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The 1951 Geneva Convention defines who a refugee is and the legal protection, assistance and rights that they are entitled to receive from signatory countries.1 The Convention also defines refugees’ obligations to host governments and categories of people, such as war criminals, who do not qualify for refugee status. The 1967 Protocol further expanded the scope of the Convention.2 Governments decide whether an individual meets the definition of refugee in the Convention and will therefore ‘recognise’ them and issue the individual with refugee status.3 This inquiry uses the term refugees to describe individuals who meet the United Nations definition of a refugee:
A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries.4
1. In June 2022, we launched our inquiry on UK aid for refugee host countries.5 We wanted to scrutinise whether UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending is responsive to the needs of refugees and provides effective, sustainable support for host countries when displacement crises become protracted. As responses to such crises require collective action, we also wanted to identify opportunities for the international community to come together to develop effective, long-term strategies at the start of crises.
2. We decided to use case studies to inform our inquiry. Jordan and Lebanon have some of the highest levels of refugees per capita in the world and have been at the forefront of the Syria response for more than a decade. Both countries also have a history of hosting Palestinian refugees, who have been supported by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) since 1948.6 Jordan and Lebanon face similar challenges in hosting refugees, but the political and economic crisis in Lebanon has created significant complexities and vulnerabilities among the refugee and host communities.
3. To inform this inquiry, we obtained written evidence addressing the terms of reference, which were published on our website.7 We took oral evidence from witnesses both in the UK and overseas to explore the key issues. Our oral witnesses included the Ambassadors to the UK from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and from Lebanon.8 We also undertook a visit to Jordan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in October 2022 to meet key stakeholders, to observe the challenges that those countries face and to see UK funded programmes in action. We arranged an oral evidence session with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Minister, but he had to withdraw at short notice, so we put our questions to the Minister in writing.9
4. This inquiry was launched within months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which caused more than 8 million Ukrainian refugees to flee their homeland and to seek sanctuary across Europe.10 Many countries in Europe have faced the challenge of hosting large refugee communities and providing access to the rights and services those refugees need. Simultaneously, food and cash assistance for refugee populations in other parts of the globe has been slashed as budgets are stretched more thinly. In March 2023, the UN World Food Programme reduced the value of its General Food Assistance voucher for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh from US$12 to US$10 per person per month, while food rations for Congolese refugees in Burundi were halved.11 12
5. Despite international initiatives such as the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, which sought to provide a framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing, initial crisis responses often degenerate due to donor fatigue and funding reductions.13 In such cases, host countries cannot simply abandon refugee communities at their borders and are often left to pick up more of the associated costs. As well as being far from fair, such outcomes have economic consequences and carry risk for social cohesion in the host country.
6. A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee their country because of persecution, war or violence.14 When violence occurs, many people will flee their homes and seek sanctuary elsewhere in their country, becoming internally displaced. However, this inquiry focused on what happens when communities cross international borders to seek safety. In such cases, it is vital that refugees receive humanitarian assistance to meet their immediate needs. Typically, the international community mobilises and helps to provide the humanitarian response required. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has published the UK humanitarian framework to set out how it will deliver its response to humanitarian crises.15 However, the drivers of displacement are usually deep rooted and complicated. Diplomatic solutions are often difficult to identify and, in which cases refugee communities remain in host countries for many years. According to the World Bank, 76% of current refugees have been displaced for more than five years.16 Several refugee intention surveys undertaken by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show that most refugees want to return home, but they only want to do so when it is safe.17
7. Across the world, millions of people are hosted in countries neighbouring the land from which they have fled. Often these countries have low- or middle- income status and do not have sufficient resources to provide services to the new arrivals or to integrate them into national infrastructure. However, low- and middle- income countries are eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA) and can receive development aid from donor countries.18 As crises fall out of the headlines, however, donor funding tends to decline and refugees’ quality of life often becomes increasingly reliant on the goodwill of the host government.
8. Since violence broke out in 2011, more than half of Syria’s pre-war population of 22 million have fled their homes.19 Some 6.8 million are internally displaced, and more than 6 million have sought safety overseas.20 The countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey host 5.3 million Syrian refugees.21 The UK is a key donor to the regional response. Between February 2012 and December 2021, it spent more than £3.7 billion to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable people in Syria and refugees in the region, while also providing support to refugee-hosting countries.22 However, total international assistance to the crisis has been declining since 2016. Germany, the US and the EU have maintained funding levels for the region, but contributions by other donors have decreased, creating challenging funding conditions and pushing greater numbers of refugees into extreme poverty.23 24
9. In November 2020, the UK decided to reduce UK ODA from 0.7% Gross National Income (GNI) to 0.5% GNI, which led to decreased funding for refugee host countries such as Jordan and Lebanon.25 The UNHCR found that the UK’s aid cuts reduced confidence among host governments that the international community would ‘stay the course’ in supporting Syrian refugees and host countries for the foreseeable future.26
10. The UNHCR argued that the aid cuts reduced the standing of the UK as an advocate for refugee issues vis-à-vis host governments and as a ‘thought leader’ on donor policy. Furthermore, the UNHCR stated that its interactions with other donors suggest that the UK’s recent domestic policies such as the Migration and Economic Development Partnership with Rwanda, which enables the UK Government to relocate asylum seekers to Rwanda for processing, have reduced the UK’s standing internationally as an advocate on refugees and migration issues.27 28
11. As crises become protracted, refugees often seek access to the same infrastructure, public services and rights as citizens of the host country. The written evidence to this inquiry described the challenges that refugees frequently face in accessing adequate nutrition, healthcare, education, legal status, employment, social security, municipal services, water, sanitation and hygiene in the country where they are displaced.29
12. Many refugees will be traumatised by violence and conflict in their homeland and may have experienced significant loss. They might also experience trauma in the process of fleeing, including separation from family members, and feelings of social isolation.30 Responses to displacement crises should adopt a trauma-sensitive approach to avoid retraumatising individuals and to provide psychological support.
