity building, and enhancing economic opportunities of both refugees and vulnerable Jordanians.
12. Overall, insufficient financial support from the international community is an issue for Jordan. This year, the World Food Programme has had to reduce cash assistance support, removing 50,000 refugees from their eligibility register and reducing the value of cash transfer by 35%. Similarly, Mercy Corps has had to close four of five health clinics in the Za’atari refugee camp due to a lack of funding.
13. The UK remains committed to helping Lebanon manage the pressures of hosting the largest per-capita refugee population in the world. We are continuing to provide humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs and alleviate suffering of the most vulnerable – both refugees and Lebanese – while supporting reforms of critical national systems to underpin a sustained and inclusive recovery. The UK is committing £10m in FY23/24 and up to £12m in FY24/25 for humanitarian assistance.
14. The committee’s report highlights the worsening economic situation in Lebanon, and in particular the impact this is having on Lebanon’s education sector. The UK has been a longstanding partner in this area and earlier this year our funding helped schools reopen after weeks of closure. Last year, similar action helped prevent the loss of the school year and therefore education opportunities for some half a million Lebanese and refugee children. We remain committed to working closely with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and international partners to ensure children can continue to receive an education and to support implementation of reforms crucial to the long-term resilience of the sector.
15. Ultimately, political, and economic reform is essential for Lebanon’s recovery and stemming growing humanitarian needs. We continue to urge election of a President and encourage the Government and Parliament of Lebanon to reach and implement an agreement with International Monetary Fund.
16. The committee’s report highlights three important issues that have significant impact on the prospects for a two-state solution. Namely, the increasingly violent situation in the West Bank, the rapid expansion of illegal Israeli settlements, and the rising trend of settler violence against Palestinians. These three issues, of course, do not paint the whole picture; there are many complicated factors that interact with the occupation and the conflict, and no side is without fault recently or in the past. But considering these three issues are important to understand the current health of the peace process.
17. Unfortunately, the security situation in the West Bank continues to deteriorate. At the end of the second quarter of 2023, there have been more than 150 Palestinians killed either by the Israeli security forces or by settlers, and over 20 Israelis have been killed in terrorist attacks, including British nationals Lucy, Maia, and Rina Dee. We call on the Palestinian Authority and its security forces to do more to combat incitement to violence, often antisemitic in nature, and to do more in exercising security control over Area A. And while we support Israel’s right to defend itself and its citizens, all military operations must comply with the principles of international humanitarian law. When there have been accusations of excessive force, there must be swift and impartial investigations.
18. Regarding the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which are illegal under international law, the Prime Minister reaffirmed our opposition to Israel’s policy of supporting settlement building in his evidence session before the Liaison Committee on 4 July 2023. The Foreign Secretary, along with his Canadian and Australian counterparts on 30 June 2023, stated the UK’s opposition to the recent announcement by the Israeli government to ‘advance’ almost 6,000 new settlement units. Settlements are a barrier to peace, and we ask Israel to halt and reverse its policy.
19. We have witnessed two incidents of settler violence of note in 2023 in the village of Huwara in February and in the town of Turmas Ayya in June. Of course, there have been many other, incidents as well. We condemned both those incidents and we welcomed the statement of 24 June 2023 by the Israel Defence Forces, Israeli Police and the Israeli Security Agency which said that the attacks “constitute, in every way, nationalist terrorism”. However, we note that, so far, only a small number of people were arrested, and no convictions have been made.
20. The UK welcomed the meetings between senior Israeli and Palestinians, alongside other partners, in Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh. We recognise that these meetings did not achieve a meaningful shift in the security situation. There has not been a third such meeting yet, but we still support this track because an open channel of communication between Israeli and Palestinian security officials is a vital tool for de-escalation in moments of heightened tension. The political horizon for a peace process and negotiations is not currently visible, but we still believe that a two-state solution offers the best prospects for achieving sustainable peace and it is the only way to protect Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature and realise Palestinian national aspirations. Peace negotiations are never straightforward, and setbacks are to be expected. We do not underestimate the challenges but believe that with the leadership of both parties, peace is possible.
