This is a House of Commons Committee report, with recommendations to government. The Government has two months to respond.
International Development Committee
Date Published: 1 July 2022
1. The world faces a catastrophic hunger crisis. The number of severely food insecure people more than doubled from 135 million before the covid-19 pandemic to 276 million in summer 2022.1 The World Food Programme estimated that that could increase to 323 million people by the end of 2022 due to the effect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on food production and distribution.2 Of those 276 million food insecure people, 48.9 million in 43 countries are on the edge of famine.3 African states are most at risk. UNICEF warned that without immediate action “an explosion of child deaths is about to happen in the Horn of Africa.”4
2. World food prices increased by 28% between 2020 and 2021.5 They increased by a further 29% between May 2021 and May 2022.6 The world price of cereals increased by 75% between May 2020 and May 2022.7 Over that period, the world price of fertiliser also increased to an all-time high.8 Fuel prices have similarly increased worldwide.9 Inflation reduces households’ purchasing power for food commodities.10 It increases both the number of people who need food assistance and the cost of delivering such assistance.11
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Food Price Index | World Food Situation, accessed 1 June 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
3. Russia and Ukraine are key exporters of grains and vegetable oils.12 Taken together, they export 12% of food calories traded worldwide.13 Russia and Belarus are key exporters of ingredients used in fertiliser.14 Russia’s invasion has devastated Ukraine’s agricultural production and exports.15 The blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has halted food shipments.16 Ukraine’s ports were used to transport more than 90% of its agri-food exports before the invasion.17 International sanctions on Russia and Belarus have affected the production and export of agri-food commodities.18 In addition, Russia has introduced a conditional export ban on grain and on most types of sugar.19
4. In 2021, 36 countries or territories that experienced a food crisis and a further 21 countries or territories that experienced a major food crisis imported more than 10% of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine.20 For example, Sudan and Yemen depended on Russia and Ukraine for wheat imports for 35% to 45% of their consumption needs in 2021.21 Executive Director, World Food Programme, David Beasley, warned that a “failure to open those ports in Odesa region will be a declaration of war on global food security. And it will result in famine and destabilization and mass migration around the world.”22 The invasion has contributed to inflation by increasing the prices of food, fuel, and fertiliser.23 It has also created a hunger crisis in Ukraine.24
5. The UK Government has expressed its desire to support the transportation of food within Ukraine, including to encircled cities, but the details of what such support might entail are unclear.25 We wrote to the Foreign Secretary in April 2022 to ask whether the Government had supplied vehicles and protective equipment to Ukraine to support food transportation.26 The reply suggested that concrete steps had not been implemented.27
6. Conflict can destroy agriculture and local markets, and subsequently restrict the delivery of food assistance.28 It remained the primary driver of food insecurity in 2021 for 139.1 million people in a food ‘crisis’ or worse across 24 countries.29 Those countries included Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, South Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen.30 Looking forwards, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Yemen face serious declines in their respective food security situations due to local conflict in 2022.31
7. Extreme weather disrupted crop production in 2022. This weather included “heavy rains, tropical storms, hurricanes, flooding, drought and increased climate variability”.32 For example, a heat wave in India had such an adverse effect on agricultural production that a conditional export ban on food was introduced in 2022.33 The effects of ‘La Nina’, a weather pattern that occurs in the Pacific Ocean, have persisted since 2020.34 Those effects include “crop and livestock losses, particularly in East Africa, Central Asia and the Caribbean.”35 A drought in the Horn of Africa contributed to 18.4 million people suffering high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in the region in 2022.36 It has been estimated that that figure may increase to 20 million people by September 2022.37
8. Despite the challenges posed by global inflation, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, other conflicts, and extreme weather events and conditions, global food production still outstrips global food demand.38 However, up to 811 million people are going hungry worldwide.39 Sufficient food is produced to feed the world. Hunger is driven by the availability, distribution, and price of food in low-and-middle-income countries.40 With insufficient funding to meet need, organisations providing food assistance are struggling. Executive Director, World Food Programme, David Beasley, observed, “In many countries, we are forced to make the heart-breaking decision to take food from hungry children to give it to starving children.”41
