This is a House of Commons Committee report, with recommendations to government. The Government has two months to respond.
This is the full report, read the report summary.
AEA Technology (AEAT) was the commercial arm of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), and it was privatised in 1996. Around 4,000 employees were transferred to AEAT and joined the company’s new pension scheme, and they had several options for the pension benefits they had already accrued in UKAEA, and the movement of these accrued benefits to the new scheme was given impetus by statements by ministers in the House of Commons. This included either keeping the benefits in the UKAEA public sector scheme, which was backed by government, or taking a special offer to transfer their accrued pension to a closed section of the new AEAT scheme. The government made assurances, including in statements by ministers and an information note provided by the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) to help scheme members make their decisions, that the new scheme would have equivalent benefits to the public sector one. Nearly 90% of eligible members chose to transfer their pension benefits.
In 2012, AEAT went into administration and the pension scheme subsequently entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF). The compensation the PPF pays is typically lower than the original pension benefits. Since then, scheme members have raised concerns with various parts of government about information provided to employees in 1996 that informed their decision to transfer their pensions, and about the company’s administration in 2012.
1. The people who transferred their accrued pension benefits to AEA Technology (AEAT) on privatisation, based on incomplete information from government, ended up losing money as a result. AEAT’s pension scheme was not guaranteed by government, but it was not unreasonable for its members to think it was similarly protected. This was particularly due to the assurances that ministers had made at the time, and other privatisations coming with government guarantees. The government should therefore have been clear with members that the new scheme would not have a government guarantee. But the information it provided—including the note provided by the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD), which was intended to outline main factors to consider—did not indicate that this was the case. Scheme members were also only given one month to make their decision. Nearly 90% of members chose to transfer their accrued benefits to the new scheme, which turned out in fact to be less secure. Since AEAT went into administration in 2012 and the scheme entered the PPF, scheme members have lost money in real terms, especially now in a time of high inflation. This is because the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) compensation for pension benefits accrued before April 1997—including all the benefits transferred in 1996—are not increased for inflation at all. For benefits accrued from 1997 onwards, increases are capped at 2.5% a year.
Recommendation 1: The government should review whether the current rules for increasing PPF compensation for inflation are appropriate. This should consider the costs and benefits of extending the rules so that benefits accrued before April 1997 are also increased for inflation and, separately, of raising the cap for annual increases above 2.5%.
2. AEAT pension scheme members have been passed from one part of government to another, with no department taking overall responsibility for their complaints. Scheme members have raised complaints with government since 2012 covering a range of issues that involve several government organisations, including departments and regulators. The Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) initially responded in 2013 on behalf of government by providing a factsheet, which summarised the complaints received and the government’s position on each. Six months later, after members were dissatisfied with the response, DWP wrote to them again saying it was not responsible for the case and directing them elsewhere. DWP had to subsequently apologise for the fact that its factsheet added to the confusion over who was responsible for what. Responsibilities for pensions are spread across government, with different departments responsible for private and public sector pensions. The lack of joined-up thinking on pensions allowed the issue to fall between the cracks. Government has not commissioned any independent review into the complaints raised by AEAT members, and all of the relevant ombudsman services have said they cannot investigate the information government provided in 1996.
Recommendation 2: The government should ensure that members’ complaints about the AEAT pension case can be independently reviewed, for example by a relevant ombudsman.
3. The AEAT case shows that there are gaps in the routes of appeal available for people raising complaints about their pensions. It is a fundamental right that people have appropriate and accessible routes of appeal. Ombudsman services provide a way for people to seek independent review of their complaints without the cost of pursuing action through the courts. In this case, ombudsman services such as the Pensions Ombudsman and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) ruled that they could not examine key complaints raised by AEAT pension scheme members because the complaints fall outside their statutory jurisdictions. For example, PHSO is unable to look into employment matters, including specifically those relating superannuation and pensions, due to its remit. Legislative amendments would be required to change this. Some aspects may have been within the remit of the Pensions Ombudsman but, because the case was more than 15 years old, the ombudsman would have been unable to award any remedy due to the Limitation Act 1980. Government protocols for retaining data may also often prevent relevant information being maintained for long enough to be reviewed in cases involving pensions. Pensions are long-term financial products, and problems can take many years to become apparent.