21. Lastly, we recognise the unique mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), voting for its renewal most recently in December 2022, and its critical role in delivering essential services, protection and humanitarian assistance, while helping to maintain stability in the region. The UK remains committed to supporting Palestinian refugees and UNRWA until there is a negotiated two-state solution. The UK is committing £17m in FY23/24 and up to £29m in FY24/25 for humanitarian assistance. We remain concerned by the financial situation of the agency and continue to work with UNRWA’s Advisory Commission members, including host countries, to mobilise funding including diversifying UNRWA’s funding base.
22. We accept the committee’s recommendations. We agree with the committee that the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) is a key opportunity for the international community to push further on implementing the objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). We consider its objectives of easing pressure on host communities, improving refugee self-reliance, expanding access to resettlement, and supporting conditions for return in safety and dignity as the best framework to address rising global displacement and ensure refugees are supported to remain in the regions they are currently hosted rather than being driven to migrate irregularly towards Europe.
23. We agree the UK government should use its diplomatic relations with co-hosts, co-convenors, and other refugee host countries to develop effective and measurable pledges. We used our diplomatic network to bring together a broad range of stakeholders at a Wilton Park conference ‘Towards the Global Refugee Forum 2023’ to identify how the international community can deliver an impactful GRF, including through the development of pledges. An invite was extended to the committee. We hosted the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Switzerland as co-hosts, GRF co-convenor states, the World Bank, various UN agencies, donor and refugee host countries, refugee leaders, private sector, and other experts. The UK is considering pledges related to supporting access to education for refugee and host community children, tackling gender-based violence in refugee settings, expanding access to climate finance for refugee host countries, and highlighting our domestic refugee resettlement and integration activities as part of our burden and responsibility sharing. We will announce our pledges at the GRF in December.
24. We agree the UK government should ensure it fulfils its commitments under the GCR and we are doing so. UNHCR have a comprehensive GCR indicator framework which allows the international community to benchmark how far it has come since the GCR was introduced in 2018. We publish publicly available data and respond to data surveys through Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which enables UNHCR to monitor how the international community, including the UK, is fulfilling its commitments under the GCR.
25. We agree the UK government should use the GRF to push for action on commitments set out in the Grand Bargain and World Humanitarian Summit. The UK is a principled humanitarian actor. In line with our commitments under the Grand Bargain and the World Humanitarian Summit, our Humanitarian Framework (HF) sets out the three objectives of how we will drive reforms of the international humanitarian system to:
26. We partially agree the UK government should use the GRF to advocate for a global strategy to provide support for refugee host countries and address the underlying causes of crises. However, rather than advocating for a new global strategy we believe the GCR provides us with the best strategy to achieve predictable and equitable burden and responsibility-sharing given it proposes a clear programme of action to implement the GCR’s objectives and continues to have the backing of the international community (it was affirmed by 181 UN Member States at the UN General Assembly in December 2018). Five years on from the adoption of the GCR we still believe the vision and underpinning thinking in its programme of action hold even if progress on its implementation has not met the expectations of some partners, particularly major refugee host countries. We believe that we can achieve the changes the international community want to see through refining and developing the GCR’s programme of action further rather than attempting to renegotiate a new strategy. Therefore, we will work with partners across the international community both in advance and at the GRF to galvanise continued support for the GCR’s implementation. There have already been positive strides towards long-term development-based approaches to displacement and the GCR has provided a valuable strategy for facilitating the shift from humanitarian to development-led displacement responses.
27. We agree facilitating returns of refugees who wish to go back to their countries of origin should be a strategic objective not only of our development policy, but also our foreign policy and diplomacy. The UK recognises most refugees wish to return to their countries of origin. We remain committed to supporting voluntary return of refugees in safety and dignity, including in Lebanon, Jordan and the OPTs. We complement and enhance the impact of our ODA spend to facilitate returns through use of our diplomatic, geopolitical, and influencing efforts at Posts, in UK missions and through the UN Security Council and multilateral platforms. We use our diplomatic levers to give a voice to marginalised groups in crises and improve their protection, drive prioritisation and coordination of global humanitarian and development assistance, lead efforts on humanitarian access, and convene like-minded partners to shape more effective approaches to crises.
Once again, we thank the committee for its efforts in conducting this inquiry and producing its recommendations on this subject which is of such central interest to us all.