9. The food price crisis in 2022 could become a food scarcity crisis in 2023.42 Russia’s invasion has damaged “farmland, machinery and livestock” in Ukraine.43 That has reduced food production. The placing of mines on agricultural land will have a long-term adverse effect on food production.44 The UN Secretary-General highlighted the risk of food scarcity arising from a shortage of fertilisers following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.45 Executive Director, World Food Programme, David Beasley cautioned that market volatility caused by reduced Ukraine exports could trigger a wider food shortage.46
Source: Global Network Against Food Crises, 2022 Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions, 4 May 2022
10. The new Development Strategy, published in May 2022, included three references to ‘food’.47 The strategy stated that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) aims to tackle the underlying drivers of food insecurity, to support sustainable food systems, and to invest in agriculture and food systems.48 The Development Strategy neither set out how the UK plans to provide food assistance in future nor explained how it will contribute to global food security.49
11. Correspondence between the Committee and the FCDO established how much the FCDO spent on bilateral food assistance as part of its overseas development assistance (ODA) budget (detailed in the table below) in the financial year 2021–22.50 Examining this year’s spending, the Government spent £72 million on humanitarian crises in 2022, including through food assistance to Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan.51
Table: UK aid spending on food assistance by country 2021–22
Recipient Country |
Total UK aid spending on food assistance |
Total |
£198 million |
Afghanistan |
£49 million |
Chad |
£1.5 million |
Ethiopia |
£17 million |
Jordan |
£7.4 million |
Lebanon (Syrian refugees) |
**See explanatory footnote**52 |
Libya |
£0 |
Niger |
£3.4 million |
South Sudan |
£8.8 million |
Syria |
£5.2 million |
Yemen |
£34 million |
Other |
£70 million |
Source: Letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs regarding food insecurity following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 13 May 202253
12. The UK Government has recently pledged more funding for food support.54 On the 24 June 2022, the Government announced a “package of support to help countries hit the hardest by rising global food costs and shortages of fertiliser.”55 That package included a pledge to increase funding for the development of sustainable and resilient agriculture and food systems, and an increase in support to UN organisations to tackle hunger.56 The Prime Minister also announced on 27 June 2022 “up to £10 million in materials and equipment to Ukraine Railways to repair rail infrastructure and help get grain out of the country by rail.”57
13. The FCDO funds work to improve agriculture and food systems in developing countries, including through its research and development ODA budget.58 Announced as part of its announcement on food insecurity on 24 June 2022, the FCDO’s Green Growth Centre of Expertise will receive £17.7 million to “improve the effective use of fertiliser and increase food production in countries including Kenya, Ghana, and Rwanda.”59 The UK Government also announced £133 million of funding to research, develop and implement technologies to improve food security, such as new drought-resistant crop varieties.60 The Development Strategy expressed the Government’s desire to support agriculture and food systems using a range of investment tools. 61 However, the Government has not articulated a joined-up strategy explaining how its various work and funding streams are intended to support sustainable and resilient agriculture and food systems.62
14. The Foreign Secretary, G7 Foreign Ministers and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy announced the formation of the Global Alliance for Food Security on 14 May 2022.63 This multilateral scheme aims to promote sustainable agricultural practices, to provide humanitarian assistance, to facilitate trade in food, to support agricultural production in Ukraine, and to help Ukraine and its regional partners restart food exports.64 It followed the G7 famine prevention and humanitarian crises compact agreed in 2021, which included commitments to address critical funding gaps.65
15. The UK supports various existing multilateral initiatives on food assistance through aid spending.66 In its announcement on 24 June 2022, it pledged £130 million to the World Food Programme (WFP) for this financial year.67 By comparison, the UK Government donated £40 million in 2020.68 The UK has pledged support to other UN organisations to address food insecurity, including £52 million for UN’s global emergency response fund, CERF, and £37 million for the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development.69 The UK Government also supports the World Bank, which recently announced a $170 billion financial package to support countries undergoing economic hardship due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That package of measures is not limited to food assistance.70
16. In order to tackle the immediate threats posed by the hunger crisis, the Government must:
a) publish a comprehensive strategy setting out its plan to address food insecurity; and
b) increase humanitarian funding for food assistance programmes to reflect increased global food and fuel costs and to meet need.