Recommendations 3: The government should review ombudsman arrangements to ensure that all aspects of people’s interactions with their pensions have an adequate route of appeal. We also ask that the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee consider examining whether the current time limits on government for retaining information and ombudsmen awarding redress are fit for purpose when it comes to pensions.
4. This is another case of government not giving people enough time or support to make complex financial decisions. The government has a role to help people make good financial decisions, because of the detriment that bad choices can lead to. In the case of AEAT, it should have done this directly. This was a complex financial decision where members needed clear information on their options and time to seek appropriate financial advice. AEAT scheme members were only given one month to decide between their pension transfer options, and the information they received was insufficient. We have seen similar issues in other areas, including in the private sector where government oversees the regulation of independent financial advice. For example, our inquiry last year into the British Steel Pension Scheme covered the significant financial harm that many scheme members suffered from transferring their pensions after receiving unsuitable advice. We concluded that the regulatory system had left members open to being taken advantage of and that, seven years after the Pension Schemes Act 2015, regulated financial advisers were still not clear on what was expected of them. DWP is developing several initiatives aimed at supporting people to engage with their pensions, such as ‘Pensions Dashboards’ and a recent call for evidence on the support and information people need when accessing their pensions. However, it is not clear when these initiatives might come to fruition and lead to tangible improvements.
Recommendation 4: The government should write to us within three months to set out what more it will do to support people to make informed financial decisions, including regarding their pensions. This should include what changes it will make in light of DWP’s recent call for evidence, and an update on progress with Pensions Dashboards.
1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP), the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) on the pensions transferred to AEA Technology (AEAT) when it was privatised.1
2. AEAT was formed as the commercial arm of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), and it was privatised in 1996. Around 4,000 employees were transferred to AEAT and joined the company’s new pension scheme, and they had several options for the pension benefits they had already accrued in their UKAEA pension. This included either keeping the benefits in the UKAEA public sector scheme, which was backed by government, or taking a special offer to transfer their accrued pension to a closed section of the new AEAT scheme. Scheme members were given one month to decide.2
3. The government made assurances, including in statements by ministers and the provisions of the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1995, that the new scheme would have equivalent benefits to the public sector one. Information provided to scheme members, including a note from GAD intended to outline the main factors to take into consideration, said the same thing. The option to transfer pension benefits to the new scheme was taken by nearly 90% of eligible members.3
4. In 2012, AEAT went into administration and the pension scheme subsequently entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF), which typically pays lower compensation than the original pension benefits. Since then, scheme members have raised concerns with various parts of government about information provided to employees in 1996 that informed their decision to transfer their pensions. This included the fact that none of the information provided to scheme members in 1996 by government or by AEAT said that the new scheme would not be guaranteed by government.4
5. When the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1995 was introduced to facilitate the privatisation of AEAT and outline the pension arrangements, it required that the pension benefits in the new AEAT scheme must be “no less favourable” than the previous scheme. Around that time, other privatisations had included government guarantees on their pensions. Ministers also gave assurances in Parliament that pension benefits would be fully protected in the new scheme.5 We asked DWP and GAD how the AEAT pension scheme’s terms could be no less favourable if, as became clear after 2012, it did not have the protection of a government guarantee. The departments told us their understanding was that the phrase “no less favourable” used in legislation referred only to the pension scheme benefits, not their security, meaning the 1995 Act did not provide for a public sector guarantee on the scheme. GAD said that it was on this basis that it will have certified that the new pension scheme met the terms of the 1995 Act.6
6. None of the information government provided to scheme members told them the government guarantee would be lost if they transferred their accrued benefits into the new pension scheme.7 We asked GAD why members were not told this, and whether the note it had provided at the time was therefore misleading. GAD said it did not believe the note was misleading, and that it was intended to assist members with making decisions over their pensions rather than be financial advice which members could depend upon. GAD noted that while the information provided to members did not tell them the new scheme would not have a government guarantee, it had never indicated that the new scheme would still have one either. GAD also argued that some information provided made references to the possibility that the scheme could fail.8 However, those same references also stated that pension scheme assets are protected in law.9