13. Refugees are often denied full employment rights in host countries and lack access to the formal employment sectors, which makes them rely on precarious and low-paid jobs in informal sectors or on food and financial support.31 They have been particularly vulnerable to recent shocks such as the covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which caused food and fuel prices to spike pushing more refugees into extreme poverty.32
14. The challenges experienced by refugees damage their well-being and their lives. For example, witnesses highlighted negative coping strategies adopted by Syrian refugees, such as begging, borrowing money, not sending their children to school, reducing health expenses, not paying rent, skipping meals and utilising child labour.33 Such strategies are not sustainable and increasing numbers of refugees are reported to be considering onward migration to Europe.34 To avoid such situations in future, the international community should assess at the start of a refugee crisis whether that crisis will become protracted over many years and plan accordingly. Refugee host countries might resist implementing policies and programmes that signal to their populations that refugees could remain in the country for an extended period, but it is vital that responses to refugee crises build long-term resilience. Their concerns could be offset by embedding diplomatic solutions to address the causes that prevent refugees from returning home. The international community must be able to demonstrate its lasting commitment to the host country and provide certainty that it will stay the course of the refugee response.
15. Jordan is an upper-middle-income country with a population of 11 million people. Some 74% of its population are below the age of 30.35 Jordan is a resource-poor, food-deficit country with dwindling energy and water resources and limited agricultural land.36 It has an unemployment rate of 23% and a youth unemployment rate of 50%.37 Jordan hosts around 675,000 Syrian and 87,000 refugees of other nationalities, including Iraqi, Somali and Sudanese communities who are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).38 In addition, more than 2 million Palestinian refugees are registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Jordan.39 H.E. Manar Dabbas, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the UK, explained how the refugee crisis had pushed Jordan from being the third to being the second most water-scarce country in the world. Some Jordanian households have seen the frequency with which they receive their water fall from every week to every four weeks.40
16. Some 83% of Syrian refugees in Jordan live among host communities. The remaining 17% of the refugees live in camp settings.41 The refugee situation is stable, because no new arrivals have been allowed entry to Jordan since June 2016.42 However, the UNHCR’s Socio-economic situation of refugees in Jordan Q4 2022 report shows that vulnerability among Syrian refugees remains high.43 In September 2022, the World Food Programme temporarily had to cut the value of its cash assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan by one-third from US $32 to $21 per month owing to reduced funding.44
17. The strategy adopted by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in Jordan is to use its Official Development Assistance (ODA) programmes to transition the refugee response from a parallel humanitarian approach to an integrated development approach that builds national systems, represents better value for money and delivers better outcomes for refugees and vulnerable Jordanians.45 This is the right approach to take. Refugee responses must meet the needs of not only refugees but host communities. That approach will reduce the risk of resentment and backlash from host communities, who might otherwise perceive that refugee communities are receiving assistance and resources that are not available to them.
18. The UK has had a positive influence on the regional response to the Syria crisis and has championed cash-assistance programmes, which provide refugees with more dignity and autonomy to choose what they want to buy than aid-in-kind approaches. However, UK ODA funding for programmes in Jordan has decreased by 61% from more than £140 million in 2019–20 to less than £55 million in 2022–23, while needs have not diminished.46
19. As previous iterations of Jordan response plans for Syrian refugees were not attracting sufficient funding or making much progress on longer-term integration, the UK and other donors came together at the 2016 high-level London Conference to try to create a more durable solution. That solution was the Jordan Compact.47
20. The Government of Jordan said that the Compact aspires to “turn the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity” for Jordan by shifting the focus from short-term humanitarian aid to education, growth, investment and job creation both for Jordanians and for Syrian refugees.48 The UNHCR described the Compact as a watershed moment, which resulted in increased funding for the region and set the tone globally for a new model of international engagement in refugee crises.49 The UNHCR praised the UK’s role in encouraging greater engagement from the World Bank and other international financial institutions (IFIs) which has reshaped the response in the region and globally.50 Annual international conferences on the Syria response have continued to generate funding pledges, and Jordan has issued more than 230,000 work permits to Syrian refugees in Jordan.51 However, international funding for the response in its current form is declining and a more sustainable development approach is needed to provide better outcomes for refugees and benefits for Jordan.
21. In October 2022, we visited Jordan to meet key stakeholders and to see the work that the Jordanian authorities are undertaking with the support of the international community to provide refugees with a safe place to stay while the crisis in Syria persists. We visited Za’atari refugee camp, which is home to around 80,000 people. We observed a classroom of female students who were studying for their final-year exams. We were impressed by the students’ skills and ambition to secure jobs in sectors such as engineering. However, we were saddened to learn about the lack of opportunities for these bright students to attend university or to undertake graduate jobs. We also observed the deteriorating state of the housing units in the camp, most of which were erected during the early phase of the crisis but have since exceeded their shelf life. The housing units are becoming dilapidated and require replacement, but current levels of international funding cannot support refurbishment.