17. To promote sustainable agriculture, the Government must increase support to agricultural development programmes in middle-and-lower-income countries.
18. The Government must work with international partners to:
a) empower the Global Alliance for Food Security to develop international solutions to regional food security challenges. That should include securing the provision, delivery and distribution of food assistance to countries in need in order to avert famine. Such initiatives should prioritise countries with communities classed on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification as in Phase 3 (Crisis) or above; and
b) support Ukraine to transport its food produce for both internal consumption and international export to help feed in-need communities. Such support should include the supply of protective equipment and transport vehicles to Ukraine and participation in multilateral initiatives to facilitate food exports by Ukraine.
Food insecurity is measured by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé (CH) framework. The IPC is used in around 30 countries and the CH is used in 18 countries.71 The two measures are “very close to each other and give comparable figures of acute food insecurity.”72 The five-phase classification, as shown in the table below, “is the same though there are a few differences pertaining to the use of certain indicators, classification of famine and estimation of humanitarian assistance.”73 The IPC/CH classifications were used to determine the number of people in Phase 3 ‘Crisis’ or worse (Phases 4 and 5) in each country for the map included in the Report.
Table 2: IPC acute food insecurity reference table
Phase number |
Phase name |
Phase description |
1 |
Minimal/None |
Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. |
2 |
Stressed |
Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. |
3 |
Crisis |
Households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis coping strategies. |
4 |
Emergency |
Households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. |
5 |
Catastrophe/Famine |
Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.) |
Source: Global Network Against Food Crises, 2022 Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions, 4 May 2022, IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity reference table
Members present:
Sarah Champion, in the Chair
Mr Richard Bacon
Mrs Pauline Latham
Chris Law
Mr Ian Liddell-Grainger
Nigel Mills
Mr Virendra Sharma
Draft Report (Food insecurity), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 18 read and agreed to.
Appendix agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Tuesday 5 July at 2.00 p.m.
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.
Number |
Title |
Reference |
1st Report |
Racism in the aid sector |
HC 150 |
1st Special Report |
Afghanistan: UK support for aid workers and the Afghan people: Government response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2021–22 |
HC 152 |
Number |
Title |
Reference |
1st Report |
Assessing DFID’s results in nutrition Review: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 103 |
2nd Report |
Global Britain in demand: UK climate action and international development around COP26 |
HC 99 |
3rd Report |
The UK’s approach to tackling modern slavery through the aid programme: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 104 |
4th Report |
International climate finance: UK aid for halting deforestation and preventing irreversible biodiversity loss: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 730 |
5th Report |
Afghanistan: UK support for aid workers and the Afghan people |
HC 919 |
6th Report |
UK aid to Pakistan |
HC 102 |
1st Special Report |
The humanitarian situation in Tigray: Government Response to the Committee’s Tenth Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 554 |
2nd Special Report |
The UK’s Support to the African Development Bank Group: report from the Sub-Committee on the work of ICAI: Government Response to the Committee’s Ninth Report of Session 2019–21 |
HC 555 |
3rd Special Report |
DFID’s results in nutrition Review: report from the Sub-Committee on the work of ICAI: Government response to the Committee’s First Report |
HC 780 |
4th Special Report |
Global Britain in demand: UK climate action and international development around COP26: Government response to the Committee’s Second Report |