7. GAD’s note suggested that scheme members seek independent financial advice if they were unsure of the most suitable course of action.10 We asked GAD whether it was realistic for scheme members to get independent financial advice, particularly when GAD is a well-recognised authority on public sector pensions and members were only given one month to make their decision. GAD told us that the range of individual circumstances which members may have been in would have made it impossible for the note to provide appropriate financial advice for each individual. GAD also said that the fact the note mentions that it was not financial advice should have been a sign that this was a matter to take seriously. GAD told us it did not believe the note would have been the only basis on which members made their decision.11 However, nearly 90% of scheme members transferred their benefits. Scheme members have said their decision was heavily influenced by GAD’s note, given GAD’s role as a professional body independent of the pension scheme, and the stated intention of the note to “outline the main factors to take into consideration in deciding whether or not to transfer”. Scheme members have also reported that independent financial advisors who were consulted largely deferred to GAD’s note.12
8. Since the scheme entered the PPF, members have lost money in real terms each year because the compensation they receive does not include rises for inflation. PPF compensation initially provides members 100% of their pension if they had already reached the scheme’s normal pension age, or 90% for those who had not. Compensation on pensions earned after 6 April 1997 increases each year in line with inflation, up to a maximum of 2.5%. However, benefits accrued before 6 April 1997, including all benefits transferred in 1996, are not increased for inflation at all.13 Scheme members who wrote to us described the damaging effects of the loss of inflation protection on many years of pension benefits, in one case losing over 40% of their pension in real terms.14 We asked DWP whether the mechanism used to provide restitution for Equitable Life pensioners could be used in this case. DWP was unable to comment on any comparison to Equitable Life, but responded that the PPF was the mechanism government had set up to provide compensation in cases such as AEAT’s.15
9. From 2012 onwards, scheme members raised a series of complaints with multiple government organisations and were dissatisfied with the responses they received. In July 2013, DWP produced a factsheet summarising the complaints government had received and a response to each on behalf of the government. In February 2014, it then sent scheme members a further letter explaining that it was not responsible for the case.16
10. When we asked it why no part of government had taken responsibility for the issue, DWP described pensions policy as a complex and wide-ranging area which touches on a number of departments. DWP is responsible for private sector pensions rather than public sector pensions, which it told us are the responsibility of HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office.17 We asked why DWP initially responded to complaints on behalf of government, before saying it was not responsible and directing members to other parts of government such as the then Department for Business, Innovation and Skills or the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). DWP responded that its factsheet was aimed at answering questions as well as it could by setting out government’s position on different issues. However, DWP acknowledged that the factsheet had not been clear about who was responsible for what, and that it had to subsequently apologise for the fact that the factsheet added to the confusion.18
11. Government has not commissioned any independent review into the complaints raised by AEAT members, and all of the relevant ombudsman services have said they cannot investigate the information government provided in 1996.19 PHSO told us it is unable to investigate personnel and superannuation matters, and that this would require a legislative change to allow it to look into the issue properly.20 We asked DWP what the Minister of State for Pensions was referring to when he wrote in 2020 that the matter had been thoroughly investigated. DWP told us that the Minister was referring to the large amount of correspondence on the issue and two Westminster Hall debates, rather than any specific investigation or review.21
12. We asked how government can ensure that, if a similar thing were to happen again, pensioners making complaints would not be shunted from pillar to post in trying to make appeals and getting no advice or satisfaction. DWP told us that the government’s Fair Deal policy introduced in 2013 means that these specific circumstances would be unlikely to happen again, as in cases of privatisation the pensions would now be expected to remain in public sector schemes.22 PHSO said that it would be helpful if government considered ombudsman jurisdictions at the formative stages of policy, to avoid gaps such as these. It also told us it had been working with government departments to produce complaints standards, with an aim to move towards consistent practice in how government handles complaints. PHSO told us that a common theme in its investigations is the need for clear communication of change by government so that people can think properly about the options available to them.23 DWP said it would be careful to ensure responsibilities are set out more clearly in any similar case in future.24
13. It is a fundamental right that people should have appropriate and accessible routes of appeal. Actions by government bodies are in principle subject to judicial review through the courts, but this is an expensive process.25 Ombudsman services provide a way for people to seek independent review of their complaints without the cost of pursuing action through the courts. They are independent statutory organisations set up to make final decisions on complaints that cannot be resolved. Where they make a decision in favour of the complainant, they can typically award or recommend redress.26