22. Expectation State and the Refugee Investment Network argued that significant investment in skills training by international partners has not been matched by investment in job creation and promoting an enabling environment for work.52 The Norwegian Refugee Council suggested that pathways could be developed through programming to support market-appropriate vocational education training alongside partnerships with higher education institutions to enable more refugees to access higher education and graduate jobs.53 However, the youth unemployment rate among Jordanians is over 50%.54 Targeted vocational training should be utilised to prepare young people from both refugee and host communities for the jobs available. Initiatives that provide refugees with access to both education and decent jobs are vital to ensure that refugee lives are not wasted in refugee camps, but it will take international investment in host countries’ economies to realise that potential.
23. The situation in Lebanon is desperate. Lebanon hosts the highest number of refugees per capita worldwide. The total population of Lebanon is around 5.5 million people, and the Lebanese Government estimates that it hosts 1.5 million Syrian refugees and 13,715 refugees of other nationalities.55 Furthermore, more than 479,000 Palestinians are registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in Lebanon.56 Many are second and third generation refugees, descended from Palestinians who were displaced in the 1948–49 Arab-Israeli War and the 1967 Six-Day War. The conflict in Syria has forced many Palestinian refugees from Syria to flee to Lebanon in search of safety. About 45% of those Palestinian refugees live in the country’s 12 refugee camps. Conditions in the camps are characterised by overcrowding, poor housing, unemployment and poverty.57
24. Between 2019 and 2021, Lebanese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita decreased by more than 36% and unemployment reached 30% in 2022.58 Lebanon was downgraded by the World Bank to lower-middle income country status from upper middle-income status. Such a severe contraction is usually associated with countries at war.59
25. The economic and financial crisis that started in October 2019 has been largely blamed on economic mismanagement and incompetence by the Government of Lebanon.60 However, the crisis was exacerbated by the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, inflation caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the massive Port of Beirut explosion in August 2020. Purchasing power has been eroded as prices soar and wages stagnate. Subsidies on most basic commodities were lifted in September 2021, increasing the costs of essential items, including food, fuel, and medicine.61 Throughout 2021, the price of petrol increased by 1,000% and of cooking gas by 955%.62 Nearly two-thirds of all households have reported that they are experiencing challenges in affording the essentials due to job losses or reduced employment.63 H.E Rami Mortada, Ambassador of Lebanon to the UK told us that 80% of households in Lebanon are now in humanitarian need.64
26. The economic crisis has also severely affected Lebanon’s healthcare system. Lebanese hospitals have been operating at 50% capacity due to fuel shortages.65 Almost 40% of skilled medical doctors and 30% of registered nurses have left the country.66 Since the lifting of government subsidies, the cost of essential medications has dramatically increased and these are now often missing from pharmacies across the country.67 The UK has historically invested heavily in Lebanon’s education system to ensure access for both refugee and Lebanese children. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, learning outcomes were poor.68 Despite support from the international community, the education sector is now in crisis. The FCDO set out that the reopening of schools after nearly two years of closure due to the pandemic has been slow and beset with challenges.69 The Lebanese Ambassador explained the shift system that enabled Lebanese students to attend school in the morning and Syrian students to attend schools in the afternoon. However, the economic crisis has caused this system to break down:
This year, because of the depreciation and diminishment of teachers’ wages, teachers of the morning shift have gone on strike, because their wages do not allow them to commute to school; a teacher today makes around £20 or £25 a month. So the morning shift has stopped. The afternoon shift, for Syrian refugees, was continuing, because the funding was secured, but it started to cause civil strife. Parents said, “There is no way our children remain at home and refugee children go to school.” So the Minister of Education finally decided to shut down both shifts, and today 170,000 Syrian students cannot go to school and 235,000 Lebanese students also cannot go to school.70
27. Some 90% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are living in extreme poverty.71 ActionAid found that refugees, particularly young women and girls, have limited education opportunities, increasing the risks of early marriages, child labour and an overall absence of agency over their lives.72 Results from the most recent UN Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) in Lebanon published in January 2022 showed that
28. Some 80% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon have no legal residency documents.74 The government stopped allowing UNHCR to register Syrians in 2015.75 Palestinian refugees remain classified as “foreigners” by the government and are denied many of the rights afforded to Lebanese nationals.76 Complex bureaucracy, prohibitive paperwork requirements and fees have hindered refugees from renewing their residency status, which has knock-on effects for economic integration, legal housing options and schooling.77 Documentation checks by security forces and police at checkpoints across cities largely target men, reducing those men’s ability to work, to access health care and to register child births due to fear of arrest, detention, and deportation if they do not have valid documentation.78
29. Due to restrictions on employment in formal sectors, some 80% to 90% of working refugees are working illegally with no protections.79 Men are often unable to provide for their families, which can lead to depression, frustration, and cases of domestic violence. Refugees without valid residency status face heightened risks of exploitation, particularly if they are reluctant to seek justice from the police and in the law courts for fear of arrest and deportation.80
30. The FCDO stated that the interlinked political and economic crises are putting Lebanon at risk of state failure.81 It said that providing humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs, alleviate suffering and contribute to stability are the primary goals of UK assistance.82 To ensure refugees’ long-term needs are met, it takes a ‘whole of Lebanon approach’, which involves providing assistance to vulnerable Lebanese individuals as well as to refugees.83 This approach is welcome, and the UK will continue to engage with the international community and International Finance Institutions (IFIs) on the macro-economic reforms needed for a long-term solution to the economic situation in Lebanon.84
31. The UK continues to support the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), which is funded by the international community. The plan aims to:
32. As a World Bank stakeholder, the UK supported a $246 million ‘Emergency Crisis and Covid-19 Response Social Safety Net’ loan to expand coverage of the National Poverty Targeting Programme.86 The UK supports security and stability in Lebanon through non-ODA funding to the Lebanese Armed Forces; and through ODA funding to the Internal Security Forces.87 However, the UK’s aid budget for Lebanon has decreased by 88% from almost £260 million in 2019–20 to £32 million in 2021–22.88 The UNHCR found that the most direct impact of UK funding cuts has been on the well-being of refugees, at a time when poverty among refugees and host communities is rising dramatically.89 It also reduced the ability of UK funded humanitarian agencies to deliver effective programmes and for the UK to negotiate with the Government of Lebanon on a transition towards greater inclusion of refugees in national systems.90
33. Hezbollah presents another challenge for international actors supporting refugees. Hezbollah holds elected offices and governs several impoverished urban areas in Lebanon.91 However, it is a terrorist organisation and is proscribed by several donor countries, including the US and the UK.92 This proscription severely constrains humanitarian programming and challenges humanitarian principles. FCDO’s implementing partners may face the dilemma of navigating diverse donor restrictions on the one hand, and respecting the democratically elected office of mayors, municipal councillors, parliamentarians and ministerial offices on the other.93
34. We are concerned by reports of increased violence against Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the use of anti-refugee rhetoric, including by sections of the media and members of the Government of Lebanon.94 We welcome the reassurances that we received from the Lebanese Ambassador to the UK that refugees will not be forcibly returned to Syria.95 Non-refoulment is a key principle of international law.96 All refugee returns must be safe, dignified and voluntary. We are pleased that UNHCR access to border crossing points to monitor returns to Syria has been reinstated.97
35. To inform our inquiry, we visited East Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank. We met key stakeholders and visited UK-funded projects, including programmes run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).98 During our visit to East Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank in October 2022, we observed the challenges facing Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. We witnessed the checkpoints that hinder Palestinians from getting to work and school. We heard first-hand testimony from individuals whose homes have been demolished and whose children had been detained by the Israeli authorities. We saw the Palestinian and Israeli communities facing each other across the valleys, often separated by high barriers. The modern Israeli settlements contrasted with the crumbling infrastructure in Palestinian camps.
36. We observed the systematic construction of Israeli settlements in Area E1 of the occupied West Bank, which will divide the territory in two if allowed to continue. In the context of these human rights abuses, tensions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories have escalated. In the first quarter of 2023, 84 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces.99 That figure is almost four times higher than during the same period in 2022. The number of Israelis killed so far in 2023 in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel increased to 18 in the same period, in addition to a foreign national and a soldier. There were six deaths in the equivalent period in 2022.100
37. The British Consulate General in East Jerusalem undertakes vital work on political, commercial, security and economic interests between the UK and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.101 We commend its efforts to oppose settler violence committed against Palestinians and the demolition of Palestinian homes by Israeli authorities. We agree with its statement that
Settler violence is a result of Israel’s continued settlement activities. Settlements are illegal under international law, fuel tensions and undermine the viability of the two-state solution and the prospect for a lasting peace in the region.102
38. In his written response to our questions, the Minister for Development reasserted the UK’s commitment to the two-state solution, describing it as the only viable solution.103 He added:
The UK’s longstanding position on the Middle East Peace Process is clear: we support a negotiated settlement leading to a safe and secure Israel living alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state; based on 1967 borders with agreed land swaps, Jerusalem as the shared capital of both states, and a just, fair, agreed and realistic settlement for refugees.104
Officials from Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and the United States held talks in Aqaba, Jordan in February 2023 and in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in March 2023, where they committed to de-escalate the situation on the ground.105 However, this sentiment does not reflect reality. Our assessment of what we saw and heard in East Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank, is that it is impossible to envisage how the two-state solution could be implemented in the current context. The UK Government and the international community should recognise that truth and reset their diplomatic position to address the reality on the ground. The UK Government uses its diplomatic relations with Israel to raise concerns about Israeli settlement building and human rights abuses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, but the 2030 roadmap for UK-Israel bilateral relations, published in March 2023, stated that the bilateral relationship has never been stronger:
Our 2 countries complement each other’s strengths. As freedom-loving, innovative and thriving democracies, Israel and the UK are proud of our deep and historic partnership. We are firm friends and natural allies.106
39. In the absence of state provision, UNRWA delivers core services to Palestinian refugees, such as, primary healthcare, education, social protection, and camp improvement in Jordan, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria. It was established following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees.107 The UK has consistently voted at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for UNRWA’s mandate renewal.
40. The UK provides annual funding to UNRWA to support the provision of basic services to more than 5.8 million Palestinian refugees living in the Middle East. Between 2016–2021, UK funding covered between 6% and 9% of UNRWA’s core delivery services.108 Since 2018, UK funding to UNRWA has decreased by about 60% from approximately £70.3 million in 2018 to £28.6 million in 2021.109 The cycle of mandate renewal and funding pledges fails to provide long-term certainty for UNRWA and is a flawed model for providing municipal-style services. When donors reduce funding to UNRWA, UNRWA cannot exclude beneficiaries from receiving essential services, but it does not have the means to continue providing these services at the same level and with the same quality.110 During our visit to East Jerusalem we were told that if this lifeline were to be wound down or withdrawn, a vacuum would open for others to exploit. We heard stark warnings about the risk of radicalised groups stepping into the void, with potentially dangerous consequences. In future, the international community must work with the authorities in refugee host countries to integrate refugees into national systems to provide a sustainable approach to service provision that does not rely on annual top-ups by donors.