HC 1008 |
5th Special Report |
The UK’s approach to tackling modern slavery through the aid programme: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI: Government response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 1021 |
Number |
Title |
Reference |
1st |
Humanitarian crises monitoring: the Rohingya |
HC 259 |
2nd Report |
Effectiveness of UK aid: interim findings |
HC 215 |
3rd Report |
The Newton Fund review: report of the Sub-Committee on the work of ICAI |
HC 260 |
4th Report |
Effectiveness of UK aid: potential impact of FCO/DFID merger |
HC 596 |
5th Report |
Humanitarian crises monitoring: impact of coronavirus (interim findings) |
HC 292 |
6th Report |
The Changing Nature of UK Aid in Ghana Review: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 535 |
7th Report |
Progress on tackling the sexual exploitation and abuse of aid beneficiaries |
HC 605 |
8th Report |
Covid-19 in developing countries: secondary impacts |
HC 1186 |
9th Report |
The UK’s support to the African Development Bank Group: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI |
HC 1055 |
10th Report |
The humanitarian situation in Tigray |
HC 1289 |
1st Special Report |
Follow up: sexual exploitation and abuse in the aid sector: Government Response to the First Report of the Committee |
HC 127 |
2nd Special Report |
Humanitarian crises monitoring: the Rohingya: Government Response to the First Report of the Committee |
HC 658 |
3rd Special Report |
The Newton Fund review: report of the Sub-Committee on the work of ICAI: Government response to the Committee’s Third Report |
HC 742 |
4th Special Report |
Effectiveness of UK Aid: Interim Report & Effectiveness of UK Aid: potential impact of FCO/DFID merger: Government Response to the Second & Fourth Reports |
HC 820 |
5th Special Report |
Humanitarian crises monitoring: impact of coronavirus (interim findings): Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report |
HC 1160 |
6th Special Report |
The Changing Nature of UK Aid in Ghana Review: report from the Sub-Committee on the Work of ICAI: Government response to the Committee’s Sixth Report |
HC 1198 |
7th Special Report |
Progress on tackling the sexual exploitation and abuse of aid beneficiaries: Government Response to the Seventh Report of the Committee, Session 2019–21 |
HC 1332 |
8th Special Report |
Covid-19 in developing countries: secondary impacts: Government Response to the Eighth Report of the Committee |
HC 1351 |
1 World Food Programme, Unprecedented Needs Threaten a Hunger Catastrophe, 4 April 2022. Severe food insecurity means that a person has gone without food for a day or more according to the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) created by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN. (Food and Agriculture Organization, Hunger, accessed 21 June 2022)
2 World Food Programme, Hunger, famine and starvation: 750,000 people are in the front line, UN study says, 6 June 2022
3 World Food Programme, Unprecedented Needs Threaten a Hunger Catastrophe, 4 April 2022
4 UN News, Horn of Africa braces for ‘explosion of child deaths’ as hunger crisis deepens, 7 June 2022
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Food Price Index | World Food Situation, accessed 1 June 2022
6 As above.
7 As above. As this Report will be published in June 2022, the average price for 2022 is not yet available. To enable a comparison between two years, the Committee have used the data for May 2022 and May 2020.
8 The UN Secretary General has commented that the price of fertiliser has almost doubled. (United Nations, Secretary-General’s remarks at the launch of the second brief by the Global Crisis Response Group, 8 June 2022) In April, “[t]he World Bank’s Fertilizer Price Index rose nearly 10% in the first quarter of 2022 to an all-time high in nominal terms.” This follows last year’s 80% surge. Prices are projected to rise by almost 70% in 2022. (World Bank, Commodity Markets Outlook: A World Bank Report, April 2022) Some fertilisers have risen higher than this. Fertilisers include diammonium phosphate (DAP), muriate of potash (MOP), and urea. Between April 2020 and April 2022, the price of DAP has increased by 238%%, MOP by 130%, and urea (nitrogen) by 294%. (World Bank Data Blog, Fertilizer prices expected to remain higher for longer (worldbank.org), 11 May 2022)