14. In the case of the AEAT pension scheme, relevant ombudsman services said they were unable to properly investigate key aspects of scheme members complaints.27 Some aspects of the case could be reviewed. For example, GAD described to us how complaints about work done by individual actuaries who are members of the actuarial profession can be raised through disciplinary and complaints processes of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and the Financial Reporting Council.28 The Pensions Ombudsman reviewed the approach taken by scheme trustees when the company went into administration in 2012, and PHSO examined DWP’s 2013 factsheet for scheme members.29 But none of these organisations has examined the information that government provided in 1996, with the ombudsman services saying it is outside their statutory jurisdictions.30
15. PHSO described to us the gaps in its remit which prevent it from providing pension scheme members with a route to appeal in this case or in similar situations. PHSO explained that its jurisdiction only allows it to investigate GAD on a very specific point about insurance companies during a defined period of time, following an amendment to its legislation that allowed it to investigate the Equitable Life pensions case. Apart from this, Schedule 3 of PHSO’s legislation prevents it from looking into personnel and superannuation matters which means it cannot examine information of the type that GAD provided in 1996. An amendment would be needed to the legislation for PHSO to able to look into the AEAT case or similar issues and have powers to make recommendations to government.31
16. The Pensions Ombudsman may also be a suitable body to investigate the administration and management of pension schemes, as it is the expert in government for investigating pensions complaints.32 However, it has no remit over the role of GAD in providing information to scheme members. The Pensions Ombudsman could in theory have examined UKAEA as the outgoing employer, but not AEAT itself as it no longer existed. However, it decided that even if it did investigate information provided by UKAEA, the Limitation Act 1980 means it would not be able to award any remedy as more than 15 years had passed between the original transfer of pension benefits and when the complaints were made.33 Government protocols for retaining data may also often prevent relevant information being maintained for long enough to be reviewed in cases involving pensions. Pensions are long-term financial products, and problems can take many years to become apparent.34 DWP told us that the Pensions Ombudsman is reviewed on a regular basis, and that its next review later this year may be a good opportunity to look at the role of the ombudsman.35
17. The AEAT case is one where government directly provided information intended to help pension scheme members decide what to do with their accrued pension benefits. Members were only given one month to make the decision, and consider that the information provided was insufficient and misleading.36 GAD acknowledged that in the present day, only giving people one month to make a financial decision of this kind would be judged to be inappropriate.37
18. This committee has previously found similar issues with how government provides or oversees support for people making complex or long-term financial decisions, including through the regulation of independent financial advice. Most recently, our inquiry last year into the British Steel pension scheme found that pensions regulators had failed to provide adequate information and support to scheme members to make decisions within tight deadlines, leading to unsuitable financial advice that caused serious financial harm. We concluded that the regulatory system had left pension scheme members open to being manipulated and taken advantage of by unscrupulous financial advisers, and that regulated financial bodies were still not clear on what was expected of them.38
19. This committee’s 2016 report on financial services mis-selling similarly concluded that the Financial Conduct Authority was not doing enough to ensure that consumers understand the financial products they are buying. The report found that even the most knowledgeable consumers can find financial services too complex to understand, which emphasises the importance of providing adequate support to consumers making financial decisions.39 While not a financial product, this committee also saw similar themes in its 2018 inquiry into the higher education market. The report found that young people taking out student loans were not properly supported to make decisions on higher education that affected their future careers, in large part due to insufficient and inconsistent careers advice.40
20. We asked DWP how government can ensure it gives clearer and more accessible financial advice in similar situations in future. DWP told us that changes to policy on privatisations and transfers of pensions meant that the specific circumstances affecting AEAT pensioners would be unlikely to happen again. More generally, it told us it has worked with the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator to strengthen the protections around financial advice on pensions. DWP said that encouraging engagement with pensions is difficult, and government has been considering how best to nudge people to seek financial guidance or advice, such as through the introduction of a pensions dashboard. DWP wrote to us after our evidence session to explain the ways it is trying to support people to engage with their pensions. This includes new regulations that came into force in 2022 to ensure nobody can transfer their savings through pension freedoms without either receiving Pension Wise guidance or opting out of it. It also includes initiatives under development such as Pensions Dashboards and DWP’s recent call for evidence on the support and information people need when accessing their pensions. However, DWP did not indicate when these initiatives might come to fruition and lead to tangible improvements.41
Members present:
Dame Meg Hillier
Dan Carden
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
Ashley Dalton
Mr Jonathan Djanogly
Mrs Flick Drummond
Mr Mark Francois
Anne Marie Morris
Nick Smith
Draft Report (AEA Technology Pension Case), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 20 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Introduction agreed to.
Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Fifty-seventh of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Adjourned till Thursday 8 June at 9.30am.
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
Martin Clarke, Government Actuary, Government Actuary’s Department (GAD); Karl Banister, Director of Operations, Legal and Clinical, Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman; Tom Josephs, Director Private Pensions and Arms-Length Bodies, Department for Work and PensionsQ1–80
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.
ATC numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 Adams, Dr Susan (ATC0016)
2 Anonymised (ATC0010)
3 Baker, David (ATC0011)
4 Bater, Mrs Deborah (ATC0020)
5 Bauer, Gerry (ATC0027)
6 Brown, Mr Alan (ATC0006)
7 Croft, Mr Barry (ATC0007)
8 Denham, Dr Mike and Turner, Dr Andrew (ATC0001)
9 Hampson, Les (ATC0017)
10 Hannan, Matthew (ATC0029)
11 Horne, Dr Morag (ATC0009)
12 Hutchings, Professor Michael (ATC0021)
13 Lee, Mr Richard (ATC0003)
14 Lewcock, Mr Andrew (ATC0014)
15 Lugg, Mr Nicholas (ATC0008)
16 Marshall, Mr Simon (ATC0018)
17 Marshall, Mr Simon (ATC0024)
18 Moran, Ms Layla (Member of Parliament for Oxford West and Abingdon) (ATC0025)
19 Murphy, Steve (ATC0026)
20 Playford, Mr Keith (ATC0004)
21 Porter, Dr Fiona (ATC0022)
22 Prospect Trade Union (ATC0023)
23 Raffel, Alistair (ATC0012)
24 Roberts, Dr David Nigel (ATC0015)
25 Sheldon, Barry (ATC0002)
26 Stacey, Mr Kevin (ATC0019)
27 Stead, Carolyn (ATC0013)
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.
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Number |
Title |
Reference |
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1st |
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Annual Report and Accounts 2020–21 |
HC 59 |
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2nd |
Lessons from implementing IR35 reforms |
HC 60 |
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3rd |
The future of the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors |
HC 118 |
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4th |
Use of evaluation and modelling in government |
HC 254 |
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5th |
Local economic growth |
HC 252 |
|
6th |
Department of Health and Social Care 2020–21 Annual Report and Accounts |
HC 253 |
|
7th |
Armoured Vehicles: the Ajax programme |
HC 259 |
|
8th |
Financial sustainability of the higher education sector in England |
HC 257 |
|
9th |
Child Maintenance |
HC 255 |
|
10th |
Restoration and Renewal of Parliament |
HC 49 |
|
11th |
The rollout of the COVID-19 vaccine programme in England |
HC 258 |
|
12th |
Management of PPE contracts |
HC 260 |
|
13th |
Secure training centres and secure schools |
HC 30 |
|
14th |
Investigation into the British Steel Pension Scheme |
HC 251 |
|
15th |
The Police Uplift Programme |
HC 261 |
|
16th |
Managing cross-border travel during the COVID-19 pandemic |
HC 29 |
|
17th |
Government’s contracts with Randox Laboratories Ltd |
HC 28 |
|
18th |
Government actions to combat waste crime |
HC 33 |
|
19th |
Regulating after EU Exit |
HC 32 |
|
20th |
Whole of Government Accounts 2019–20 |
HC 31 |
|
21st |
Transforming electronic monitoring services |
HC 34 |
|
22nd |
Tackling local air quality breaches |
HC 37 |
|
23rd |
Measuring and reporting public sector greenhouse gas emissions |
HC 39 |
|
24th |
Redevelopment of Defra’s animal health infrastructure |
HC 42 |
|
25th |
Regulation of energy suppliers |
HC 41 |
|
26th |
The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2021–22 – Fraud and error in the benefits system |
HC 44 |
|
27th |
Evaluating innovation projects in children’s social care |
HC 38 |
|
28th |
Improving the Accounting Officer Assessment process |
HC 43 |
|
29th |
The Affordable Homes Programme since 2015 |
HC 684 |
|
30th |
Developing workforce skills for a strong economy |
HC 685 |
|
31st |
Managing central government property |
HC 48 |
|
32nd |
Grassroots participation in sport and physical activity |
HC 46 |
|