41. The international community must provide funding and resources to ensure that refugees have the opportunities, rights and assistance that they need to support themselves for the duration of their stay in the host country. The UK must work with the international community to identify and adopt a fair and equitable process to share that responsibility as current practices are failing refugees and failing refugee hosting countries.
42. On 17 December 2018, the United Nations General Assembly affirmed the Global Compact on Refugees.111 This is a framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing, recognising that a sustainable solution to refugee crises cannot be achieved without international co-operation. It provides a blueprint for governments, international organisations and other stakeholders to ensure that host communities get the support that they need and that refugees can lead productive lives.112 Its four key objectives are to:
However, recent funding shortfalls demonstrate that more needs to be done to realise those objectives.
43. The UN’s Global Refugee Forum is taking place in December 2023.114 This is a key opportunity for the international community to work towards implementing previously agreed initiatives and pledges and to find solutions to the issues that are holding up progress. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Ministers are currently considering what pledges they will bring to the 2023 Global Refugee Forum.115 Before the Forum, the UK Government should use its diplomatic relations with the Forum co-hosts, Republic of Colombia, Japan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, France, the Republic of Niger, the Republic of Uganda, the Swiss Confederation, the UNHCR and other refugee hosting countries to develop effective, measurable pledges for action.
44. To maintain international credibility on refugee issues, the UK Government should ensure that the UK has fulfilled its commitments under the Global Refugee Compact.116
45. The UK Government has adopted an approach in Jordan and Lebanon that incorporates the needs of the host community in its refugee response programming. It should use the Global Refugee Forum to advocate humanitarian response plans that distribute assistance according to vulnerability rather than someone’s immigration status. It must ensure that future responses to displacement crises adopt a trauma-sensitive approach to avoid retraumatising individuals and to provide psychological support.
46. The UK Government should use the Forum to push for action on the commitments set out in the Grand Bargain which was agreed at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 to:
increase and support multi-year investment in the institutional capacities of local and national responders, including preparedness, response and co-ordination capacities, especially in fragile contexts and where communities are vulnerable to armed conflicts, disasters, recurrent outbreaks and the effects of climate change.117
The UK must avoid imposing unsuitable approaches from outside on refugee host countries. Instead, it should work with local civil society organisations to identify and implement best practice for each context. It should recognise the vital role that municipalities play in providing support and services as part of a broader effort to shift power and resources to affected communities.
47. The UK Government should use the Forum to discuss with the international community what lessons have been learned from current protracted crises. It should advocate for a global strategy that can be extended over the short-, medium- and long- term, to provide predicable support for refugee host countries and embeds a commitment to find diplomatic solutions to address the underlying causes of the crisis from the start. The strategy should set out how the international community will support host countries to move from the initial humanitarian response to a long-term development approach that incorporates access to education, healthcare, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, social security, and essential infrastructure. It should also include recommendations on how to incorporate refugees into national systems rather than setting up parallel mechanisms for delivering essential services. This must be supported by long-term financing mechanisms that host countries can rely on when traditional aid provision tails off.
48. UNHCR surveys of refugee intentions indicate that most refugees wish to return to their country of origin, when it is safe to do so. Displacement crises will only be solved once communities have a safe and dignified route to return. Facilitating such routes must be strategic objectives of not only UK development policy, but UK foreign policy and diplomacy.
1. The UN’s Global Refugee Forum is taking place in December 2023. This is a key opportunity for the international community to work towards implementing previously agreed initiatives and pledges and to find solutions to the issues that are holding up progress. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Ministers are currently considering what pledges they will bring to the 2023 Global Refugee Forum. (Paragraph 43)
2. Before the Forum, the UK Government should use its diplomatic relations with the Forum co-hosts, Republic of Colombia, Japan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, France, the Republic of Niger, the Republic of Uganda, the Swiss Confederation, the UNHCR and other refugee hosting countries to develop effective, measurable pledges for action. (Paragraph 43)
3. To maintain international credibility on refugee issues, the UK Government should ensure that the UK has fulfilled its commitments under the Global Refugee Compact. (Paragraph 44)
4. The UK Government has adopted an approach in Jordan and Lebanon that incorporates the needs of the host community in its refugee response programming. It should use the Global Refugee Forum to advocate humanitarian response plans that distribute assistance according to vulnerability rather than someone’s immigration status. It must ensure that future responses to displacement crises adopt a trauma-sensitive approach to avoid retraumatising individuals and to provide psychological support. (Paragraph 45)
5. The UK Government should use the Forum to push for action on the commitments set out in the Grand Bargain which was agreed at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 to:
increase and support multi-year investment in the institutional capacities of local and national responders, including preparedness, response and co-ordination capacities, especially in fragile contexts and where communities are vulnerable to armed conflicts, disasters, recurrent outbreaks and the effects of climate change.