9 World Bank, Commodity Markets Outlook: A World Bank Report, April 2022
10 World Food Programme, Food security implications of the Ukraine conflict, 11 March 2022
11 As above.
12 International Food Policy Research Institute, How will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affect global food security?, 24 February 2022
13 As above.
14 As above.
15 As above. Russia’s invasion has disrupted Ukraine’s agricultural production through conflict on and around agricultural land, including the destruction of equipment, crops and silos, and Russia stealing Ukrainian grain. The invasion has caused a Ukrainian ban on exporting some food commodities and disrupted the export of other food commodities. 20 million tonnes of grain are said to be trapped in silos in Ukraine. This means that the new harvest will not be able to be stored. (BBC News, Is Russia exporting grain from Ukraine? 10 June 2022) (BBC News, Tracking where Russia is taking Ukraine’s stolen grain, 27 June 2022) (The Guardian, How do you get 20m tonnes of grain out of Ukraine?, 7 June 2022)
16 The Guardian, How do you get 20m tonnes of grain out of Ukraine?, 7 June 2022; World Food Programme, War in Ukraine: WFP renews call to open Black Sea ports amid fears for global hunger, 20 May 2022; Financial Times, Ukraine warns that only lifting Black Sea blockade can avert global food crisis, 4 June 2022. It will also be necessary to de-mine the ports’ surrounding waters in the Black Sea to open up the import and export of food to and from Ukraine.
17 The Guardian, How do you get 20m tonnes of grain out of Ukraine?, 7 June 2022. Mariia Didukh, director of the Ukrainian National Agrarian Forum, which represents Ukraine’s largest food producing organisations, gave the ‘more than 90% figure’.
18 World Food Programme, Food security implications of the Ukraine conflict, 11 March 2022. While sanctions on Russia and Belarus have not targeted food commodities and fertiliser, the WFP details that many Russian grain shipments have been frozen due to uncertainty around sanctions. For example, shipping companies have refused to do business with Russia, and banks have refused the issuance of letters of trade with Russia. There is also an additional difficulty in obtaining insurance for grain shipments from the Black Sea due to conflict in the area.
19 Reuters, Russia temporarily bans grain exports to ex-Soviet countries, 14 March 2022
20 Global Network Against Food Crises, 2022 Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions, 4 May 2022
21 As above.
22 World Food Programme, War in Ukraine: WFP renews call to open Black Sea ports amid fears for global hunger, 20 May 2022
23 World Food Programme, Food security implications of the Ukraine conflict, 11 March 2022
24 As above.
25 Oral evidence taken on 18 May 2022, HC (2022–23) 148, Q347 [Elizabeth Truss]
26 Letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs regarding food insecurity following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 19 April 2022
27 Letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs regarding food insecurity following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 13 May 2022
28 World Food Program USA, Conflict Causes Famine, & Famine Fuels Conflict, updated 23 July 2021
29 Global Network Against Food Crises, 2022 Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions, 4 May 2022.
30 As above.
31 As above.
32 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme, Hunger Hotspots: FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: June to September 2022 Outlook, 6 June 2022.
33 BBC News, Ukraine war: Global wheat prices jump after India export ban, 16 May 2022
34 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme, Hunger Hotspots: FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: June to September 2022 Outlook, 6 June 2022; World Economic Forum, What is the La Niña weather pattern? All you need to know, 16 December 2021
35 As above.
36 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Horn of Africa Drought: Humanitarian Update, 10 June 2022 - Ethiopia, 10 June 2022; PQ 6778 [on Horn of Africa: Food Supply], 30 May 2022
37 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Horn of Africa Drought: Humanitarian Update, 10 June 2022 - Ethiopia, 10 June 2022
38 Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, United Kingdom Food Security Report 2021: Theme 1: Global Food Availability, 22 December 2021
39 World Food Programme, Unprecedented Needs Threaten a Hunger Catastrophe, 4 April 2022
40 Price is a key obstacle to those in need being able to acquire sufficient food. (Voice of America, Global Hunger to Rise on Record Food Prices, 10 June 2022) Availability and distribution are also key. Conflict or extreme weather can affect the production or the delivery of food, including through displacing people. (Global Network Against Food Crises, 2022 Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions, 4 May 2022)
41 World Food Programme, War in Ukraine: WFP renews call to open Black Sea ports amid fears for global hunger, 20 May 2022