33rd |
HMRC performance in 2021–22 |
HC 686 |
|
34th |
The Creation of the UK Infrastructure Bank |
HC 45 |
|
35th |
Introducing Integrated Care Systems |
HC 47 |
|
36th |
The Defence digital strategy |
HC 727 |
|
37th |
Support for vulnerable adolescents |
HC 730 |
|
38th |
Managing NHS backlogs and waiting times in England |
HC 729 |
|
39th |
Excess Votes 2021–22 |
HC 1132 |
|
40th |
COVID employment support schemes |
HC 810 |
|
41st |
Driving licence backlogs at the DVLA |
HC 735 |
|
42nd |
The Restart Scheme for long-term unemployed people |
HC 733 |
|
43rd |
Progress combatting fraud |
HC 40 |
|
44th |
The Digital Services Tax |
HC 732 |
|
45th |
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy Annual Report and Accounts 2021–22 |
HC 1254 |
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46th |
BBC Digital |
HC 736 |
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47th |
Investigation into the UK Passport Office |
HC 738 |
|
48th |
MoD Equipment Plan 2022–2032 |
HC 731 |
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49th |
Managing tax compliance following the pandemic |
HC 739 |
|
50th |
Government Shared Services |
HC 734 |
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51st |
Tackling Defra’s ageing digital services |
HC 737 |
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52nd |
Restoration & Renewal of the Palace of Westminster – 2023 Recall |
HC 1021 |
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53rd |
The performance of UK Security Vetting |
HC 994 |
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54th |
Alcohol treatment services |
HC 1001 |
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55th |
Education recovery in schools in England |
HC 998 |
|
56th |
Supporting investment into the UK |
HC 996 |
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1st Special Report |
Sixth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts |
HC 50 |
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2nd Special Report |
Seventh Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts |
HC 1055 |
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Number |
Title |
Reference |
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1st |
Low emission cars |
HC 186 |
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2nd |
BBC strategic financial management |
HC 187 |
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3rd |
COVID-19: Support for children’s education |
HC 240 |
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4th |
COVID-19: Local government finance |
HC 239 |
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5th |
COVID-19: Government Support for Charities |
HC 250 |
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6th |
Public Sector Pensions |
HC 289 |
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7th |
Adult Social Care Markets |
HC 252 |
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8th |
COVID 19: Culture Recovery Fund |
HC 340 |
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9th |
Fraud and Error |
HC 253 |
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10th |
Overview of the English rail system |
HC 170 |
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11th |
Local auditor reporting on local government in England |
HC 171 |
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12th |
COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update |
HC 173 |
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13th |
Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic |
HC 175 |
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14th |
Windrush Compensation Scheme |
HC 174 |
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15th |
DWP Employment support |
HC 177 |
|
16th |
Principles of effective regulation |
HC 176 |
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17th |
High Speed 2: Progress at Summer 2021 |
HC 329 |
|
18th |
Government’s delivery through arm’s-length bodies |
HC 181 |
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19th |