The UK must avoid imposing unsuitable approaches from outside on refugee host countries. Instead, it should work with local civil society organisations to identify and implement best practice for each context. It should recognise the vital role that municipalities play in providing support and services as part of a broader effort to shift power and resources to affected communities. (Paragraph 46)
6. The UK Government should use the Forum to discuss with the international community what lessons have been learned from current protracted crises. It should advocate for a global strategy that can be extended over the short-, medium- and long- term, to provide predicable support for refugee host countries and embeds a commitment to find diplomatic solutions to address the underlying causes of the crisis from the start. The strategy should set out how the international community will support host countries to move from the initial humanitarian response to a long-term development approach that incorporates access to education, healthcare, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, social security, and essential infrastructure. It should also include recommendations on how to incorporate refugees into national systems rather than setting up parallel mechanisms for delivering essential services. This must be supported by long-term financing mechanisms that host countries can rely on when traditional aid provision tails off. (Paragraph 47)
7. UNHCR surveys of refugee intentions indicate that most refugees wish to return to their country of origin, when it is safe to do so. Displacement crises will only be solved once communities have a safe and dignified route to return. Facilitating such routes must be strategic objectives of not only UK development policy, but UK foreign policy and diplomacy. (Paragraph 48)
Sarah Champion, in the Chair
Richard Bacon
Mrs Pauline Latham
Chris Law
Nigel Mills
Navendu Mishra
Rt Hon David Mundell
Kate Osamor
Mr Virendra Sharma
Draft Report (UK aid for refugee host countries), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 48 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Defining who is a refugee introduction agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Eighth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Tuesday 6 June at 2.00 p.m.
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
H.E. Manar Dabbas, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Kingdom of JordanQ1–22
Amy Schmidt, Country Director, Norwegian Refugee Council Jordan; Sabine Abi Aad, Communications and Campaigns Coordinator, ActionAid Arab Region; Dominik Bartsch, Representative in Jordan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)Q23–45
H.E Rami Mortada, Ambassador, Embassy of Lebanon in the United KingdomQ46–73
Najat El Hamri, Regional Director, Middle East, MAG (Mines Advisory Group); Suzanne Takkenberg, Country Director, Action Against Hunger Lebanon; Hoda Samra Souaiby, Senior media and communications advisor, UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), LebanonQ74–100
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
RHC numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 ActionAid UK (RHC0011)
2 Age International (RHC0008)
3 Amnesty International UK (RHC0026)
4 British Red Cross (RHC0025)
5 Cakal, Dr Huseyin (Lecturer in Psychology, Keele University) (RHC0001)
6 Christian Aid (RHC0023)
7 Danish Refugee Council (RHC0019)
8 Development Initiatives (DI); and Durable Solutions Platform (DSP) (RHC0014)
9 Embrace the Middle East (RHC0018)
10 Expectation State; and Refugee Investment Network (RHC0004)
11 FCDO (RHC0005)
12 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (RHC0030)
13 Hayes, Dr Aneta (Senior Lecturer in Education , Keele University) (RHC0002)
14 MAG (Mines Advisory Group) (RHC0003)
15 Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) (RHC0012)
16 Mosaik Education (RHC0017)
17 Norwegian Refugee Council (RHC0009)
18 ReBUILD for Resilience (RHC0010)
19 The Henry Jackson Society (RHC0028)
20 The Institute of Development Studies (RHC0013)
21 UK NGO Syria Advocacy Group (RHC0027)
22 UNHCR (RHC0022)
23 UNRWA (RHC0024)
24 University of Sussex (RHC0029)
25 World Food Programme (RHC0015)
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st Report |
Racism in the aid sector |
HC 150 |
|
2nd Report |
Food insecurity |
HC 504 |
|
3rd Report |
From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world |
HC 149 |
|
4th Report |
(Fourth Report of the International Development Committee) - Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls |
HC 282 |
|
5th Report |
Extreme poverty and the Sustainable Development Goals |
HC 147 |
|
6th Report |
Aid spending in the UK |
HC 898 |
|
7th Report |
Debt relief in low-income countries |
HC 146 |
|
1st Special Report |
Afghanistan: UK support for aid workers and the Afghan people: Government response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2021–22 |
HC 152 |
|
2nd Special Report |
Food insecurity: Government response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 767 |
|
3rd Special Report |
UK aid to Pakistan: Government Response to the Sixth Report of the Committee |
HC 829 |
|
4th Special Report |
From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world: Government response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 992 |
|
5th Special Report |
Racism in the aid sector: Government response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 956 |
|
6th Special Report |
Extreme poverty and the Sustainable Development Goals: Government response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2022–23 |
HC 1177 |
|
7th Special Report |
Aid spending in the UK: Government response to the Committee’s Sixth Report |
HC 1367 |
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st Report |
Assessing DFID’s results in nutrition Review: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 103 |
|
2nd Report |
Global Britain in demand: UK climate action and international development around COP26 |
HC 99 |
|
3rd Report |
The UK’s approach to tackling modern slavery through the aid programme: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 104 |
|
4th Report |
International climate finance: UK aid for halting deforestation and preventing irreversible biodiversity loss: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 730 |
|
5th Report |
Afghanistan: UK support for aid workers and the Afghan people |
HC 919 |
|
6th Report |
UK aid to Pakistan |
HC 102 |
|
1st Special Report |
The humanitarian situation in Tigray: Government Response to the Committee’s Tenth Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 554 |
|
2nd Special Report |
The UK’s Support to the African Development Bank Group: report from the Sub-Committee on the work of ICAI: Government Response to the Committee’s Ninth Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 555 |
|
3rd Special Report |
DFID’s results in nutrition Review: report from the Sub-Committee on the work of ICAI: Government response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 780 |
|
4th Special Report |
Global Britain in demand: UK climate action and international development around COP26: Government response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 1008 |
|
5th Special Report |
The UK’s approach to tackling modern slavery through the aid programme: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI: Government response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 1021 |