42 Devex, ‘The house is burning’: Beasley sounds food crisis alarm in US Congress, 12 May 2022
43 Bloomberg, Ukraine’s Farm Industry Has Lost $4.3 Billion From Damage in War With Russia, 21 June 2022
44 As above.
45 United Nations, Secretary-General’s remarks at the launch of the second brief by the Global Crisis Response Group, 8 June 2022
46 World Food Programme, Failing to open Ukrainian ports means declaring war on global food security, WFP Chief warns UN Security Council, 19 May 2022. David Beasley, Director of the World Food Programme, said, “Food pricing is our number one problem right now, as a result of all this perfect storm for 2022. But by 2023 it very well will be a food availability problem. When a country like Ukraine that grows enough food for 400 million people is out of the market, it creates market volatility, which we are now seeing.”
47 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Development Strategy, 16 May 2022. Food is mentioned three more times outside of the main text in two text boxes discussing two examples of development programmes. These are ‘Sharing British expertise in disaster risk financing and insurance with our partners in Africa’ and ‘Protect ocean biodiversity for future generations’.
48 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Development Strategy, 16 May 2022
49 As above.
50 Letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs regarding food insecurity following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 13 May 2022
51 PQ 6778 [on Horn of Africa: Food Supply], 30 May 2022; PQ HL209 [on Africa: Food Supply], 26 May 2022; PQ HL502 [on East Africa: Famine], 9 June 2022
52 The UK Government have £7.2 million to Syrian refugees in Lebanon by means of cash transfers. This was not included in the table as the Committee do not know what proportion of this Syrian refugees spent specifically on food.
53 The Committee asked the Government how much food assistance they had provided to Libya in 2021. The Government did not respond on this point. From this, the Committee has assumed that no food assistance was given to Libya bilaterally through ODA.
54 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, press release, PM pledges new support for countries on the food security frontline, 24 June 2022
55 As above.
56 As above.
57 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, press release, PM to tell G7 leaders: we must end Putin’s stranglehold on food prices, 27 June 2022
58 PQ 9048 [on Agriculture: Developing Countries], 6 June 2022. This budget supports the CGIAR (formerly the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research), the world’s leading agricultural science and innovation organisation. The CGIAR receives funding from a number of donor countries, and it has done work in Ethiopia, Southern Africa, and Sudan.
59 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, press release, PM pledges new support for countries on the food security frontline, 24 June 2022. It is not clear how much of this will come under the ODA budget.
60 As above. It is also not clear how much of this will come under the ODA budget.
61 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Development Strategy, 16 May 2022
62 Details on the Government’s programmes on supporting sustainable agriculture and food systems came from a variety of sources. It is not clear which streams are directly ODA funded and which are funded through investment partnerships, including ODA and non-ODA investment.
63 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office press release, Commitments on the Global Food Security Consequences of Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine - G7 Foreign Ministers, 14 May 2022
64 As above.
65 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, G7 famine prevention and humanitarian crises compact, 5 May 2021
66 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2020, 29 September 2021
67 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, press release, PM pledges new support for countries on the food security frontline, 24 June 2022
68 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2020, 29 September 2021, p 46. The statistics for the UK’s multilateral ODA funding for 2021 are not yet available.
69 The UN’s global emergency response fund is the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). CERF allocated $100 million (£80m) in April for an urgent response to seven countries at risk of famine. The £37 million for the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) will be used to work with the private sector and governments to address poverty and hunger in rural areas of developing countries.
70 Oral evidence taken on 18 May 2022, HC (2022–23) 148, Q274, Q275 and Q341 [Elizabeth Truss]; PQ HL502 [on East Africa: Famine], 9 June 2022
71 Global Network Against Food Crises, 2022 Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions, 4 May 2022
72 As above.
73 As above.