Protecting consumers from unsafe products |
HC 180 |
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20th |
Optimising the defence estate |
HC 179 |
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21st |
School Funding |
HC 183 |
|
22nd |
Improving the performance of major defence equipment contracts |
HC 185 |
|
23rd |
Test and Trace update |
HC 182 |
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24th |
Crossrail: A progress update |
HC 184 |
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25th |
The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2020–21 – Fraud and error in the benefits system |
HC 633 |
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26th |
Lessons from Greensill Capital: accreditation to business support schemes |
HC 169 |
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27th |
Green Homes Grant Voucher Scheme |
HC 635 |
|
28th |
Efficiency in government |
HC 636 |
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29th |
The National Law Enforcement Data Programme |
HC 638 |
|
30th |
Challenges in implementing digital change |
HC 637 |
|
31st |
Environmental Land Management Scheme |
HC 639 |
|
32nd |
Delivering gigabitcapable broadband |
HC 743 |
|
33rd |
Underpayments of the State Pension |
HC 654 |
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34th |
Local Government Finance System: Overview and Challenges |
HC 646 |
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35th |
The pharmacy early payment and salary advance schemes in the NHS |
HC 745 |
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36th |
EU Exit: UK Border post transition |
HC 746 |
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37th |
HMRC Performance in 2020–21 |
HC 641 |
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38th |
COVID-19 cost tracker update |
HC 640 |
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39th |
DWP Employment Support: Kickstart Scheme |
HC 655 |
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40th |
Excess votes 2020–21: Serious Fraud Office |
HC 1099 |
|
41st |
Achieving Net Zero: Follow up |
HC 642 |
|
42nd |
Financial sustainability of schools in England |
HC 650 |
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43rd |
Reducing the backlog in criminal courts |
HC 643 |
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44th |
NHS backlogs and waiting times in England |
HC 747 |
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45th |
Progress with trade negotiations |
HC 993 |
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46th |
Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk |
HC 952 |
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47th |
Academies Sector Annual Report and Accounts 2019/20 |
HC 994 |
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48th |
HMRC’s management of tax debt |
HC 953 |
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49th |
Regulation of private renting |
HC 996 |
|
50th |
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up |
HC 951 |
|
51st |
Improving outcomes for women in the criminal justice system |
HC 997 |
|
52nd |
Ministry of Defence Equipment Plan 2021–31 |
HC 1164 |
|
1st Special Report |
Fifth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts |
HC 222 |
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Number |
Title |
Reference |
|
1st |
Support for children with special educational needs and disabilities |
HC 85 |
|
2nd |
Defence Nuclear Infrastructure |
HC 86 |
|
3rd |
High Speed 2: Spring 2020 Update |
HC 84 |
|
4th |
EU Exit: Get ready for Brexit Campaign |
HC 131 |
|
5th |
University technical colleges |
HC 87 |
|
6th |
Excess votes 2018–19 |
HC 243 |
|
7th |
Gambling regulation: problem gambling and protecting vulnerable people |
HC 134 |
|
8th |
NHS capital expenditure and financial management |
HC 344 |
|
9th |
Water supply and demand management |
HC 378 |
|
10th |
Defence capability and the Equipment Plan |
HC 247 |
|
11th |
Local authority investment in commercial property |
HC 312 |
|
12th |