|
Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Humanitarian crises monitoring: the Rohingya |
HC 259 |
|
2nd Report |
Effectiveness of UK aid: interim findings |
HC 215 |
|
3rd Report |
The Newton Fund review: report of the Sub-Committee on the work of ICAI |
HC 260 |
|
4th Report |
Effectiveness of UK aid: potential impact of FCO/DFID merger |
HC 596 |
|
5th Report |
Humanitarian crises monitoring: impact of coronavirus (interim findings) |
HC 292 |
|
6th Report |
The Changing Nature of UK Aid in Ghana Review: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 535 |
|
7th Report |
Progress on tackling the sexual exploitation and abuse of aid beneficiaries |
HC 605 |
|
8th Report |
Covid-19 in developing countries: secondary impacts |
HC 1186 |
|
9th Report |
The UK’s support to the African Development Bank Group: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 1055 |
|
10th Report |
The humanitarian situation in Tigray |
HC 1289 |
|
1st Special Report |
Follow up: sexual exploitation and abuse in the aid sector: Government Response to the First Report of the Committee |
HC 127 |
|
2nd Special Report |
Humanitarian crises monitoring: the Rohingya: Government Response to the First Report of the Committee |
HC 658 |
|
3rd Special Report |
The Newton Fund review: report of the Sub-Committee on the work of ICAI: Government response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 742 |
|
4th Special Report |
Effectiveness of UK Aid: Interim Report & Effectiveness of UK Aid: potential impact of FCO/DFID merger: Government Response to the Second & Fourth Reports |
HC 820 |
|
5th Special Report |
Humanitarian crises monitoring: impact of coronavirus (interim findings): Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report |
HC 1160 |
|
6th Special Report |
The Changing Nature of UK Aid in Ghana Review: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI: Government response to the Committee’s Sixth Report |
HC 1198 |
|
7th Special Report |
Progress on tackling the sexual exploitation and abuse of aid beneficiaries: Government Response to the Seventh Report of the Committee, Session 2019–21 |
HC 1332 |
|
8th Special Report |
Covid-19 in developing countries: secondary impacts: Government Response to the Eighth Report of the Committee |
HC 1351 |
1 UNHCR UK The UN Refugee Agency, The 1951 Refugee Convention, accessed May 2023
2 USA for UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, What is a Refugee?, accessed May 2023
3 For example: Refugee Council, The truth about asylum, accessed May 2023
4 USA for UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, What is a Refugee?, accessed May 2023
5 House of Commons International Development Committee, MPs probe UK aid to countries hosting refugees, 17 June 2022
6 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Where we work, accessed May 2023
7 House of Commons International Development Committee, UK aid for refugee host countries, accessed May 2023
8 House of Commons International Development Committee, Transcript of oral evidence session with HE Manar Dabbas, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the UK, 15 November 2022, and Transcript of oral evidence session with HE Rami Mortada, Ambassador of Lebanon to the UK, 17 January 2023
9 The Minister of State for Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and United Nations at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office was scheduled to attend the IDC session on Tuesday 21 March 2023. Six days before the session, the Department informed the Committee it would be more suitable for the FCDO Minister of State for Development and Africa to provide evidence to this inquiry. The Minister of State for Development and Africa was not able to attend the session on 21 March and offered dates in May 2023. To avoid causing further delay to this Report, the Committee decided to put its questions to the Minister for Development and Africa in writing. House of Commons International Development Committee, Correspondence from Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell, Minister for Development and Africa, 30 March 2023.
10 UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR: One year after the Russian invasion, insecurity clouds return intentions of displaced Ukrainians, accessed May 2023
11 UN World Food Programme, Lack of funds forces WFP to cut rations for Rohingya in Bangladesh, 17 February 2023
12 UN World Food Programme, WFP to reduce food rations by half for refugees as funding decreases in Burundi, 30 March 2023
13 UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, The Global Compact on Refugees, accessed May 2023
14 USA for UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, What is a Refugee?, accessed May 2023
15 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, UK humanitarian framework, accessed May 2023
16 World Bank, Forced Displacement, Refugees, Internally Displaced and Host Communities, accessed May 2023
17 For example: UNHCR, Seventh regional survey on Syrian refugees’ perceptions and intentions on return to Syria, June 2022, UNHCR, UNHCR: One year after the Russian invasion, insecurity clouds return intentions of displaced Ukrainians, 23 February 2023
18 The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) sets the rules on what can be counted as Official Development Assistance. OECD, Official Development Assistance (ODA), accessed 23 May 2023
19 BBC News, Why has the Syrian war lasted 12 years?, 2 May 2023
20 Ibid
21 UNHCR, Operational data portal: Refugee situations, accessed May 2023
22 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
24 World Food Programme (RHC0015)
25 HC Debate, 26 November 2020, Vol 684, Column 1018, Official Development Assistance
27 Ibid
28 Home Office, Migration and Economic Development Partnership with Rwanda: equality impact assessment, accessed May 2023
29 For example: Age International (RHC0008), Danish Refugee Council (RCH0019), The Institute of Development Studies (RHC0013), Norwegian Refugee Council (RHC0009)
30 UK Trauma Council, How to support refugee and asylum-seeking children and young people who have experienced trauma, accessed 23 May 2023
31 For example: The Institute of Development Studies (RHC0013) and Norwegian Refugee Council (RHC0009)
32 For example: ActionAid UK (RHC0011), Danish Refugee Council (RCH0019) and Norwegian Refugee Council (RHC0009)
33 For example: ActionAid UK (RHC0011), Age International (RHC0008) and World Food Programme (RHC0015)
34 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
35 UN World Food Programme, Jordan Country Brief, accessed May 2023
36 Ibid
37 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
38 UN World Food Programme, Jordan Country Brief, accessed May 2023
39 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Where we work, accessed May 2023
42 The New Humanitarian, No way out: How Syrians are struggling to find an exit, 10 March 2016
43 UNHCR, Socio-economic situation of refugees in Jordan Q4 2022, February 2023
44 UN World Food Programme, Jordan Country Brief November 2022, accessed May 2023. The World Food Programme previously reduced food assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan. See for example: World Food Programme, Funding crunch forces WFP to scale back food assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan, 3 June 2021.