Management of tax reliefs |
HC 379 |
|
13th |
Whole of Government Response to COVID-19 |
HC 404 |
|
14th |
Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak |
HC 405 |
|
15th |
Improving the prison estate |
HC 244 |
|
16th |
Progress in remediating dangerous cladding |
HC 406 |
|
17th |
Immigration enforcement |
HC 407 |
|
18th |
NHS nursing workforce |
HC 408 |
|
19th |
Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster |
HC 549 |
|
20th |
Tackling the tax gap |
HC 650 |
|
21st |
Government support for UK exporters |
HC 679 |
|
22nd |
Digital transformation in the NHS |
HC 680 |
|
23rd |
Delivering carrier strike |
HC 684 |
|
24th |
Selecting towns for the Towns Fund |
HC 651 |
|
25th |
Asylum accommodation and support transformation programme |
HC 683 |
|
26th |
Department of Work and Pensions Accounts 2019–20 |
HC 681 |
|
27th |
Covid-19: Supply of ventilators |
HC 685 |
|
28th |
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s management of the Magnox contract |
HC 653 |
|
29th |
Whitehall preparations for EU Exit |
HC 682 |
|
30th |
The production and distribution of cash |
HC 654 |
|
31st |
Starter Homes |
HC 88 |
|
32nd |
Specialist Skills in the civil service |
HC 686 |
|
33rd |
Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme |
HC 687 |
|
34th |
Covid-19: Support for jobs |
HC 920 |
|
35th |
Improving Broadband |
HC 688 |
|
36th |
HMRC performance 2019–20 |
HC 690 |
|
37th |
Whole of Government Accounts 2018–19 |
HC 655 |
|
38th |
Managing colleges’ financial sustainability |
HC 692 |
|
39th |
Lessons from major projects and programmes |
HC 694 |
|
40th |
Achieving government’s long-term environmental goals |
HC 927 |
|
41st |
COVID 19: the free school meals voucher scheme |
HC 689 |
|
42nd |
COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal Protective Equipment |
HC 928 |
|
43rd |
COVID-19: Planning for a vaccine Part 1 |
HC 930 |
|
44th |
Excess Votes 2019–20 |
HC 1205 |
|
45th |
Managing flood risk |
HC 931 |
|
46th |
Achieving Net Zero |
HC 935 |
|
47th |
COVID-19: Test, track and trace (part 1) |
HC 932 |
|
48th |
Digital Services at the Border |
HC 936 |
|
49th |
COVID-19: housing people sleeping rough |
HC 934 |
|
50th |
Defence Equipment Plan 2020–2030 |
HC 693 |
|
51st |
Managing the expiry of PFI contracts |
HC 1114 |
|
52nd |
Key challenges facing the Ministry of Justice |
HC 1190 |
|
53rd |
Covid 19: supporting the vulnerable during lockdown |
HC 938 |
|
54th |
Improving single living accommodation for service personnel |
HC 940 |
|
55th |
Environmental tax measures |
HC 937 |
|
56th |
Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund |
HC 941 |
1 Comptroller & Auditor General, Pensions transferred to AEA Technology when it was privatised, Session 2022–23, HC 1169, 3 March 2023
2 ATC0023; C&AG’s Report, paras 2, 9
3 C&AG’s Report, paras 10–11, 1.5
4 C&AG’s Report, paras 12–14
5 C&AG’s Report, para 1.5, 1.10
6 Q 2
7 C&AG’s Report, para 1.10
8 Qq 15, 20, 23–26, 53
9 Q 32; C&AG’s Report, para 1.9
10 Q 33; C&AG’s Report, para 1.11
11 Qq 52, 54–55
12 Q 54; C&AG’s Report, para 1.13
13 Q 79; C&AG’s Report, para 2.6
14 ATC0001; ATC0004; ATC0016; ATC0022
15 Q 79
16 C&AG’s Report, para 3.2, 3.6
17 Qq 28, 32
18 Qq 56–57, 67 ; C&AG’s Report, para 3.9
19 Q 66; C&AG’s Report, para 16
20 Qq 41–43
21 Q 66
22 Qq 31, 68, 80
23 Q 74–74
24 Q 67
25 Qq 47–48
26 C&AG’s Report, para 3.8
27 C&AG’s Report, para 16
28 Qq 8–9
29 Qq 50, 56; C&AG’s Report, para 3.9
30 C&AG’s Report, para 3.10
31 Qq 41–45
32 Qq 9, 74
33 Qq 50–51; C&AG’s Report, paras 3.10–3.11
34 Qq 44, 51
35 Q 74
36 Q 66; C&AG’s Report: para 1.7
37 Q 55
38 Committee of Public Accounts, Investigation into the British Steel Pension Scheme, Fourteenth Report of Session 2022–23, HC 251, July 2022, paras 2, 5
39 Q 54; Committee of Public Accounts, Financial services mis-selling: regulation and redress, Forty-first Report of Session 2015–16, HC 847, May 2016, para 4
40 Committee of Public Accounts, The higher education market, Forty-fifth Report of Session 2017–19, HC 693, June 2018, para 2