45 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
46 FCDO Devtracker, Jordan Summary, accessed May 2023
47 The Jordan Compact was signed in February 2016 at the London Conference hosted by the UK, Germany, Kuwait, Norway and the United Nations. It brings together international humanitarian and development actors under host country leadership. It combines humanitarian and development funding through multi-year grants and concessional loans, with pledges of $700 million in grants annually for three years and concessional loans of $1.9 billion. Payment of grants and loans is linked to specific targets. One of these targets is related to formal labour market access. Jordan is to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in specified sectors. The Compact commits the EU to relaxing trade regulations to stimulate exports from 18 designated economic zones and industrial areas in Jordan, in return for employment quotas for Syrian refugees in these businesses. The Compact stipulates that Jordan will institute reforms to improve the businesses and investment environment and formalise Syrian businesses. It commits Jordan to providing school places to all Syrian children, and some vocational training opportunities. ODI: The Jordan Compact. Lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts, February 2018.
48 ODI, The Jordan Compact: Lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts, February 2018
50 Ibid
51 International Labour Organisation, Impact of work permits on decent work for Syrians in Jordan, September 2021
52 Expectation State and Refugee Investment Network (RHC0004)
53 Norwegian Refugee Council (RHC0009)
54 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
55 UNHCR UK, Lebanon, accessed May 2023
56 UNRWA, Where we work, accessed May 2023
57 Ibid
58 World Bank, The World bank in Lebanon, accessed May 2023
59 Ibid
60 World Bank, Lebanon Public Finance Review: Ponzi Finance?, August 2022
61 World Food Programme (RHC0015)
63 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
65 Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) (RHC0012)
66 Ibid
67 Ibid
68 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
69 Ibid
71 UNHCR UK, Lebanon, accessed May 2023
73 United Nations, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) in Lebanon, January 2022
74 Brookings, Why Syrian refugees in Lebanon are a crisis within a crisis, April 2021
75 Ibid
76 Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) (RHC0012)
77 The Institute of Development Studies (RHC0013)
78 Ibid
79 ReBUILD for Resilience (RHC0010)
80 The Institute of Development Studies (RHC0013)
81 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
82 Ibid
83 Ibid
84 Ibid
85 UNHCR, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2023, May 2023
86 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
87 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005), British Embassy Beirut, UK supports Lebanon ISF with MOU cooperation £15.9m, 9 December 2022, British Embassy Beirut, UK commits further £13m to the Lebanese Army, 15 December 2022
88 FCDO Devtracker, Lebanon Summary, accessed May 2023
90 Ibid
91 The Institute of Development Studies (RHC0013)
92 Home Office, Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations, accessed May 2023
93 The Institute of Development Studies (RHC0013)
94 Associated Press, UN body says violence against Syrians in Lebanon on the rise, 29 July 2022
96 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The principle of non-refoulement under international human rights law, accessed May 2023
97 House of Commons International Development Committee, Correspondence from Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell, Minister for Development and Africa, FDCO, 30 March 2023
98 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Home, accessed May 2023
99 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Protection of Civilians Report | 28 March – 17 April 2023, 20 April 2023
100 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Protection of Civilians Report | 28 March – 17 April 2023, 20 April 2023
101 British Consulate General Jerusalem, The British Consulate General in Jerusalem represents the UK government in Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza, accessed May 2023
102 British Consulate General Jerusalem, Diplomatic missions visit the Palestinian community of Huwara, 4 March 2023
103 House of Commons International Development Committee, Correspondence from Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell, Minister for Development and Africa, FDCO, 30 March 2023
104 Ibid
105 United Nations Press, Applauding Recent Diplomatic Talks between Israelis, Palestinians, Speakers in Security Council Urge Parties Commit to Agreements, 22 March 2023
106 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 2030 roadmap for UK-Israel bilateral relations, accessed May 2023
108 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (RHC0005)
110 Ibid
111 UNHCR, The Global Compact on Refugees, accessed May 2023
112 Ibid
113 Ibid
114 UNHCR, Global Refugee Forum 2023, accessed May 2023
115 House of Commons International Development Committee, Correspondence from Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell, Minister for Development and Africa, FDCO, 30 March 2023
116 An overview of the UK’s commitments under the Global Refugee Compact can be accessed here: UNHCR, Global Compact on Refugees, United Kingdom, accessed May 2023. It includes objectives to improve refugee self-reliance and to expand access to third-country solutions.
117 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, More support and funding tools for local and national responders, accessed May 2023